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THE
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VOLUME III.

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NUMBER I.

ART. I.—WILL THE GRAND CONSUMMATION, giving the Kingdoms of this World to Christ, be introduced under the Dispensation of the Spirit? By Rev. Joseph Steele, Castleton, Vermont. An Article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, November, 1849.

BY THE EDITOR.

A MORE general reason perhaps than any other for neglecting the study of the prophetic Scriptures, is the impression that the knowledge of them, if attained, would be of but little utility. All the great truths of the gospel, it is held, and the various forms of duty, grounds of obligation, and sources of motive, are already understood. An exact comprehension, therefore, of the revelations made in the visions of the Apocalypse and the ancient prophets, cannot, it is inferred, essentially affect any question of faith or duty, and may, without injury, be postponed till made known by events. In this judgment, which is, we believe, wholly mistaken and unfriendly to the piety of the church, as well as irreverent to God, Mr. Steele does not concur. He holds that no "question can be of greater practical importance to the church," than that debated by interpreters: whether the giving of the kingdoms

of this world to Christ," is to be consummated under what he calls the dispensation of the Spirit, or is to follow Christ's advent and the institution of another dispensation; and one of his objects in the article to which we invite the notice of our readers, is to confirm the views commonly entertained, that the nations are to be converted by the present system of means and anterior to Christ's coming, under the representation, on the one hand, that all the efforts of the church to make known the gospel to the heathen have their origin in that persuasion; and on the other, that those who regard Christ's advent as to precede the evangelization of the world are, and necessarily from that expectation, disinclined to missions, and endeavors generally to lead men to salvation, and disposed to treat obedience to the command to go into all the world and proclaim the glad tidings as no longer obligatory, or encouraged by the prospect of a blessing.

That the views entertained of the design and issue of the present dispensation, and the office which men are to fill in the conversion of the world, naturally exert on them an important influence, we shall not dispute. It is inevitable, and is exemplified on a vast scale in the history of the church. That that influence is favorable, or unfriendly to the discharge of their duty, very much in proportion as their views of God's designs, and the work which man is to perform in accomplishing them, are just or mistaken, we take to be equally indisputable. It is seen on every hand in the conduct alike of individuals, associations, and communities. If the belief in Christ's advent anterior to the evangelization of the nations, therefore, naturally and actually exerts the influence Mr. Steele asserts, it must be regarded, for aught that we see, as an indication that it is an error; and the question accordingly—what is the real and legitimate effect of the two views on the dispositions of those who entertain them to obey the commands of Christ—is important, and whatever may be the issue to which a candid inquisition leads, will not be evaded, but welcomed by the friends of truth. It is quite requisite, however, that those who institute it, and attempt to make the practical effects of the two systems a criterion of their accuracy or error, should understand what the systems themselves are, and the influences which they exert, and present a just

statement of them. Otherwise, not only will the result be false in respect to those who are assailed, but it will on their own principles directly confute their assailants. The assumption on which Mr. S. proceeds—that the actions of men are the legitimate consequence of their belief, and of the same moral character,—is as applicable to him as to those whom he attacks, and may, if he is found to be essentially defective in any relation, be made the instrument of confuting *his* faith, and impeaching his principles as well as theirs. If he shows, for example, that he has not taken care to ascertain what it is that the Scriptures teach on the subject he treats, it will demonstrate that instead of placing a high estimate on the knowledge of God's will, he regards it as of little consideration; and that his zeal, accordingly, to communicate the gospel to the ignorant, of which he makes so ostentatious a profession, is a false one. If his views of what the Scriptures teach are seriously mistaken, it will show that his desire is not in fact to communicate the gospel, but only to impart to them his own erroneous notions. If he misrepresents those whom he attempts to convict of error, and assails them with groundless and calumnious charges, it will prove that he does not recognise the obligations of truth, but holds that injustice and detraction may be legitimately used for the refutation of their views, and interception of their influence. And, unfortunately, Mr. Steele has erred in all these relations. He has neglected to make himself adequately acquainted with the subject which he attempts to discuss. He has fallen into great misapprehensions of the teachings of the Scriptures. He has most seriously misrepresented those whom he assails; and it is on this account especially that we ask attention to his essay. The injurious statements and charges on which he founds much of his argument are not peculiar to him. Similar misrepresentations have been publicly uttered by others. They have been directly addressed to us, and in terms of discourtesy and passion, not to say audacity and insolence, which we should expect from none but the coarsest and most unscrupulous; and indications appear of an extensive combination to propagate them. It is due, therefore, to the glory of Christ, against whose word and disciples they are, in fact, directed, that they should be pointed

out, and their authors induced to withdraw and retract them ; or if they persist in asserting and propagating them, that the people of God may be furnished with the means of judging who it is that yields or refuses a consistent and conscientious obedience to his commands. We therefore propose to put the question to a fair and thorough trial in the presence of that Omniscient Being whose honor it intimately respects ; whose truth does not need the aid of error for its support ; who will not accept their endeavors who undertake to promote his cause by means which his word forbids ; and who will ere long make known his judgment, and show who they are whose views of his purposes and will he approves.

We shall not, however, retort on Mr. S. his own argument. We shall not, because he has fallen into great errors, undertake to show either that he is a fanatic, or an enemy to the gospel. We shall simply point out his mistakes and fallacies, and refute his aspersions, and leave our readers to form their own judgment of his principles and motives. We transcribe his first page :—

“ What question can be of greater practical importance to the church of Jesus Christ, at a time when so many signs proclaim the day near at hand ! Already the millenarian sees it at the door, and concentrates his plans and efforts upon those duties which harmonize with such expectation. He feels dissatisfied with the tardy and far reaching plans of benevolence, and earnestly demands that the church give up her dreams of evangelizing the world, and hasten to gather in the last gleanings of the vintage. In all the aggressive movements of the day, and the success which has crowned them, he sees no cheering indications. In his view the world is only waxing worse ; the gospel is only a proclamation, and not the power of God for the world's salvation ; and the good for which it was designed, is nearly accomplished ; and nothing great, nothing important touching Zion's prosperity, is to be anticipated, until the Redeemer shall come in person. On the contrary, a large portion of the church, adopting other views, and reading their duty in harmony with the expectation that, under the dispensation of the Spirit, the heathen are to be given to Christ for an inheritance, are laying plans and combining their energies to send the gospel to every creature, confident that the great harvest is yet to be gathered. In their view the cause is making progress, the signs betoken success, and the blessing of God upon their efforts is the seal of his approbation. They fancy that the systems of paganism are

becoming decrepit, that the throne of Antichrist is tottering, and that the year of jubilee is near.

"Views so widely dissimilar must exert widely dissimilar effects. How far the millenarian views, if generally adopted, would change the direction of the church experience has not yet taught us, but it seems manifest to us, that the effect would be dispiriting and disastrous in the extreme. The influence of opposing views may fairly be estimated from the past. No era in the history of the church is more clearly marked than that of modern missions, and the fact is well established, that the originators and most active promoters of them held the doctrine, that the world would be subjugated to Christ under the dispensation of the Spirit."—P. 657.

More unfortunate indications of extreme inacquaintance with his subject could scarcely be given by a controversialist, who treats ignorance and error as proofs of bad principles, than that which Mr. Steele exhibits in these paragraphs. He has not extended his researches so far even, it seems, as to learn the meaning of the term millenarian. He is unaware that it is not applicable at all to those who hold the views which he employs it to designate. He has no consciousness that he himself belongs to one of the classes whom it is commonly and appropriately used to denote. He employs it as the appellative of those who hold not only that the world is not to be generally evangelized anterior to Christ's advent, but that the gospel-dispensation and the work of redemption are to terminate at that epoch,—a sense which makes it synonymous with Millerite. That, however, not only is not its meaning, but, specifically, excludes every element that enters into its true signification. The term in its least specific sense means one who believes in a millennium, or thousand years of the saints' reign with Christ on earth, without consideration whether that reign is to be personal or figurative. In this use it is applicable to Mr. Steele himself, and those at large who suppose the millennium is to precede Christ's personal coming. In didactic and controversial works, generally, however, it is employed, in its more restricted signification, to denote those who hold that Christ's personal advent is to precede the millennium; that the resurrection of the saints is literally to take place at that

epoch, and their reign with him to be personal ; that mankind are still to live in the natural body, and multiply ; and the gospel-dispensation continue during the thousand years ; and, finally, that the Israelites are then to be restored and re-adopted as God's people, and together with the Gentiles be generally converted. It acquired this sense from the fact, that these several events are referred by the Scriptures to that period, and that they were embraced in the views of the millennium held by those of the Christian church,—Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, and others, to whom the term was first applied. It is not applicable at all, therefore, to those whom Mr. Steele employs it to denote, who hold, that "the good" for which the gospel "was designed," is nearly accomplished, and that the church should "hasten to gather in," before Christ comes, "the last gleanings of the vintage." It does not belong in any sense, for example, to the disciples of the late Mr. Miller, whom he perhaps meant to designate by it ; as they specifically deny that the nations, generally, are ever to be converted, or the Israelites restored, and hold, that all, who at Christ's coming are unsanctified, are to be destroyed, the living saints universally glorified, and, consequently, that the multiplication and redemption of the race are then absolutely to terminate. The views of the Millerites, instead of concurring with those of the literal millenarians, resemble far more nearly those entertained by Mr. Steele himself and his coadjutors ; for the belief is common to them, 1, that the Israelites are not to be restored ; 2, that the work of conversion is to terminate at Christ's advent ; 3, that the gospel-dispensation is then to end ; 4, that the multiplication of the race is then to cease, and all who have come into existence enter on their final reward ; 5, and, consequently, that there is to be but one resurrection, and one judgment. The only difference between them respects the period of the advent, and the events that are to precede it ;—the disciples of Mr. Miller deeming it near, and that the nations are then, generally, to be, as they now are, in alienation from Christ ;—the figurative millenarians, of whom Mr. S. is one, holding, that it is distant at least a thousand years, and is to be preceded by the evangelization of the nations. On the other hand the Millerites agree with the literal

millenarians in nothing except that Christ's coming is to precede the world's conversion. Such is the issue of Mr. Steele's first movement. Instead of reaching those whom he designed to overthrow, he has struck in the opposite direction, and thrust his spear under the fifth rib of his own system,—an awkward exploit for one who proceeds on his principles.

He betrays a similar ignorance, and has fallen into as gross misstatements in his representation of the views and dispositions of millenarians in respect to the gospel and the evangelization of the world. He exhibits them, as not merely disinclined and even hostile to missions, and all other endeavors to communicate the gospel to the nations, and as disbelieving that any good is accomplished by them, but as absolutely denying that the gospel is the power of God for the world's salvation; as regarding it as having nearly accomplished all for which it was designed; and as holding, therefore, that if the world is to be saved, it is to be by a different method from that which the gospel presents; and he treats that imputed distaste, aversion, and false belief, as the natural effect of their millenarian faith. He says: "The millenarian" "feels dissatisfied with the tardy and far reaching plans of benevolence, and earnestly demands that the church give up her dreams of evangelizing the world, and hasten to gather in the last gleanings of the vintage. In all the aggressive movements of the day, and the success which has crowned them, he sees no cheering indications. In his view the world is *only waxing worse*; the gospel is *only a proclamation, not the power of God for the world's salvation*; the good for which it was designed is nearly accomplished; and nothing great, nothing important, touching Zion's prosperity, is to be anticipated until the Redeemer shall come in person." If these representations are true, millenarians are, doubtless, justly obnoxious to the reproaches and denunciations with which Mr. Steele assails them. If they are averse or indifferent to the communication of the gospel to men, they disregard a clear and specific command of Christ. If they see nothing cheering in the success which attends the distribution of the Scriptures, and the dissemination of religious knowledge in our own and other Christian countries, and the labors of missionaries abroad, and hold that "the world is

only waxing worse," they must believe that God has ceased to attend his word with a blessing; that the work of renovation and sanctification is absolutely suspended; that the number, consequently, of the pious is diminished by every death of a believer, and that the whole body, if the process continues, will soon be exterminated; and contradict, therefore, one of the clearest teachings of the prophecies and most essential elements of their own system, that the gospel must be preached to all nations before Christ's coming, and that there is, at his advent, to be an innumerable multitude of living believers, who are to be changed to immortal and dwell under his reign. If they hold that *the gospel is ONLY A PROCLAMATION; and not the power of God for the world's salvation*; they then not only controvert the apostle's declaration that it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; but as they hold that men are now actually saved, and are hereafter to be saved in countless multitudes, they must hold that they are to be saved by some other method than that through Christ which the gospel proposes; and, therefore, that there are two methods of redemption; and consequently that Christianity is essentially defective and false. Such is the monstrous system of folly, falsehood, and self-contradiction which he exhibits as their faith; such the open war which he represents them as making on God's word and kingdom!

What now are his proofs of these bold and sweeping charges? If they are just, they of course can be verified. If he alleges them in good faith, he must believe that he has in his possession adequate evidences of their truth. Otherwise he is a deliberate calumniator. What then does he offer in their support? Not a solitary consideration; not a shadow of anything bearing the name of proof. He treats that which he avers as so open and notorious a fact, that a demonstration of its truth is superfluous. This is certainly extraordinary. If he truly believes what he affirms; if he regards himself as able to prove that millenarians are opposed to the efforts which are making to communicate the gospel to the idolatrous nations; that they believe that no good is accomplished by them; that the work of regenerating and sanctifying men is suspended; and that the multitudes and generations

whom they hold are hereafter to be saved, are to be saved by some other method than that presented by the gospel, why is it that he neglected so efficient a method of confuting them, and intercepting them from the injurious influence he regards them as exerting? He might have accomplished by it a thousand fold more, than by the unsupported assertions, crude declamation, and false logic on which he has chosen to rely. Had he verified his charges—had he convicted the millenarians of the monstrous errors and self-contradictions which he imputes to them, we venture to assert that he would not only have wholly divested them of their power to mislead the church, but they would themselves universally be induced to abandon their system. There is not an individual among them that would not instantly relinquish a faith that was shown to involve such absurd and unscriptural elements. The reason, however, that he has offered no proofs of his allegations is, that he has none; that they are put forth either in utter ignorance, or under the grossest infatuation. They not only are not demonstrable truths; they are sheer fabrications. They are not only without the slightest ground or color of probability; they are in such open contradiction to notorious facts, that unless retracted, they must brand him and his coadjutors with the infamy of deliberate calumniators. Let him produce proofs, if in his possession, that millenarians hold the doctrines, or pursue the course which he ascribes to them. We call on him, if in his power, to verify any one of his allegations. Let him prove that they hold that “the gospel is *only* a proclamation, and not the power of God for the world’s salvation.” Let him prove that on their principles those whom they hold are to be saved during Christ’s reign on the earth, are to be saved by some other method than that of the gospel. We challenge him to produce the slightest evidence of either of these charges. We challenge him to prove that they are not in contradiction to the most conspicuous and indubitable facts, and do not bear on their front the stamp of gratuitous and infamous misrepresentation. Let him show, if he can, that they hold that “the world is *only* waxing worse;” that they “see no cheering indications in the success” which attends the efforts that are made to communicate the gospel to the

nations; that they are "dissatisfied with far-reaching plans of benevolence," "and earnestly demand that the church should give up her dreams of evangelizing the world." If not able to verify these charges against them as a body, let him, if he has the means, prove that they are true of any considerable number of them. Let him name even one conspicuous individual among them either in this country, Europe, Asia, or Africa, of whom they are not wholly false. This is certainly liberal. His position and that of his coadjutors is truly pitiable, if he cannot produce at least one who may be considered as a fair representative of them to whom the imputation is applicable. But we go further. We give him leave to prove that his accusations are not totally and conspicuously false, not only of the millenarians as a body, and of every considerable portion of them, but of every individual of their number. We challenge him to prove that they are not generally friendly to missions and other benevolent undertakings; that it is not conspicuously their characteristic; that they are not accustomed to appropriate to them as large a share of their means and time, and display as deep an interest in them as any other class of equal numbers, wealth, and opportunity. Can anything more generous than this be demanded? Can any easier terms be imagined for the extrication of himself and his co-operators from a discreditable position? Can a more unenviable predicament be conceived than that which they will occupy if unable to meet even this condition?

We, however, shall not wait either for his proof or retraction, but proceed to show that his imputations are in every relation false.

We have read a large share of the works that have been published by millenarians on their views during the last fifty years, to say nothing of those of an earlier date—enough, undoubtedly, to furnish a fair and ample view of their opinions and sentiments, and so far as we are aware, have never met in them the slightest indication of aversion, or indifference to missions, and other Scriptural methods of communicating religious knowledge to the ignorant and perishing. So far from it, they are universally and heartily favorable to them.

Since this charge was made against us several months ago, in the manner to which we have alluded, we have stated it to a very considerable number of men of education who are themselves millenarians, and who are extensively acquainted with others of that class, and inquired whether they themselves are hostile or adverse to missions and other measures for the communication of the gospel to the unevangelized, and whether they know, or have ever known, a millenarian who was opposed or indifferent to them. We have put the question to Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, Jews, and Gentiles, residing in the eastern, middle, western, and southern states, and the response has been uniformly in the negative. The charge has in every instance been treated as a gratuitous and shameless libel.

We have stated the accusation also to persons from abroad who are acquainted with the millenarians of Great Britain, and are familiar with their works, and inquired whether it is in any degree verifiable of them; and the answer, as we were aware it would be, has been in the most emphatic manner in the negative. There is no body of men in England, Scotland, and Ireland, against whom the charge would be more totally false and preposterous. They are distinguished for their activity and heartiness in all the great measures of the period for the promotion of religion at home, and the spread of the gospel abroad; and have been from the institution of Sunday schools, Bible societies, Tract societies, and domestic and foreign missions. These facts are so notorious as to make the denial or doubt of them altogether discreditable.

We have made inquiry also in respect to the views of the missionaries themselves, who have gone from Great Britain, and are now employed in endeavoring to make known the gospel to the heathen, and have learned from the most reliable witnesses that a large proportion both of the missionaries from that country, now laboring in Asia and Africa, and of the zealous and efficient friends and supporters of missions residing in those countries, are themselves millenarians; and so far from being obstructed in their work by their views of the divine purposes, derive from them their most efficient encouragement and support.

Several of the missionaries also from this country to India

and China are millenarians. Thus ample and conspicuous are the proofs of the utter falsehood of his representation that they are hostile to missions and other measures for the instruction and conversion of men.

The charge that in their "view the gospel is only a proclamation, and not the power of God for the world's salvation," and implied representation thereby that they must hold that the conversion of the nations, which they expect during the millennium, must be accomplished by some other method than that which the gospel proposes, is equally false and injurious.

The millenarians of this country are, as a body, beyond all question, emphatically evangelical. They hold, we will venture to assert, without one exception, that Christ is the only Redeemer of men, and the Holy Spirit their only regenerator and sanctifier; and that there is no method of salvation except that by faith, repentance, and love, which is proposed in the New Testament. They hold, as far as we have the means of judging, at least as respectable a rank in theological knowledge and general cultivation, as any other class in the church, and are as distinguished for piety, activity in duty, and usefulness. There is, indeed, no other body probably so free of persons of a questionable faith. There is not among them, we have no hesitation in affirming, a single individual who denies the deity of Christ. There is not one who denies his expiation. There is not one who denies the power of the Holy Spirit to renew and sanctify the mind. There is not one, we presume, who denies that justification is by faith, and only by faith, in Christ, in the relation in which he is proposed in the gospel as the Redeemer of men by his expiatory sacrifice. There is not one who does not hold that salvation is wholly of grace; nor, finally, that does not receive the great doctrines generally of redemption. Not an individual can be found among them, we are sure, who denies the inspiration of the Scriptures; not one who does not regard them as the authoritative and only rule of faith. The disciples of Swedenborg, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, those who question the inspiration of the Scriptures, those who reject the deity and expiation of Christ, those who deny the power of God to renew the mind, those who deny the possibility of proving the being of God,—all, in a word, who regard God and the universe as

merely ideal, and Christianity as wholly subjective,—belong to the opposite party, and they are among the contemners and calumniators of those who receive the Scriptural doctrine of the millennium.

That such is the faith also of the millenarians of England is a fact of too general notoriety to need any demonstration. They constitute, in a large degree, the class in the English establishment, who are usually denominated evangelical. They are characterized as a body by faith in the great truths of the gospel, zeal and fidelity in proclaiming them, and diligence in cultivating the piety of their people. Of the great number of books which they have published, a large proportion are practical, and many hold a high rank in excellence, and have a large circulation. The late Mr. Bickersteth's works, which extend to nearly twenty volumes, and are largely known in this country, may be taken as a fair specimen of them.

The millenarians of Scotland and Ireland also, it is well known, are of the same character, and among the most laborious, faithful, and successful in the sacred office. It is this large body of truly excellent men, occupying a highly conspicuous station, and exerting a vast and most beneficial influence on the churches not only in the British isles, but throughout the provinces of that great empire, whom Mr. Steele and his coadjutors think proper to brand with the infamous charge of regarding "the gospel as only a proclamation, and not the power of God for the world's salvation;" and as in effect, therefore, holding that if any are saved it must be by some other method than that of faith in the Redeemer.

So much for his accusations. He is equally at fault also in the assumption that "the millenarian views" naturally exert the evil influences which he ascribes to them, and, "if generally adopted," would give birth to effects that would be "dispiriting and disastrous in the extreme." There are speculative views, undoubtedly, and systems of faith, that, unless intercepted, or modified by extraordinary causes, must naturally generate a total indisposition and aversion to missions, and all other efforts for the instruction and conversion of men. Such, for example, is the theory of moral agency, which denies to God the power of preventing

men from sinning by the renewing and sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit, or any other agent or means. It must, necessarily, in proportion as it has its legitimate effect, annihilate the feeling of duty, and extinguish all inducement to make exertions for the salvation of the perishing; as it not only exhibits all means themselves as altogether inefficacious, and God as wholly incapable, either of rendering them effective, or restraining and sanctifying the mind without them, but divests his commands also to preach the gospel to all nations of authority, by representing him as infinitely imperfect and inadequate to exercise the government he has instituted, or fill the office he has assumed of ruling and blessing the universe. Under such a belief, by which there cannot, by any possibility, be any connexion between teaching and conversion, it were preposterous to make exertions to lead men to repentance and faith; and if persons accordingly, who hold that doctrine, engage in the support of missions, or other institutions, for the instruction and reformation of the ignorant and irreligious, it is infallibly certain that they contradict their principles; and it may be taken for granted, that the real motive by which they are prompted, is not the salvation of others, but the benefit of themselves, either by the reputation and influence it gives, or the means it indirectly furnishes of gaining some selfish end.

Such also is the theory of our perceptive faculties which represents the material world, fellow-creatures, God, and all exterior to the mind that pertains to them, as merely conceptual, and denies, therefore, that there is either any gospel to communicate, or nations to be converted. If Jehovah, Jupiter, and Juggernaut are held to be alike mere ideas, it not only cannot possibly be thought to be of importance, that one rather than the others should be the object of religious regard; but it must be held to be absurd and self-contradictory to regard either as a real deity, and honor it with trust and adoration. If mankind themselves, and the gospel, are mere forms of thought existing only in the minds that conceive them, the scheme of converting them to Christianity by bibles, missions, and other means of instruction and persuasion, is solecistical and ridiculous. The zealot who wishes to achieve that change has only to alter his own idea,

and *conceive* of them as christianized, and the work is accomplished.

In like manner the belief that language is inadequate to a determinate expression of thought, that it is of such vagueness and uncertainty of meaning that it cannot be made the instrument of an unequivocal and clear statement of doctrinal truths, must preclude a disposition to attempt to communicate the gospel to the nations. How can they have such a disposition, when, by their theory, they have no certainty what the gospel teaches, and none that that which it teaches, whatever it is, can be expressed, and be made the object of faith?

Those also who deny, that there are any proofs of God's being, and hold, that his existence must be assumed without evidence, on the mere ground that the supposition of such a cause is necessary to the moral and logical wants of the mind, must, naturally, be indisposed to exertions for the evangelization of the nations, as the announcement itself of their faith, they must see, would inevitably preclude them from success. With what hope could a disciple of that creed undertake a mission to the heathen to communicate to them the revelation which God has made, when the first fact he would be required to state to them, would be, that there are no evidences whatever of the existence of the Deity from whom the revelation is alleged to have come, and that they must begin the process of conversion, therefore, by dismissing their inherited faith, and, without any reason whatever, assuming the existence of the God whose ambassador he claimed to be, and the authenticity of the message he was to address to them as from him? Mr. Steele knows where to look for these several classes. They are not among those whom he assails.

But there are no such impediments in the belief of millenarians to exertions for the instruction and conversion of mankind. God and men are to them realities, not mere assumptions or "forms of thought." They hold, that Jehovah is an actual self-existence of the infinite perfections, the universal relations, the supreme rights which the Scriptures ascribe to him. They regard men as actual beings, and of the nature, relationship to him, character, and condition, that are affirmed of them in

the Scriptures, and hold, accordingly, that God has a right to impose laws on them, and that they are under obligation to obey his will; and thence that it is their duty, on the ground of his command, to preach the gospel to the nations. They regard the Scriptures as a real revelation from God, and the language and signs, through which they are expressed, as perfectly intelligible and determinate; and hold, therefore, that their truths may be communicated with ease and certainty to the unevangelized. They hold, also, that the method of redemption through Christ is real, and suited to the end for which it is instituted; and that the gospel is accordingly in fact, and is ever to be, the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth. And, finally, they regard the Spirit of God as able to renew and sanctify whoever he pleases, and hold, that he has actually renewed all who have heretofore been converted, and will regenerate all who shall hereafter become partakers of salvation. It is, therefore, not only perfectly consonant with their principles to preach the gospel, distribute the Scriptures, and use all other proper means for the instruction and conversion of men, but they are prompted to it by every species of effective consideration:—the command of God, his power to make their labor successful, his promise of a blessing, the adaptedness of the means they use to the end at which they aim, and the fact that God actually accompanies these means with the renewing and sanctifying influences of his Spirit.

The fact that the world is not to be universally converted by the means they and others use, and are to employ anterior to Christ's coming, is no obstacle whatever, as Mr. S. imagines, to their using them. Their duty to preach the gospel does not depend at all on the question whether God is to make their labors the means of the universal conversion of the nations. Their obligation to obey his command is absolute; it is his to determine whom he will lead to faith and repentance, and make partakers of salvation. Nor does their belief, that, anterior to Christ's coming, the number to be saved is to be, as it has heretofore been, comparatively small, impair their feeling of the authority of that command, or repress their zeal to fulfil it, any more than the conviction that they are to meet but partial success obstructs and dis-

courages men in other undertakings. No minister of the gospel who is intrusted with the care of a congregation already christianized, is withheld from discharging the duties of his office by the knowledge that every individual is not to be converted whom he addresses. No philanthropist is prevented from endeavoring to relieve the wants, remove the ignorance, or reform the morals of the miserable and vicious, by the certainty that he is not to accomplish all at which he aims. No physician is withheld from employing remedies for the restoration of the sick by the consideration, that he has no assurance, nor probability, that they will be universally efficacious. What can be more absurd than to assume that the certainty of but partial success in their efforts must act as a check on millenarians any more than any other class of men? Mr. Steele himself, and those who concur with him, do not expect the conversion of all whom their influence may reach. Instead, the immediate results which they anticipate, are but slight, compared with the christianization of the world. They act under as absolute a limitation of their hopes, for the present, as millenarians themselves. Why then should not the narrowness of their expectations prove as dispiriting and disastrous as that of the millenarians? What can be more inconsiderate than thus to offer objections that are as applicable to himself, and to men of all other beliefs and pursuits, as to those whom he assails? If, however, the ground, on which he argues, is legitimate,—if the expectation of the speedy and general conversion of the nations is essential as a motive to communicate the gospel to them,—then that motive is enjoyed by the millenarians in an immeasurably higher degree than the anti-millennialist, as the millenarian looks for their conversion at the advent of Christ, and regards the communication to them of the gospel as the immediate precursor of his appearance. The consummation of his desires is to him, therefore, near and sure, just in proportion to the rapidity with which the gospel is made known to the unevangelized. Mr. Steele and his party can look for no such speedy triumph. For aught that can be proved, or rendered probable, on their scheme, many hundreds and thousands of years may pass ere the whole world is converted. At the pace at which the work is now

proceeding, millions of ages would bring it no nearer a consummation, as the apostasy of the church is advancing on a scale that more than counterbalances the conversion of the heathen. Indeed, if Christ is not to come anterior to the conversion of the world, it is absolutely certain that it is never to be converted: as it is expressly revealed, that the man of sin, and the powers denoted by the wild beast of ten horns, are to continue in the christianized world, and make war on the saints, and idolatry continue in the pagan, until he comes and destroys them. Dan. viii. 9-14, 19-27; Rev. xix. 11-21; Isaiah ii. 10-21.

Mr. Steele is wholly unauthorized also in the representation that the work of missions had its origin in the persuasion, that the world is to be converted through the labors of the church, anterior to the coming of Christ, and owes to it all the support it has received. He says:—

“The influence of the opposing views may fairly be estimated from the past. No era in the history of the church is more clearly marked than that of modern missions, and the fact is well established, that the originators and most active promoters of them held the doctrine, that the world would be subjugated to Christ under the dispensation of the Spirit. . . . They acted under a sense of responsibility for the accomplishment of this. . . . Can it now be believed that such fruits have sprung from an error so important as that of mistaking the object of the present dispensation, and the great end of Christ's second appearance?”—P. 658.

It certainly has sprung from an error, if Mr. Steele's statement is just, as according to his representation it has been totally disconnected with Christ's command to preach the gospel to all nations, and had its whole ground in a false conception of his purposes. But it is in the utmost degree mistaken and unjust to assign it that origin. It had its ground indisputably in Christ's command. It was undertaken supremely in obedience to him, and the issue referred at every step to his sovereign pleasure. No heavier accusation can be brought against them than to assert that had they not expected absolute success they would not have attempted a compliance with his will. Had that been the ground on which they pro-

ceeded, the disappointment and confutation which they met at every step, would soon have led them to abandon the undertaking. The fact, accordingly, that foreign missions are sustained, and are to be sustained, notwithstanding they are attended with no greater measure of success than similar labors among those who are already acquainted with the gospel, shows that they are not prompted by the expectation that they are to be made the means of salvation to all whom they affect, any more than the support of ministers in the churches at home has its ground in such an expectation. That many who contribute to both objects imagine that the world is to be converted by these means, and anterior to Christ's advent, we do not dispute. That they are taught with the utmost assurance by many of the advocates of missions that that is the representation of the Scriptures, and urged on the ground of it to give their property and labors to the object, we are aware, and that it has had a degree of influence in prompting donations we do not doubt. We have ourselves repeatedly heard the declaration uttered with an audacity of assurance far worthier of a fanatic than a minister of Jesus Christ ; "Give us the money and we will convert the world. We have the men ; all we need is money ;" and the representation—in order to induce contributions, that the question whether the thousands and millions of the heathen who were perishing were to be saved or lost, depended on the decision the hearers should make to give or withhold their property, and that if they denied it they would be guilty of the destruction of those who should be lost, and held responsible for it at God's tribunal. At other times we have heard it affirmed with equal presumption, "What we need is not money, but men. The church is ready to contribute the money. Give us the men, and we will convert the world." But these shocking extravagances do not prove that the whole work of missions has its ground in that false belief ; nor does the fact that those representations, and the momentary enthusiasm they have excited, have induced a share of the contributions that have been made to the object, prove that their general and ultimate influence is not "dispiriting and disastrous in the extreme." Instead, one of the great difficulties with which missionary societies have now to contend, undoubtedly springs from the falsifica-

tion of those presumptuous promises, and the expectations excited by them. The total disappointment of the anticipations with which the minds of thousands were filled has not only swept away that inducement, but inspired a distrust in a degree, if not of the whole undertaking, at least of the views on which it is conducted ; and the evil, we apprehend, will continue to be felt, until that false expectation is abandoned, and the church led to obey Christ's injunction from regard to his will, and in submission to his sovereignty to whom it belongs to give or withhold as he pleases the influences of the Spirit on which the efficacy of the truth depends.

Nor is the fact that men engage in the support of missions, and make ostentatious professions of interest in their success, any proof, as Mr. S. seems to assume, that the end at which they aim is the conversion of men. It is well known that some who take an active part in advocating them, do not even believe that men are converted by the influences of the Spirit, but have spent a large share of their lives in endeavoring to convince the churches that it is impossible to prove that God can prevent men from sinning by any agency or means whatever. Such, it is notorious, is the faith of the party to which one who was lately appointed to preach the anniversary sermon of a missionary society belongs. What can be more absurd than to suppose that their object is to accomplish what they hold has never been achieved, and is alike impracticable to God and to man? Their zeal and liberality plainly have their origin in some other aim. It is well known that several years since one holding a high position in the same society, in order to induce both the believers and deniers of the Spirit's power to renew the mind, to continue to unite in its support, promulged the doctrine that such differences on that and other subjects are no sufficient obstacle to their co-operation in sending missionaries without any consideration what their doctrinal views are ; that all that is necessary as a ground of harmony is, an admission of the facts taught in the Scriptures ; that the views that are formed of the nature and causes of those facts belong to the *philosophy* of Christianity, not to Christianity itself, and are not, therefore, proper matters for the cognisance of a society whose object is simply to communicate the gospel to the heathen : and he found many apolo-

gists and supporters. On that theory, however, persons who deny every fundamental doctrine of redemption, and regard religion as a system of mere naturalism, are as eligible to the office of missionaries as those who hold the faith delivered to the saints. He, for example, who admits that Jesus Christ died, admits, according to that scheme, all that belongs to Christianity in respect to his death. The question whether he died in innocence or guilt, as a sacrifice for men, or as a mere malefactor, is a question of *philosophy*, and, therefore, of no consideration. He, in like manner, who admits the fact that the blind received sight, the deaf hearing, the sick health, the dead life, admits all that is the object of Christian faith. Whether their cures were wrought by the finger of God, or by Beelzebub, is a mere question of philosophy, and therefore of no religious significance: and so of every essential truth of revelation. On his principles the most unreserved and audacious infidelity is no disqualification for the office of a missionary, and the employment of infidels as missionaries for the evangelization of the heathen, no reason that the people of God should not unite in sending and supporting them. Can any one suppose that his object was the conversion of the nations? Do not the love of conspicuity, ambition of power, party spirit, furnish a far more probable explanation of his zeal? There are many others also who take a part in the support of missions who cannot be regarded as prompted by a desire of the conversion of men. Some are the disciples of Kant, and do not believe in the reality either of God or man. Some are neologists, and doubt the inspiration of the Scriptures, reject Christ's miracles, and deny his expiation, and the justification of believers by his merits. Their co-operation, and the officious pretences of zeal which they sometimes make, have their origin doubtless in the reputation it gives, the gratification it yields their love of notoriety, or some other sinister motive; not in their desire for the salvation of men. There is the same mixture of evil with good in this, as in other religious and benevolent works. That bad men thus engage in it, and find in it a theatre for the gratification of their vanity, ambition, or party spirit; that there is a large infusion of error in the views on which it is conducted; that many unauthorized expectations are entertained; is no proof whatever

that the great object and effect is not generally after all the communication of the gospel. It is no proof that most who are engaged in it are not true disciples of Christ, and prompted by love and submission to him. It is no proof that the missionaries are not generally well qualified for their work, and do not discharge its duties with zeal and fidelity. It does not tarnish the beauty of the self-denial, devotedness, and fortitude, which many of them have displayed, nor eclipse the grandeur with which they have been invested, as they have closed their conflict and ascended to the glories of heaven. These are characteristics indisputably that have distinguished them, shed a lustre over their work, and endeared them beyond any others of the age, to God's people. But it does prove the error and folly of treating a mere zealous approval and support of missions as an indubitable criterion of piety, or the truth or falsehood of views that are entertained of God's purposes.

After these injurious representations of the doctrines and dispositions of millenarians, and of the influence of their belief, Mr. S. proceeds to confirm his views of the divine designs, by a variety of considerations that are marked by similar misconceptions and errors. He first alleges that the theory that the world is to be converted by the means now employed anterior to Christ's coming, is "in admirable harmony with the general object and plan of redemption;" and on the ground that otherwise Satan will not be defeated by Christ. But his argument is founded wholly on the false assumption, that if the world is not rescued from Satan's dominion before Christ's advent, it will not be extricated from his power at all. He says:—

"The truth and honor of Jehovah are both engaged to trample Satan under foot, and give the heritage to his beloved son. How is this to be accomplished? . . . If Satan *continue to the end*, lord of this world, as he has been hitherto, how is he despoiled of his usurpation? If he hold his dominion *as long as the world stands*, will he not seem to have maintained his supremacy?"—P. 659.

But the world is not to be destroyed, nor the nations of the living exterminated at Christ's coming. There never was a grosser or more extraordinary mistake. It is explicitly fore-

shown both in the Old and New Testaments, that the nations are to survive his advent; that he is then to be invested with dominion over them, and that they are to be converted and live obediently under his reign. Thus, at the sound of the seventh trumpet, it was announced by a voice from heaven, *ἡ βασιλεία του κόσμου* "the monarchy of *the earth*" is our Lord's, and the throne on which he is to reign, it was proclaimed at his birth, is the throne of David. It is accordingly afterwards shown in the Revelation that the nations are to bring their honor into the new Jerusalem, which he is to lighten with the effulgence of his glory. It is announced also by Daniel, that the dominion with which he is to be invested at his advent, is to be in order that "all people, nations, and languages should serve him; that his kingdom is to be *under* the whole heaven, not in heaven itself; and that his dominion is to be an everlasting dominion, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." And it is by this perfect extrication of the race from the sway of Satan, redemption from the curse of the apostasy, and subjection to Christ's sceptre, that that malignant being is to be defeated. Could any other scheme of government involve so majestic a triumph over him? Were the world to be destroyed, as Mr. S. expects, it is to be because Satan has held dominion over it; or the race intercepted from multiplying, and transported to some other scene of existence, on the ground that the earth had become unfit for their residence because of the curse brought on it by sin, would it not be a triumph to Satan? Would it not enable him to boast that he had defaced the world with such ruin that God himself could not repair it and make it fit for the habitation of his children? That he had stamped his image so effectually on man, that the Almighty could not erase it, and had no other method of concealing his defeat but to put an end to the propagation of the race, give those who had come into existence a different nature, and transport them to another world? Rancorous as he is in malice, and boundless in his wish of evil, he probably would ask for no greater victory than would be involved in such a demonstration that God is incapable of exercising an administration over fallen creatures that is worthy of a being of infinite perfections; that to restore an apostate world is beyond his power; that

instead of accomplishing the remedy by wisdom and love, his only method of arresting an evil is annihilation! But the devil is to enjoy no such boast. Christ is to work a perfect remedy of the disorder and ruin brought on man and the world by revolt, not by putting an end to the multiplication of the race, nor by striking the earth from existence, but by rescuing them from the dominion of sin and its curse, and restoring them to their original beauty, maintaining them in existence, making the earth the theatre of his glory, causing the race to continue as it would have done had it not fallen and raising it through eternal ages to a beauty of rectitude, wisdom, and bliss, as great, and perhaps far greater than it would have enjoyed had it never revolted. Can a more perfect vindication of himself and confutation of Satan be conceived than this? How incommensurate with his infinite attributes, what a total and hopeless failure compared to it, is the scheme which Mr. S. ascribes to him! Mr. S., however, imagines that if Satan is not conquered anterior to Christ's coming, his overthrow will not take place in the manner that was originally promised, nor honorably to the means which Christ has hitherto employed for the purpose. He says:—

“If the gospel age shall terminate, and Christ appear in power and glory before he is dethroned, will it not be *the power of God*, not *the seed of the woman*, which bruises his head? This thought becomes the more convincing when we consider what vast preparations are made in the gospel for the express end of man's recovery; and though *designed* for the whole world, they have been made effectual hitherto only to a limited extent. The command to preach the gospel to every creature with the promise that *in it* shall all the families of the earth be blessed clearly indicates a glorious triumph. If now the success of the gospel continue to be limited as it has been, will it not seem to be a failure? Will there not be an appearance at least of undertaking to build, and not being able to finish? Is it not most reasonable to suppose, after the Son of God has made a sacrifice of his life for the avowed purpose of destroying the power of the devil, that he will, by *that sacrifice* accomplish the end?”—P. 659.

It is truly an unwelcome task to contend with a writer who descends to such senseless and contradictory objections. Does Mr. S. imagine that when Christ comes “in power and

glory," he is not to come as the incarnate Jehovah, the seed of the woman, and effect what he accomplishes by his power as God? Is it, in Mr. S.'s judgment, a condition of his triumph over Satan, that it is to be gained independently of his omnipotence? If not, what is the import of his argument? And if it be, then what becomes of the charges which he falsely alleges against millenarians, of holding that the gospel is not the power of God unto salvation? Is he not himself obnoxious to it in a far higher sense than they could be, even were his allegation against them vindicable in the relation in which he offers it? Is he not able to perceive the most obvious relation of the propositions which he advances? But he betrays his confusion of mind and perplexity to frame an argument that will answer his end, still more unfortunately in the remainder of the passage, in which he misrepresents the promise to Abraham to which he refers, and assumes that it is by the gospel in contradistinction from the seed of the woman that Satan is to be overthrown and divested of his dominion! The assurance to the father of the faithful was not that "*in it*"—the gospel, but that in him and his seed "shall all the families of the earth be blessed." But according to Mr. S. "the glorious triumph" that is to be gained, is to be gained not by the seed of the woman and of Abraham, but by the gospel. If Christ interfere in person and strike down his foes by his own almighty hand, then the gospel will "seem to be a failure," and he will have "the appearance of undertaking to build, and not being able to finish!" The gospel has thus taken the place, in Mr. S.'s conceptions, of the Almighty Word, and his triumph becomes his defeat; and his exercising an administration by which all the obstacles to the efficacy of the gospel are removed, and all nations brought to accept it, instead of honoring, is to disgrace it, and make it "a failure." He even supposes that a direct interposition of Christ to vanquish Satan, and redeem the world from his sway, would be to dishonor his sacrifice, and abandon the end for which he laid down his life! "Is it not most reasonable to suppose, after the Son of God has made a sacrifice of his life for the avowed purpose of destroying the works and power of the devil, that he will, by *that sacrifice*, accomplish his end?" Was there ever hallucination that

transcended this? The passage which he partially quotes does not represent that Christ is to destroy the works of the devil simply by his sacrifice, nor by the proclamation of that sacrifice to the nations. That would exclude the agency of the Spirit, as well as his personal intervention. It simply declares that that was the object of his incarnation, without indicating the means by which it is to be accomplished. Its language is, "For this purpose was the Son of God *manifested*, that he might destroy the works of the devil." How then does it appear that the object of his sacrifice will not be accomplished if he comes in person anterior to the millennium, banishes Satan from the earth, destroys the civil and ecclesiastical powers that are arrayed against him, brings the nations to submission to his sceptre, and reigns over and redeems their successive generations through eternal ages? Will they not then be saved through his sacrifice as truly as those are who are redeemed now? Will not the object for which he laid down his life be then, at least, as adequately accomplished as on the narrow conceptions which Mr. S. entertains of the ends that are to be achieved by his mediation?

He next argues in the same absurd manner in respect to the cross of Christ, as though that—irrespective of the Redeemer himself, or the influences of the Spirit—was to be the sole means of the conquest of Satan, and conversion of the world!

"Is it not also to be expected that Jesus Christ, who suffered shame and reproach in this world, and was condemned and put to death as a malefactor by man, should have this reproach removed in the sight of all men, and that the cause in which he suffered and died, should prevail and be victorious in this same world where he suffered and died, and be exalted and extolled, and be very high? The enemies of Christ have always hated and derided the cross, and have tried all means to overturn it. They even laugh it to scorn, and insultingly boast that Christ can never reign on the earth by means of the cross. Shall they not be disappointed, and their arrogant falsehood be made apparent? *The great question now at issue is, not the supremacy of God, but the supremacy of the cross.* With all his malice, Satan can aspire to nothing greater than to hinder the success, and tarnish the glory of the cross. This is his great object. Can it be possible that he will prevail?"—P. 659.

This is evidently the same argument as the former, with the exception that he has substituted the cross in the place of the gospel. What does he mean by the cross? Is it the mere tree on which Christ was crucified; and does he suppose that that is the instrument by which the world is to be rescued from the power of Satan? If not, what can he design by it but the doctrine of the cross, the good news of salvation through Christ's death, the gospel? But if that is his meaning, what is to be gained by this repetition of his argument? It indicates a dearth of materials to sustain his position, thus to ring a round of mere verbal changes. But apart from this, what can exceed the error of his idea that "the shame and reproach of Christ's death cannot be removed in the sight of men," "the cause in which he suffered prevail, and be victorious here where he suffered and died, and he be exalted and extolled," unless the work of vanquishing Satan and redeeming the world is intrusted by him entirely to his cross! He cannot achieve them at all by coming in his glory as the risen Redeemer, raising his saints from death, establishing his throne on the earth, conquering his enemies, subduing the whole race to his sway, and reigning over them through eternal ages;—that were but to be degraded, and yield Satan a triumph! But how is it that the cause of Christ will not then prevail and be victorious, and the reproach of his death be removed as effectually as in any other condition that can be conceived? Will it not then be indisputably certain that he is Jehovah, and has the attributes and rights which he asserted during his ministry? Will there not then be the most ample demonstration of his adequacy in every relation to the work he has undertaken? Will not those who are then saved, be saved by his death on the cross, as absolutely as those who are redeemed antecedently to his advent? And will not the redemption of the innumerable millions who are to come into existence through the endless round of years form as effective an exemplification of the efficacy of his sacrifice, of the vastness of his power, and of the grandeur of his wisdom and love, as the salvation of the immeasurably inferior number who are to be saved in the short period during which Mr. S. supposes the work of redemption is to continue? Can anything exceed

the misconception and confusion of mind which he here betrays ?

But he returns again to the assumption that the triumph must be gained by *the cross*, and not by Christ himself, in order that it may free it from reproach.

“ It is said all these ends will be attained by Christ's second coming, —that when he appears, in the glory of his Father with all the holy angels, his enemies will be confounded, and Christ be honored. Be it so ; yet if it is accomplished by *the glory of the Father*, it is not done by *the cross* ; nor can we conceive that the glory of the second coming should have any influence to take away the reproach that the cross is of none effect, or to make manifest that it is the power of God unto salvation.”—P. 660.

Had this come from a Roman Catholic who regards the mere cross as the grand instrument of salvation, and adores and trusts it in place of the Redeemer, it would excite no surprise ; but its utterance by a Protestant certainly indicates an extraordinary hallucination. Will Mr. S. be good enough to inform us who or what it is that is to be vindicated and glorified by the conquest of Satan and deliverance of the world from his power ? Is it the great Crucified, or is it the mere wood on which he was hanged ? Is it against the tree which was the instrument of his death, that Satan wages his war ? Is it that which men scorn and revile ? Or is it he, the incarnate Jehovah, who died on it for our redemption ? If the latter, how is it that his coming in person in the glory of his Deity, banishing his great adversary to the abyss, destroying the civil and ecclesiastical usurpers of his rights, and slaughterers of his witnesses, and taking possession of the earth, and bringing all nations to obedience to his sceptre, will not be to vindicate himself, and the method by which he accomplishes the redemption of men ? Will the renovation and sanctification of the nations under his reign then be any the less through his death than they are during his reign in heaven ? Is the method of redemption to depend on the scene in which he is visibly present ? If the whole race are saved through innumerable ages under his administration on earth, will there not be as ample evidences of the efficacy of

his expiation, and as vast and emphatic a confutation of the reproaches of which his sacrifice has been the object, as there are under the present dispensation? What accusation has been uttered by his enemies that will not then be refuted? What tongue of scorn and detraction that will not then be hushed in eternal silence? If Mr. S. cannot "conceive, that the glory of his second coming should have any influence to take away the reproach that the cross is of none effect," let us remind him that the Spirit of inspiration which he so much affects to honor, has specifically announced that he is to come from heaven, with all his mighty angels, in flaming fire, for the express purpose of avenging himself on those who refuse to recognise and obey him as the Redeemer; and to complete the redemption of those who have believed by their resurrection to glory and immortality,—which will constitute, we apprehend, an adequate demonstration of the efficacy of his death in their behalf,—and that the instant effect of his presence is to be, that "all the kindreds of the earth are to wail because of him," from the conviction undoubtedly, with which they are to be penetrated, that he is the Jehovah incarnate, the King and Judge whom he claims to be; that there can be no redemption except through his blood; and that they are obnoxious to his wrath from their not having embraced his salvation.

He next alleges the importance of the work of redemption as a proof of his views :—

"The doctrine, that the world will be subjugated to Christ under the dispensation of the Spirit, is also confirmed by the importance given to the work of redemption. This is the grand work of time. For it the world was created, and man formed upon it. . . . To us it seems incredible, that a work which the Scriptures so delight to magnify, a work which has been introduced with such an array of preparation, and which gives promise of results so vast, should be brought to a sudden termination when it has scarcely made any impression upon this world of sin, and when the dominion and the greatness of it under the whole heaven is still in the hands of Satan. What becomes of the promise, 'It shall bruise thy head,' if Satan is for ever the oppressor?" —P. 660.

But he here proceeds again on the false assumption that, if

the nations are not converted before Christ's coming, they are not to be converted at all; for he holds, with the late Mr. Miller, "that the world will then be *burned up*." But that, we have already shown, is both against the views entertained by the millenarians, and the clear teachings of the Scriptures. How can Mr. S. feel satisfied in thus directly contradicting the plain announcement in many passages that Christ is to reign on the earth, on the throne of David, and over the nations, for ever and ever? If he is able to set aside these testimonies by others, equally, or more explicitly, declaring that he is not to reign here, that his kingdom is not to be "under the whole heaven," but only in heaven itself, and that the world is at his coming to be annihilated, and "the righteous taken to heaven," why does he not adduce them? Why does he prefer to rely for the conviction of his readers on his own unsupported testimony?

He proceeds, in the next place, on the equally mistaken assumption that this is what he calls "the dispensation of the Spirit," and that, therefore, the whole work of redemption is to be consummated under his sway, and anterior to Christ's coming—a theory which we confuted in our notice of Mr. Beattie's discourse, in our last number, by showing first that it is founded on an erroneous view of the promise to the apostles of the Spirit's *miraculous gifts*, not of his renewing agency; and that this is not, therefore, in any sense in contradistinction from others, "the dispensation of the Spirit." It is not peculiar to this dispensation that he renews and sanctifies those who are saved. He renewed all who were redeemed under the dispensations that preceded this; and he is to renew all who are to become partakers of salvation under that which is to come. It is not peculiar to this dispensation that his miraculous gifts are bestowed on believers. They were bestowed on the prophets of ancient times as well as on the apostles, and their first converts. They are not now characteristic of this dispensation; having been wholly withheld from the church since the apostolic age. And next, we refuted it by showing that it implies that Christ has altogether transferred the work of redemption to the Spirit, and is, therefore, no longer the head of the church, its lawgiver, its providential ruler, who appoints its trials, chastens it for

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its offences, defends it from its enemies, gives the Spirit itself which it enjoys, and is, ere long, to judge and avenge it; which is not only without authority from the Scriptures, but contradicts their clearest and most ample teachings, and detracts from the Redeemer the prerogatives and glory that are peculiar to his office.

He repeats the argument again in respect to the overthrow of Satan, and the promises to Abraham that in his seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, and says :—

“The nations of the earth can be blessed in Christ, only by being made subjects of his kingdom; and the promise cannot have its fulfilment unless the nations are subdued by the gospel, and by means of the gospel Christ reigns over the earth. It is a miserable evasion of the argument from these and similar passages, to represent that this promise may be fulfilled by the destruction of the nations which are now upon the earth, and by peopling it again from the multitudes of the pious dead, with nations who receive Christ and are blessed in him.”—
P. 662.

But this is not the theory of the literal millenarians, nor the representation of the Scriptures. The Scriptures distinguish between the risen and glorified saints, on the one hand, who are symbolized by the new Jerusalem, and *men*, on the other, with whom, when that tabernacle of God descends to the earth, God is to dwell, and free from the curse of mortality, want, tears, and sorrow, and the nations also who are to be healed by the leaves of the tree of life, walk in the light of the new Jerusalem, and bring their honor and glory into it. As the risen saints are to be kings, and priests, and reign, there must of necessity be moral beings who are to be under their dominion, and we are told accordingly that they are to rule *the nations* with an iron sceptre, and that their dominion is to be “under the whole heaven,” and that it is to succeed that of the four great monarchies which is to be destroyed at Christ’s advent. And this is the view entertained by millenarians. It was the faith of Irenæus, Tertullian, Lactantius, and the ancient millenarians generally, and was then and has since been made the ground of objection to them. It was the faith of Mr. Mede and his followers. It is the view that was

entertained by the late Mr. Bickersteth, and is held by Mr. Anderson, Mr. M'Neile, and those universally, so far as we are aware, who hold to the restoration of the Israelites at the period of Christ's advent, and is an essential element in that belief. It were to offer the most direct and absolute contradiction to the predictions of their return, to suppose that they are immediately to be glorified and transferred to another world. The promise is that they are to possess their national land for ever, to live there under the reign of the Messiah, to multiply in peace and bliss, and share universally in the blessings of redemption. It is to spiritualize these predictions to assume that they are not to be literally fulfilled. What can be the design of their restoration, if they are not to remain there, but be instantly transported to another orb? Cannot they as well be translated from other parts of Asia, and from Europe, Africa, the isles of the sea, and this continent, as from the hills and vales of Palestine?

Mr. S. next turns from these general views of this dispensation "to those prophetic promises which speak of what the church is to be." He says:—

"Her future glory is the theme of prophetic rapture in the Old Testament, and in the New. 'The mountain of the Lord's house shall be exalted above the hills.' 'The stone cut out without hands shall become a great mountain and fill the whole earth.' These are a few out of the many Scriptures which speak of the glory which is to come. Shall this be under the dispensation of the Spirit? We appeal to the Scriptures themselves for the answer. . . . 'The mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains . . . and all nations shall flow unto it, and many people shall go and say, come ye and let us go up to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us of his ways, for out of Zion shall go forth the law.' We ask now of what age or dispensation does the prophet speak? The description is by no means suited to such a heavenly state as is supposed to succeed the destruction of this world."—P. 663.

We answer that the time when the stone is to break the image, and become a great mountain and fill the whole earth, is expressly defined in the prophecies to be at Christ's advent. The image represents the same series of dynasties as the four

great beasts, and the iron legs and feet of the image, the rulers of the same empire, the Roman, as the fourth beast. This is indisputable from the fact that each is represented as symbolizing the rulers of the fourth empire; that the empire represented by each is exhibited as succeeding the three others; and that each is represented as destroyed at the time when the dominion of the world is transferred to the saints. The stone itself is interpreted as symbolizing the saints by whom the powers denoted by the image are to be destroyed. When then are the rulers symbolized by the iron and clay of the image, and the fourth beast, to be destroyed? At the coming of Christ. This is clear from a variety of proofs. First, The fourth beast is to continue till the Ancient of Days comes. "I beheld, and the same horn made war with the saints and prevailed against them until the Ancient of Days came, and judgment was given to the saints of the Most High, and the time came that the saints possessed the kingdom." Again the Ancient of Days is to come at the time of the destruction of the fourth beast. "I saw in the night visions and behold a fourth beast, dreadful and terrible, and it had great iron teeth; it devoured and broke in pieces, and stamped the residue with the feet; and it had ten horns. I considered the horns, and behold there came up another little horn; and behold in this horn eyes like the eyes of a man, and a mouth speaking great things; and I beheld the beast till the thrones were set and the Ancient of Days did sit; the judgment was set and the books were opened. I beheld then because of the voice of the great words which the horn spake, till the beast was slain and his body destroyed and given to the burning flame." This great transaction was in the atmosphere of our earth. This is shown by the interpretation which exhibits the Ancient of Days as coming to it, and his presence and act as in the scene where the prophet had beheld the beast exercising its tyranny over the nations, and making its war on the saints. That the judgment was in the scene where the beast was beheld, is manifest also from the fact that it was beheld by the prophet at the time of the judgment, its voice speaking great things heard, and its destruction witnessed. To suppose the judgment to have taken place in heaven, is to suppose that to be the scene of the Roman empire, the perse-

cution of the saints, and all the other events represented in the vision of the image and beast. Secondly, but the coming of the Ancient of Days and the coming of the Son of man are to be at the same period. For the prophet immediately adds, "I saw in the night visions, and behold one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of Days, and they brought him near before him, and there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." This investiture of the Son of man took place also in our atmosphere. This is seen from the fact that the Son of man *came* to it, and came to it to the Ancient of Days, who was enthroned in the sky of our world. The scene was the same undoubtedly as that of the judgment, as the transaction had as direct and exclusive a relation to our world, and no indication is given of a change of place; and this is made indisputable by the fact that the Son of man came "with the clouds of heaven," which are the clouds of our atmosphere. Thirdly, the coming here symbolized is literal, and his second coming. This is certain from the laws of symbolization. The transaction is prophetic. The agents and acts are representative of agents and acts. But by a necessity, arising from his nature and office, the Son of man acts as his own symbol. No other being is adequate to serve as his representative, none having the requisite attributes and rights. This is expressly shown in the vision of his reception of the sealed book, Rev. chap. v.; and in accordance with this great law, the Father and the Son, in all the symbolical visions of them in the Old and New Testament, appear in person, and act for themselves. Their acts, accordingly, are in like manner representative of their own acts. The coming, therefore, of the Son in this vision to the heaven of our world, and with its clouds, symbolizes his real and personal coming, and his investiture here with the dominion of the earth symbolizes his real investiture with it at that epoch. This is shown also by the fact that it is revealed in other passages, that he is, at his second advent, to come with the clouds of heaven; an expression taken from this vision,

and indicating that the coming which they foreshow is the same. "Behold he cometh with clouds, and every eye shall see him; and they that pierced him, and all kindreds of the earth, shall wail because of him." Rev. i. 7; Matt. xxiv. 30; Acts i. 9-11. It is shown also by the vision of his coming to destroy the wild beast and false prophet. Rev. xix. He then came from heaven to the earth, as is seen from the fact, on the one hand, that it was by the opening of heaven that he became visible to the apostle; and on the other, that the beast and false prophet, the kings and their armies who were gathered together to make war against him, and whom he destroyed, were on the earth. In this vision also, by the law of the prophecy, he represents himself, and his coming in the vision symbolizes his personal coming at the destruction of the rulers of the fourth empire. It is foretold also by a verbal prediction, 2 Thess. ii. 3-8. "And then shall the lawless one be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus shall consume by the breath of his mouth, and shall destroy by the brightness of his coming." The lawless one, the man of sin, the son of perdition, is the same as the little horn of the fourth beast, and the false prophet, as is shown by the acts ascribed to him, and the fact that he is, like the power denoted by that horn, and the false prophet, to be destroyed at Christ's coming. That this coming, here foreshown, is to be a personal and visible coming, is certain from the fact that that is the literal meaning of the term ἡ παρουσία, and that it is the term which is usually employed to signify his personal coming; 1 Thess. ii. 20, iii. 13, iv. 15, v. 23, are examples of its use to denote his advent in person when he is to raise and judge the saints. And that it is used here in its literal meaning is indisputable from the fact that its use *by a figure* to denote *his* act is absolutely incompatible with the law of the metaphor. That figure—which is the only one that can be supposed to be used here, or that would answer the end that is sought in treating the term as figurative—lies, when employed in respect to an agent, in ascribing to him a nature, act, quality, or whatever it is, that is affirmed by the figure, that does not really belong to him, and is not proper to his constitution; as when a hero is called a lion, a poet's imagination is said to soar, and a philosopher's intellect to be

strong, or capacious. In order, then, that a personal coming of Christ to our world may be metaphorical, a literal personal coming must be unadapted to his nature, and impossible to him in the same manner as it is impossible that a man should be literally a lion, or a poet's imagination fly on wings into the heights of the atmosphere. Here is thus, from the laws of language, a direct and absolute demonstration that the coming foreshown in this passage is not metaphorical but literal. To deny it is to deny that he *can* come, and thence that he ever will, and not only contradict, therefore, all the predictions of his personal coming at the resurrection and judgment of the saints, but to overthrow Mr. Steele's own theory as effectually as the doctrines of the Scriptures which he assails.

We might confirm this view by other considerations, but these furnish an ample certainty that Christ's second coming is to take place at the epoch of the destruction of the European monarchs and ecclesiastics symbolized by the wild beast and false prophet, and is, therefore, to precede the conversion of the nations, the reign of a thousand years, and the last resurrection and judgment.

Mr. S., however, strenuously denies, that these passages have any relation to Christ's second coming. He admits that they announce the institution of his kingdom on earth, and relate to his reign here. He says:—

"The triumphant reign of Christ upon earth is abundantly established by the prophecies both of the Old and New Testament. Daniel, in the vision of 'the great image,' speaks of his kingdom as 'a stone cut out without hands, which became a great mountain, and filled the whole earth.' Again, in the visions of the 'four beasts,' he describes it as the kingdom given to the Son of man, and the saints of the Most High, which is to supersede all other kingdoms. In the Revelation the same glorious kingdom is represented in three distinct visions. The first is at the sounding of the seventh trumpet, . . . 'there were great voices in heaven saying, the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdom of our Lord, and he shall reign for ever and ever.' Again Chap. xix. 1, and xx. 1. . . . That these all refer to the same event is evident from the resemblance of the things described, and from the inapplicability of either to any other predicted event. Whatever is meant by the prophets of old in their descriptions of the

glory which is to come ; the same is meant by 'the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdom of Christ,' 'the marriage of the Lamb,' and the saints 'reigning with Christ a thousand years.' The difference in the description is only the difference resulting from different points of observation. The question which concerns the present discussion is, do these refer to the second personal advent of Christ? As there are other passages which speak of this advent, about which there is no dispute, and which are very explicit, we must learn from these what this advent is to be."—Pp. 665, 666.

He accordingly quotes and refers to a number of passages, which he regards as showing that that advent is not to take place till the last resurrection and judgment and the annihilation of the world. What testimonies, however, ought he to allege, in order to set aside the construction we have placed on these predictions, and establish his own view? It is not enough that he alleges passages that simply announce that Christ is to come again. It is not enough to quote passages that show that there is to be a judgment at his coming, nor that he is to be present at the last judgment. It is not enough to show that there is to be a resurrection at his coming, nor that he is to be present at the last resurrection; as all such predictions are perfectly consistent with the doctrine that there are to be two resurrections and two judgments, that he is to be present at each, and that his advent, and the first resurrection and judgment, are to take place at the epoch of the destruction of the powers denoted by the wild beast and false prophet, and to precede, therefore, the saints' reign a thousand years. To accomplish his object he must produce passages that explicitly affirm, or by the laws of language or symbols demonstrably teach, either that he is not to come at the period of the destruction of the wild beast, false prophet, and man of sin; or else that his advent is not to take place till after the millennium; or that it is not to take place till a time when the earth is to cease to be the residence of men; or finally, that there is to be but one resurrection, and one judgment. He must also show that all the other passages that treat of his advent, the resurrections and the judgments of the living and dead, are consistent with his constructions of those which he alleges. If he does not demonstrate by unanswerable proofs, that such predictions as that of Christ's

literal coming at the destruction of the man of sin, 2 Thess. ii. 8, Rev. xix. 11–21, and Daniel vii. 13–28, have not the meaning by the laws of language and symbols which we ascribe to them, but are consistent with his view, he achieves nothing except to confute himself by showing that his theory is in contradiction to the certain teachings of the Scriptures. He has, however, neither produced any passages that directly affirm what he affects to prove, in respect to the time of Christ's advent, the resurrection of the holy and sinful, the judgment of the living and dead, or the destruction of the world. He has not alleged any that directly contradict, or that are inconsistent with the doctrine which he controverts that Christ's coming, and the first resurrection and judgment, are to precede the thousand years. He has not offered any evidence whatever that his constructions are not wholly irreconcilable with the revelations made in the predictions we have quoted, and others of the kind. The whole pretence of determining the import of "doubtful" passages by those that are explicit, is a mere sham. He only quotes and refers to passages which announce that Christ is to come, that there is to be a resurrection and judgment, that when he comes he is to judge the nations, and inflict vengeance on the wicked, and that there is at his coming to be a conflagration, and, without an attempt at argument, assumes that they demonstrate what he affects to determine by them. He says:—

"These Scriptures, we think, establish the following points beyond all controversy, viz. that Christ will personally appear in our world but once more;—that the great object of that appearing is the general judgment, including both the righteous and the wicked;—that all the dead will then be raised, and all be judged: for we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ;—*that the world will then be burned up, the righteous taken to heaven, and the wicked cast into hell for ever. Now if this be the end of Christ's coming, the prophecies referred to can have no reference to it; for they clearly indicate that this world is to continue after the event of which they speak.*"—P. 666.

He thus, without a pretence of reasoning, assumes all that he was to prove, that there is to be but one resurrection and one judgment; that they are to take place at Christ's coming, and that his coming is to be immediately followed by the

annihilation of the earth and removal of the saints to another world. And then on the ground of that gratuitous assumption infers that the passages in question in Daniel, the Revelations, Thessalonians, and others of the kind, do not reveal Christ's coming, because they expressly teach "that this world is to continue after the event of which they speak." That is, he assumes first that the passages which he quotes teach what they do not, and then from that assumption infers that those of Daniel, Paul, John, and others of the kind, do not teach what they do! And such is his ignorance of the principles by which the question is to be determined, that he has not the slightest suspicion that he has not settled it in a scholarly and demonstrative manner. That the passages which he employs for the purpose are of the character we represent, will be seen by a reference to them. The first is Acts i. 11; which simply announces that Christ shall come again in the same manner as he ascended into the sky, when he entered into a cloud. It presents no indication of the *time* when he is to come, or of the *events* that are to follow his advent. Another is Jude 14; which simply declares that he shall come with ten thousand of his saints to execute judgment upon all. It determines nothing as to the time of his coming. It determines nothing in respect to the order in which men are to be judged. The fact which it announces, that all are to be judged, is perfectly consistent with the revelation made in other passages, that there is to be a judgment of the living immediately on Christ's coming, and a judgment of the dead at another period; and that those two judgments are to be separated by the millennium. The next, Heb. ix. 27, 28, in like manner simply announces that after death there is to be a judgment, and that to those who look for Christ, he shall appear the second time unto salvation. It does not designate the period of that judgment, nor his coming. Another, 1 Thess. iv. 16, only announces, in the part which he quotes, that "the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God." *He suppresses the prediction with which the verse closes—"AND THE DEAD IN CHRIST SHALL RISE FIRST,"* by which his theory is confuted that there is to be but one resurrection! What an adroit method of clearing up "pas-

sages of doubtful import" "by those which are plain!" What exemplary fairness! How admirably suited to conciliate the confidence of his readers in the unsupported opinions which he advances of the import of these passages! The next, 2 Thess. i. 7-9, merely announces "that it is righteous to reward the Thessalonian believers with rest when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, with flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and shall be glorified in his saints." It does not indicate when that coming is to take place. It does not assert or intimate that there is not to be a resurrection and a judgment at a later period. Instead of being a passage by which others that relate to the time of Christ's coming, the first and second resurrection, and the judgment of the living and dead can be explained, it is one in the interpretation of which important aid is derived from other predictions. Who, for example, are they that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power, when he shall come to be glorified in his saints? Are they the living or the dead? The fact that he is to take vengeance on them by flaming fire, indicates that they are the living in the natural body; and that is confirmed by the prediction, chap. ii. 8, that he is then to destroy the man of sin—the lawless usurper of his throne and prerogatives—by the breath of his mouth and the brightness of his coming; by the parable of the tares, that then "his angels shall gather *out of his kingdom*," which is in this world, the scene of the harvest, "all things that offend, and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them into a furnace of fire:" by the vision, Rev. xix. 11-27, of his advent, when those who are symbolized by the wild beast, false prophet, kings and their armies are to be destroyed; and Dan. vii. 21, 22, in which it is revealed that the powers denoted by the fourth beast are to make war on the saints till the Ancient of Days comes and destroys them; and thus explained, it contradicts the theory which Mr. S. alleges it to support, by showing that the coming which it announces is to take place at the period of the overthrow of the tyrants and persecutors symbolized by the image and beast, which he himself admits

is to be before the millennium. What exquisite perspicacity he displays in the selection of passages for his object! What an admirable model he presents of accuracy and candor!

He quotes also, to support his views, the prediction, Matt. xxv. 31, 32, in which it is simply announced that when Christ comes he shall sit on the throne of his glory, and all nations shall be gathered before him, and separated one from another. "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations, and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats." But here is no explicit specification of the period when his coming is to take place. There is only an announcement of acts and events that are immediately to follow his coming. There is no intimation that the whole race is then to be judged, nor that those who are then to be judged are to be raised from the dead. So far from it, the language renders it indisputable that they are the living alone, not the dead. This is seen first from the fact that those who are to be gathered before him and judged are *the nations*, for they are the living, not the dead. The term is never employed to denote the dead, nor does it admit of such a use. It is the denomination of a great division of the human family, that have sprung from the same ancestry, that speak the same language, or that live under the same government, as Canaanites, Egyptians, Israelites, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Saracens, Turks, French, British. The dead are not separated into such communities in the invisible world. They constitute but two great bodies, and are in hell, or in heaven. But that they are the living and not the dead, is placed beyond debate by the consideration that they are then to be separated one from another, as a shepherd divides his sheep from the goats, which shows that up to the period of the judgment they are to continue to be intermixed with each other. They cannot be the dead, therefore, inasmuch as the righteous and wicked are separated at death, and are never again to be intermixed, as the righteous are to be raised first, the wicked at a later period. They are the nations of the living, therefore, since there will be no other body of the race existing by itself,

made up promiscuously of the righteous and unrighteous. And, finally, this is confirmed by other passages which teach expressly that the holy and unholy will continue to live intermingled with each other on the earth till Christ's coming. It is explicitly revealed and exemplified in the parables of the tares and of the virgins, and directly foreshown by Christ, and illustrated by a comparison with the conduct of the race at the flood. "For, as in the days that were before the flood, they were eating and drinking, till the day that Noah entered into the ark—so shall also the coming of the Son of man be. Then shall two be in the field; the one shall be taken, and the other left. Two shall be grinding at the mill; the one shall be taken, and the other left." This passage, therefore, in place of proving, confutes the doctrine which he attempts to maintain by it, and shows that the judgment when the dead, and the dead alone, are to be tried, symbolized in Rev. xx. 12–15, is to be a different judgment. That they are to be at wholly different periods, is apparent also from the grounds on which the judgment of the living is to be founded. The righteous are to be blessed and inherit the kingdom prepared for them because of the proofs given by them of love to Christ, in their conduct towards his brethren in want, sickness, and *imprisonment*; and therefore in a season of persecution; and the wicked sentenced to punishment because of their refusal to succor them in the necessities of that period. The judgment is, therefore, immediately to follow *the last period* of the severe trial and persecution of Christ's disciples, and is accordingly to precede the millennium, as their last persecution is immediately to precede the destruction of the powers symbolized by the wild beast and false prophet, which is to take place before the millennium. They are to wear out the saints till the Ancient of Days comes, and the time arrives that the saints possess the kingdom. It is shortly before the sounding of the seventh trumpet that the witnesses are to be slain. The wild beast, the false prophet, and the kings are then to make war on the Lamb; and the innumerable multitude in robes made white in the blood of the Lamb who are to survive that battle and enter the millennium, are to go out of great tribulation. The judgment foreshown in the parable is unquestionably,

therefore, to precede the thousand years ; while the judgment of the dead, symbolized Rev. xx. 12-15, is to take place after that period. Such is the brilliant result of his attempt to prove that there is to be but one judgment.

And, finally, he refers to 2 Pet. iii. 7-10, as authority for his representation that the world will then be burned up, and "the righteous taken to heaven." It neither teaches, however, that the world is to be burned up, by which he means, destroyed, resolved into its primary elements, so that it is no longer an earth, or annihilated, nor that the righteous are then to be taken to heaven. The language on which he founds his representation is doubtless the following, though he refers to the 7th, 8th, and 9th verses, and omits the 11th and 13th. "But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night, in the which the heavens shall pass or rush with a great noise, and the elements being kindled shall be dissolved, and the earth also, and the works on it, shall be burned. All these, therefore, being to be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy conversation and godliness, looking for and desiring the coming of the day of God, by which coming the heavens, being set on fire, shall be dissolved, and the elements, being enkindled, shall be melted. We expect, however, new heavens and a new earth, according to his promise, in which righteousness dwells." Here is not a syllable that represents or implies that the righteous are then to be transferred from this world to another. There is no prediction, direct or implied, that the earth is then to be burned *up*, that is, reduced to ashes, divested altogether of its present constitution, so that it will no longer be the earth, or will be annihilated. The language is simply that the heavens, by which is meant the atmosphere of our globe, not the boundless space that surrounds it, a vast portion of which, probably, contains no inflammable body, shall be kindled, fired, dissolved, and the earth burned, that is, subjected to that fire, not burned *up*, or divested of existence as an earth. It is the atmosphere that is to be the subject and scene of the fire. The earth is to be burned by the contact of the kindled air with its surface ; not by the enkindling of its whole mass. This is indicated by the statement that the works on it, that is, the works which man has erected, are to be burned. If

the whole mass of the globe is to be fired and absolutely resolved into ashes, or struck from existence, it would scarcely be necessary to state that erections which man has built on its surface are also to be burned. It is indicated also by the object of the fire, which is, in order to "the perdition of ungodly men," not to the annihilation of the globe. "The heavens and earth that now are, are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." Their destruction will not require the annihilation of the earth. But it is made certain by the apostle's expectation of new heavens and a new earth, as the consequence of the fire. The word earth is never used in the Scriptures to denote any other than this globe. Had it been his design to announce that believers looked for a different atmosphere and earth, just called into existence, he would doubtless have used the word another, instead of new. The use of new, to denote that that to which it is applied is renewed, renovated, restored from ruin to integrity and beauty, is customary with the prophets and apostles. The phrases, new spirit, new heart, new creatures in Christ Jesus, new man, are examples. And that this is the sense in which it is employed is indisputable, from the promise of new heavens and a new earth, Isaiah lxxv. 17-25, lxxvi. 20-24, to which the apostle refers. "For behold, I create new heavens and a new earth; and the former shall not be remembered, nor come into mind. But be ye glad and rejoice for ever in that which I create; for behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my people: and the voice of weeping shall be no more heard in her, nor the voice of crying. There shall be no more thence an infant of days, nor an old man that hath not filled his days; for the child shall die an hundred years old; but the sinner an hundred years old shall be accursed. And they shall build houses and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards and eat the fruit of them. They shall not build, and another inhabit; they shall not plant, and another eat; for as the days of a tree, shall be the days of my people, and mine elect shall long enjoy the work of their hands. They shall not labor in vain, nor bring forth for trouble; for they are the seed of the blessed of the Lord

and their offspring with them. And it shall come to pass before they call, I will answer, and while they are yet speaking, I will hear. The wolf also and the lamb shall feed together, and the lion shall eat straw like the bullock; and dust shall be the serpent's food. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord." The new earth is thus indisputably the same earth physically as the present, and is still to be the habitation of man in the natural body; for Jerusalem is to be in it, and be a city of houses, and Palestine therefore, and be a region of vineyards.

This is confirmed also by the representation, chap. lxvi. 15-24, that it is the idolatrous and openly wicked who are to be destroyed at his coming—not men universally, and that the Gentiles shall after that destruction bring the whole body of the Israelites who continue till that period in dispersion, "out of all nations, upon horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to his holy mountain Jerusalem," and that he will "take of them for priests and Levites," and that they shall dwell there in his presence for ever. "For as the new heavens and the new earth which I will make, shall remain before me for ever, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain. And it shall come to pass that from one new moon to another, and from one sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord. And they shall go forth and look upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me, for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh." Can a more perfect confutation of Mr. Steele's whole theory be imagined, than is presented in these predictions? They show—1st, that the new heavens and earth are to be the same materially as the present, and that their newness is to consist in their renovation; the atmosphere, instead of pestilential, is to become congenial to life; the earth, in place of being blighted with sterility, and overrun with thorns, is to become fruitful. Wildernesses are to bud and blossom as the rose; and deserts smile with verdure and plenty. Jerusalem especially is to be restored from its ruins, and adorned with immeasurable beauty and magnificence. 2. Mankind, whether Israelites or Gentiles, are still to subsist, and their several countries, instead

of being obliterated, are still to continue to be occupied by them and bear their ancient names. The Israelites are to be gathered out of all the lands where they are dispersed, and conveyed to Palestine; and the Gentiles of all those lands are to assist them in their return: 3. Those to be destroyed by fire at Christ's coming are his open and incorrigible enemies, who refuse submission to him and pay their homage to other beings. "For behold the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots, like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire. For by fire and by his sword will the Lord plead with all flesh; and the slain of the Lord shall be many. *They that sanctify themselves and purify themselves in the gardens, under one tree in the midst, eating swine's flesh, and the abomination and the mouse shall be consumed together, saith the Lord,*" v. 15-17. The carcasses of which the worm shall not die, nor the fire be quenched, are to be "the carcasses of the men who have transgressed" against Jehovah. They are shown, Zech. xiv. 1-3, to be the Gentile armies that are to capture Jerusalem at the last great battle. That is the representation also, 2 Thess. i. 7-9, ii. 8, Rev. xix. 11, 21. 4. Not only are the nations to survive the fire of Christ coming, but the animals also, both harmless and noxious, ferocious and tame; the wolf and lamb, the lion and bullock, the serpent and cockatrice, the horse and camel, the mule and dromedary. 5. The new earth and atmosphere are not only to be the same materially as the present, but they are to be subject to the same great laws and answer the same great ends as the present. The earth is to be attended by the moon, and that orb is to wax and wane as it now does, and furnish a measure of time, which is of itself a sufficient proof that the earth is to be the same. The earth is to revolve on its axis, as it now does, wheel round its orbit, and be enlightened by the sun, as it is to have a succession of days, lunar revolutions, seasons, and years. There cannot be sabbaths, and therefore weeks of days, new moons, and therefore revolutions of the moon round the earth, and seasons of planting and sowing, and years by which the lives of men are measured, except by a revolution of the earth on its axis, and an annual motion round the sun. 6. The race, instead of being intercepted from any further increase, is to multiply, and in exemp-

tion from the anxiety and terror that now attend the birth and nurture of offspring. 7. The resurrection of the wicked, instead of taking place at the time of Christ's coming, and the destruction of the hostile armies, when the righteous are to be raised, is not to be until after the renovation of the heavens and earth. For all those who go up to Jerusalem from sabbath to sabbath to worship Jehovah, are to go forth and look upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed, and "they are to be an abhorring unto all flesh." *They are to remain unraised*, therefore, for a long period, and the places where they are interred be known. 8. The new earth, instead of ever being destroyed, is to continue for ever, and be the abode of men, and the scene of Christ's visible presence.

The passage thus directly and specifically confutes every element of Mr. Steele's theory. Instead of an annihilation of the earth, it is to be renewed, and subsist for ever. Instead of an end to the increase of the race, it is to multiply for ever. In place of the righteous being transported to another world, they are to reside here. In place of the resurrection of the transgressors against God, at the time of Christ's coming, they are to remain in their graves for a long period after the renovation of the earth. This is indisputably the revelation that is made in the passage. There is no method by which it can be set aside, except by a reasonless and flagrant violation of the laws of language. It is not a symbolical prophecy. It has none of the marks of such a prediction. The agents, acts, places, and events, were not seen by the prophet in vision, as they would have been had they been symbols of agents, places, acts, and events of a different order. They are described as future, not as actually present to him and objects of his perception, as symbols universally are. Nor can they be treated as symbols without involving the prediction in contradiction and absurdity. If Israelites and Gentiles are used as symbols, whom do they represent? Not any other classes of mankind, as they include the whole race. If they denote different agents, therefore, they must stand for nations that inhabit some other world, instead of this earth. If all flesh who are to go up to worship before Jehovah act as symbols, they also must of necessity denote a race of a different orb; and, accordingly, the carcasses of them that transgressed, which all flesh are to

abhor, must symbolize the carcases of transgressors of another world. Such are the monstrous results to which that theory, which is usually adopted to escape the revelation made in the passage, leads.

It is equally impossible to wrest it from this meaning by the pretence that it is figurative. For, 1st, by the laws of the metaphor—which is the only figure that would give a different sense to the predictions—the figure lies in the predicate, not in that of which the affirmation is made. 2. That of which the affirmation is made, is to be the subject of that which the metaphorical prediction foreshows. If, for example, the prediction be, “the desert shall rejoice;” the figure lies in the verb, not in the noun. The earth is used literally, and is to be the subject of that, whatever it be, which the verb foreshows. 3. The metaphor affirms something of that to which it is applied, that is not literally proper to it, but only resembles that which is its own. Thus the desert cannot literally rejoice, as that is an act that is peculiar to intelligent beings; but being adorned with verdure and bloom, and peopled with active and joyous creatures, it may present an air of cheerfulness and exhilaration that is analogous to the gladness which men feel and utter; and it is that resemblance that the verb is employed to express. In the first place, then, if the predictions in this passage were metaphorical, the agents and objects of which the affirmations are made, would still be the subjects of that which the affirmations denote. The heavens and earth would be the subjects of that which is predicated of them; Jerusalem of that which is promised of her; the Israelites and Gentiles, respectively, of that which is predicted of them; the idolaters and their carcases of that which is foreshown of them. To suppose that they would not, is to suppose that they are used as *symbols*, and that the prediction therefore is not metaphorical but symbolic. In the next place, if the passage were metaphorical, that which is affirmed of the several agents and objects would be incompatible with their nature, and would be applied to them only to signify that they are to be the agents or subjects of some resembling act or event; in the same manner as rejoicing is incompatible with the nature of a desert, though it resembles a seeming cheerfulness and hilarity which a desert may be made to assume by

being converted into a scene of beauty and life. But the acts and events affirmed of the several agents and objects of the prophecy, instead of being improper to their natures, are in entire accordance with them. It is perfectly compatible, for example, with the constitution of the earth and atmosphere, that they should be freed from the deterioration with which they were smitten at the fall, and restored to their original healthiness and beauty. It is compatible with the nature of Jerusalem that it should be rebuilt and adorned with a magnificence and splendor immeasurably transcending that of any other capital. It is compatible with the nature of the Israelites that they should return to their ancient land, be reinstated as God's chosen people, live there in obedience under the reign of the Redeemer, and multiply in safety and blessedness through unending years. It is entirely competent to the nature of the Gentiles that they should assist in restoring the Israelites, and go to Jerusalem by representatives at stated periods to worship Jehovah. It is perfectly possible that the graves of the transgressors who are to be slain at Christ's coming should remain, and be visited by those who frequent Jerusalem, and the Redeemer's victory and deliverance of his people there remembered and commemorated. We have, therefore, in this harmony of the things foreshown with the natures of the agents and objects of which they are predicted, the utmost certainty that the prophecy is not metaphorical. There is no species of demonstration more incontrovertible and absolute than this. The passage then foreshows the great events which it directly announces, and overturns accordingly, instead of sustaining, the contradictory views which Mr. Steele endeavors to maintain.

That such, however, is the character of the passages on which he relies to determine the question, Mr. S. has not the least suspicion. A total stranger to the laws of figures and symbols, entirely unaware, apparently, that there is any other method of settling their meaning than by mere asseveration, he proceeds to treat his theory as demonstrated by irrefragable evidence, and the doctrine he rejects as left without a shadow of ground for its support. He says :

"There is not one passage in the visions of Daniel or of John, above
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referred to, xx. 7-15, which contains any such mention of the second advent, or of the general judgment, as appears in the passages we have cited; *not one from which it would be possible to prove the doctrine of the second advent.* Daniel has been thought to refer to this, when he 'saw one like the Son of man come with the clouds of heaven—and come to the Ancient of days—and there was given him dominion and glory and a kingdom.' But it should be observed that the coming here spoken of is not to *this earth*, but to *the Ancient of days*, that is, to the throne of God in heaven; and this was fulfilled when Christ *ascended in the clouds of heaven, and sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high.*"—P. 667.

If bold and reasonless assertion is the proper instrument for determining the question, he has doubtless established what he affirms; not otherwise. But is that the appropriate medium of proof? Is that the instrument which men of candor and learning will choose to employ? Is it suitable, at this period of ostentatious boast of the progress of biblical culture; is it creditable to those who affect to be masters of the art of interpretation, when they attempt to determine a great question like this, thus wholly to repudiate the scientific exegesis of which we hear so many commendations, abandon all pretence of exposition or argument, and turn to mere dogmatism for the discovery and establishment of the truth? It is an expedient which those who know of no other method, or are conscious they have no other means of maintaining their views, sometimes adopt; but men competent to the task they undertake, and regardful of their obligations, will not be likely to employ it. If Mr. S. is able to demonstrate that there is "not one" passage in Daniel or John "from which it is possible to *prove* the doctrine of the second advent," why did he not present his evidences, and confute those who have formed a different judgment? If he has the means of proving that the coming of the Son of man in the vision of Daniel, does not symbolize his coming to "this earth," but his *going* "to the throne of God in heaven," why did he not present them, and at once put an end to their misconceptions who suppose it to represent his "second advent?"

It would doubtless be a formidable task; as, first, to prove that the throne of the Ancient of days, to whom the Son of man came, was not "at this earth," but in heaven, would be

to convict the prophet of a misrepresentation, in stating that he saw the Ancient of days *come* to the judgment and destruction of the beast. Secondly, it would be to prove that the judgment and destruction of the beast did not take place on the earth, but in the heaven of heavens; for it took place in the immediate presence of the Ancient of days. We are expressly told that the horn made war with the saints *until the Ancient of days came*, and judgment was given to the saints of the Most High. The setting of the judgment and opening of the books also imply that it was in the presence of the beast that was judged and destroyed. But the beast was on the earth, not in the third heavens. The prophet saw it ascend from the sea. It was where the saints were, on whom it made war, which was the earth, and it is represented as symbolizing a body of conquerors, who are to devour the whole earth, and tread it down, and break it in pieces. The throne of the Ancient of days, therefore, who came to its judgment, and was present at it, was at "this earth," not in the third heavens. 3. It would be to prove that *coming to the earth is going from it*, and coming to it the same as *ascending to heaven*; for Mr. S. affirms that Christ's coming to the Ancient of days, whose throne was in our atmosphere, was "his ascending in the clouds of heaven, and sitting down at the right hand of the Majesty on high." But if that is the meaning of the word *come*, can Mr. S. prove that the Son of man is ever again to appear in our world? Has he any more right to assign to the verb that false and contradictory meaning in this instance than in Acts i. 11, Matt. xxiv. 30, or in any other passage in which it occurs? What estimate are we to form of the learning and judgment of a writer who utters assertions which thus directly overthrow his own system, and would, if legitimate, convert the whole revelation which God has made into a chaos of contradiction and absurdity? That Christ's investiture took place in our atmosphere is shown, also, by the fact that he *came* to the Ancient of days, and came with the clouds of heaven, which are the clouds of our atmosphere. 4. It would require him to prove that the Son of man has not yet ascended to heaven, and sat down at the right hand of the majesty on high; for the epoch of the investiture of

the Son of man is that of the destruction of the beast, and the institution of the kingdom of the saints of the Most High, which are still future. The prophet "beheld" the beast exerting its conquering and destructive agency, "till the thrones were set, and the Ancient of days did sit, the judgment was instituted, and the books were opened;" and "beheld, the horn making war with the saints, and prevailing against them until the Ancient of days *CAME*, and judgment was given to the saints of the Most High, and the time came that the saints possessed the kingdom."

But the kingdom of the saints is to be contemporaneous with the dominion and kingdom with which the Son of man was invested; for the dominion and kingdom are given to him, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him; and are to be everlasting; and the kingdom and dominion given to the saints, are also to be under the whole heaven, and are to continue "for ever and ever." None of the nations are to be in rebellion under Christ's reign any more than they are under the reign of the saints. He is invested with dominion that all should serve him, and his sceptre, we are specifically told, "all dominions shall serve and obey." The powers denoted by the beast that makes war on the saints, are not to exercise their tyranny during that reign. "His kingdom is not that which shall be destroyed" in any measure, it is not a dominion under which his throne is usurped, and his worshippers worn out with war and prosecution. No more shocking contradiction to the prophecy can be conceived. The epoch of his investiture is, therefore, to be that of the destruction of the wild beast. It, accordingly, did not take place at Christ's ascension to heaven, after his resurrection, but is still future. This is shown also by the voice at the seventh trumpet, announcing that the empire of the earth has become Christ's, which implies, that it is not to be his till that period. Such are some of the impossibilities which Mr. S. must accomplish, in order to verify his assertion, that there is no mention of the second advent in Daniel. How convenient to escape this formidable task by substituting his unsupported assertions for proof! Let us remind him, however, that this is not the mode in which the witnesses of Jesus are accustomed to treat his word. It is the charac-

teristic, not of the saints of the Most High, but of the horn that makes war on them, and wears them out. It is he that "thinks to change times and laws," by arbitrary assumptions and authoritative decrees.

He next denies that there is any proof of the second advent in the visions of John :—

"In the visions of John there is no proof of the second advent. We look in vain for such proof at the sound of the seventh trumpet, or in the vision of the marriage of the Lamb, or at the binding of Satan. It is said that the appearance of Christ, and of the armies of heaven, in the vision of the destruction of the beast and false prophet, Rev. xix. 11, is proof that this refers to a personal advent, because Christ can be a symbol of no one but himself. But we find an appearance of the same person in the same characters essentially in the vision which precedes the letters to the churches of Asia. The argument, therefore, proves a personal advent at that time as really as at the time here referred to, which is not true."

What an appropriate climax thus to terminate his argument with a denial that overturns his whole scheme, and implies that there is not to be a second advent at all ! For he holds that the vision of the great white throne, resurrection, and judgment, Rev. xx. 11–15, "symbolizes the last judgment ; that at the last judgment Christ is to preside ; that it is to take place at the epoch of his second coming ; that his coming is to be chiefly in order to that judgment ; and that, immediately after the sentence is pronounced, the world will be burned up, the righteous taken to heaven, and the wicked cast into hell." If there is no proof then in that passage of the second advent, there is no proof in it of the resurrection and last judgment ; and if there is no proof there, then may not all the proof of them that exists in other passages be with equal ease and propriety denied ? What exquisite perspicacity he displays ! What a masterly comprehension of the relations of his several asseverations to one another !

The expedient by which he attempts to set aside the proof of a personal advent in the vision of Christ's descent to the earth on a white horse, with the armies of heaven, and destruction of the beast and false prophet, exhibits an equal grasp of intellect. His argument is, that as Christ's appear-

ance to John in the first vision was *not* prophetic, or symbolical of his appearance to him, at a time then future, therefore his appearance in the vision of the nineteenth chapter, which *was* prophetic, or symbolical, is no proof of his appearing at a period, then future, to destroy those denoted by the beast and false prophet ; or, in other words, that, inasmuch as that which is not prophetic does not foreshow his second coming, therefore that which is prophetic does not !—logic worthy of the purpose for which he employs it, and kindred to that of his whole article. The appearance of Christ in the first vision was not prophetic, or symbolical of another appearing. His design in it was simply to apprise the apostle from whom the revelation came, commission him to write it, and especially to dictate to him the letters to the churches of Asia. The fact, accordingly, that that appearing was not prophetic, is no more a proof that his appearing at the destruction of the beast is not, than the fact that his appearing to the disciples at the sea of Galilee was not prophetic, is that the symbols of the seals, the trumpets, the vials, or any others of the visions, are not. He thus again, by the assumption on which he here proceeds, overturns his whole system ; for if the fact, that the first vision of the Apocalypse is not predictive, proves that that of chap. xix. 11–27, does not foreshow Christ's second coming ; it must prove equally, not only that none of the other symbols are prophetic of that which by the laws of symbolization they represent, but that none of the passages, on which Mr. S. relies to sustain his views, are predictive of what they signify,—inasmuch as they are all associated with other passages that are merely descriptive or historical, not prophetic. Such is the abyss of confusion and self-confutation in which his argument ends !

He treats of two or three other topics in the course of his essay ; but his results are reached so obviously by mere assertion, his reasoning is so inconclusive, and his assumptions and interpretations marked by such ignorance and fatuity, as to render a minute notice of them unnecessary. He alleges, for example, the predictions and promises of “the outpouring of the Spirit in the latter days” as a proof that his whole work in the regeneration and sanctification of the

race is to be accomplished antecedently to Christ's coming, on the assumption either that the whole work of redemption is to be completed before his advent, which is to beg that which he affects to prove; or else, that the Spirit cannot exercise his office in Christ's presence, which is again to beg that which he should demonstrate, and is wholly groundless and false. The principal passages to which he refers, are promises to the Israelites, and respect the period of their restoration, and re-establishment in their national land, which, it is abundantly shown by those predictions themselves, and other prophecies of the Old Testament, are to take place after Christ's coming. It is expressly shown in the Apocalypse, that the Spirit is to continue his office after the resurrection of the saints and descent to the earth. "The Spirit and the bride say come," at the close of the visions. The bride is the symbol of the risen saints; their utterance of the invitation must take place to be heard by men after their resurrection and descent to the earth, and is, therefore, to be during their reign over the nations as kings and priests; and the invitation of the Spirit, which is to be contemporaneous, is, of course, to be of the same period. Besides what can be more groundless and irrational than to assume, that the Spirit cannot renew and sanctify men as well in the presence of the Redeemer as while he reigns in heaven? Mr. S. even asserts that any other theory than his "makes" these promises of the effusion of the Spirit "difficult, and *tends to divest them of interest!*" Can prejudice or infatuation go further than this! Is there anything in the folly and hallucination of Miller, or his lowest disciple, that exceeds it in blindness and fatuity? The regeneration and sanctification of the race through unending ages, it seems, has nothing in itself of significance and grandeur! The work of the Spirit owes its whole interest to its being accomplished, in accordance with Mr. S.'s theory of it, formed not only without authority from the word of God, but in defiance of its frequent and emphatic teachings! This is truly worthy of a writer who settles questions by asseveration.

He alleges the fact that there is to be a resurrection after the thousand years as a proof that the vision of the first resurrection, Rev. xx. 4-6, is not symbolic of a real resurrec-

tion, on the assumption that there is to be but *one resurrection*; which is to beg the position to be proved, and is in direct contradiction both to the laws of symbolization, and the interpretation—"This is the first resurrection,"—given in the passage itself of its meaning. But perhaps the most extraordinary specimen of exegesis and logic presented in his essay is his construction of the second Psalm:—

"In the same psalm we have the solemn decree of the Father that the heathen shall be given to the Son for an inheritance. By what means is this decree, which secures the glorious triumph, to be executed? The prophet tells us, 'the king is set or *poured out*, upon the holy hill of Zion,'—the well known figurative denomination of the Christian church. Does not this clearly indicate that *the church* is to be *the instrument*? Does not a king conquer by means of his subjects? The expression, '*I have poured out my king*,' may be equivalent to 'I have constituted my king, *by pouring out my Spirit*,' and then it refers to the abundant and glorious outpouring of the Spirit on the primitive disciples, and those effusions yet to be enjoyed."—P. 664.

We doubt whether the annals of ignorance and presumption present anything that transcends this in fatuity. 1. In direct violation both of the Hebrew text, and of the Septuagint, Vulgate, and other translations, which exhibit the king as the subject of the action, Mr. S. puts him in the place of the oil that was poured, and makes the hill of Zion the object on which the pouring took place—the effect of which is to represent THE HILL, instead of the Son, as invested with kingly power! 2. He asserts that Zion is "the well-known figurative denomination of the church," which is, in the first place, a mere unproved assertion; next, it is wholly without authority from the word of God. If Mr. S. is aware of any passage in which Zion is expressly declared to be the Christian church, let him produce it. He has yet to learn probably that in order that Zion may be used by a metaphor to denote the Christian church, there must be an express affirmation that it is the church. And, thirdly, if, as he asserts, Zion means the Christian church, and that which was poured was, as he represents, poured *on Zion*, then it is the church, not Christ, nor the hill of Zion, that was invested by the act with kingly

power. It cannot, therefore, as he assumes, indicate that the church is to be the "instrument" by which the decree is to be executed. It implies that the church is itself the king that is to reign and obtain the triumph! 3. But he says, "the expression *I have poured out my King*, may be equivalent to—I have constituted my king by pouring out my Spirit, and then it refers to the glorious outpouring of the Spirit on the primitive disciples." Had this stupid misrepresentation of the passage proceeded from Matthias, Miller, or a Mormon, it would be regarded as a resistless proof of his utter ignorance and lawlessness. Had it appeared in the pages of some low and fanatical newspaper, it would have stamped its author and publisher with disgrace as absurd and presumptuous sciolists.

In the first place, it is a violation of the text of which no scholar would be capable, to represent it as exhibiting the king as being poured out. Such a process is incompatible with the nature of a corporeal being. It implies that he is a liquid in place of living flesh and bones. That which the text asserts is, that Jehovah had "anointed" him, which was the rite by which persons were constituted kings, or invested with kingly authority; as at the designation of David to the throne, the inauguration of Solomon, and others; and that is the meaning assigned to it by every respectable commentator, so far as we have observed, ancient and modern; and it is shown to be the sense in which it is used by the Spirit of inspiration himself, by the application of the passage to Christ, Act. iv. 25-28. "For of a truth Herod and Pontius Pilate have been gathered against thy holy Son Jesus, *ὃν ἔχρισας, whom thou hast anointed.*" It was thus Christ himself that was the object of the anointing act, not he that was poured out as the oil. The act towards the Son, which Mr. S ascribes to God, is violent and shocking in the highest degree. What could pouring him on Mount Zion be, but hurling or casting him there, as though an object of detestation? Is it possible to conceive of such an act, except as one of rejection and dishonor? It would be to dethrone him, and treat him with ignominy, instead of investing him with power and dignity. Next constituting Christ king by anointing him, cannot, as Mr. S. asserts, "be equivalent to

constituting him king by pouring out the Spirit on men!" What solecism ever surpassed this in extravagance and senselessness? Christ is not constituted king by the effusion of the Spirit. The supposition implies that he is re-constituted king at every effusion of the Spirit, which is false, and supposes that his kingship expires at every cessation of the Spirit's influence, and needs to be repeated, therefore, as often as the Spirit is outpoured. And, moreover, if the effusion of the Spirit constituted any one a king, it would be the person on whom he was poured, not a different being, and a being in a different world; and thence it would be the apostles, primitive disciples, and all who have been the subjects of the Spirit's influence, who would be represented by the passage as constituted kings, not the Son of God! Such are the unscholarly and lawless methods by which Mr. S. attempts to set aside the plainest and most unequivocal teachings of the Scriptures, and substitute his theories in their place.

If Mr. Steele's essay is to be taken as a specimen of the critical and theological knowledge of those who have given it their sanction, as we suppose it is on this subject, it indicates but very slight qualifications for the office of teachers. It is put forth with an air of the utmost assurance. Not the slightest suspicion seems to have been felt that it is not wholly unanswerable. More than ordinary pains have been taken, we believe, to give it notoriety. In notices of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, in which it appeared, attention was particularly called to it. It has been eulogized as a rare gem of critical learning, and urged on the notice of the churches as a most timely and effective exposure and confutation of great and dangerous errors. No intimation has been uttered that its author alone is to be held responsible for its doctrines. Not a hint has been given of dissent from any of its representations. What a deplorable degradation of the profession it bespeaks! What wretched superficiality in those who affect to be guides of public opinion! Not a trace appears in it of any acquaintance with the laws of philology, of the culture of which much has been heard of late years; not an indication that a glimpse has ever been gained of "the track of simple historico-critical exegesis, along which the science of interpretation now bids" the scholar and theologian "move." The crudest

blunders, the blindest and most fanatical dogmatism of Miller and his disciples, present nothing that exceeds this, either in ignorance of the principles on which the Scriptures are to be explained, or in contradiction to their indisputable teachings. We deeply regret this. We regret it for the honor of the profession. We regret it for the discredit which it brings on learning. We regret it for their own sakes. They may, perhaps, flatter themselves that they can settle this great question by their mere authority; that they have but to announce their opinions and the world will assent without inquiry or hesitation. They may imagine that with the co-operation of a very superficial, and, in some instances, a very venal and unprincipled press, they may beat down those whom they attack by mere misrepresentation and abuse. They could make no mistake betraying a profounder ignorance either of themselves or the public. They, like men in all other stations and pursuits, will infallibly find their true level; and a few more such specimens as this will produce a verdict which they will find it no easy task to reverse, though they should "seek it carefully and with tears." But they are unjust to themselves as well as to the sacred office and the subject. Their primary error is their attempt to treat the question without studying it. Had they qualified themselves for its discussion by a careful investigation of the principles by which it is to be determined, they would have emerged from the confusion in which they are involved, and invested their views, even if mistaken, with an air at least of learning and dignity. As there are among those who entertain the prevailing views on the subject, men who, from their talents and cultivation, are amply competent to treat it in an exact and thorough manner, we wish that its discussion may hereafter be assumed by them. It is due to their cause as well as the honor of religion. We have had ignorance, declamation, and dogmatism enough. Let us hereafter have something that merits the name of "scientific" interpretation; something that without a violent trope can receive the praise of sense, learning, and candor.

ART. II.—A DESIGNATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE FIGURES
OF ISAIAH, CHAPTER VIII.

BY THE EDITOR.

THIS prophecy was uttered at the same, or nearly the same period, as that of the preceding chapter, and relates, like that, to the deliverance of Jerusalem and Judea, from Rezin and Pekah, the speedy conquest of Damascus and Samaria by the king of Assyria, the disastrous result to the Jews of their alliance with that monarch, and the calamities and sorrows with which they were to be smitten in consequence of their revolt from God.

The prophet was directed to write on a roll or tablet, "Haste the spoil; Hasten the plunder." "And Jehovah said to me, Take thee a great roll, and write on it with a man's pen, Haste the spoil; Hasten the plunder. And I will take to witness for me credible witnesses, to wit, Uriah the priest, and Zechariah the son of Jeberechiah," v. 1, 2. It was Jehovah, probably, not the prophet, who selected or constituted those persons witnesses of the writing. The inscription on the tablet or roll, it would seem, was simply the expression, Haste the spoil, Hasten the plunder. The direction to write it with a man's pen was simply, it is presumed, a direction to write in the usual style of documents that were designed to be read by the people. An announcement was made, doubtless, to Uriah and Zechariah, of the kingdoms to which the inscriptions related, and the sign that was to confirm it, and determine the period within which it was to be verified; and it was that explanation of the reference of the writing that they were to corroborate by their testimony. The tablet was probably placed, after the birth of that child, in the temple, the palace, the prophet's house, or some other edifice in which it was seen by the people, and the design of communicating its meaning beforehand to those witnesses, the sign by which it was to be confirmed, and the time within which it was to be verified, was to excite the attention of the people to it, and convince them of its truth and significance in a higher measure than would result from the unaided testimony of the prophet.

'And I approached unto the prophetess, and she conceived

and bare a son. And Jehovah said to me, Call his name Maher-shalal-hash-baz, Haste the spoil; Hasten the plunder. For before the child shall know to cry my father and my mother, they shall take away the wealth of Damascus and the spoil of Samaria before the king of Assyria," or in his presence, v. 3, 4. The gift of this sign of the conquest of those capitals shows that the event, of which the birth of Immanuel, predicted in the preceding chapter, was the sign, was wholly different, and confirms the construction placed by us on it, as a proof of the deity of Jehovah, in contradistinction from the gods of the Syrians, and of the certainty of his promise to sustain and perpetuate the house of David. This prediction was fulfilled probably, within a year, by the conquest of Damascus and Samaria by Tiglath-pileser.

1. Metaphor. "And Jehovah spake again to me, saying: Because this people contemptuously rejected the waters of Siloam gently flowing, and is rejoicing in respect to Rezin, and the son of Remaliah, therefore Jehovah brings up upon them the waters of the river, strong and many,—even the king of Assyria and all his glory,—and it shall come up over all its channels, and go over all its banks; and it shall pass over into Judah, and overflow and pass through; to the neck it shall reach, and the spreading of its wings shall fill thy land, O Immanuel." V. 5–8. The waters of Siloam are those of a pool at the foot of Mount Zion, within the ancient wall, that descend through an artificial channel from another fountain a short distance towards Mount Moriah, and are the only perennial waters of the city. They are supposed by interpreters, generally, to be employed as a symbol. Some regard them as standing for the house of David. But they have no adaptation to represent that dynasty, nor had it been rejected by the Jewish people. They appear to have concurred with the monarch in his distrust of Jehovah, his faith in the Syrian deities, and his alliance with the king of Assyria. Others suppose the waters to represent Jehovah's providence, protection, or kingdom. But as the waters themselves were not an act or agency, but merely an instrument, they were not suited to symbolize his acts or agency. If they were used as a symbol, it would only be in a relation like that which they actually sustained to the inhabitants of Jerusalem as a *means*

of life and enjoyment, not as a cause or bestower of those means, which was Jehovah's relation to them as their protector and benefactor. The waters of Siloam then were not a representative, but were themselves the object of that contemptuous distrust or rejection which is ascribed to the people of Jerusalem ; and that rejection, not something else, was the reason of the punishment that was threatened because of it. Its criminality and offensiveness, accordingly, must have lain in its involving a distrust and rejection of Jehovah. The act was doubtless, therefore, a disbelief of the adequacy of the waters of that pool for the wants of the city during the siege by Rezin and Pekah, and an attempt to obtain a full supply by the introduction of others within the walls ; and that was probably the object for which Ahaz had gone to the end of the conduit of the upper pool, or point, where it passed beneath the wall into the city, at the time of the announcement to him of the prophecy of the preceding chapter. It was in direct disobedience, therefore, to the command to him on that occasion, to make it the object of his care to *be quiet*, to guard against alarm, abstain from endeavors to defend himself by measures that would necessarily be wholly inadequate, and trust to Jehovah for the deliverance which he had promised. In disregarding that command and proceeding to fortify themselves, as though their safety was to depend on their own exertions, until the king of Assyria could interpose for their deliverance, they manifested a total disbelief of Jehovah, and presented a just reason for his showing them their folly and guilt, by allowing the Assyrian monarch, to whom they looked for protection, to inflict on them the identical evils which they expected to escape by his intervention. The joy and exultation which they felt in respect to Rezin and the son of Remaliah, was joy, doubtless, either at the persuasion that they should be able to resist them, till the king of Assyria should come to their relief, or, possibly, at their having already been induced to abandon the siege by the news of his confederacy with Ahaz, and purpose to invade their territory.

The waters of the river also are usually treated by commentators as a symbol. They are, however, used by a metaphor, though the affirmation that the king of Assyria and his army

are the Euphrates, instead of being direct, is introduced as an explanation. Had they been employed as a symbol, the description would have been in the past, instead of the future tense; and the inundation would have been represented as having been beheld by the prophet. The meaning is the same as though the expression had been, "inasmuch as the king of Assyria and his army are in the faith and hope of this people, an Euphrates, therefore, Jehovah will bring up upon them the waters of that river, its strong and many waters, and it shall come up over all its channels, and go over all its banks, and it shall pass over into Judah, overflow and pass through, to the neck shall it reach, and the spreading of its wings or sides shall be the filling of thy land, O Immanuel." Its reaching to the neck, indicates that it would expose the population to imminent danger of destruction.

2. Metonymy in denominating the army of the Assyrian monarch his glory. Instead of his glory itself, it was but the instrument by which he gained the conquests that gave him glory, and made him the object of admiration and trust to the Jewish king and people.

3. Metaphor in denominating the sides of the current, or its expansion to the right and left, its wings. The term is supposed by many commentators to denote directly the wings of the Assyrian army; but as it is the water of the river that denotes the invading army, it is the waters that spread on either hand from the main current, that denote those portions of the army that were to make excursions from the line of march and conquer the cities and villages on either hand.

4. An Apostrophe in the address to Immanuel; "and the spreading of its wings shall fill thy land, O Immanuel." By filling the land, is meant filling the vales and plains over which such an inundation would naturally run, to the extremities of the country towards the east and west.

That the waters of the Euphrates are thus used in this passage by a metaphor, not as a symbol, confutes the construction generally placed by interpreters on the sixth vial of the Apocalypse, as denoting the decay of the Turkish power or empire. On the assumption that the Euphrates is here employed as a symbol of the Assyrian king and his army, it is

held by many that the Euphrates, on which that vial was poured, must be the symbol of the *empire* through which that river runs at the period when the vial is poured. That assumption is inadmissible indeed in every relation ; as, in the first place, on the principle on which the river is supposed to be used in this passage, it must denote *the monarch and his army*, not the territory or empire ; and in the next place, in order that it might denote the monarch and his army, the capital in which he reigns, should be on the borders, or in the vicinity of that river, not in a remote part of his dominions. But apart from these incongruities, as the river is not here employed as a symbol, it cannot from its use here be assumed that it in that vision symbolizes the Turkish Sultan and army.

5. An Apostrophe to the Jewish people and their Assyrian allies : " Associate yourselves, and be broken ; and give ear, all ye of remote parts of the earth, gird yourselves and be broken ; gird yourselves and be broken ; take counsel, and it shall be without effect ; speak a word, and it shall not stand ; for God is with us," v. 9, 10. This direct address to the confederates adds greatly to the emphasis of the predictions ; they are made to stand as it were in the immediate presence of Jehovah, and hear the announcement of their defeat. The passage has an unusual number of figures.

6, 7, 8, 9. Metaphors in the use of broken and stand. Their union was to be dissolved, as a vessel is broken by a powerful blow, or an edifice dashed to pieces by a resistless shock : their orders were not to be executed, nor their promises verified, but to fail of accomplishment, as a person who is unable to sustain himself in an erect position, sinks to the ground.

10, 11, 12. Hypocatastases : in the use of give ear all ye of remote countries, an attitude of attention is substituted for attention itself : and in the use of gird yourselves, a preparation of the body in one relation for acting, is substituted for a preparation generally for the contest that was approaching.

The reason given for the defeat that was to overwhelm them is sublimely emphatic : because of Immanuel, or because God is with us.

13, 14. Hypocatastases. " For Jehovah spake to me thus

with a strong hand, and instructed me that I should not walk in the way of this people," v. 11. A strong hand is used by substitution for the powerful influence of the Spirit; and walking in the way of the people, for imitating their example, and joining them in their reliance on the Assyrians for deliverance. An act or agency of one species is put for one of another.

15. Metonymy in the use of fear, for its object, or causes, "saying, call ye not everything a conspiracy which this people call a conspiracy; neither fear ye their fear, nor be afraid." v. 12. The meaning doubtless is that they should not, like the people, who had forgotten that Jehovah was their monarch, regard a disapprobation of the king's schemes, and refusal to concur in his alliance with the Assyrians, as a conspiracy, or treason; but remember that Jehovah was their real ruler and protector, and yield their supreme homage to him. This is seen from the command that follows.

16, 17. Metonymies. "Jehovah of hosts him shall ye sanctify, and he shall be your fear and he your dread." v. 13. Fear and dread are here used for their object. To sanctify Jehovah, is to regard him with the awe and render him the homage that is his due.

18, 19, 20, 21, 22. Comparisons. "And he shall be as a holy thing, but as a stone of stumbling and as a rock of offence to both the houses of Israel; as a gin and as a snare to the inhabitants of Jerusalem." v. 14. To such as sanctified Jehovah and made him their fear, he would be in his providence such as they regarded him: he would manifest his power, wisdom, and holiness, by protecting, sanctifying, and blessing them according to his promises: but towards the two houses of Israel and the inhabitants of Jerusalem, he would pursue such a course as on the one hand to leave them to act upon their false views and cherish their fallacious hopes, and on the other, to meet the disappointment and destruction of which he had forewarned them. This is an exemplification of the great law of his administration, by which he allows men to make a practical experiment of their principles, and confutes them by the results in which they issue.

23, 24, 25, 26, 27. Metaphors, in the use of stumble and fall, broken, snared, and taken; "And many among them shall stumble and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and be taken,"

v. 15. These verbs, which denote motions or conditions of the body that are produced by an external cause, without the mind's volition and against its purpose, are employed to show that the Israelites were to be overwhelmed with catastrophes of an analogous kind, as resistless, as unexpected, and as much against their designs. What a terrible prediction to apostates, propagators of false doctrines, and perverters and corruptors of the church! God, instead of interposing to recall them by extraordinary and resistless means from their errors, only commands and forewarns them by his word, and leaves them to make their choice under the influence of the principles and passions to which they have surrendered themselves, and try the question practically whether their scheme is true or his. That they are allowed to go on in their war on his word, meet success, gather a crowd of followers, and acquire popularity and influence, is no indication in their favor; but, instead, an infallible signal of their destiny to a defeat as great proportionally and as awful as their crimes, and as eternal as the retributions are to be with which they and those whom they draw with them to destruction, are to be overwhelmed.

28. Metonymy in the use of the houses of Israel, for Judah and Jerusalem, the two divisions of that people.

"Bind up the testimony, seal the law with my disciples," v.

16. The disciples or learners were the witnesses, doubtless, whom the prophet had *taught* the meaning of the prediction couched in the name Maher-shalal-hash-baz. It is probable the whole prophecy that followed was subsequently inscribed on that roll, and that the purpose that it should be inscribed after the birth of the child, to whom that name was given, was the reason that the prophet was directed to take a large roll or tablet, though the first inscription embraced nothing but that name, and the record of the witnesses.

29, 30, 31. Hypocatastases. "And I will wait for Jehovah that hideth his face from the house of Jacob, and will look for him," v. 17. The acts of waiting and looking for Jehovah, are put for waiting for and expecting the fulfilment of the revelation he had thus made, and his hiding his face, for his withdrawing his favor. The great questions between Jehovah and the Israelites were to be put to a trial, and the prophet resolved, in faith in the divine veracity, to abide the issue.

"Behold, I and the children whom the Lord hath given me, are for signs and for wonders in Israel, from Jehovah of Hosts who dwelleth in Mount Zion," v. 18. This is a response of the Messiah to the prophet's resolution, as is indicated by Paul's reference of the homage to him, Heb. ii. 13; and it is in harmony with the fact that Immanuel was revealed as a sign to the house of David, chap. vii. 13-16, and that Shear-jashub and Maher-shalal-hash-baz were signs of the events that were indicated by their names. These children are said to be given to Christ, probably not only as they were the instruments of instructing and warning the true worshippers among the Israelites, but as they were partakers of the salvation he was to bestow on his people.

32. Metonymy in the use of house, instead of the people of Israel.

"And when they shall say to you, seek unto the spirits and the wizards that peep and that mutter, should not a people seek to their God?—are the living to seek to the dead?" To resort to necromancers for information respecting the future was inconsistent with their professing to be the people of Jehovah, and involved a renunciation of him, and an ascription of his perfections to the dead, who, instead of surpassing or equalling him in powers or prerogatives, were sinners under the dominion of the great penalty of transgression, and, therefore, the most unsuitable creatures to be made the object of such a regard.

33, 34, 35, Hypocatastases. "To the law and to the testimony, if any speak not thus, there is to him no light or dawn. And he shall pass through the land distressed and hungry, and it shall be that when he is hungry, he shall fret himself, and curse his king and his God, and shall look upwards, and he shall look to the earth, and behold distress and darkness, dimness of anguish, darkness, compulsion," v. 21, 22. Light, the means of sight, is put for the knowledge of God's word, and the condition of one who is forced in weariness and hunger to march on in utter darkness and despair, driven by a pursuing enemy, or an enemy to whom he has become a captive, put for the darkness, distress, and despair which those Israelites were to experience who rejected God's testimony, and relied for guidance on the spirits and wizards of

the Assyrians. Fret, an act on the body, is substituted also for an analogous treatment of the mind. What a picture of the agony, the desperation, the horrors with which they were to be overwhelmed!

In the remaining verse, the prophecy announces the dissipation of that darkness by the dawn of the Messiah's day, and will be more properly considered in connexion with the next chapter.

1. While the gift to the Jews of such an extraordinary sign to excite their attention, and confirm their faith, bespeaks God's condescension and goodness, it exemplifies also the decisiveness of the trial to which he subjects those who profess to be his people, and the indisputableness of the proof they are made to give of their dispositions towards him. The result to the inhabitants of Jerusalem and Judea in this instance was, that in continuing in unbelief, in putting their trust in the gods of Syria, and in looking to the monarch of Nineveh for deliverance, they gave a more open and indubitable demonstration than they otherwise would, of their alienation from Jehovah. They were put in a condition in which they could not possibly go on in rebellion, if imbued in the slightest degree with a proper sense of his being, perfections, and dominion. And such is his providence towards all those especially who engage in open revolt, transfer their allegiance to false gods or creatures, pervert his word, teach erroneous doctrines, and attempt to make religion the instrument of their ambition. The very means which should restrain and correct them, become, by their perverseness, the occasions of a manifestation of themselves that makes it clear to all spectators what their character is.

2. It is not to be expected that those who reject the true for a false gospel, and are resolute and zealous in the assertion and propagation of their errors, will ever be reformed. God will not misrepresent the truth by secretly countenancing their false faith, and leading them to act as though they did not hold it. Instead he will leave them under the power of their own principles, and conduct his providence in such a manner that they will exhibit in their lives the natural fruits of their system. His dealings with them will be in effect like a stumbling-stone to them, a gin, and a snare. Their very

success will be the means often of their revealing what they had designed to conceal, and of following their speculations to results which they did not originally contemplate ; until at length their system assumes the form in which it naturally terminates, and shows its tendencies by the evil passions which it generates, and the crimes which it prompts. The career of the leaders and parties that are now introducing the doctrines of infidelity into the church, and endeavoring to mould Christianity into harmony with them, may be anticipated with almost as much certainty as it can be shown when it is finished. They will not be led by any confutation of their principles to abandon them. With all their professions of sincerity and conscientiousness, they will not confine themselves to honorable means in maintaining them. With all their boasts of the unanswerableness of their arguments, they will not rely on the merits of their cause for its support and propagation. The conditions into which they will be led,—perhaps by the success they meet in their endeavors to win followers and applause, and the eager hopes the prospect of a powerful combination to sustain them will excite,—will be such as to prompt a development of their true characters, and they will be found to be as evil as their principles are ; false, contradictory, intriguing, deceitful, malignant, ready to make any profession by which they can evade objection, and prevent those who are disposed to reject their system from justly understanding it ; and capable of using any dishonorable arts by which they can advance their party, or obstruct or discredit those who oppose them. Such the Redeemer himself has taught us, is the law of his providence. “Beware of false prophets which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye shall know them by their fruits ! Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles ? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.” Matt. vii. 15–20.

3. To the law and to the testimony. If those who attempt to show what the purposes of God are in respect to the

church and world, do not speak according to his word, they can give no knowledge. They have no light, either in their boasted reason, learning, philosophy, or in man, whom they take as their guides, but are like persons who attempt to traverse an unknown region wrapped in impenetrable darkness. They know nothing of the direction in which they are advancing, the objects that surround them, or the dangers into which they are to fall. And how many of the views of God's designs, on which the church is now proceeding, are of this character! There was never an epoch, perhaps, when, with so much light, such narrow conceptions were entertained of the aims of his administration, and so large a mass of error held in conjunction with so much truth. The neglect and disbelief of the revelations God has made respecting the future, are as characteristic of the church now, as they were of the Jewish people in the days of the prophet. The schemes now entertained are, in many respects, as unlike his as were theirs, and the expectation of their accomplishment is, in a great degree, as truly founded on man.

4. However the crowd may now doubt and disregard the predictions and warnings of the Scriptures, as they did at the period of the prophecy, frame other schemes, and put their trust in man to accomplish them, it becomes Christ's disciples to wait, like the prophet, for Jehovah, and look for the verification of his word, in calm assurance that at the proper time it will be fulfilled, and the combinations and agencies that are designed to defeat it, instead of success, serve only to demonstrate the folly of their authors, and confirm and exemplify his truth.

ART. III.—RESEARCHES IN ASIA MINOR, PONTUS, AND ARMENIA, with some account of their Antiquities and Geology. By W. J. Hamilton, Secretary of the Geological Society. In two volumes. London: John Murray. 1842.

Among the most conspicuous features now presented by the countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa, in which the gospel

was first preached, are the marks they bear of the inflictions denounced by the prophets of the Old and New Testament. They are seen not simply in the extermination of their ancient inhabitants ; in the depopulation of vast regions that were once thronged by multitudes ; in the decay of agriculture, commerce, and the arts ; in the ignorance and barbarity of the tribes that now occupy them ; and in the prevalence of the most debased forms of false religion ; but in the vast and massy relics with which they are everywhere strewn of their former grandeur. No other countries were ever adorned by such a multitude of structures capable of surviving even in ruin the lapse of so many ages. Were such a storm of devastation to sweep over this continent as deluged and wasted Greece and Italy in the fifth century, Asia Minor, Pontus, Armenia, Syria, Egypt, and Numidia, in the seventh, eighth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, not a trace would be left after a short period of our towns, or our most massive buildings. But the cities of the eastern world, at the period of the institution of Christianity, were formed in a considerable degree of imperishable materials. The walls with which they were surrounded, were usually, if not Cyclopean, of great breadth and solidity. Their temples, palaces, theatres, baths, and other public edifices, were built of blocks of a size and weight that are unknown in modern architecture ; and adorned with pillars proportionally massy. Their sarcophagi and sepulchres were formed of the same solid materials, or excavated from the rocks themselves. Even in their ruin, therefore, whether overthrown by the hand of man or shaken down by convulsions of the earth, they are imperishable ; and seem to have been built of indestructible materials, that they might prove eternal monuments of the overwhelming judgments by which their guilty authors and possessors were struck from the earth.

We have been much impressed in the perusal of Mr. Hamilton's volumes with the proofs which Asia Minor, Pontus, Armenia, and the islands of the Mediterranean present of the inflictions on the apostate nations inhabiting those regions that are foreshown under the fifth and sixth trumpets of the Apocalypse. The country lying between the Euxine and the Mediterranean was, in the early ages of the Christian era, one

of the most populous, cultivated, and flourishing portions of the globe. It had been the seat, for a thousand years, of a succession of powerful and magnificent kingdoms; not only were all the provinces adorned with splendid capitals, but the ports of both seas, the line of the principal rivers, and the whole interior were studded with marble cities, in all of which were temples or churches, a forum, a theatre, an acropolis, and many other elegant and apparently imperishable structures. The symbols of the fifth and sixth trumpets, and the explanations that are given of the work those whom they represented were to perform, though indicating that they were to be the instruments of terrific inflictions on the false worshippers whom they were to torture and slay, yet present no direct hint that the destroying blow was not to fall alone on them; and were we without any historical details of their agency, or knowledge of the present condition of the country, it would not be unnatural to suppose that the slaughter, abuse, and degradation of the nations whom they overran were the only evils which they wrought; and, perhaps, depopulation for a period, and oppression and wretchedness, the only traces that would remain of their devastating sway. Those changes are, indeed, vast, and proclaim with an awful voice the guilt of apostasy, and God's avenging justice. The ancient races are almost wholly extinct. The number of Greeks and Armenians who survive is small. The chief part of the thin and wretched population now scattered over the territory are Turks and Kurds. But the almost total change of races, depopulation, poverty, ignorance, and wretchedness, are not the only proof of the accomplishment of those predictions. Their fulfilment is stamped in ineffaceable characters on the country itself, in the boundless remains with which it is everywhere strewn of its ancient cities, that show at once the populousness and grandeur from which it has fallen, and the change which its inhabitants have undergone from culture and prosperity to barbarism and misery.

Mr. Hamilton commenced his tour at Moudaniah on the south side of the sea of Marmora, and passing down the Rhyndacus till he struck a branch of the Hermas, advanced on the line of that river to Smyrna. He next sailed up the Euxine to Trebizond, and travelled to Erzaroom, and Kars in

Armenia. On returning, he passed down the coast of the Euxine from Trebizond to Sinope, when he went into the interior, and crossing the mountains forty or fifty miles from the sea, proceeded eastward, on a line nearly parallel with the coast to Niksar, the ancient Neo-Cæsarea, on the Lycus, and thence westward to Amasia, Ancyra, Laodicea, Antiochia, and other ancient capitals, to Smyrna. He next visited the principal sites on the coast, from Smyrna to Ephesus, and in Rhodes, and at length traversed the country south of his former route, and visited Iconium, Cæsarea, and other important places, and found at almost every step of his progress the relics of once flourishing cities, dilapidated temples, fallen aqueducts, and rifled sepulchres. Those on the line of his journeys are counted not merely by scores, but hundreds; and could the whole with which the plains and vales and hills are everywhere set be enumerated, they would, doubtless, be found to amount to several thousands. Some of them, indeed, it is known, were overturned by earthquakes anterior to the incursions of the Saracens; and some, doubtless, were dismantled in the civil wars of the third and fourth centuries, and those of the Persians in the sixth and seventh; but by far the greater number owe their destruction to the Arabs and Turks. Many of them, emptied of their population by ages of slaughter and oppression, were left to dilapidation and overgrown with shrubbery and wood. The most solid and beautiful structures of many appear to have been wantonly demolished by the hands of their conquerors; and many have been gradually torn down, that their materials might be wrought into new erections. We transcribe, as a specimen of them, Mr. H.'s description of Sagalassus, three degrees and a half nearly E. from Ephesus, and directly north of Adalia.

"There is, I believe, no other ruined city in Asia Minor, the situation and extensive remains of which are so striking and so interesting, or which gives so perfect an idea of the magnificent combination of temples, palaces, porticoes, theatres and gymnasia, fountains and tombs, which adorned the cities of the ancient world. Between the main portion of the town and the scarped cliff which rises to the north of it, an irregular terrace, partly natural and partly artificial, extends for nearly half a mile, following the outline of the hills, and rising gently towards the centre. On it are the remains of several buildings, apparently temples

or sepulchres; but at the western extremity is one which appears to have been a church. At its northwest end are the remains of a portico of fluted columns, and at the other extremity a high wall, with an irregular niche, and surmounted by a frieze or cornice. Within are several shafts of fluted marble columns, some of granite, very large and plain, and also many tiles lying on the ground. The length of the building is forty-five paces. Near it are the remains of a smaller circular building, which may have been a fountain. A massive wall once extended along the outer edge of the terrace, now only visible in places, and other buildings have been erected on it. Near the centre are the remains of a small but beautiful temple, extending from north to south, in front of which are the fallen ruins of the portico and outer wall, with the shafts of fluted columns. To the S.E., at a lower level, are many walls and foundations, and heaps of columns, marble blocks, and pedestals; the ruins of other buildings cover the ground towards the south, and the remains of a magnificent theatre are seen to the east. In the face of the steep cliff, to the north, numerous niches and small sepulchral chambers have been excavated in the rock, while, to the south, rises a high and insulated conical hill, with the remains of a wall round its summit, agreeing with a description of the acropolis given by Arrian in his account of Alexander's expedition.

"But the most interesting building amidst these ruins is the theatre, which is both larger and better preserved than any I had yet seen, and which, from the circumstance of almost the whole of the scena being perfect, conveys an excellent idea of the appearance and distribution of a Greek theatre. Part of the proscenium has fallen in, but the seats of the cavea are, with scarcely an exception, as perfect and as level as the day they were placed; although the effect is, perhaps, slightly injured by two or three fine walnut trees growing amidst them. The diazoma and the interior gallery behind it are almost perfect, as well as most of the vomitoria which open from it and the passages leading into the diazoma.

"It is built on the sloping side of a hill facing west, but itself faces S.W., so that while the left wing is excavated in the hill side, the right or west side is artificially built up. The diameter of the theatre, taken at the inner circumference of the upper row of seats, is something under three hundred feet. The wall of the right wing of the cavea measures one hundred and twelve feet.

"The point of a hill a hundred yards S. by E. from the theatre, has been crowned with a handsome fluted column, the fragments of which, three feet and nine inches in diameter, are scattered about on all sides. The base, which measured six feet square, overturned and displaced, is also lying near. The situation is very commanding, and from its

vicinity to the necropolis, it was, probably, a sepulchral monument. On a rocky hill further east, the ground is covered with sarcophagi, all of them broken open or displaced, with their covers lying near them. Some few of these tombs, excavated in the solid rock, had been afterwards covered with a stone slab; some were richly ornamented with garlands and festoons, some with the caput bovis, and others with a lion's head.

"Proceeding S. W. into the town I passed numerous heaps of blocks of stone, marking the sites of ruined buildings, and reached a spot surrounded on all sides, except the south, by mounds or low hills supported by walls and terraces, on which once stood two temples and other public buildings. It was evidently an agora or forum: in many places the ancient pavement was still visible, strewn with the broken shafts of fluted columns and pedestals intended for statues. I saw no inscriptions, but it appears to have been surrounded with a colonnade of fluted columns. On the south a handsome flight of marble steps leads to a wide street, marked on each side by an avenue of pedestals through which the road, a kind of *via sacra*, passed to the ruins of a beautiful temple situated on a projecting point of rock. On one of these pedestals an inscription is preserved, Η ΣΑΓΑΛΑΣΣΕΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΣ ΠΡΟΤΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΙΣΙΔΙΑΣ, by which we are enabled to fix with certainty the name of the city. The temple above-mentioned is prostrate, but every part of it seems to be there, and it is still beautiful in its fall; the deeply fluted columns, the rich architrave, mouldings, and cornices—the graceful Corinthian capitals of the columns all attest its former loveliness. It is built partly on the solid rock, and partly on a platform supported by a wall of masonry. The old Cyclopean walls of the town may be again traced to the west of the *via sacra*, lower down the hill, following its windings, and strengthened by several towers now in ruins. Further west, also, the slope of the hill is covered with remains of other walls and gateways; while to the N.W. a long row of fallen columns and marble blocks marks the position of an extensive colonnade, or portico, extending from E. to W., but all is one scene of ruin and confusion; the marble has assumed the grey and corroded look of the barren hills on and amidst which it lies, and at a distance can scarcely be distinguished from any other mass of rocky fragments precipitated from the mountains overhead."—Vol. i. pp. 487–491.

Of Laodicea, which is nearly west of Sagalassus, at the distance of near a hundred miles, he gives the following description:—

"Nothing can exceed the desolate and melancholy appearance of the

site of Laodicea : no picturesque features in the nature of the ground on which it stands, relieve the dull uniformity of its undulating and barren hills, and, with few exceptions, its grey and widely scattered ruins possess no architectural merit to attract the attention of the traveller. Yet it is impossible to view them without interest, when we consider what Laodicea once was, and how it is connected with the early history of Christianity. Its stadium, gymnasium, and theatres, one of which is in a state of great preservation, with its seats still perfectly horizontal, though merely laid upon the gravel, are well deserving of notice. Other buildings, also, on the top of the hill, are full of interest ; and on the east the line of the ancient wall may be distinctly traced, with the remains of a gateway. There is also a street within and without the town flanked by the ruins of a colonnade and numerous pedestals, leading to a confused heap of fallen ruins on the brow of the hill, about two hundred yards outside the walls. North of the town, towards the Lycus, are many sarcophagi with their covers lying near them partly imbedded in the ground, all having long since been rifled.

" Amongst other interesting objects are the remains of an aqueduct, commencing near the summit of a low hill to the south, whence it is carried in arches of small stones to the edge of the hill. The water must have been much charged with calcareous matter, as several of the arches are covered with a thick incrustation. From this hill the aqueduct crossed a valley before it reached the town, but, instead of being carried over it on lofty arches, as was the usual practice of the Romans, the water was conveyed down the hill in stone barrel-pipes ; some of them also are much incrustated, and some completely choked up. It traversed the plain in pipes of the same kind, and I was enabled to trace them the whole way quite up to its former level in the town. Thus we have evidence that the ancients were acquainted with this hydrostatic principle of water finding its level when confined in a close pipe, or drain of sufficient strength. The aqueduct on the hill appears to have been overthrown by an earthquake, as the remaining arches lean bodily on one side without being much broken. At the spot where it reaches the town is a high conical wall, picturesquely covered with incrustations and water pipes of red clay, some of which are completely choked up. The remains of what appeared to have been another water tower were not far distant.

" The stadium, which is in a good state of preservation, is near the southern extremity of the city. The seats, almost perfect, are arranged along two sides of a narrow alley which appears to have been taken advantage of for this purpose, and to have been closed up at both ends. Towards the west are considerable remains of a subterranean passage, by which horses and chariots were admitted into the arena, with a long

inscription over the entrance. Near the east end are the ruins of a massive pile of building, the plan of which can be distinctly traced, the walls still standing to a considerable height.

"The whole area of the ancient city is covered with ruined buildings, and I could distinguish the sites of several temples with the bases of the columns still *in situ*. Strabo says, that although formerly an inconsiderable place, it had risen to great importance just before his time: thus the ruins bear the stamp of Roman extravagance and luxury, rather than of the stern and massive solidity of the Greeks."—Vol. i. pp. 515, 516.

We add his description of Hierapolis, a few miles north of Laodicea:—

"The whole area of the town is covered with ruins of a more imposing character and form than those of Laodicea,—it may indeed be called a town of ruined palaces and temples. The effect is considerably heightened by the singular beauty of its position. The broad terrace on which it stands, is bounded on the N. E. by a range of lofty mountains, while to the W. and S. the eye wanders over a vast extent of productive and rich pastures.

"In a hollow of the hills to the N. are the ruins of one of the most perfect ancient theatres to be seen in Asia Minor, from whence the view is very extensive. It faces the S.E. and overlooks the ruins of the gymnasium situated on the edge of the terrace. This extends above a mile from S.E. to N.W., having a projecting mass at each end, formed by the sediment of calcareous water. It is covered with ruins as well as the lower slope of the hills; in one place is a grand pile of arches, in another a colonnade, of which many columns are still standing; and again a fallen temple with its columns and massive doorways half buried in the ruins. In all directions rows of columns, walls, and sideposts of doorways meet the eye; but an air of ponderous taste pervades every building, unrelieved by the light Ionic shaft or elegant Corinthian capital. The city walls may be traced for a considerable distance, stretching across the terrace from the cliff to the hill, as well as along the edge of the former, where they are of Hellenic construction. In general they are formed of fragments of former edifices, with many columns and sepulchral monuments.

"Beyond the city walls to the E. and S. are also many interesting sepulchral monuments of large dimensions and imposing style. The height of one of them built amongst the rocks, and formed of large blocks of stone, is, exclusive of the pediment, about ten feet. The roof is

formed of two long blocks on each side. They are, in fact, small buildings or mausolea of stone in the same style, though differing much in detail, with stone shelves inside, probably intended for urns and vases containing the ashes of the dead. Some few bear inscriptions, but too much defaced to be copied.

"Proceeding along the terrace, a magnificent Doric colonnade 200 paces long, with the bases of the columns still *in situ*, connects the north-west gate with a triumphal arch, consisting of two gateways with a round tower on each side. Beyond this again to the N.W. is another large building eighty paces long, with massive walls and open arches. Some of the walls are slightly out of perpendicular, but the effect of this vast edifice is very striking. On the side commanding the view the building is left open, except three piers which support the roof. Beyond this again is the principal necropolis of the city; numerous handsome sepulchres and mausolea are still perfect, although robbed of their contents. I could not help admiring the taste, simplicity, and variety of construction exhibited in many of these monuments of the past."—Vol. i. pp. 518–521.

These are examples of the relics of ancient populousness, luxury, and grandeur, which are found at slight intervals throughout the whole country from the Hellespont to the Euphrates. What a stupendous proof they present of the guilt of the churches in the punishment of whom they were overthrown! What a confutation of their false worship! Had the idols to which they knelt in homage, or the saints and angels to whom they addressed their supplications had any power to save them, would they have been swept away by such a whirlwind of ruin? What an exemplification of God's truth and justice! Could we be made acquainted minutely with the history of their destruction; could the whole spectacle of terror, slaughter, outrage, oppression, and misery which the wars and tyrannies of twelve centuries have formed, be beheld by us; could we collect into one awful group the unutterable agonies and horrors, that rent the heart during that long night of suffering and despair, to what a towering height would our sense of these inflictions rise? With what a terrible significance would these memorials become invested? Vast and impressive as they are however, they have not exerted the restraining and reforming influence for which they seemed adapted and designed. The con-

tinued blindness and incorrigibleness of those on whom they fell, and the nations that witnessed the spectacle, are as extreme and dreadful as the punishment itself, and the monuments of its severity it has left. Neither were the Christians of Asia Minor, Armenia, Syria, or Egypt reformed by these judgments, nor were those of Greece, Italy, and the west of Europe, who beheld them, and through eight centuries trembled with the apprehension that they should themselves share in them, led to turn from their apostasy. "The rest of the men that were not killed by these plagues yet repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils, and idols of gold, and silver, and brass, and stone, and of wood, which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk; neither repented they of their murders, nor of their sorceries, nor of their fornication, nor of their thefts."

Nor have they wrought their proper effect on the Protestant churches. Though the great lesson which it teaches of the guilt of sin, and the certainty of its retribution, is presented to them as conspicuously, and urged as impressively as though it were proclaimed by a voice from heaven; they are, as a body, almost as little affected by it as the Catholics and Greeks themselves. A vast proportion of them on the continent of Europe have, in fact, within seventy-five years, rejected God as offensively and as absolutely as the image-worshippers of the east; and the elements of their atheism have entered deeply into the metaphysics and theology of Great Britain, and this country. As preventives and means of reformation, these chastisements seem thus to have wholly failed of their legitimate effect, as have all the similar inflictions with which the Christian and the Israelitish church has been smitten. On man their influence has apparently been almost lost. They seem to have answered scarcely any other end than to vindicate God in the eyes of other orders of beings who have beheld the spectacle, or been made acquainted with its character! What a dark and inexplicable mystery would this awful fact be were it not for the light thrown on these terrible judgments by the prophetic Scriptures in the indication that they fulfil their proper office in preparing the way for another and different administration, under which, through an endless round of years, the whole

race are to be redeemed? Then their import will be seen. Then the truths they exemplify of man and God will be comprehended and felt, and influences be drawn from them that will minister to the humility, faith, and love of the universe throughout eternal ages.

ART. IV.—A BRIEF TREATISE ON THE CANON AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES, for the special benefit of junior Theological Students, but intended also for private Christians generally. By Alex. McClelland, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. Second Edition, enlarged. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1850.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE first edition of this work embraced only the manual of interpretation, and an address to students of theology. The address serves in this edition as the introduction, and is followed by a treatise on the genuineness and canonical authority of the Scriptures. The manual, with the exception of a slight addition, remains, we believe, unchanged.

We are induced to notice this part of the work, from the view Professor McClelland presents of the interpretation of figurative language and prophecy. A proper treatise on those subjects is greatly needed. Compared with other branches they are but little cultivated. They have been the themes of conjecture and hypothesis, rather than exact investigation, and the theories that prevail respecting them are extremely crude and erroneous. The writings of the prophets constitute, however, so important a portion of the sacred volume, and figures are of such frequent occurrence in its historical and didactic, as well as its predictive parts, that no system of interpretation can justly be termed Biblical, that does not treat of them fully and accurately. The necessity of a better knowledge of the prophetic Scriptures Prof. McC. admits. He says in respect to them:—

"No department of theology has occasioned so much perplexity to serious inquirers, and the subject is still beset with difficulties, which we have little hope will soon be removed. God has suffered clouds and darkness to rest on it for the wisest reasons, some of which are obvious."
—P. 189.

We cannot, however, acquiesce in what he alleges as those reasons. "He would not deprive his church of the privilege which she has enjoyed in every age and place, *of walking by faith.*" We cannot persuade ourselves that either ignorance of his purposes, or a false belief respecting them, is a necessary condition of walking by faith. To walk by faith is to walk, we apprehend, by a belief in what God has revealed; not in darkness respecting it, or under false views, which were to walk without faith. The purposes and events he has made known must be understood and believed, in order that we may live in the conviction and expectation of them. We walk without faith, just in proportion as we reject, misapprehend, or remain ignorant of the disclosures he has made of the future.

"He would not," he adds, "by exhibiting a clear picture of the future, disturb the freedom of his creatures, and the natural course of human events." But his not having exhibited such a picture by revealing a greater number of events is not the reason that those which he has foreshown, are not easily determinable. If the means through which those are disclosed are intelligible, they may be as easily discerned as though they were a thousand times more numerous, and formed a clear picture of the future.

"In short," he says, "he would teach that our religion provides other business for us, than to indulge a childish curiosity as to 'times and seasons.'" But how does the revelation he has made in the prophecies teach that lesson? The fact that he has placed it in our hands, instead of teaching us to repress our curiosity respecting it, puts us under obligation to investigate its meaning; and any intricacy, therefore, in which it is involved, instead of showing that we are not to give it a careful attention, indicates that we are to study it with a diligence and perseverance proportional to the difficulty of learning its import. The larger the labor that is necessary, the greater the obstacles are that are to be overcome, the higher are

its claims on our consideration. A profound desire to know what it is that he has addressed to us, is not "a childish curiosity as to times and seasons." It is to impeach his wisdom, and detract from the glory of his government, to represent the great measures and events of his sway, which he has foreshown for our instruction, as suited only to excite the interest of children. The absolute duty of studying and mastering every part of the sacred volume, Prof. McClelland himself earnestly asserts and enforces. He says of the minister of religion :—

"He is by divine institution a *teacher*, and in the simple naked grandeur of this character, he stands before the people. A volume has been put into his hands of rich and various contents, nay, absolutely teeming with matter; and at the peril of his soul, he must spread it out in its whole length and breadth before his hearers. The principle on which he must act, is this simple and obvious one, and there is nothing in his commission which he may deliberately overlook. He is not at liberty here. Some parts of duty may perhaps be omitted without subjecting him to the brand of gross unfaithfulness. But if he neglect to expound the sacred volume, if he show no anxiety to form among his people habits of carefully reading and inwardly digesting it, he may well tremble at the thought of rendering an account."—Pp. 12, 13.

The obligation is of course absolute to study the prophecies,—which, aside from its historical parts, constitutes by far the largest division of the sacred volume,—as the narrative and didactic portions. They are as directly addressed to us. The knowledge of them is as essential to a just comprehension of the divine government; and they are fraught with as large and salutary an influence. Mr. McClelland errs, therefore, and is inconsistent with himself in cautioning his readers against studying them. He says :—

"We would not, therefore, encourage the student to speculate much on this subject. The predictions which have been fulfilled, especially those accomplished in the advent of our Redeemer, deserve all attention, being the strongest confirmation of the truth of our holy religion, and arguments of resistless force against the infidel. As to futurity—let the 'sapphire throne,' borne by the flaming cherubim, take its own mighty course."—P. 190.

But how is this to be reconciled with the duty which he has so strongly urged in the introduction, of investigating the whole of the sacred volume, and communicating the knowledge of it "to the people?" Is the minister any more at liberty here than anywhere else? If he arbitrarily sets aside this large and most important portion of the Scriptures, has he not as much occasion to tremble at the thought of rendering an account for it as for any other dereliction of duty? Mr. McClelland's advice that "the sapphire throne should be left to take its own course" is altogether inopportune. The question whether that "throne will take its own mighty course," is not the question which the interpreter is to determine, but what God has *revealed* on that and other themes. His averment, also, in the next sentence is equally irrelevant. "There is a 'living spirit in the wheels,' who *keeps his own counsel*, and seems, if we may judge from the past success of Apocalyptic commentators, to treat with very little respect the numerous attempts to advise him," p. 190. In his ambition to appear smart, Mr. McC. has forgotten that the subject he is treating, is the interpretation of what God *has revealed*, not what his counsel is, which he has withheld from our knowledge. How does the fact that he has designs which he has not disclosed, prove that the minister of his word is not to investigate those which he has communicated? It is in like forgetfulness that he exhibits it as the object of commentators on the Apocalypse to give advice to the Almighty, not to ascertain what it is that he has foreshown in it. How does the consideration that they are not to meet with success in undertaking to advise him, if guilty of such a presumptuous attempt, show that they are not to endeavor to ascertain the import of that which he has revealed for their instruction? Does it follow from the fact that they are not to teach him, that he is not to teach them? That because he does not take counsel from them, they are not to receive that which he has communicated for their guidance? How unfortunate that Prof. McClelland cannot find adequate opportunity to indulge his disposition to be witty, without a sacrifice of his sense; that in his eagerness to flourish his satiric thong he makes himself its victim, and sometimes suffers a worse laceration than he inflicts on others!

Prof. McC. admits that the importance of a critical knowledge of the Scriptures is but very inadequately realized ; and that a singular indisposition is felt to the exertion that is requisite to its attainment :—

"God, in his infinite kindness to man, has preserved for them an ample revelation of his will by a series of dispensations falling little short of miracle. He has set apart an order of men to be its official expounders, and the church is generously sustaining the institution by its munificent provision for the gratuitous education of candidates in all stages of their progress, and, when they have entered on their work, by relieving them of every worldly care and avocation, that they may give themselves wholly to it, and their profiting may appear to all men. *Yet the question is seriously asked, whether a practical acquaintance with these lively oracles in their proper dialects, should be anxiously cultivated by the Christian minister !*

"We blush to think in how many respects the children of the world are wiser than the children of light. The merchant's clerk, if his interest point that way, will sit down, and master French, Spanish, and German, without heaving a sigh. The gentleman who intends to travel a few years in the East, grudges no pains to make himself acquainted with Turkish, Arabic, or Lingua Franca. Even the girl, scarcely in her teens, wearied of thrumming on her guitar to the harsh strains of her native English, determines and carries the purpose through in a way that might astonish many a grave student of the other sex, to achieve a conquest over the sweetly flowing Italian. *But the professed interpreter of God's holy word, the legate of the skies,* is so astounded at the thought of learning a pair of languages,—than either of which a finer never vibrated on the human ear,—that he prefers to live and die, just able to spell the letters of his commission."—Pp. 14, 15.

This representation is peculiarly just in respect to the study of the prophetic Scriptures, and unfortunately is as true of most of those who cultivate, as of those who neglect the sacred languages. Prof. McC. admits also that many who attempt to expound the sacred word, proceed on principles and theories that are false, and instead of discerning and unfolding its meaning, necessarily miss or pervert it :—

"The sense of Scripture is in general one ; in other words, we are not to assign many meanings to a passage. . . . The trans-

gressors of this rule are the mystics and allegorists. Their fundamental maxim is not unlike that of the Papists ; for they consider the Bible to be a book so different from others, that its depth of meaning can never be reached by the ordinary laws of interpretation. Being from God, they insist that it must in all respects be worthy of him, and contain a richness of thought suited to his infinite understanding. This odd theory was a great favorite with the Jews, and they communicated their mania to the old Christian Fathers, whose writings abound in mystical expositions of all kinds. *Everything in sacred history was metamorphosed into type and symbol.* Origen denied even the literal truths of history, contending that its whole and only meaning was allegorical. Thus he pronounced it absolutely absurd to suppose that the world was created in six days ; *the creation signified the renovation of the soul by the gospel* ; and the six days intimate that it is carried on by degrees. Israel in Egypt he makes to be the soul living in error, and the seven plagues are its purgations from various wild habits,—the frogs denoting loquacity, the flies carnal appetites, the boils pride and arrogance. This mode of expounding continued through the different ages of the church, and *has been formally adopted by the Papists*, who recognise three senses besides the literal, viz. the allegorical, the tropological, and the analogical. Nor was it put down by the reformation ; Cocceius, a celebrated Dutch divine, carried it almost as far as Origen did. He held that the whole of the Old Testament was an anticipated history of the Christian church, containing a full recital of everything that should happen to the end of time. Even the Lord's Prayer is a prophecy, and its six parts denote six great epochs in history. Every good man in the Old Testament is a type of Christ ; every bad man of the devil, or the unbelieving Jews.

"Such schemes are to be wholly rejected. They destroy all certainty of interpretation ; taking the ground from beneath our feet ; and making Scripture a nose of wax which every one may twist into the shape that pleases him best. Thomas Woolston, a celebrated English infidel, attacked Christianity itself with these arms, insisting that the narratives of Christ's miracles were not designed to be histories, but are pure allegories. Volney, a French writer, has turned the evangelic history into a system of astronomy,—Christ being the sun and moon, and the twelve apostles the twelve signs of the zodiac."—Pp. 99–102.

This account of the mode in which the Scriptures have been tortured, and made the vehicle of teaching the fancies and hypotheses of expositors, is not overdrawn ; and, unhappily, is in a great degree as true of the interpreters generally

of the present day, as of those of earlier periods. The principle on which, whether orthodox or neological, most of them proceed in treating the prophecies of the Old Testament, is the same substantially as that of Origen, viz. that they are not literal, or their meaning that which their language expresses, but that the persons, places, and actions, mentioned in them, are representative of analogous persons and things in the Christian church.

Professor McClelland thus admits that those who assume the sacred office are bound carefully to investigate every part of the word of God, and communicate its teachings to their people ; that this great duty is most unhappily and strangely neglected ; that the theories on which many proceed, are false in the extreme ; and, finally, that in order to the discovery and evolution of the true meaning of the sacred text, it must be interpreted by the just and settled laws by which every other species of writing and speech in the ordinary intercourse of life is interpreted.

"The same method must be followed in expounding Scripture, which we employ in searching out the meaning of *other books*. It *was* indited to men ; it speaks to men, in *the language* of men ; and *was* understood by them to whom in ancient times it *was* addressed, *as* they understood any other communication. The design of God in giving it, was to communicate certain ideas, in order to which he must *speak to us, just as do others.*"—P. 97.

His object in the volume, accordingly, is to furnish the student with the rules that are requisite to guard him against the errors that are common in the interpretation of the Scriptures, and lead him to a true knowledge of their meaning ; and its value depends on its adaptedness to that end.

In what measure then is it suited to that office ? In order to answer its object as a corrective of the errors that prevail, it must point out and explain them in such a manner that the learner may be able to identify them, understand the principle on which they proceed, and possess the means of confuting them. That it may prove an adequate guide to the true sense of the prophecies, it must state the laws of all the media or instruments through which their predictions are

made, and teach the student how to apply them. If it has not these essential requisites; if no adequate information is given respecting the modes in which the sacred text is misrepresented; if no such light is thrown on the nature of figurative language as will enable the learner to distinguish it from that which is literal, and discern the criteria by which its meaning is to be determined; if the views that are presented, and the counsels that are given, are in a large degree erroneous and self-contradictory; if, finally, the subject is left in all the darkness in which it was enveloped before he attempted to treat it, and the volume can only serve to perpetuate the evils it proposes to correct; then it is unsuited to its object, and is not entitled to be received as "a Manual of Sacred Interpretation." And such, unfortunately, is its character.

In the first place, it states no law whatever for the explanation of the symbolic prophecies. Not one of the questions involved in that branch of his subject is treated by Professor McClelland; not a solitary hint is given, either to guard the student against a false method of interpretation, or to indicate what the principles are on which he should proceed in treating that class of prophecies. Whether Professor McC. holds that symbols are used to denote agents, objects, and events of the same class as themselves, or of a different kind; whether he supposes there is any settled relation between the representative and that which it represents; whether he is even aware that symbols are a peculiar instrument of prediction, and have their own laws, no specific information is given. He indicates, indeed, in the representation that the Apocalypse is "highly figurative and allegorical," that he regards them as a species of figures, and treats them as such in the statement that "sober criticism" "would infer that the phrase," the first resurrection, Rev. xx. 5, "cannot possibly receive any other than a *figurative* sense, on the very rational and obvious principle, that a *symbolical* document must be *symbolically* interpreted." P. 212. He thus, instead of furnishing rules for the interpretation of the whole of the prophetic Scriptures, entirely overlooks the most difficult part of them: a large division of Ezekiel, nearly the whole of Daniel, half of Zechariah, and the Apocalypse alto-

gether, with the exception of the letters to the churches. This alone demonstrates the inadequacy of his work to its object. A volume might as well be called a concordance of the sacred Scriptures, which embraced only the words of the historic and didactic parts; or a volume be denominated the New Testament, that contained nothing but the gospels, as a system that only presents rules for the exposition of language, be entitled "a manual of sacred interpretation." How is it that Professor McClelland omitted this branch of the subject, in respect to which, from its difficulty and the diversity of views that prevail, theological students are peculiarly likely to be betrayed into error? Has he no opinions respecting it? Has he himself neglected to study this large portion of the sacred volume? How is such an omission to be reconciled with his protestations that the whole should be mastered by candidates for the sacred office, if they would be qualified for their profession? How is he to vindicate himself, should those to whom he gives instruction ask in response to his remonstrances against their irresolution and negligence—"If the obligation to investigate the whole Scriptures is so imperative as you represent, how is it that you have not yourself fulfilled that duty? How can you reproach us for not attempting what you have not yourself achieved? How can you demand of us the interpretation of so large and difficult a portion of the sacred word, when you are not yourself prepared to yield us any aid? Thou that teachest another, teachest thou not thyself? Thou that makest thy boast of the law, through breaking the law, dishonorest thou God? Thou art inexcusable that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things." Instead of a manual of sacred interpretation, Professor McClelland should have made the title of his work—A treatise on the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, from which the topics of chief interest and necessity to the student are excluded.

In the next place he is nearly as deficient in the treatment of figures. To have furnished the aids that are needed, he should have given an exact definition of their several species, pointed out the principles on which they are employed, and shown the modes in which they are misinterpreted, that the

student might know how to distinguish tropical from literal expressions, confute the false constructions that are placed on them, and unfold their true meaning. He has, however, only presented a vague statement of the chief characteristic of several of the figures, and two or three useless directions in reference to their treatment,—such as not to seek for the allegory, which gives no information respecting the mode in which, when found, it is to be interpreted; and to “consider only the parts which are connected with the doctrine taught,” which leaves the question, which those parts are, wholly undecided. The metaphor, which is far the most important figure, and the most inadequately understood, he represents as involving so little difficulty as scarcely to need consideration, and dismisses it with the absurd remark, that “the great point to be remembered is, not to press the resemblance beyond the boundary intended by the author,”—by which he means, we infer, from the exemplification he gives, not to treat the figure as though it was employed in any other relation than that in which it is really used; which is simply to direct the reader not to commit a fatal mistake, but furnishes none of the necessary information to enable him to avoid it. Not a solitary rule is given for the interpretation of the figure; not a hint of the modes in which it is misrepresented; not an intimation that hundreds and thousands of passages are treated as metaphorical that are wholly free from the figure; not an allusion to the fact, that the pretence that passages that are wholly without a metaphor, or any other figure, are metaphorical, is the grand expedient by which the deniers and perverters of the great doctrines of the sacred word endeavor to expunge them from its pages. Who from his mere dozen lines on the subject would suppose that commentators, with scarce an exception, proceed in many of their interpretations on the assumption that a metaphor is not at all necessary to constitute a prediction metaphorical? Who would suspect that in a vast portion of instances they assume, that not only the predicate of a metaphorical expression, in which the figure lies, is metaphorical, but that the agent, or object, to which the predicate is applied, is metaphorical also; so that in the sentence, “Dan is a serpent by the way,” Dan is to be regarded as used

by the figure as well as serpent; the consequence of which would be, that the persons denoted by Dan would be left wholly unmentioned;—as if that title is not used as the name of the tribe, of which it is literally the denominative, but some other people, or some other class of agents, as Philistines, idolaters, hypocrites;—then there are no means of determining who they are; so that the proposition would simply declare that *some undesignated agent, or object*, is both like Dan, and like a serpent. Who would conjecture from him that an equally common method of misrepresenting and confounding the sacred text under the pretence that it is metaphorical, is by the assumption that the agents, objects, and acts of which it treats, are not the real subjects of the prediction of which it is the vehicle, but are mere symbols of a wholly different class?

This part of his work, therefore, is wholly unsuited to its object. He has not only not furnished the student with the aids that are needed to the interpretation of the figures of the prophets; but he has not even made himself in any tolerable degree acquainted with their nature. Not one of the directions he has given is of any real service. Not one of the points that are most essential to be understood, is approached by him. The whole subject is left in as absolute darkness as it was before he attempted to treat it.

In the third place, the "hints," which he gives "on the general subject of prophecy," are equally vague and irrelevant. Such is his first direction :—

"Remember that the diction of this part of the Scripture is intensely poetical. Not only were its authors poets, in the common sense of the word, but in its richest and noblest acceptation. In splendor of imagination,—in the gorgeous coloring which they throw over everything which they describe, in boldness of imagery and enthusiastic glow of feeling, they excel all other authors."—P. 190.

But no information is here given of the mode in which they are to be treated because of this characteristic. Professor McClelland merely indicates what he regards as a difficulty in their interpretation. He leaves the student to ascertain as he can, the method by which it is to be over-

come. After this bold stride towards the composition of "a manual," he relaxes from the severity of his exertions and indulges in an attempt at sarcasm, in which, as is usual, the stroke falls on himself:—

"How miserably such noble spirits will be explained by those who treat their productions as if they were discourses on history or civil government, we need not say. Quite as little may be expected from those who discover in their writings a dark and tangled forest of hieroglyphics; insist that every image is a definite *symbol* of invariable signification; and actually turn the noblest creations of genius into an Egyptian alphabet, of which these great Champollions have been fortunate enough to discover the key that enables them to decipher the most crabbed page in the book of destiny."—Pp. 190, 191.

But these last, unfortunately, are the very class to which Prof. McClelland himself belongs. He, and those who concur with him, proceed in a large share of their interpretations on the assumption, that there are metaphors in passages that are wholly free from figures, which is the fault he exhibits as an imagined discovery in the writings of the prophets of a "dark and tangled forest of hieroglyphics." We have an example of this error in his treatment of the phrase "the first resurrection," Rev. xx. 5, "as metaphorical." P. 212. As that expression is, as we shall hereafter show, an interpretation of the symbolic vision to which it is applied, it cannot be metaphorical. It is the *living* or restoration to life of those who had died, that is denominated the first resurrection; and a resurrection, therefore, to a life in the body; as that is the only return to life that is predicable of the corporeally dead. As it is a literal resurrection then, that is the symbol, and that is declared to be the first resurrection, the affirmation that it is the first resurrection is also literal. From the nature of the metaphor it cannot be otherwise.

To "insist that every *image* is a definite *symbol*" is the error also into which Mr. McClelland and those who follow his method of interpretation fall, in treating the agents and objects to which the figure is applied in metaphorical passages as symbols. We have an example of this misconstruction in his treatment of Mount Zion and Jerusalem in the

ancient prophets, as signifying "the church," and the enlargement of Jerusalem as the enlargement of that church, p. 199. Not content with interpreting the language of the prophets according to its proper laws, they treat that which is literal as though it were figurative, and the agents and objects of that which is figurative as though they were symbols; and thus "turn the noblest creations of genius into an Egyptian alphabet, of which these great Champollions have been fortunate enough to discover the key that enables them to decipher the most crabbéd page in the book of destiny."

His next observation is equally irrelevant. "They were, while composing their predictions, in a state of ecstasy or high supernatural excitement, produced immediately by the inspiring Spirit," p. 191. That was undoubtedly the fact, but in what sense is it a rule by which the student is to interpret their writings? What is it that Professor McC. deduces from their writing in that supernatural state? Not surely that the interpreter must be in the same state also in order to understand them. How then does the mere consideration that they wrote under such an influence, show what the rules are by which their predictions are to be expounded?

Of the same character are the remarks that next follow; "that they saw objects *as present to them*," that they "did not, however, see them in their strict relations to each other, nor in their chronological connexion," and that "they seldom perceived objects as related to each other in time." Admitting these statements to be true, what information do they furnish for the guidance of the student in the interpretation of the symbolic objects which the prophets saw? How does the fact that Daniel, Zechariah, and John, beheld the symbols of their visions "as present to them," show what the principle is on which those representatives are to be interpreted? How does the fact that they did not see them in their strict relations to each other, nor in their chronological connexion, show how the student is to discern what their mutual relations and chronological connexions are? Can anything be plainer than that the Professor has forgotten his subject, and is confounding the mode in which the symbols were beheld by the prophets, with the rules by which their meaning is to be ascertained by the interpreter?

He adds as a fourth hint, that "as the scenes and events described were present" to the prophet, "*so their dress and coloring were borrowed from objects, with which, as a Jew, he was familiar.*" But how were the statement correct, could it thence be seen what the principle is on which those scenes and events are to be interpreted? How can the fact that the prophet was familiar with their dress and coloring, *show us* who are *not* familiar with them, what those scenes and events denote? Is not the Professor presenting an enigma quite as perplexing as that which he is attempting to solve? However clearly the prophets may have seen the symbols which they describe, it is apparent that he has completely lost sight of the object at which he is professedly aiming. But the statement itself is not altogether true. Was Daniel familiar with the dress and coloring of the four great beasts which he saw emerge from the sea? Was John familiar with those of the dragon and wild beasts, the locusts and horsemen, the angels and cities, the resurrections and judgments of his visions? What key has this great "Champion" discovered by which he can explain this "crabbed page" of his volume?

After apologizing for the undue length to which he extends the discussion of these topics, because "the subject is important," and he thinks, "*not always understood,*" he adds that as his "statement of general principles relieves from the necessity of entering into a minute detail of rules, two only shall be added." How his "statement of general principles," which are not principles of interpretation, but mere statements respecting the conditions in which the prophets wrote, the modes in which they beheld the objects of their visions, or the character of their writings, "relieves from the necessity of entering into a minute detail of rules," for the explanation of the language and symbols through which their predictions are conveyed, the reader will probably not find it easy to see. Mr. McClelland has obviously in inadvertence substituted a statement on one subject for a statement on another, between which, unfortunately, no such resemblance subsists that the representative can fill the office he has assigned it. A description of John Baptist's dress and food might as well be offered as equivalent to a statement of his

doctrine, as a description of the condition of the prophets when beholding and writing their visions, as equivalent to a detail of the rules by which their prophecies are to be interpreted.

Of the two rules he has "specified," the first is the following,—“Be not anxious to find chronological connexion and order in the prophecies.” But how does this direction not to search for what it is affirmed is not to be found in the prophecies, aid the student in ascertaining the meaning of that which is found in them? What information does it give respecting the principle on which their language and symbols are to be explained?

His other rule is equally nugatory, “*Do not interpret prophecy too literally.* Its splendid imagery and glowing pictures must not be tortured into statements such as a witness makes in a court of justice, or a historian in describing the campaigns of Wellington or Bonaparte; they are figures, and must be treated as figures,” p. 206. But how is the student to know from any of the aids which Mr. McC. presents, what it is to interpret it “too literally?” It surely is not to treat it too literally to interpret all its language that is free from figure, as literal. To expound its literal language as though it were figurative, is as great an error as it is to interpret its figurative language as though it were literal; and that, unfortunately, is a fault with which Mr. McC. himself and a crowd of others are chargeable.

He furnishes, therefore, no canon whatever of interpretation in these two rules. He only directs the student, first, not anxiously to seek what he cannot find; and next, not to fall into any mistake in interpreting that which is found. And these counsels comprise the whole of his manual on the subject of prophecy. Not the shadow of a law either of language or of symbols is presented by him for its exposition. He proceeds as though the proper principles of interpretation were so well understood as to render a formal statement of them unnecessary; and nothing more could be needed than some general statements respecting the style of the prophets, and the condition in which they wrote. This is certainly a very different course from that which professors in other departments of knowledge pursue, when attempting to teach the

principles of their several branches. The mathematician, when stating the laws of geometry, does not assume that the definitions and axioms on which it is founded are already so well known that no notice of them is necessary, and content himself with merely describing the process by which Euclid and other ancient cultivators of the science acquired their knowledge of its truths, or the shape and color of the diagrams by which its problems are worked, or the appearance the demonstrations present when wrought out at large. He does not, when attempting to teach the laws of arithmetic, deem it enough to direct the learner to assign to the figures only the power that properly belongs to them in their several places, p. 206 ; to remember that they have, when multiplied by one another, an "intense" capacity of generating larger sums, p. 90 ; and, finally, not to be anxious to find problems that are to be solved by the rule of three ; nor when they fall in his way, to treat them too much as though they were mere questions in addition and subtraction, pp. 169, 200. It is only in treatises like Professor McClelland's, on the interpretation of the prophetic Scriptures, that such a preposterous method is pursued. There is no other department of life in which so transparent a spectre could be passed off on the sober, as a substantial reality.

In the last place, Professor McClelland not only has not presented the requisite rules for the guidance of others, in the interpretation of the prophecies ;—it is apparent from the inconsistencies into which he has fallen, that he is not master of his own principles, but in contravention of them, commits, without being aware of it, some of the most reprehensible of the faults which he denounces in others.

Thus his first general maxim is, that the object of interpretation is to give the precise thoughts which the sacred writers intended to express. "*No other meaning is to be sought, but that which lies in the words themselves, as he employed them ; in all cases, we should take a sense from Scripture rather than bring one to it. This rule is fundamental,*" p. 93. This is indisputably a just and most important maxim. His next is equally incontrovertible. *The same methods must be followed in expounding Scripture which we employ in searching out the meaning of other books.* It was indited to men ; it speaks

to men in the language of men, and was understood by those to whom in ancient times it was addressed, as they understood any other communication, p. 97. His third is of like truth and importance, "*The sense of Scripture in general is ONE; in other words, we are not to assign many meanings to a passage. Words, indeed, have a variety of significations, but they cannot have this variety at the same time. A single sense must be chosen, in doing which one expositor may differ from another, and be dubious which is right. They cannot, however, be both right; if we approve the one, we must, if they really differ, disapprove the other,*" pp. 99, 100. Yet their maxims, if followed, would overturn a very large share of the constructions which he places on the prophets. His interpretation, for example, of the predictions of the restoration of the Israelites, rebuilding of Jerusalem, and re-erection of the temple, is in direct contravention of them. He says:—

"Mount Zion and Jerusalem, the civil metropolis of the nation, signify the church redeemed by the blood of the only true sacrifice for sin, and serving God in spirit and in truth. The aggrandizement and enlargement of Jerusalem are the enlargement and increase of that church. Her enemies are called by the names of the ancient enemies of Judah, Egypt, Ammon, Moab, Edom, and Babylon. The restoration of the Jews in later days to the blessings of God's covenant, is *symbolized* by their rebuilding a temple on Mount Moriah; and the union of all nations in the love and worship of God is shadowed forth by a universal participation in the feast of tabernacles. The extinction of sectarian feuds, and the delightful harmony prevailing among the lovers of the Lord Jesus Christ, especially the redeemed children of Abraham, is beautifully represented by the healing of the ancient separation between Israel and Judah. There is nothing strange in this; it is perfectly natural to invest our conception with the hue appropriate to our physical and moral condition, and the objects with which we are daily conversant. Where could the prophet have gone, if precluded from this source of coloring?"—P. 199.

Can anything be plainer than that this is in total contradiction to his first maxim, that "no other meaning is to be sought but that which lies in the words themselves," as the prophet "employed them?" The words of the prediction to

which he refers, contain no such meaning as he ascribes to them. There is no figure or law of speech by which, as they are used by the prophets, they can possibly carry such a sense. In order, for instance, that the mountain of the Lord's house, and Zion, in the prediction, Isaiah ii. 2, 3, may by a metaphor denote the church, there must be a direct affirmation to that effect. The prediction cannot otherwise be metaphorical, there being nothing whatever in its present form of the nature of that figure. It is the mountain of the Lord's house, and Zion, that are the subjects of the affirmations, and that which is predicted of them is appropriate to their nature. Nothing can be more free from metaphor than the announcement, "It shall come to pass in the last days that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established on the height of the mountains." But Professor McClelland treats it as though it were preceded by the metaphorical affirmation, "the mountain of the Lord's house is the Christian church," which completely changes the subject of the prediction. He assigns to it a meaning, therefore, that does not lie in the prophet's words, but in others which he, *by a tacit interpolation*, ascribes to him, in violation both of his own maxim and of the laws of language.

It is in equal violation also of his grand maxim, that "the same method must be followed in expounding Scripture, which we employ in searching out the meaning of other books." We never interpret other writings on the theory on which he here proceeds. When historians state that the English and French fought a great battle at Waterloo, no one ever assumes that the English and French are not the subjects of the affirmation; but that a metaphorical sentence precedes it, declaring that the English are Jews, and the French Ishmaelites, and that the meaning of the assertion therefore is, that a Jewish and an Ishmaelitish army fought a great battle at Waterloo. No one assumes that Waterloo is preceded or followed by a sentence declaring it to be Esdraelon, and that that ancient battle-field, therefore, was the scene of the contest, instead of Waterloo. Yet it is by this *monstrous method of interpolation*, unheard of in the interpretation of other documents, that Mr. McClelland makes Zion, Jerusalem, and the temple stand for the church; and forces into the

text the other meanings he assigns to it. Such an abuse of language, in any other profession, would consign its perpetrator to universal disgrace and detestation.

It is in equal contravention of his maxim, if the process by which he makes the passage the vehicle of such a prediction, be the assumption, that the mountain of the Lord's house, Zion, and Jerusalem are symbols of the church; and the Gentiles who go up to the house of the God of Jacob, representatives of Christians. No other books or documents are interpreted on such a theory. No one supposes, in determining the import of deeds, contracts, and wills, that the parties named in them are not the real parties to the engagements and conveyances which they recite, but only representatives of another set. A jurist or judge who should set up such a pretence, would be regarded as either insane or unprincipled. No one, in interpreting Josephus, treats the Israelites and Jews wherever they occur, as symbols of Gentiles, and the Gentiles as symbols of Christians; nor Jerusalem, Zion, and the temple, as representatives of the church. Dr. McClelland himself would contemplate such a perversion of the historian with scorn, and pronounce the perpetrator fitter for the mad-house than the chair of an interpreter of Greek. It is only in expounding the oracles of God, that such an outrage of the laws of language is deemed allowable, and a proof of philological skill.

It is irreconcilable also with his maxim, that "the sense of Scripture is (in general) ONE; in other words, that *we are not to assign many meanings to a passage.*" Can anything be more certain than that he assigns to these predictions a second meaning, that not only does not properly belong to them, but that wholly changes the very subjects of which they treat? The import he ascribes to them differs as widely from their philological sense, as the meaning of Josephus would, if all the persons, places, actions, and events, mentioned in his history, were treated as mere symbols of agents, places, and occurrences of a different kind. What now is the secret of this extraordinary self-contradiction? Can anything be plainer than that Professor McClelland is not master of his own maxims; that he founds a large part of his most important constructions on principles that are in direct antagonism

with them, and that he would reject were he aware of their nature ?

He presents similar evidences of his want of a just apprehension of the subject, in his representation that millenarians deduce their peculiar views from the prophecies, by treating their figurative language as though it were literal. He says :

“ Do not interpret prophecy too literally. Its splendid imagery and glowing pictures must not be turned into statements, such as a witness makes in a court of justice, or a historian in describing the campaigns of Wellington or Bonaparte ; they are figures, and must be treated as figures. Here our millenarian brethren err exceedingly. Their whole hypothesis of the Jews becoming pre-eminent as a nation over all the people of the earth, the actual subjugation of the latter under their political sway, the rebuilding of the temple, the resurrection of the martyrs, and the personal residence of Christ as a temporal monarch in Jerusalem, rests on no other basis than the assumption that tropes, when found in the Bible, tell the literal truth.”—Pp. 206, 207.

Dismissing from consideration such of these terms as millenarians would not employ in expressing their views, no statement could indicate a more total inacquaintance with the grounds on which they rest their belief of the restoration of the Israelites, their readoption as God's peculiar people, the rebuilding of the temple, the resurrection of the saints at Christ's advent, and his personal and visible reign on earth, than the representation that its sole basis is the assumption that the tropical language of the Bible is literal, and must be interpreted as though it were free from figure. First, because a large share of the passages which they regard as teaching those truths, are not tropical but literal. Next, because the figures of those of them that are tropical, instead of giving them another sense, make that more obviously and indisputably their meaning ; and thirdly, because, instead of language, some of those truths are revealed through *symbols*, which are not on any theory to be interpreted as *language* either figurative or literal. Thus, in the annunciation to Mary that “ she should bring forth a son, and call his name Jesus,” it was predicted—“ He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Highest ; and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of

his father David, and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever and ever, and of his kingdom there shall be no end." There is no metaphor whatever in this language. The only figure in it is metonymy in the use of the house, instead of the family or descendants of Jacob, which does not alter in any measure, nor obscure the sense.

In like manner in the symbolic investiture of Christ with the dominion of the earth in the vision beheld by Daniel, it is said: "and there was given him dominion and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." Dan. vii. 13, 14. There is no metaphor, nor any other figure, in this language. It is altogether literal. The only figure in the passage is a metaphor in the use of the verb pass, in the expression,—we have omitted,—"his dominion . . . shall not pass away," which literally denotes the movement of a body in space. That, however, is not literally predicable of a dominion; but the verb is used to signify the analogous change by which a dominion declines, loses its energy, and finally ends; and, instead therefore of altering the sense of the passage, makes that more clearly and emphatically its meaning.

So also in explanation of the vision of the resurrection and enthronement of the martyrs and other saints, Rev. xx. 4-6, it is said: "and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years,"—"this is the first resurrection." The chant, too, of the living creatures and elders in the vision of Christ's reception of the sealed book is closed with the saying, "Thou hast made us unto our God kings and priests, and we shall reign on the earth." Rev. v. 9, 10. These expressions also are absolutely literal. No one not wholly unaware of the nature of the metaphor, will assert its existence in them. And such is the character also of a great number of other passages, which millenarians regard as announcing the advent of Christ anterior to the millennium, his reign on earth, the resurrection of the saints at that period, and reign with him, the restoration of the Israelites, and the re-erection of the temple. So far from founding their belief of those great events on the assumption, that the tropical language of the Bible is literal, they are led to it, by interpreting the prophe-

cies in accordance with the nature of the instruments, through which they are made ; those that are embodied in language by the laws of that language, whether literal or figurative, and those that are foreshown through representative objects, by the laws of symbolization. And just in proportion as any of their number pursue any other method, they overturn their own faith.

On the other hand, it is by departing from that method, and treating the language and symbols of the prophets as though they were of a wholly different nature from what they are, that Mr. McClelland and other anti-millenarians reject the reign of Christ on earth, the pre-millennial resurrection of the saints, the re-erection of the temple, and other great events which are foreshown in the prophecies. It is only by assuming that literal passages are figurative, and mere language prophecies symbolical, that they expunge from them those predictions, and make them the vehicle of another meaning. This is exemplified in their treatment of all the passages we have quoted from the Old and New Testament. Those from Luke and the Apocalypse, they assert, are metaphorical ; and that from Isaiah, which is a mere language prophecy, they hold as symbolical. Professor McC. may make his "philology sweat at every pore," he can never, except by these processes, get rid of the import we assign to them. Could he have given higher evidence than is presented in this mistake, that he is essentially unaware of the nature both of his own principles, and theirs whom he opposes ?

Such is his treatise on the interpretation of the figurative and prophetic Scriptures ! Was there ever a more pitiable abortion put forth by a man of respectable talents, in a responsible position, and on a great subject ? Could indications more decisive be given that theological students who have no other instruction than this volume furnishes, must not only remain without any just understanding of the subject, but infallibly be led into gross and mischievous error ? Can a more resistless and humiliating demonstration be imagined, that the art of biblical interpretation, instead of having reached the perfection which is generally thought by those who claim to be proficient in it is, on these subjects,

so utterly neglected and misconceived as to render a prompt and thorough reformation indispensable to the credit of the profession? The defects and errors we have pointed out are not peculiar to Dr. McC. They are common to him, with other writers and interpreters generally, in this country and Europe. We have no evidence that he is not as well versed in the languages and literature of the sacred volume, as most others whose office it is to give instruction respecting them. Whatever faults of taste he has, he is not likely to be suspected of a want of adequate talent. He has cultivated himself with much diligence. He has familiarized himself with the modern philology. He has drunk as deep as others of the fashionable neological hermeneutics, and with far greater discrimination than some who make a more ostentatious display of their learning. He is a fair representative, therefore, we presume, of the class, and his volume a fair exemplification of the imperfect state of the art; and it is on that account that we have noticed it, that an exposition of the faults of the methods that are now pursued may induce a re-study, and better understanding of the subject. Can any candid reader persuade himself that a system that is obnoxious to such formidable objections, can stand the trial of a searching criticism? Does it need the eye of a prophet to foresee, that however reluctant some may be to admit that their cherished theories are false, and with whatever obstinacy they may struggle to perpetuate their reign, truth will ere long make its way with the intelligent and candid, and the ignorance and quackery that are now dignified by the names of learning and science be regarded with the ridicule and scorn which they deserve?

ART. V.—OBJECTIONS TO THE LAWS OF FIGURES.

BY THE EDITOR.

It is Professor Bush's principal aim, in the articles that follow those we have already considered, to invalidate the

laws we have stated of figurative language, especially in their application to the prophecies of the restoration of the Israelites: and he pursues the same method as in his criticisms on the laws of symbolization; introducing and interspersing his discussion with contemptuous imputations of self-confidence, and dogmatism, of violent objurgations against the results we deduce from the principles on which we proceed, and assurances to his readers, that, however formidable the task may seem, when the proper moment arrives, he shall inflict a blow on our system that will consign it to the annihilation it deserves;—*while, at the same time, he admits the truth of all our main positions; acknowledges that, if the question is to be determined by the mere laws of language, it is impossible to escape the conclusions we have reached; and concedes, that he evades them only by quitting the ground on which we stand,—the principles of language and symbolization,—and ascending to “the plane” of Swedenborg, whose theory, he confesses, is not directly deducible from the Scriptures, and could never have been known by men, had it not been revealed by that self-constituted seer.* He accordingly enters into no thorough trial of the question which he affects to decide; confines himself chiefly to an attempt to prove that, however true the laws he assails are generally, there are, in his judgment, exceptions to them; and that exceptions must, necessarily, divest them of validity; and contents himself with efforts to imbue his readers with prejudice and disbelief.

He begins his objurgations by charging us with Judaizing; not that we represent a compliance with the Jewish rites as obligatory on the Gentiles, and necessary to their justification, which is the proper import of the term; but simply, that what we maintain is held by the principal Jewish teachers also:—that the predictions and promises of the restoration of the Israelites are literal, and are to meet a literal verification. But what is he to accomplish by this imputation? Does he imagine that the fact that David Kimchi, David Levi, Aben Ezra, and other rabbies, who were masters of their national tongue, held, that the ancient prophets foreshow the restoration of their nation, proves that the laws of the metaphor are not what we have represented

them? It is on their truth or error, that the validity of our construction of those prophecies depends—not on the views of Jewish rabbies. Can Professor B. show, then, how their believing with us convicts those laws of inaccuracy? Or is his object to be gained without the aid of argument, by the mere use of an opprobrious epithet? The resort to such an expedient seems to us to bespeak either a conscious want of any legitimate means of reaching the end at which he aims, or else an extreme inconsideration of the results to which his theory of Judaizing leads in respect to himself. If simply to agree with the principal Jewish writers on any of the great themes of revelation is to Judaize, does not Professor B. see that he is as chargeable with it as any one else? Does not he concur with those writers in respect to a great number of things taught in the Old Testament? Does he not believe with them, for instance, that Jehovah is the true and only deity; that he is the creator and upholder of the world; that the Scriptures are his word; that he made a covenant with Abraham; that he revealed himself to Moses, and constituted him the leader of the Israelites; that he appointed Aaron to the priesthood; that he led the Israelites out of Egypt; that he gave them the law at Sinai; that he established them in Canaan; that he communicated to the prophets the messages which they uttered; that he revealed the coming of the Messiah, and the establishment of his kingdom? Why then, if concurring with the leading Jewish writers, in respect to the great and indubitable teachings of the ancient Scriptures, is to Judaize, is not Prof. B. as open to the discredit of that imputation as he wishes to persuade his readers we are? If he is able by any legitimate means to convict our views of error, why does he resort to such a preposterous pretence?

Before he ventured thus to disparage the interpretation of the prophets by the legitimate laws of language, it would be well to debate with himself the question in the first place, whether God could, had he attempted it, have made a clear and indubitable revelation that the Israelites are to be restored to their national land, and re-adopted as his peculiar people? Does he believe it was in the power of the Almighty, had he undertaken it, to communicate such a revelation to the

prophets, and to have embodied it in language in such a manner, that it would be certain and demonstrable from the laws of speech, that that was the import of the prediction? We presume he will not deny it. He regards *us* as having expressed the conviction in such a form, that that event is made known through the prophets, as to leave no doubt of our meaning. He treats the language employed by others also as presenting a clear and indubitable utterance of that persuasion; and would deem it unjustifiable and absurd to put any other construction on their affirmations. He surely cannot suppose that God is less able to select the requisite terms and use them in the proper form to make them the vehicle of announcing that event.

But if he considers that it is practicable to the Almighty to frame a prediction in language in such a manner that, interpreted by its proper laws, it shall indubitably foreshow the restoration of that people; let him then, in the next place, consider whether any terms could be selected or any modes of expression employed, that would form a clearer and more undeniable prediction of that event, than is presented in those which God has actually used for that purpose. Can Prof. B. point out any terms that would more effectually designate that people as the subjects of the predicted event? Can he indicate any that would more clearly and indisputably define the nature of the event itself? Is he aware of any that would more specifically identify the country to which they are to return? Can he conceive of any antecedents, attendants, or consequents of the event, that, if interwoven in the prediction, would contribute in a higher degree to determine its nature, and preclude a false construction, than those which are incorporated in the predictions as they stand in the prophets? He will soon become aware, if he makes the experiment, that it is altogether impossible. He not only cannot transcend the omniscient, but neither he nor all the linguists on earth united can frame a series of predictions within the same compass, that shall embrace such a number of particulars that contribute to mark that as the event foreshown, and inwrought in such a form as to render it impossible by the laws of language to assign to the prophecy any other meaning. He may search through all the realms of written language,

and he cannot find a theological, a legal, a philosophical, a scientific, or an historical document, that more simply and demonstratively expresses that which it proposes to set forth and affirm, than those predictions set forth and assert the restoration of that people.

But if he grants this, as we doubt not he will, he must admit that interpreted by the laws by which all other writings are construed, the import of these predictions is undeniably that which we ascribe to them. Determined by the settled usages of speech, it is no more open to debate than the question whether the relations of numbers to each other are such as the multiplication table expresses, or the solutions of problems in geometry are such as Euclid represents.

If then that, though their indubitable and only philological sense, is not the predictive import of those prophecies, it is manifest that their prophetic meaning must depend on something wholly distinct from the language in which they are embodied, in its ordinary usage. If it lies in the terms, it is to be deduced by some principle entirely different from that by which uninspired writings are interpreted; and that principle, therefore, in order to be known, must be revealed. It cannot be inferred from usage. It cannot be known by intuition. To all this Prof. B. will undoubtedly assent. That these are his convictions, he in fact admits, and it is apparent from the whole course of his discussion.

As then the question whether his view of the prophetic meaning of these prophecies is correct, does not, in his judgment, turn on the laws of philology; as he founds his construction of them on ground that lies wholly out of the domain of speech; what, we ask, is he to achieve by discrediting the views of figurative language, which he assails? How do his utterances of surprise, perplexity, and astonishment at the course we pursue, yield any confirmation to his theories? How can it aid his object, could he succeed in showing, that though the principles we hold are in the main correct, there are passages that appear to present exceptions to them? It does not, on his theory, touch the question whether his constructions are right. He knows that the laws of philology and the principles of Swedenborgianism are wholly indepen-

dent of each other. His questioning or confuting the first, cannot confirm the last. His confirming the last, were it practicable, could not confute the first. What then is the object of his crusade against the views we have stated of figurative language? He knows, that tried by the principles of philology, the construction we place on the predictions of the restoration of the Israelites, is indubitably correct. He is aware that when he and others reject that construction, and assign them another meaning, it is by interpreting them on principles that are wholly different from those on which he construes the language in which we have expressed our views of their import, and all other uninspired writings. What end, then, is to be subserved by his charges of Judaizing, his imputations of self-confidence, and his attempt to discredit laws, the truth of which, he in the main admits;—unless it be to divert his readers from the proper issue, and lead them, through misapprehension and prejudice, to reject that which cannot be subverted by legitimate argument?

From the imputation of Judaizing he turns to an attempt to confute our reference of the predictions of the restoration of the Israelites, and re-building of Jerusalem, to the literal Israel and city, on the ground that the Jerusalem, the re-erection of which is predicted in the latter chapters of Isaiah, is a mere representative of the church, and fills the same prophetic office as the new Jerusalem of the Apocalypse; and founds that representation on the mere fact that the description given of the two cities is, in many particulars, very nearly the same. But in this he, in the first place, takes for granted the point which he proposes to prove, viz. that the Jerusalem of Isaiah is a symbol. The fact that it is such a city, in many or all respects, as that which was exhibited in vision to John, is no evidence that it was employed like that, as a representative of an organization of risen and glorified saints. Its being used as a symbol in the Apocalypse is no more a proof that it is employed in that relation also in Isaiah, than the fact that the temple, altar, and court, and the holy city itself, are used as symbols in the eleventh chapter of the Apocalypse, is a proof that that is the relation in which they are employed in Christ's prediction of their overthrow, Matt. xxiv., or in any of the narratives of the gospel, or the

ancient Scriptures. Let us suppose that Jerusalem is to be rebuilt in accordance with the predictions of Isaiah, and what obstacle is there to its being employed as a symbol in the form it will then bear any more than there is to the use of the city and its temple as symbols, in the form in which they existed anterior to their destruction by the Romans? The supposition that they must necessarily, from the similarity of their description, be used in the same relation, is clearly not only without ground, but preposterous, as it implies that the city cannot be described or used in any other instance except as a representative of another object. Professor B.'s assumption is thus fraught with the most fatal consequence to his own system as well as the truth; inasmuch as if granted, all the agents and objects which he regards as used symbolically, are divested by it of their real existence, and made mere symbols. Let us know then distinctly, what it is that he holds on this subject. Does he maintain that an agent or object that is in any instance used as a symbol, is shown by that fact to be used in that relation, also, in all the other instances in which it is mentioned on the sacred page? If so, then he has no real geographic and historic Jerusalem whatever; no temple; no Israelites; no land of Israel; and the whole fabric of Judaism, as well as Christianity, is instantly swept from his hands. If, to escape from this catastrophe, he admits, as he undoubtedly will, that agents and objects that are used as symbols may also have a real existence, and be the subject of a literal description and literal predictions, then he must abandon his assumption that the Jerusalem of Isaiah is not to be a real city, but only fills a symbolic office like that of the visionary Jerusalem beheld by John. The fact that the description given of them is in many particulars the same, is no more a proof that each is merely a symbol, than the fact that the earth, the sea, and the fountains and rivers of Asia and Europe, are the same as those that were seen by John in the visions of the Apocalypse, demonstrates that these objects have no existence whatever except as mere symbols.

But let us ask again, does Prof. B. doubt that God could, if he chose, embody a prediction of the re-erection of Jerusalem in such language, that, interpreted by its proper laws, it would

be a veritable description and prophecy of such a city as that which is delineated by Isaiah? We presume not. Can he show then that any terms could have been selected better adapted to express such a prophecy than those which are actually employed for the purpose? Will he deny that taking the terms in their philological sense, they actually form a prophecy of such a city, and of nothing else? And, finally, will he deny that a city, a sea, a river, a fountain, the earth, the sun, the moon, a star, may have a real and independent existence, notwithstanding it is employed in a prophetic vision as a symbol? If not, then the whole of his confident assumption and asseveration on this subject falls to the ground? How is it that he neglected to look at these considerations; that he ventured his argument on a foundation that thus yields to the first critical shock, and precipitates his whole system to the dust?

But Prof. B.'s favorite method of establishing a point, is very different from that of consistent and unanswerable argument. If he cannot support a proposition by evidence, he can assure his readers that it is so obviously true as not to need any demonstration. If he cannot disprove a law, he can pronounce it a solecism that shocks "the primary intuitions of the Christian mind, and give it to the winds," as too palpably false to need a formal refutation. He says:—

"It is easy to see how completely the two prophets are divorced from each other in this interpretation of their respective burdens. . . . In the one case, Jerusalem is a literal, and in the other a symbolical city; and the whole reason, as far as we are able to judge, of this diverse construction is, that the prophecy of Isaiah is couched in comparatively unfigured diction, while that of John involves a visionary representation, and, therefore, falls into the category of symbolical predictions, which must of course be interpreted, not on the principle of *similia similibus*, but of *similia dissimilibus*. It must represent something different from itself; it cannot therefore be by any means identical with the Jerusalem of Isaiah.

"Now we say at once that if any alleged law or canon of hermeneutics, however plausibly urged or argued, leads to a result that outrages the simplest and most primary intuitions of the Christian mind, we give it to the winds forthwith, as an authoritative rule of universal application. If it be admitted to hold in other cases, we know it does not hold

when adherence to it lands us in a conclusion so near an absurdity as in the present instance. Any asserted principle of exegetic science, which requires the admission that the above predictions of Isaiah and John refer to two distinct, diverse, and unrelated states of the church, bears the marks of fallacy on its face, and we set it aside without dubitation or delay. A similar sentence do we unhesitatingly pronounce upon the same principle in its application to other results which hold a prominent place in Mr. L.'s theory. *We object to them that they go counter to mental convictions*, founded upon other considerations, which are as imperative in forbidding, as aught that Mr. L. can possibly adduce in sustaining his conclusions. As nothing in the literal sense or canonical authority of the book of Genesis, can countervail the deductions of geological science in regard to the vastly elongated periods of the earth's past duration, *so do other departments of science*, and even other texts of Scripture, as emphatically put their veto upon such alleged issues as the resurrection of the body, the restoration of the Jews to Palestine, the visible advent of the Lord in the clouds, the physical disruption of the Mount of Olives, the intermingling of the living and the re-living saints in an earthly economy of a thousand years' continuance, of which the literal Jerusalem is to be the metropolis, all which are points which enter the *credenda* of those who symbolize with Mr. L. We say we reject them, because they go counter to conclusions that rest upon premises equally authoritative in their character, with any evidence which he can summon in behalf of his much vaunted principles of interpretation."—Pp. 350, 351.

Is it not singular, if he is able with so much ease and certainty to confute the position in question, that he does not at once present the proof of its error? that he wholly refrains from verifying his assertions, and contents himself with such mere declamation? He offers no philological reason for his decision; he alleges nothing to support it from the word of God, but the fact that the description of the two cities is so similar. The whole ground of his belief, that both are so purely representative, and have the same significance, lies in the theory of symbolization, and a spiritual sense which he has adopted from Swedenborg, and thinks proper to dignify with the name of "science." He does not hesitate to avow, that he regards that as authoritative, that he considers "the primary intuitions," and "mental convictions," that are generated by it, as infallible criteria of the truth, and "gives

to the winds," "without dubitation, or delay," whatever the Scriptures, interpreted by the laws of philology, teach, when it goes "counter" to those convictions. It is only on the ground of his Swedenborgianism, that he can pretend that literal prophecies are symbolical, as well as those that are made through symbols. It is only on the ground of that theory, that he can erase from the sacred page the predictions of the restoration of the Israelites, the resurrection of the dead, the advent of Christ in the clouds, the reign of the risen saints on earth, and other events that are predicted: and such is the dominion it has acquired over him, that his faith in it is not impaired by the discovery that it is in contradiction to the word of God; nor that it exhibits his word as contradicting itself. On his theory the tabernacle or its parts, a pattern of which was revealed to Moses, anterior to its erection, must have stood for identically the same things as the holy of holies, the sanctuary, the candlestick, the altar of incense, the court, the altar of sacrifice denote, as they are employed as symbols in the Apocalypse, and had no other use. Jerusalem itself also, the temple, and the altar, as they are described in the Old Testament, must have filled identically the office, and that alone, which belongs to them as symbols in the visions of John. For why is not the similarity of the literal and symbolical city and temple, and the sameness of the terms by which they are designated, as much a proof that they cannot have different uses, or fill dissimilar offices, as they would be were the real city and temple to be erected at a future time? But that their uses were in fact wholly different, it were insane to deny. This confutation, however, of his "primary intuitions," and "mental convictions" by the usage of the Scriptures, does not abash him at all. The question, what the authoritative laws of interpretation are, is not determined by him, by the usages or teachings of the sacred word, but by "other departments of science." Instead, his "intuitions" and "convictions" are the criteria by which he attempts to settle its meaning, and he alters, or rejects, "without dubitation, or delay," whatever he finds in it that, interpreted by the laws of philology, "goes counter" to them. This he openly avows in his Anastasis. He says:—

"It is human reason that *originates* the rules of interpretation for the inspired volume, and we claim nothing more for it than its appropriate function, when it is thus called in to decide the *meaning* of revelation. . . . If the averments of that word which professes to have emanated from the Omniscient Spirit, clash with any positive, fixed, irrefragable truth in the universe, then the word itself must be a forgery and a lie, for God would never set one truth in contradiction to another. Panoplied by this principle, which is as firm as the perpetual hills, if in the careful scanning of that word, the *letter* speaks a language contrary to *clearly ascertained facts* in nature and science, he will take it as *type, figure, allegory, metaphor, symbol, accommodation, anthropomorphism*—*ANYTHING*, rather than the declaration of absolute verity."—P. xxi.

He thus acknowledges that he interprets the word of the Omniscient Spirit by his preconceived theory; for whatever Swedenborg's pantheism exhibits as ascertained facts "in nature and science" he regards as such. Whether the passages he thus endeavors to force into harmony with his scheme in reality involve any type, allegory, metaphor, or symbol, by which they are, by the laws of those instruments, made the vehicle of the sense he ascribes to them, he does not stop to inquire; nor whether, in treating them as figurative or symbolical, he is not guilty of precisely such a violation of ascertained facts "in nature and science," as it is his proposed object to avoid. He assumes in fact that there are no fixed and ascertained principles of language, but that whatever the modes or instruments of expression are, they may be regarded as of any nature, and interpretable by any laws, that will bring their meaning into concurrence with the doctrines of his psychology. His attempts, accordingly, to set aside the laws which we have stated, of language and symbols, are aimed as directly against the word of God as against us.

He does not, however, adhere uniformly to his own system, but sometimes treats his "primary intuitions" and "convictions" with as little respect as the Scriptures; for in the next place, to complete the embarrassment of his argument against us, he assigns to the Jerusalem predicted by Isaiah, an office that is in total contradiction to his theory of symbols, and that, if admitted, overturns the whole fabric of his Sweden-

borgianism. His doctrine, in common with that of Swedenborg, is, that the relation of the symbol to that which it denotes is invariably that of an effect to its cause. He here, however, represents that the Jerusalem which Isaiah describes is the symbol of the church. But that Jerusalem is not the *effect* of the Christian church. If, as he holds, it has neither had, nor is hereafter to have a real existence, it certainly cannot be an effect of the church. How can the church be the cause of a city that is never to exist? And what can be the use of such a symbolization of the church in a relation which it is never to sustain? How much better than Judaizing is the ascription to the prophecy of such a false and senseless prediction? If, then, that Jerusalem is in fact, as he represents, the symbol of the church, it must be in a relation wholly different from that of an effect to its cause, and disprove, therefore, his theory of symbols, and overturn his whole system of symbolic correspondences. Such is the brilliant issue of his first attempt to confute the laws of figurative language.

ART. VI.—CRITICS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

I.

THE N. C. REPOSITORY ON THE REVIEW OF DR. BUSHNELL.

A CONTRIBUTOR to the *New Church Repository*, edited by Prof. Bush, has attempted to refute our review of Dr. Bushnell's *Dissertation*, by denying that the theory of literal and figurative language, advanced by him in that essay, is that which we have ascribed to him. The method he pursues is such as might be expected from the class to which he belongs—imputations of misapprehension, asseverations instead of proofs of the points he would establish, and the embarrassment of the cause he aims to uphold, by new and more perplexing difficulties.

Not only is Dr. B. himself in urgent need of extrication, but

his errors and absurdities are in a degree an obstruction to the party. They must, therefore, if possible, be eluded ; and the most effective method, it is thought, it seems, of escaping them is a bold denial of the proper meaning of his language, and ascription to him of a different theory. Thus, in respect to our statement that he "represents the names of physical things as universally literal, and with rare exceptions used arbitrarily, or without any ground in analogy," and "that all the names of intellectual and spiritual things are figurative," and "are drawn from things that are physical," he says :—

"Hereupon Mr. L. taking Dr. B. to mean that in *our current literature* one physical object is never used in a trope or figure to illustrate or set off another physical thing, its action, or phenomena attending it, immediately expends some six or eight pages to show that 'the use of terms figuratively in the denomination and description of physical objects, if less frequent proportionally than in reference to the mind, is yet so common as to form a conspicuous feature of language ;'—a *proposition which Dr. Bushnell never thought of calling in question*. The idea is, not that the '*terms of spirit*' are always used figuratively, after they come to be applied to their secondary objects, and in their secondary sense, but that they *originally* acquired that application in virtue of a figure."—Vol. ii. p. 550.

"Now the assertion of Dr. B. is not that the terms God and Spirit are in *our every-day use applied figuratively*, but that these names, *now* used in the world of spirit, were transferred thither out of the world of physics, where they *originally* resided, so that the very phrase upon which Mr. L. would have us think he so triumphantly refutes the theory, is, in fact, a complete illustration of its truth."—P. 551.

This is, in the first place, mere oracular assertion. No passage is produced from Dr. B. in which he presents that view of his theory. No consideration is offered to show that that is the theory which he advanced. Nothing whatever is alleged to reconcile it with the contradictory representations with which the Dissertation abounds. If W. H. B. was able to verify these statements by evidence from the Dissertation, why did he not produce it ? Does he found his affirmation on ground that lies out of the essay ? Has he Dr. B.'s authority for this construction of his theory ? Why, then, did he not call on him for such explanations and reasons as would make

his statement credible to the readers of the Dissertation? Is Dr. B. also under the necessity of relying on mere asseveration to extricate himself from the unfortunate predicament in which his blunders have involved him?

But, in the next place, these assertions are in direct contradiction to the statements of the Dissertation. Thus Dr. B. says:—

“There are in every tongue two distinct departments. First, there is a *literal* department, in which sounds are provided as names for *physical objects and appearances*. Secondly, there is a department of *analogy or figure*, where physical objects and appearances are named as images of *thought or spirit*, and the words get their power as words of thought through the *physical images* received into them. . . . They raise a distinction between what they call the *literal and figurative* uses of the word. But this distinction of literal and figurative, it does not appear to be noticed, even by philosophers, runs through the very body of the language itself, making two departments—one that comprises the *terms of sensation*, and the other *the terms of thought*.”—Pp. 38–40.

Here his representation is, 1. That every human tongue consists of *two* DISTINCT departments, the *literal and the figurative*. 2. That the literal department *comprises the terms of sensation* or the names of *physical objects and appearances*. 3. That the other department *comprises the terms of thought*. 4. That in the department of analogy or *figure*, physical objects or appearances are named as images of *thought or spirit*, and the words get their power as words of thought through the *physical images* received into them. He asserts also in the same passage, that though philologists “cannot find in every particular case the physical term on which the word is built, they attain to a conviction that *every word has a physical root*, if only it could be found;” and exhibits it as an inconsistency “that still *the natural necessity that all words relating to thought and spirit* SHOULD BE FIGURES, and as such *get their significance*, they do not state;” but “still retain the impression that *some of the terms of thought are literal, and some figurative*.” “This is the manner of the theologians. They assume that there is a *literal* terminology in religion as well as figurative (as, doubtless, there is in reference to

matters of outward fact, and history, but nowhere else) and then it is only *a part of the same mistake* to accept words, not as *signs, or images*, but as absolute measures and equivalents of truth." P. 40. Many other passages presenting the same theory might be quoted from the Dissertation, while not a solitary sentence, so far as we are aware, can be alleged from it that exhibits any other view. Here is thus as express and unequivocal a statement of the theory we ascribed to him as can be embodied in language. Not a solitary element is wanting to verify our representation, and preclude the construction placed on it by W. H. B. If all the words of every language belong to one of two departments, the literal and figurative; and if all the names of physical things and their appearances are literal; and all the names of intellectual and spiritual things are figurative, and by "*a natural necessity*," and "*get their power as words of thought, through the physical images received into them*," then clearly no figurative names are employed in their figurative use, as the names of physical things; and no literal names are employed in their literal use, as the names of intellectual and spiritual things. The terms that belong to the physical department, and are literal, are, when used in that department, used in conformity with its law, as literal names; and the terms belonging to the intellectual and spiritual department, and are figurative, are, when employed in that department, employed according to its law, as figurative names. Can anything be more obvious and indisputable?

But beyond these direct proofs, that his theory is what we have represented it, W. H. B.'s construction is cut off by a formal denial by Dr. B., that the words of thought and spirit ever lose their figurative sense and become literal names of the thoughts which they signify. He says:—

"It will perhaps be imagined by some, indeed it is an assumption continually made, that words of thought, though based on mere figures or analogies in their original adoption, gradually lose their indeterminate character, and settle down under the law of use, into a sense so perfectly unambiguous, that they are to be regarded as *literal names*, and real equivalents of the thoughts they signify. *There could be no greater mistake*. For though the original type, or historic base of the

word, may pass out of view, so that nothing physical or figurative is any longer suggested by it, *still it will be impossible that mere use should have given it an exact meaning, or made it the literal name of any moral or intellectual state.*"—Pp. 46, 47.

Can language express a more specific contradiction to W. H. B.'s assertion, that Dr. Bushnell's idea is not that the "terms of spirit" *are always used figuratively after they come to be applied to their secondary objects, and in their secondary sense*, but "merely that they originally acquired that application in virtue of a figure?" How happens it, then, that W. H. B. asserts, with such an unhesitating and authoritative front, that our statement of the doctrine of his Dissertation is a "*tirade expended on a total misapprehension of his theory*," and affirms, that his "idea" is that which he thus formally disclaims? Does he make whatever assertions suit the end he seeks to achieve, without any inquiry whether they are true or false? Or, though aware of Dr. B.'s language and reasoning, has he assumed, from the palpable error and absurdity of the scheme, that he *cannot* have held it; and, on that mere conviction, assigned to him a different meaning? What an admirable ground for the positiveness of his asseverations! And how complimentary to Dr. Bushnell! Or, finally, has he acted, in putting forth this pretence, as the mere organ of Dr. B.? Has he his authority for it? If not, how is he able to aver that that gentleman "never thought of calling in question" "a proposition" which his theory thus specifically denies? Or how is it that he feels justified in making statements throughout his article in the most dogmatic form respecting Dr. B.'s meaning, that not only have no ground in the Dissertation, but are in direct contradiction to its unequivocal teachings?

In like manner he charges us, on a subsequent page, with perverting Dr. B.'s meaning in exhibiting him as representing that "the principle on which terms are used figuratively, or the reason of their being employed in that relation, is unknown and incomprehensible." He says, in respect to the quotation on which we founded that statement:—

"This passage is liable to no such perversion. What the author of

the Dissertation has reference to, is evidently the root and cause of all analogy and figure ; not, as Mr. L. seems to suppose, absurdly enough, to the analogy existing *between any two figures or symbols*, which if it were not perceived, could never be made use of ; but to the original *why* of all analogy. whatever, or in other words, the psychological ground or reason why the mind ever perceives such relationship or why it exists. Wherein such relationship consists between *any two objects* made use of in *literature for tropical purposes, must of course be obvious* at once to the writer choosing them, and to the reader."—P. 553.

Here is the same audacity of assertion, the same pretence to a perfect knowledge of Dr. B.'s meaning, and the same direct contradiction to the doctrines of his Dissertation. The question which Dr. B. discusses in the passages we quoted from him, is not what the psychological law or peculiarity of our nature is, by which the analogies between objects are seen and felt ; but whether, when a "relationship" existing "between two objects," is "made use of in literature for tropical purposes," the principal or nature of that relationship is seen and understood by the person who employs it ; and he specifically denies that it is. Thus he represents the "relation" of "types or images" to "mind and thought" as "*inscrutable*," p. 43, and the "analogy" by "reason" of which the "forms" that are provided in the world of sense," and "are cognate to the mind, are fitted" "to represent or express its interior sentiments and thoughts" as "*hidden*," p. 41 ; and avers that "we can say *positively*, that there is always *some reason in every form or image made use of, WHY IT SHOULD BE USED ; some ANALOGIC PROPERTY OR QUALITY which we feel instinctively, BUT WHICH WHOLLY TRANSCENDS SPECULATIVE INQUIRY*," p. 42. The topic of which he is here treating thus, is the *reason why* THE "FORM OR IMAGE made use of should be used," and what the nature is of "*the analogic property or quality*," which is *instinctively felt* by us ; *not the quality or property* IN OUR NATURE, that is the ground of that instinctive feeling. There is not a syllable in the discussion that relates to that subject ; and he declares that that "analogic property or quality, *in the form or image*, wholly *transcends speculative inquiry*, or lies altogether out of the sphere of our knowledge ; and the whole object of his declamation respecting it is, to prove that the reason of our feeling

the relationship between objects, is entirely unintelligible, and that feeling itself, therefore, so far as we are concerned, blind and arbitrary. Thus he says, "Milton, I suppose, could not tell us *why* he sets any form in connexion with any spiritual thought. He could only say he has some internal sense of concinnity which requires it." Of the nature or principle of that concinnity, then, he must have been wholly ignorant; and Dr. B., in order to exemplify and confirm it, proceeds to assert and endeavor to show that while it is an indisputable fact, that an analogy is felt to subsist between a crooked line and acting sinfully, no reason whatever can be given *why* the feeling is excited by that line any more than by a straight one, nor why in place of it precisely the opposite feeling of a resemblance to rectitude is not awakened by it.

"Still," he says, "the question remains, *why* the form of outward divarication has any such original relation to sin, as to have been made the natural pathological demonstration of it:—*why* a crooked line, which is the more graceful in itself, should not have been the natural instinct, and so the symbol of the right, as it now is of the wrong. Here we come to our limit; all we can say is, that by a *mystery*, transcending, in any case, our comprehension, the Divine Logos, who is in the world, weaves into nature types or images, that have an *inscrutable relation* to mind and thought. On the one hand is form; on the other the formless. The former *represents*, and is somehow *fellow* to the other; *how, we cannot discover*; and the more we ponder this mystery, the closer we bring it to our understanding, *the more perfectly inscrutable will it appear*."—Pp. 42, 43.

Such is the certainty, that the doctrines of the Dissertation are on these subjects what we represented them. How happens it, then, that W. H. B. has put forth a statement so flagrantly false, and employed no small vocabulary of accusatory and vituperative terms to give it effect? Is this to be taken as an index to his veraciousness and perspicacity? Are the fates of Swedenborgianism so intimately involved with Dr. Bushnell, that such an expedient is necessary to save it from the shock his ignorance and folly have given it? Or is his condition so helpless, that no method but this can be devised for his extrication from disgrace?

But, in the third place, the absurdity of this attempt to

save Dr. B. from the discredit in which his Dissertation has involved him, is completed by the consideration, that, if W. H. B.'s representation of his theory were true, it would be wholly unsuited to the end for which he employs it, and convict him of as great a blunder in that relation, as that into which he has now fallen. Dr. B.'s object in promulgating his theory was to show that language is extremely unsuited to be a vehicle of thought; that it is so vague and equivocal that it cannot be the means of a clear and definite expression of truth; and, thence, that such a latitude of opinion should be allowed in the interpretation of the Scriptures, that the denial of its cardinal doctrines, and substitution of another system in their place, should be no obstruction to a reputation for orthodoxy. And the means which he employed to accomplish this feat, were the theories we have ascribed to him; first, that all the names of intellectual and spiritual things are figurative, and drawn from things that are physical; and secondly, that the principle on which they are used, or the reason of their being employed in that relation, and with the meaning which they bear, is wholly unknown and incomprehensible. Thus he represents:

"That as *physical* terms are never exact; . . much less have we any terms in the physical department of language that are *exact representatives of thought*; for, first, the word here used will be the name only of a genus of *physical images*; then it will have been applied over to signify a genus of *thoughts* or *sentiments*; and, thirdly, in a particular case it is drawn out to signify a *specific thought or sentiment*, which of course will have qualities or incidents peculiar to itself. What now can steer a word through *so many ambiguities and complications, and give it an exact and determinate meaning in the particular it is applied to prove?*"—P. 44.

"Words of thought and spirit are not only inexact in their significance, never measuring the truth, or giving its precise equivalent, *but they always affirm something which is FALSE, or CONTRARY TO THE TRUTH INTENDED. In our view they are all false*, for there are no shapes in the truths which they represent."—P. 49.

It is on this ground, accordingly, that he denies that words can be the medium of an exact expression of the truth.

"The views of language and interpretation I have offered suggest the very great difficulty, if not impossibility, of mental science and religious dogmatism. In all such uses, or attempted uses, the effort is to make

language answer a purpose that is against its nature. I see not, therefore, how the subject matter of mental science and religion can ever be included under the fixed forms of dogma."—P. 72.

"We find little, therefore, in the Scriptures to encourage the hope of a complete and sufficient Christian dogmatism, or of a satisfactory and truly adequate system of scientific theology."—P. 76.

His whole accusation of language as equivocal and deceptive, and denial of the possibility of an exact and demonstrative statement in it of the doctrines of the Scriptures, is thus founded on his theory that all the terms employed to express intellectual and spiritual things are figurative, and transferred from physical things; that those terms never become literal, but are always used in their figurative sense; and that the principle on which they are employed is wholly unknown and indeterminable. If, therefore, that is not his "idea;" if, as W. H. B. affirms, he holds only that those terms were *originally transferred* from physical objects, but admits that they soon lose their figurative sense, and "are applied as literally as are the names of physical objects," then his theory has no adaptation whatever to the end for which he employs it, and his whole conclusion against the possibility of an exact determination and expression of the doctrines of the Scriptures, falls to the ground. Instead of sustaining, it confutes him; instead of exculpating him for his denial of the great teachings of God's word, it convicts him of a lawless misrepresentation of its indisputable meaning! Such is the issue of the expedient by which W. H. B. endeavors to shield him from the discredit which his Dissertation has drawn on him. If W. H. B.'s pretences were true, it would follow that Dr. B. has not only put forth a theory which he does not hold, and that "never entered his thoughts," but that he has also employed it for a purpose for which it has no suitableness; and, consequently, that in place of being a master of the subject which he affects to treat with so much originality and learning, he neither understands that nor himself. Who can doubt that he has found in W. H. B. a vindicator and eulogist worthy of his merits? Who can doubt that W. H. B. has chosen a theme and method of treating it, that are equally suited to his principles and capacity?

II.

GERMAN METAPHYSICS.

Inquiries are frequently addressed to us, explanations asked of passages of Scripture, objections made to views we have advanced, or wishes expressed that topics we have not yet treated may be discussed, the replies to which may be of interest to others as well as those who propose them. We design therefore, occasionally, to make the Journal the medium of a response to such correspondents, or present in it the answers we give to their requests and objections.

A friend residing at a distance, in expressing his disgust at the systems of Kant, Coleridge, Bushnell, and Morell, indicates surprise, that the confutation of doctrines that are so palpably false, can be necessary to more than a very small number; and others have intimated the feeling, that they can gain none but weak and "hallucinated followers." We are glad that the articles to which they refer, have wrought so thorough a conviction of the error of those writers. Their systems however, are very far from being so unadapted as our correspondents suppose, to gain adherents among the educated and speculative. They are held by nearly the whole body of those in the sacred and other professions in Germany, and a vast proportion of the people. They are widely diffused in Great Britain and this country, and are inculcated in a measure, in several of our colleges and theological seminaries. The works of Coleridge, Cousin, Kant, and others of the modern German school of metaphysics, have been so largely circulated, and commended with such zeal and assiduity by their disciples, that many, in spite of a total disappointment felt on reading their misty pages, have been led to suppose that they must have great merits, and that to admire and adopt their theories, is an indication of genius and learning. Thousands accordingly have been betrayed under that impression, and the loud pretences of their partisans, that they furnish the only satisfactory view of our nature, into the reception of their main principles, without fully perceiving the results to which they lead. In the meantime, those results have been worked out by the German theologians, and embodied in their works on Biblical philology

and exegesis ; and they also are introduced into our colleges and theological seminaries, and have, under the reputation of learning, become popular. This specious form of infidelity has thus, under the mask of a profound philosophy of our nature, Christianity, and the universe, gained admission in a degree to the principal seats of learning, and become an element in an academical and theological education.

While this process has been going forward, some of the disciples of the system, who, perhaps, were never really believers in the doctrines of revelation, have become aware of the results to which it leads, when applied to them, and discovered that it is a more effective instrument than any other, of subverting the truth and propagating error ; and are beginning boldly to employ it to set aside the inspiration of the sacred word, convert its miracles into mere natural events or fables, and deny all its great doctrines respecting the work of redemption.

A just exposition of its principles and character is, therefore, highly important to check, if practicable, its diffusion, to apprise those who have partially embraced, without fully understanding it, of its hostility to the Scriptures, and to disarm its advocates of the influence they enjoy from the pretence that they are believers in Christianity. Such an analysis of its elements and exhibition of the mode in which it carries its disciples on to the realms of atheism, is peculiarly essential from the fact that in the views that have usually been given of it, that feature has not only not been adequately noticed, but has been studiously, or ignorantly, concealed. Of the many statements, criticisms, and eulogies of the doctrines of Kant and Coleridge, that had fallen in our way, not one pointed out that element in such a manner as to enable us to understand the process by which their infidelity results from their theory of our nature. Most give not the remotest hint, that it leads to such an issue. The notices, especially of Coleridge, that have appeared in this country and Great Britain, with scarce an exception, treat him as a religious philosopher, and expounder of Christianity, and commend and eulogize his scheme in extravagant terms, as presenting an unanswerable confutation of many of the views that are held by the orthodox of the

great doctrines of redemption, and exhibition of a just theology in their place. Many of the writers of those articles were not themselves aware, there is reason to believe, of the real nature of his system. There is room for doubt whether even President Marsh, who had a large instrumentality in introducing and propagating it in this country, saw and realized its infidelity. That he perceived its antagonism to several of what are usually deemed the doctrines of Christianity, and substitution of a species of rationalism in their place, is clear indeed, as he presents it as one of its chief merits. That he saw, however, that that rationalism is nothing else than a blank atheism, is not probable. Confused and misty in his views, and misled by an infatuated admiration of Coleridge's genius and learning, he seems to have supposed that the professions of faith in Christianity, with which he disguised his attempt to overthrow it, were sincere. That Coleridge himself was provoked at his ignorance and stupidity in not seeing the atheism of the system, and regarded him with such contempt that he thought it not worth while to undeceive him, is indicated with very little disguise by his nephew.

The exposition of its infidelity is important, not only to apprise those who have partially assented to it, of the issue to which its principles lead, and guard them against its errors, but also to point out, to those who reject it, the proper method of confuting it. It is only by understanding the mode in which it attempts to get rid of the exterior universe, God's being, and his word, by resolving them into mere forms of thought, that its denials of his existence, the inspiration of the Scriptures, and their facts and doctrines, can be properly met and overthrown. Mere expressions of dissent will not refute them. Mere denunciations of their doctrines as false and infidel by ecclesiastical bodies, will not lead the churches to an intelligent rejection of their errors. A proper conviction of their infidelity can only be produced by an exhibition of the mode in which they deny that we have any evidence of God's existence, and a demonstration, that that denial results of necessity from their principles. But when the steps by which they reach that conclusion are understood, the confutation of the system itself, and the rejection they

found on it of the facts and doctrines of the Scriptures, becomes easy.

And, finally, such an exposition and confutation of it is rendered peculiarly necessary by the general disuse of other methods of counteracting the propagators of error. There are divisions of the church in which those in the sacred office are no longer expected to utter a public testimony against false doctrines that may be taught by individuals of their number. A doubt of the inspiration of the Scriptures, a rejection of their most essential doctrines, the inculcation of another gospel in their place, is no longer a disqualification for the ministry, nor a barrier to reputation and influence, if it is but veiled under a profession of the Christian faith, and accompanied by a bold impeachment of the doctrines held by the orthodox as unphilosophical, and loud pretences of exhibiting the facts and teachings of revelation in a form in which they have the sanction of reason. The whole circle of subjects embraced in theology, is considered, by not a few, as unsettled; one class of theories and doctrines are held to be as consistent with faith in Christianity as another; and he is regarded the ablest theologian, who sets forth his system with the greatest art, and gains the largest body of zealous followers. The only way, accordingly, in which the spread of this mischievous system can be checked, is the exposure of its true features to the public gaze, that none may be led to adopt it through a misapprehension of its nature.

A knowledge of its character and of the extent to which it prevails is essential also to a just estimate of the condition and tendencies of the church. It is one of the signs of the times, indicates that the disciples of Christ here are to be put to a trial of their fidelity like that to which they are subjected in Europe, and concurs with a crowd of other facts to show the error of the persuasion generally entertained that Christianity is rapidly advancing, and likely soon to achieve the conquest of the world.

That the articles on the subject have met the approbation of a large body of the best men in the church, we have ample evidence, and in compliance with a wish that has been repeatedly expressed, we design, as occasion offers, to notice

other works that are devoted to the propagation of that infidel system.

III.

THE REPERTORY'S NOTICE OF MR. IMBRIE'S DISCOURSE.

A writer in the Biblical Repertory for April, in a notice of the Rev. Mr. Imbrie's sermon delivered before the synod of New Jersey, pronounces "the premillennial theory," as he denominates it, "Judaic," and represents it as "adopted bodily" from the Jews by the Christians of the second and third century. Inquiries are made of us whether that statement is in any measure justifiable, and a wish expressed that we would furnish the means of an impartial judgment respecting it. In the passage to which we refer, the writer says in regard to the revelation God has made of the future:

"There are three views on this subject. The first is *the Jewish doctrine*; and by Jewish, we mean that ACTUALLY HELD BY THE JEWS. They taught, 1. That the Messiah was to appear and reign in person in Jerusalem. 2. That all the Jews were to be gathered in the holy land. 3. That the pious dead were to be raised to share the blessings of the Messiah's reign. 4. That the Messiah and his people were to reign over all nations for a thousand years. 5. That at the end of that period, Satan was to be loosed, and a great conflict ensue, after which were to come the general resurrection and final judgment. This theory was by many Christians, during the second and third centuries, ADOPTED BODILY. The only difference was that what the Jews expected to occur at the first coming, these Christians anticipated at the second advent of Messiah. This doctrine has been revived at different periods during the history of the church; and after making a great noise for a while, has gradually died out. In our day it has experienced a new resurrection, and if we may judge from the past, is destined to a long sleep, after a long and turbulent life."—P. 329.

"The premillennial theory conflicts with . . . many well established doctrines of the word of God, and is in its whole character *Judaic*, and in its whole tendency, as we conceive, injurious."—P. 332.

The Jews from whom he asserts that the millenarians adopted these views, were of course unchristianized Jews, and of an earlier age than Christ,—he probably supposes,

though he does not define their period. The term "Jewish" and "Judaic," accordingly, are used by him reproachfully, to brand the doctrine as grossly and discredibly erroneous. Why else are they employed? The mere fact that a doctrine or belief was held by the Jews, is no evidence against its truth. They believed that Jehovah is the true God; that the Old Testament is his word, that the Messiah was to come, that he was to be of the line of David, and that he was to redeem his people. Does that prove that that faith was groundless? Does it constitute any reason for denominating it Judaic? Were it called a Jewish and a Judaic belief in such a discussion, would it not be opprobriously, in contradistinction from that which is Christian, and imply that it is wholly mistaken, and had its origin in the ignorance, prejudice, and bigotry of that perverse people? The writer, then, in denominating "the premillennial theory in its whole character Judaic," means to exhibit it as *not Christian*, but an invention or error of the Jews. He represents indeed that they adopted it through misapprehension. He says, "The Jews made a twofold mistake in the interpretation of their prophetic writings. First, They understood them in a literal or carnal sense, as predicting an earthly kingdom; and second, they referred them all to the period of Christ's first coming," p. 331. It is accordingly to mark them as mistaken, and the work of a Jewish error, that he pronounces them Judaic. He uses the term as antagonistic to Christian, in the same manner as he would have employed Mahomedan, Hindoo, or Pagan, had he used those terms to indicate the parentage and character of the doctrine.

In the next place, by the statement that "this theory was by many Christians, during the second and third centuries, *adopted bodily*," he means, that it was adopted *from the Jews*; that it was received because of their having held and taught it, in contradistinction from being believed as a doctrine of the New Testament. Otherwise he could not exhibit it as Judaic in respect to *them*. If he does not regard them as having derived it from the Jews,—if he admits that they adopted it on *Christian* grounds, or because they believed it was taught by Christ and the Apostles, and is a doctrine of the Scriptures; if he allows that their faith in it was founded on pre-

cisely the same grounds—the word of God,—as their belief in the future coming of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the eternal blessedness of the righteous, he cannot denominate it Judaic *in respect to them*, any more than he can defame the articles of their belief, which he regards as Scriptural, by the application to them of that epithet. If it was adopted on Christian grounds, it is as much to be called a Christian doctrine in contradistinction from Judaic, as it is Judaic in contradistinction from Christian, if adopted wholly on Jewish grounds. In like manner, it is not Judaic to those who now believe it, unless they derive it from the Jews, and believe it, because it was held by them. If they believe it without any consideration whether that people held it or not, simply because it is taught in the Scriptures, or because of what the Scriptures teach; it is no more Judaic, in relation *to them*, than their belief of any other truth or fact, on the ground of its self-evidence, the testimony of the senses, or the word of God, such as the equivalence of two and two to four, the alternation of day and night, the succession of the seasons, the future blessedness of the redeemed, is Judaic to them, because it was also held by the Jews. In saying, then, that it was “adopted bodily,” by “many Christians of the second and third centuries,” his meaning is, that it was adopted by them *as Judaic*; or that they drew it *from the Jews*, and believed it, because it was held and taught by them: not because it is taught, or they regarded it as taught, in the Scriptures.

The question now is, is that representation correct? Is there anything in the writings of the Christians of the second, third, or fourth centuries, that have come down to us, to justify it, or yield it any color of truth? We answer emphatically in the negative. Is it not in direct contradiction to the representation given by those writers, of the grounds on which the doctrine was believed by the church of that age? We reply as emphatically—it is. No statement could have been made, more unauthorized and mistaken.

Thus, in respect to Papias, the earliest of those writers of whose opinions we have any knowledge, Eusebius expressly represents, that he professed to derive that which he detailed in his books, from the hearers of the Apostles, and expresses the opinion, that he founded his belief of Christ's personal reign

on the earth, during a thousand years after the resurrection of the dead, on a misunderstanding of the apostolical narratives, or reports he had heard of their sayings. There is not a hint that he drew the doctrine from the Jews, or that he knew or supposed that it was an article of the Jewish faith.

Justin Martyr, in like manner, alleges as the ground of his belief of the reign of the saints a thousand years in Jerusalem, the prophecy of Isaiah respecting the new heaven and new earth, chap. lxxv. and lxxvi., and the revelation made to the Apostle John : Dial. cum Tryph. c. 81. He gives no intimation that he received it as a tradition from the Jews ; or that he believed it because it was an element of their faith. Instead, he directly professes, that he founded it on the word of God, in contradistinction from the opinions of men.

Such is most conspicuously the fact also with Irenæus. Of the whole series of discussions in the Repertory on theological topics, there probably is not one in which the question debated is treated more directly as a question of revelation, and the doctrine advocated founded more explicitly and entirely on the word of God, than the doctrine of Irenæus respecting the millennium. He refers throughout his argument to Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and John, for the grounds of his faith in the coming of Christ at the period of the destruction of the fourth monarchy, his reign on earth, and the resurrection of the saints and reign with him during the thousand years, and alleges the same passages that are quoted by millenarians now as revealing those events.

Tertullian, also, in professing his belief that a kingdom is promised us on earth during a thousand years after the resurrection of the saints, represents the new Jerusalem which was the object of his expectation, as that which was seen by Ezekiel and John. He does not intimate that his faith was founded on that of the Jews, or that it had any other ground than the word of God.—Adv. Marcionem, lib. iii. c. 24.

Eusebius, indeed, in the account he gives of the books written by Dionysius of Alexandria, against Nepos, an Egyptian bishop, who taught that there is to be a millennium on earth, states that Nepos had held that the promises made to the saints in the Scriptures are to be interpreted "*very Jewishly*." It does not appear, however, that Nepos himself had employed

that language, or made any such representation. Instead, it is the mere construction undoubtedly which Eusebius put on his teachings; as he immediately adds that Nepos thought himself able to verify his opinion *from the Revelation of John*, and wrote a volume *on that question* which he entitled a confutation of the allegorists; and that it was that treatise that Dionysius attempted in his work to confute,—devoting the first book to that question—viz. whether the doctrine held by Nepos is taught in the Apocalypse; and the second to the question whether the Apocalypse was written by the Apostle John, or some other person of his name, and was inspired, or, as some had held, is a forgery. There is no indication that Nepos or Coracion, with whom Dionysius held a colloquy on the subject, was led to adopt the doctrine, by the fact that it had been entertained by the Jews. The whole representation shows that the question was argued altogether on the ground of the Scriptures, and chiefly of the Apocalypse. Dionysius says expressly that in their colloquy they endeavored to conduct the discussion with the utmost frankness and integrity, striving to dismiss all prepossessions; seeking to give to every argument its proper weight; and desiring to embrace the views that are authorized by the indisputable teachings of the Scriptures. He acknowledges, moreover, that he did not understand the Apocalypse, that he thought it had a concealed meaning, and suspected its sense was higher than that which is conveyed in its words.—Lib. vii. c. 24.

Lactantius, likewise, expressly founded his views of the coming of Christ, the resurrection of the saints, and the millennium on the predictions of the prophets. Not the slightest evidence appears in his discussion on the subject, that he drew his opinions from the Jews, or was aware what the notions were which they had entertained.—Inst. lib. vii. c. 14–26.

And, finally, to complete the confutation of the reviewer, both Origen and Jerome, who controverted the doctrine of these fathers, openly acknowledge, like Dionysius, that the method by which they evaded it, was the ascription of a *figurative* or *spiritual sense* to the prophecies respecting the resurrection, new Jerusalem, and reign of the saints. Origen represents those who looked for a life of corporeal enjoyment

during the millennium, as falling into that error by not understanding that the prophecies are to be interpreted *figuratively*; and alleges that they who receive them in their true sense, assign to them a spiritual, instead of a literal meaning.—Tom. i. p. 104, ii. p. 570, iii. p. 827.

Jerome also exhibits it as characteristic of the Jews and those Christians whom he accuses of Judaizing, that they interpreted the predictions in respect to Jerusalem, Zech. xiv. and Isaiah lxx., according to the letter, while he explained them *tropologically*. He avers that the Apocalypse also is to be expounded *spiritually*: the heavenly Jerusalem as denoting the church; its gold and gems as the ornaments of the church; its enemies as the enemies of the church; and the prosperity and blessedness, that are to follow the deliverance of Jerusalem from its enemies, as the prosperity and bliss of the church. Com. ad Zech. xiv. There is no intimation that if the predictions in question are taken according to the usual sense of the terms, they do not teach the restoration of the Israelites, the rebuilding of Jerusalem, the re-erection of the temple, the resurrection of the saints, the continued occupation of the earth by men in the natural body, and the propagation of the race during the thousand years. Instead, Jerome expressly admits, that the Apocalypse itself, if taken according to the letter, teaches the doctrine which he denounces as Judaical; and that it was because he spiritualized it, that he rejected the construction placed on it by Irenæus, Tertullian, and others. "I am not unaware," he says, "how great the diversity of opinions is; I do not refer to the mystery of the Trinity, but to other church-doctrines,—how the revelations of the future are to be taken respecting the resurrection of the dead for example, and the condition of souls and the human body; and what the principle is on which John's Apocalypse is to be understood, which if we receive according to the letter, we Judaize; if we treat it as written spiritually, we seem to oppose the opinions of many of the ancients, Tertullian, Victorinus, Lactantius, of the Latins, and of the Greeks, to mention no others, Irenæus, bishop of Lyons." Com. ad Jesaiam, ch. lxx. Indeed the terms "Judaize," "Judaic sense," and "Jewish," appear to be used by Jerome, Dionysius, and Origen, in some instances at

least, simply to denote the literal in contradistinction from the allegorical or spiritual interpretation of the Scriptures ;—not to indicate that the Christians whom he charged with Judaizing, adopted the peculiar views which the Jews entertained. They employed those epithets to designate and disgrace *their mode of exegesis* ;—not to signify that the results to which the Jews and Christians were led by that mode, were the same. To take the Apocalypse according to the letter, was to Judaize, simply because it was to follow the literal method of the Jews, instead of spiritualizing, which was the method of the church at that period. As the Jews to whom Jerome, Dionysius, and Origen refer, were unbelievers, and did not receive nor interpret the Apocalypse, it is not easy to see how, in any other sense, such a mode of interpretation can have been Judaizing.

The assertion by the reviewer that the Christians of the second and third centuries, who believed in the millennium, adopted their theory respecting it from the Jews, is thus wholly mistaken. Not the slightest ground exists for it. It is in contradiction to the representations they themselves give of the source from which they drew their views. It is equally at variance with the statements made by their opponents respecting the grounds of their faith. Origen, Dionysius, and Jerome show throughout their discussions respecting it, that the question between them and the millenarians was the question, whether the revelations made in the Scriptures respecting the restoration of the Israelites, the coming of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the thousand years' reign, is such as the millenarians held ;—*not whether their faith was founded on, or accorded with the traditions or opinions of the Jews*, respecting the return of their nation, the rebuilding of their capitol, and the coming and reign of Christ. They acknowledge that the difference of opinion between them resulted wholly from their different methods of interpretation. And, finally, they admitted and proclaimed without hesitation, that the way in which they evaded the doctrine held by the millenarians, was the rejection of the philological sense of the sacred word, and ascription to it of a tropological or spiritual meaning.

How is it now that the reviewer has made a statement so

contradictory to the fact? A glance at the writings of those ancient fathers would have shown him that it is erroneous? Did he neglect to examine what the grounds were of their faith? Is he unacquainted with their works? Has he fallen into the error, which he ascribes to them, of taking tradition, or the accusatory statements of Origen and Jerome as his guides, instead of the writings themselves, the character of which he professes to state?

In the third place.—But he is not only in error in asserting that those Christian fathers “adopted bodily” their theory of the millennium from the Jews, but is mistaken, we apprehend, in representing that the Jews held that doctrine “bodily.” It is certain indeed that they held that the Messiah was to appear and reign in person gloriously in Jerusalem,” and “that the Jews were to be gathered in the holy land.” That *some* of them believed also that “the pious dead were to be raised to share the blessings of the Messiah’s reign,” we do not doubt. That it was not a national belief, however, we know from the fact that the Sadducees held that the dead had ceased to exist, and denied that there was to be any resurrection: and Jerome expressly asserts that the Hebrews held that the predictions respecting the new heaven and new earth, Isaiah lrv., were to be accomplished *antecedently to the resurrection of the dead*. But where is there any evidence that they believed that the reign of Christ and his people was to continue but a thousand years? And where, we ask still more emphatically, are there any proofs that they held “that at the end of that period *Satan was to be loosed*, and a great conflict ensue, *after which* were to come the general resurrection and final judgment?” Can this writer produce a particle of proof that they entertained such an expectation? Is there a trace of any such revelation in the Old Testament? Is there any hint there that Christ’s reign is to continue for only a thousand years? Is it not predicted that his dominion over the nations is to endure for ever, and his kingdom be without end? Where is there any intimation in the ancient prophets that *Satan is to be bound* during a thousand years, and at the expiration of “that period be loosed, and a great conflict ensue,” to be followed by “the general resurrection and final judgment?” Where are there any proofs that the Jews

believed in two resurrections and two judgments? If this writer has any, let him produce them. They will form, we apprehend, a new chapter in the theology of the Jews. If he has no such proofs, what are we to think of his assertion that the Jews believed what he thus ascribes to them, and that the millenarians of the early ages "adopted bodily" from them their theory on these subjects? Can anything be plainer than that he has drawn his sketch of the faith of the Jews, —not from their writings, nor from the prophecies to their Scriptures, but instead, *from the faith of the millenarians themselves*, founded altogether in respect to the thousand years' reign, the imprisonment and release of Satan, the apostasy and war that are to follow, and the second resurrection and judgment, *on the Apocalypse*, of which *the Jews in question had no knowledge*; and then built on that ground his statement that those millenarians adopted their faith on these subjects from the Jews? An awkward position for one who speaks with so much assurance, and attempts to discredit those whom he assails with the charge of passing off the doctrine of one party, as the doctrine of another!

After thus summarily disposing of the views entertained by the millenarians, he next states the common theory of a spiritual millennium, which he rejects; and then presents a third doctrine which he himself entertains, and represents as having been held by the church from the early ages. We quote it to show our readers what his scheme is, and to point out some difficulties with which it seems to us to be embarrassed, and ask in what way he is to obviate them.

"The third general doctrine on this subject is, that the present order of things, called the dispensation of the Spirit, is to continue to the end of the world. The church on the whole is to advance, sometimes more, and sometimes less pure and prosperous. *But there is to be no such millennium as is assumed by the advocates of the other theories to be predicted.* The glowing passages which are referred by some to the period of Christ's personal reign, and by others to the spiritual millennium, are, according to this view, to be understood of the state of things after the final consummation. They relate to the new heavens and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness; to that glorious liberty of the sons of God, into which the whole creation is to be introduced at the day of final redemption. According to this view there is to be a

second personal, visible advent of Christ; when he shall appear to be admired in all them that believe, and to take vengeance on them that obey not the gospel. The kingdom of Christ is then to be established, not for a thousand years, but for ever. It is not to be an earthly, but a heavenly kingdom. It is to consist not of Jews mainly, but of all the redeemed; not of men in their earthly bodies, but of the saints in their spiritual bodies. Its seat is not to be the Jerusalem that now is, but the heavenly Jerusalem which is the mother of us all.

"How far the gospel is to prevail over the earth before the final consummation, and what is to be the fate of the church in the meanwhile, is not clearly revealed. It is the common opinion, that it is to prevail very extensively, if not universally; that the Jews as a people, or the great body of them, are to be converted; but it is not assumed that there is to be any millennium strictly speaking.

"This third view is substantially the church doctrine; that is, it was the doctrine maintained against the millenarians of the second and third centuries, and which became prevalent through the eastern and western churches, and was defended by every branch of the Protestant church, at the time of the Reformation, against the Anabaptists. . . . This doctrine supposes that the church is to advance until all the elect are to be gathered in; that then, and not before, Christ is to appear the second time, without sin unto salvation; that then all the dead are to rise; the final judgment is to be held; the world and all that is therein is to be burned up, and the everlasting kingdom of the Messiah is to be established in glory."—Pp. 330, 331.

There are several statements in this passage which seem to us to involve the writer in serious difficulties.

1. Is he aware that, except in reference to the period of Christ's second coming, his doctrine is that of the late Mr. Miller? Had Mr. Miller, instead of fixing the date of the advent, simply said that, though unknown, it may be immediately at hand, we see not but that their agreement would have been entire; for this writer holds that "the extent to which the gospel is to prevail" and "the fate of the church" anterior to Christ's coming "is not clearly revealed." How on his theory can he show that all that is revealed as to precede Christ's coming has not already happened? If he regards it as so "uncertain whether anything more is to take place before the advent; if he agrees with Mr. Miller in deny-

ing that the Jews are to be restored ; that the resurrection of the righteous is to precede that of the wicked ; that Christ and the risen saints are to reign on the earth, and that there is to be a millennium here ; if he concurs with him also in asserting that, immediately on the advent, *all* the dead are to be raised, the redeemed transferred to another scene of existence, the wicked destroyed, and the earth itself annihilated ;— may he not fairly be regarded as substantially holding the doctrine of Mr. Miller ? We do not wish to detract in the least from the distance that truly separates them, but we think it proper that it should be understood what this writer's position is in regard to that errorist, a partial agreement with whom on any branch of this subject is in many quarters treated as the mark of an absurd and hopeless delusion.

2. We ask for the proof that "this third view is substantially the church doctrine ; that is, was the doctrine maintained against the millenarians of the second and third centuries, and which became prevalent through the eastern and western churches, and was defended by every branch of the Protestant church, at the time of the Reformation, against the Anabaptists." There are several positions that will need to be demonstrated in order to verify it.

In the first place, it will need to be shown that Origen, Dionysius, and Jerome did not apply their "tropological" and spiritualizing method of interpretation *to the most important predictions on which the millenarians founded their faith*, respecting the first resurrection, the new heavens and new earth, the reign of Christ and the saints during the thousand years, the return of the Jews and the rebuilding of Jerusalem, but only to the least essential of them, leaving "the glowing passages which are referred by some to the period of Christ's personal reign, and by others to the spiritual millennium," "to be understood of the state of things after the final consummation." Otherwise his assertion that "this third view" was the doctrine maintained against the millenarians of the second and third centuries" must be abandoned. Can he prove, however, that they exempted those passages from their spiritualizing process ? Let him make the experiment. We apprehend he could not undertake a more hopeless and preposterous task. We have not now space to exhibit the

method at large in which they treat them ;—Nothing, however, can be more certain, than that they expressly represent themselves as evading the constructions placed on them by the millenarians, by assigning to them A TROPOLOGICAL OR SPIRITUAL MEANING, *by which they referred them to the church before Christ's advent.* Nothing can be more indisputable than that Jerome openly and formally explains the creation of the new heavens and the new earth, of *the renovation or change* for the better, of *the present heavens and earth*, not of others. Peter, he asserts, in saying "We look, however, for new heavens and a new earth, according to his promise," did not say we look for *other* heavens and *another* earth, but for the old changed for the better. . . . Novos autem cœlos et novam terram videbimus et repromissionem ejus ; non dixit, *alios* cœlos et *aliam* terram videbimus, sed *veteros et antiquos* in melius commutatos.—Com. ad Jesaiam, c. lxxv. Nothing can be more unquestionable than that he treats the whole prophecy as relating to this earth ; and finally, to complete the difficulties of this writer, nothing is more incontrovertible than that he exhibits the Hebrews as contending that these predictions were to be accomplished *antecedently to the resurrection*, during the thousand years of the kingdom on earth, and interpreting them of the literal Jerusalem, Judea, and Jews ; while he himself admits that it is equally in harmony with the faith of the church, whether they are understood as to take place after the resurrection at Christ's second coming, or at the first resurrection, by which he meant regeneration, *after baptism.* Unless this writer, then, can show that they did not thus spiritualize these passages, and exhibit this world as the scene in which they are to be accomplished, he cannot sustain his representation, that they held and maintained the doctrine he ascribes to them against the millenarians. If they interpret them of the church in *this world*, it is not their doctrine that they relate only to the church in another orb.

3. He will need to prove that the church did not, on its nationalization by Constantine, regard that change as the institution of Christ's kingdom on earth in the triumphant form foreshown in those "glowing passages" which are referred by the spiritual millenarians to the thousand years.

If the church at large then adopted that view, as is indicated in the Apocalypse, chap. xii. 10, 11, and intimated by Eusebius, lib. ix. c. 9, x. c. 9, and if that has been the doctrine of the Catholic and Greek church through every subsequent age, and a main ground of the pretence that the Pope is Christ's vicegerent, and exercises the dominion that is ascribed by the prophets to him; then the reviewer's statement that the doctrine that the church is not to receive that triumphant form in this world, has been the doctrine from the early ages, is overthrown. And is it not notorious that they regard their church as Christ's kingdom in the form which is foreshown in the most "glowing passages" of the prophets, and make the same application of them as was made by Origen and Jerome, by spiritualization and tropology?

4. He must show also that it was his third doctrine that was maintained by every branch of the Protestant church, at the time of the Reformation, against the Anabaptists." That also will prove, we suspect, a task of some difficulty. The doctrine of the Anabaptists was that the antichristian powers were to be destroyed, and the saints reign over the earth, *antecedently to Christ's second coming*, not afterwards, as was held by the millenarians; and the method which the reformers employed to refute them was the allegation of proofs from the Scriptures in contradiction to *their pretended* revelations, that Christ's kingdom is not to be established *until his second advent*; that that was not to take place till several hundred years had passed; that antichrist is *not to be destroyed till he comes*, and that in the meantime *the church*, instead of reigning, *is to continue to be subjected to great trials*. They had no occasion, in order to accomplish their object, to prove that Christ's kingdom is not at his coming to be established in this world, but that some other orb is to be the scene then of his reign, and the reign of the saints. Let this writer prove, if he can, that they held such a theory. If he cannot, his assertion respecting the ground on which they opposed the Anabaptists must be retracted. That the doctrine of the Anabaptists respected the condition of the church anterior to Christ's advent, is seen from the language in which it was denounced in the Augustan Confession of 1540. "We condemn the Anabaptists, who now propagate Judaic opinions,

feigning that the pious are *before the resurrection* to possess the kingdoms of the world, the ungodly being universally vanquished and exterminated. We know that the church must in this life be subjected to the cross, and will first be glorified after this life. We therefore denounce and execrate the insanity of the Anabaptists." *Damnamus Anabaptistas, qui nunc Judaicas opiniones spargunt, fingunt ante resurrectionem, pios regna mundi occupaturos esse, ubique deletis aut oppressis impiis. Scimus quod ecclesia in hac vita subjecta sit cruci, et primum post hanc vitam glorificabitur.—c. xvii.* Here is no denial that the saints are to possess the kingdoms of this world *after* the resurrection, nor is there any intimation in the passages in the Confession of 1531, in relation to Christ's coming, that the kingdom into which the saints are then to be introduced is not to be in this world. *Dicunt quod Christus apparebit in consummatione mundi ad iudicandum, et mortuos omnes resuscitabit, piis et electis dabit vitam æternam et perpetua gaudia, impios autem homines ac diabolos condemnabit, ut sine fine crucientur.* "The Protestants teach that Christ will at the consummation of the world come to judgment, raise all the dead, and bestow on the holy eternal life and joy, but condemn the impious and devils to endless punishment."

But beyond this, Melancthon interprets Zech. xiv. 4–21 of Christ's second coming, and represents the disruption of the Mount of Olives as denoting a change or new modification of the world,—not its annihilation; the prediction that there shall at evening be light, as signifying that the empires of the world will be wholly abolished; that no one will any longer rage against the church, but that it will be well with the righteous; and the announcement that they that are left of the nations that came against Jerusalem, shall go up from year to year to worship the Lord and keep the feast of tabernacles, as indicating that none *shall be saved out of the church*; which implies, that the nations are still to exist after Christ's advent, the church subsist, and men continue to become partakers of salvation. And finally, he explains the closing prediction, that in that day there shall no more be a Canaanite in the house of the Lord of Hosts, as meaning that the true church shall no longer have priests and teachers who corrupt its doc-

trines for the sake of pleasure and power. Tom. ii. p. 540. Though there may be some uncertainty whether he regards the whole of the predictions in that chapter, as referring solely to the period of the advent and the ages that are to follow, the reviewer will find it no easy task, we imagine, to reconcile his constructions of them with the representation that the reformers held that the fate of the church anterior to Christ's coming is not clearly revealed, and that at that epoch the earth is to be struck from existence, and the redeemed transferred to another world. No question in respect to their doctrines is less open to doubt, than that they held essentially the same views respecting the condition of the church down to the period of Christ's second coming, and of the deliverance it is then to receive from its enemies that are held by millenarians, viz.—that it is to be depressed, led astray by false teachers, distracted by contentions, and persecuted and trodden down by the civil rulers and popish ecclesiastics, till he comes; and that he is then to destroy those antichristian powers *by his own hand*, not by the agency of men.

5. But in addition to these tasks, the reviewer must, in order to verify his statement, produce direct and unequivocal proofs, that his "third doctrine" was the doctrine of the church from the second and third to the sixteenth century; that it was held and asserted by the reformers; and that it is, at the present time, the doctrine of the church generally, with the exception of a small body in this country. If he is able to show that such is the fact, let him produce the proofs of it. We do not ask him to allege statements from the fathers, the doctors of the middle ages, or the reformers, that are simply not inconsistent with that doctrine; nor that if contemplated irrespective of all others, may be made the ground of a plausible inference that they entertained that theory. Let him produce passages in which it is specifically presented as their view of the teachings of the Scriptures, in contradistinction from the doctrine of the millenarians on the one hand, and the tropological and allegorical interpreters on the other. But as Origen, Jerome, and their followers, *spiritualized* the prophecies which this question respects as openly and systematically as they are spiritualized by the modern advocates of a mere figurative resurrection of the

saints and reign of a thousand years, it will be necessary for the reviewer, in order to substantiate his statement, to show that there is a radical difference between that ancient and this modern spiritualization. If both interpret "the glowing passages which are referred by some to the period of Christ's personal reign, and by others to the spiritual millennium" of the church on earth anterior to Christ's coming, "instead of the state of things after the final consummation," which is, in the meaning of the reviewer, after the earth has ceased to be the scene of Christ's kingdom, are not their spiritualizations of the same nature, and their theories, whether they use the word millennium or not, essentially the same? Here is a fine field for the display of the reviewer's subtlety. We shall look for brilliant flashes of intelligence ;—for sharp and novel discriminations in this part of his discussion. The discovery and demonstration of two wholly different systems of spiritualization applied to identically the same passages, and assigning to them the same meaning, will constitute, we apprehend, a new era in the history of interpretation.*

* However satisfactorily the reviewer may succeed in that undertaking, he has fallen into an error in the introduction of his article, in stating that Mr. Imbrie represents the theory of a spiritual millennium, which prevails in this country, as having been the doctrine of the church at large from the rejection of millenarianism in the age of Jerome. He says :—

"Americans are often accused of considering their country the whole world. We fear, that American theologians will lay themselves open to the accusation of thinking their church the church universal, and their theology the whole field of divinity. Mr. Imbrie, throughout this discourse, contrasts two theories about the millennium. The one he calls the church-doctrine, and the other, which he advocates, is that of the personal reign of Christ for a thousand years before the consummation. He speaks of the former as the common doctrine of Christians, he regards it as part of the general faith of Christendom, and looks upon it as one point as to which the church has lapsed from the teachings of the Apostles. Now the truth is, it is no church-doctrine at all. It is a modern theory of very limited extent, almost peculiar in fact to a certain portion of the churches in America. His whole discourse is constructed on a false hypothesis. He assumes that there is no other view of the subject, of which he treats, than the two theories which he here contrasts. He, therefore, supposes if he has demolished one, the other must, of necessity, be admitted. This is a mistake. He may successfully disprove the doctrine at present popular in this country as to the millennium, and yet the whole doctrine of the church as to the 'last things' be left untouched."

This representation we regard as wholly without ground. Mr. Imbrie does not profess to show what the doctrine is which the church, generally, has held on the subject, since it rejected the faith of the first centuries. He makes no specific statement of the kind the reviewer ascribes to him. He had no occasion to consider particularly what the opinions were that were held by the Greeks and

He, however, will find it equally difficult to reconcile his third doctrine with the representations of the Scriptures. 1. He denies that there is to be any millennium, either literal or spiritual. But that is to contradict the express revelation made in the Apocalypse that there is to be a thousand years, during which Satan shall be bound and imprisoned so that he shall not deceive the nations; and that the risen and enthroned saints shall during that period reign with Christ. That the thousand years are to precede the annihilation of the earth, or end of the world, in the sense of this writer, and that men are both then, and after the expiration of that period, to exist in the body, and be sanctified and saved, is made indisputable by the prediction that Satan shall not deceive the nations during the thousand years, but shall, after that time has passed, delude them again, and excite them to rebellion. That the race unglorified are then to inhabit the earth is implied also in the reign of the saints. How can the saints reign, unless they have subjects? And who are to be their subjects, unless it be the nations in the natural or un-

Catholics of the dark ages. The differences of which he treats are the differences that subsist in the Synod which he addressed, the church with which he is connected, and the other Protestant churches that are now engaged in the work of "missions;" and it is in reference to the views with which the gospel is to be sent to the nations, as a practical question, the just determination of which is of moment to each party, that he states and discusses the two systems. The following passage exemplifies the mode in which he presents it throughout his Discourse:—

"We all pray 'thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.' We all look with certain hope for the establishment of that kingdom. We are all agreed that there is but one such kingdom; when the 'earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.' But a glance at the church will satisfy any one, that as to the nature and accompaniments of that kingdom, we are not all agreed."—P. 32.

His argument thus relates to the opinions that now prevail in the body he addressed, and the other churches of the period, that are now engaged in the work of missions. Inasmuch, therefore, as the reviewer admits the two theories, which Mr. Imbrie states, are actually held by the members of the synod generally, and the evangelical churches of this country, that are engaged in endeavoring to evangelize the nations, his representations on the subject are correct. The reviewer's imputation to him, accordingly, of a blunder that must render him ridiculous in the eyes of foreigners, is unjustifiable. It is the reviewer himself, we apprehend, not Mr. Imbrie, who has fallen into the mistake of imagining, that his own opinion is the common doctrine of the church, and a part of the general faith of Christendom.

glorified body, according to the prediction in Daniel, that "the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to them," and that "they shall possess it for ever?" How is this writer to justify himself for thus unhesitatingly setting aside so important a portion of the revelation God has made? What weight can he expect the cautious will attach to his denunciations of millenarians, if he shows himself to be so little regardful of the prophecies on which they found their faith?

2. He represents that the anti-christian power is to continue to the end of the world; that the redemption of the race is to terminate at Christ's coming; and that he is not, after that period, to have a kingdom on the earth. But that is in direct contradiction to the revelation made in Daniel, that at the coming of the Ancient of Days to destroy the powers symbolised by the wild beast, Christ is to be invested with the dominion of the earth, that all nations are then to serve him, and that the saints at the same epoch are to take the kingdom and possess it for ever. It is in direct contradiction to the prediction that the stone cut out of the mountain without hands, that falls on the image, the feet of which stand for the same power, shall, after it has destroyed that symbol, itself become a great mountain and fill *the whole earth*; which shows with equal certainty that the earth is to be the scene of the rule which the persons denoted by the stone are to exert. It is in like contradiction to the revelation made in the Apocalypse, that the kingdoms of *the earth* are at the period of the final judgment of the anti-christian powers, and the resurrection and reward of the holy dead, to become the kingdom of Christ, and that he shall reign for ever. How can those kingdoms become his, and be the scene of his eternal reign, if the earth is then to be annihilated, and the race, good and evil, transported for ever to other orbs?

3. It will be acceptable to be informed what the principle is on which this writer interprets the prophecies, so as to obtain the meaning which he ascribes to them. Does he hold that the whole of the Old Testament has a double sense? or is the law by which he expounds the prophets applicable only to them? If so, will he be good enough to state the reasons of that distinction? Does he hold the theory on which

Jerome proceeds, that the persons and places that are the literal subjects of the predictions, are not the real persons and places that are to be the subjects of the events foretold, nor the events that are literally designated the events that are foreshown ; but only representatives of others of a different order ? If, as he assumes, Israelites mean Gentiles or Christians, Jerusalem the church, and the new Jerusalem heaven, or some other world, what is the law by which they are invested with that signification ? Where are the proofs of its truth ? Is that theory to be applied to writers generally, or only to the prophets ? If their predictions are to be interpreted on that principle, how does it appear but that *the interpretations put on their predictions* by this writer, are also to be interpreted by the same law, and Christians, the church, and heaven, taken as standing for persons, an organization, and a place of a different order ? Why not ? How is he to prove that his statements of the things predicted, are not to be interpreted by that law, as much as the statements of them are, that are made by the prophets ? Does he observe that law in the common affairs of life ? If he reads a volume of travels in Palestine, in which there is a description of Jerusalem, the site of the temple, Mount Zion, and the neighboring valleys and hills, and a detail of events that happened there during the visit of the writer, does he interpret Jerusalem, Zion, the temple, the valley of Jehoshaphat, the Mount of Olives, and other places, as mere symbols of the Christian church ; and the occurrences related in the narrative of which they were the scenes, as merely representative of resembling occurrences in the church ? If not, what is the ground of his treating them differently ? If he borrows money of a Jew, and gives a note for it payable to the order of the person who lends it, does he treat the name of that person in the note, as a mere representative of a different person ; and hold that the debt is absolutely due—not to the lender—but to another party, of whom no mention is made in the obligation ? He denounces “the premillennial theory” “as in its whole tendency” “injurious.” But are not his own principles, in fact, obnoxious in the utmost degree to that charge ? Let him prove, if he can, that they are not both false and fraught with the subversion of all the truths of God’s

word. Let him show, if in his power, that they do not merit and would not meet with universal reprobation, were they to be applied to the ordinary transactions of life.

4. We ask the reviewer to verify his representation, that according to the Scriptures, the kingdom Christ is to institute at his advent, is not to be on the earth, but in heaven. He holds that the earth is to fly away at his coming and be burned up, and regards it as beyond contradiction, that the kingdom he is then to establish is to be a "heavenly, as distinguished from an earthly kingdom;" that is, that the heavens and not the earth are to be its scene. If he is aware of any passages that present such a revelation, let him indicate them, and show how they are to be reconciled with the frequent and unequivocal representation that at his coming the kingdoms of *this world* are to become his, and that he is to reign *here* for ever and ever.

5. We will thank him to state the grounds on which he asserts that "all the elect are to be gathered," and the work of redemption completed before Christ's coming, and to show how that theory is to be reconciled with the representation in Daniel, that at his advent he is to be invested with a power and dominion under which all people, nations, and languages—which are indisputably men in natural or unglorified bodies—are to serve him; that the leaves of the tree of life on the banks of the river issuing from his throne in the new Jerusalem, are to be for *the healing of the nations*, which implies that there are not only to be men in unglorified bodies, but in bodies that will need to be freed from mortality; and that the saints of the Most High are, when he comes, and the fourth monarchy is destroyed, to take the kingdom, and possess it for ever and ever, which implies that there are to be men in different, and therefore in unglorified bodies, who are to be their subjects.

6. And finally, we ask him, if in his power, to verify the charge with which he closes his article, that "the premillennial theory conflicts with many well-established doctrines of the word of God, and is in its whole tendency injurious." This is a grave accusation—as if it cannot be substantiated; if that doctrine, instead of being a mistake, is a doctrine of the word of God, it is an impeachment of that word itself as self-contradictory.

dictious and injurious. Let him then verify his imputations if he is able. Let him designate the doctrines of the Scriptures with which that "theory" conflicts, and demonstrate its inconsistency with them. Let him show what its whole tendencies are, and prove that they are injurious.

It is scarcely necessary to suggest, that to accomplish these tasks a different method will be requisite from that which he has chosen in his notice of the Discourse. If millenarianism "is destined" to be put to "a long sleep after a short and turbulent life," by his instrumentality, some more efficient means will be necessary than mere asseveration, discourteous epithets, misstatements, and unsupported imputations of error. The question is not to be cut short by denunciation, nor determined by dogmatism. Is there any other subject on which differences exist among the ministers and members of the church to which the reviewer belongs, of which he would think it decorous or safe to speak in the contemptuous and authoritative manner in which he treats this? Let us hope that it will hereafter be discussed with the candor and care to which a question on so important a theme, and affecting so large a portion of the word of God, is entitled.

ART. VII.—MISCELLANIES.

THERE are many subjects entitled to be noticed, that do not require such space as to make it worth while to treat them separately. We design to group them under this head; and without consideration whether, as in this article, they are in any degree connected with one another.

What is the destiny of our race? What are the great purposes which God has revealed respecting the future? How are the nations to be converted? By whom are they to be led to the reception of the gospel? What office is the church to fill in their evangelization? What is their conversion itself to be?—are questions that were never so generally discussed by all parties—religious, irreligious, philosophic, and

political—as at the present time, nor answered by theories so numerous, and that embraced so small a share of truth. The following, among others, have recently fallen under our notice :—

I.

Dr. Niven, President of Marshall College, Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, lately published a Baccalaureate address, delivered by him at the close of the last academical year at that institution, which exemplifies the mode in which the dreamy speculatists of the transcendental school are endeavoring to force Christianity into the form of an atheistic naturalism. He exhibits the young men who had closed their college career, as about to enter on “a hard and difficult world,” and his object is “to fix upon their thoughts a few primary and central interests of morality that may be felt to commend themselves to regard as specially needful for the mission of life at the present time,” and his “parting counsel gathers itself up into this threefold interest,” “*faith, reverence, and freedom.*” These are terms of frequent use in morals and religion, and most unacquainted with the metaphysics of Dr. Niven, on hearing it announced that they were to be urged to cultivate that for which they stand, probably would suppose themselves able to anticipate with a good share of accuracy the affections they were to cherish, and the objects to which they were to be directed. No greater mistake, however, could be made in respect to either. His counsel is, “Cultivate faith in the existence of the *invisible and eternal*; cherish reverence for the *absolute and universal*; seek the true freedom of the spirit in its own sphere of necessary *self-moving law*. Only so can you be true to yourselves. Only so can you hope to be either truly useful, or truly honorable in your generation.” By “the invisible and eternal,” and “the absolute and universal,” he means, according to the import of those terms in the vocabulary of the transcendentalists, God’s essence or nature, considered irrespective of his agency, relations, or the effects he has produced. He contradistinguishes “the absolute as such simply,” from “the absolute in the form of self-revelation, God in the world, God unfolding his glory to the view of angels and men.” His advice, then,

to "cultivate faith in the existence of the invisible and eternal," is advice to cultivate faith in God's existence simply as an essence or being, irrespective of all displays he has made of himself; and this faith he holds is to be regarded as "a central interest of morality," that is "specially needful to the mission of life at the present time." This is undeniably transcendental. It not only overleaps nature, but reason. How is it possible to believe in God's existence, independently of all evidence of his being? How is it practicable to see him who is invisible, except by the aid of some medium that demonstrates his existence? Paul teaches us that it is by the things he has made, that the invisible things of him, even his eternal power and Godhead, are seen. What propriety is there in thus attempting to exercise faith without evidence;—to believe not only independently of reason, but in contradiction to it;—in a word, to stultify our nature, by placing what ought to be the highest exercise at once of the intellect and heart, on lower ground than the convictions that are produced through our senses? What interest of morality is to be subserved by such a contemplation of God irrespective of his agency towards us, his claims and our obligations? That is not the relation in which he calls us to contemplate him. He requires us to regard him as our creator, upholder, benefactor, and lawgiver, and the maker, owner, and ruler of all. The questions we have asked are certainly natural and appropriate; and to the uninitiated, it will seem no easy task to give them a satisfactory answer. Dr. Niven, however, though desirous that his hearers and readers should believe without a reason, does not act without one in giving this counsel. The secret of his exhortation doubtless is, that he holds with Coleridge, Cousin, Hegel, Kant, and other transcendentalists, that there are no evidences of God's existence; and if he is not believed to exist, therefore, without evidence, he cannot be the object of faith at all; and thence, that blind and senseless faith is held to be a primary interest of morality, as without it there cannot be even an ideal lawgiver, and, therefore, no religion nor morals.

This will doubtless strike the reader as sufficiently false and absurd. He will naturally suppose that he now has a full comprehension of the import of Dr. N.'s exhortation. He will

have no suspicion that he has not yet caught a glimpse of the fathomless abyss of contradiction and nonsense that yawns under those lofty phrases; that the most unequivocal and important of the terms of Dr. N.'s advice is employed in a sense, not only wholly unknown to usage, but that ingenuity itself could never guess. Yet such is the fact. What is faith? Is it an act of the mind? Is it belief, trust, conviction, that is deliberately recognised as resting on adequate grounds and cherished as legitimate? Not at all. Instead of an act, it is in Dr. Niven's vocabulary an "*organ*." "This communication with the spiritual world is accomplished by *faith*; which is simply *the capacity or organ* our nature carries in itself as spirit, for perceiving and apprehending spiritual things, the realities of a higher world, as sense is the organ through which we stand in union with things seen and temporal. It forms emphatically thus, the bond that joins us in a real and living way, with the *pleroma* of life in God; and it is easy to see how immeasurably needful it is, that it should be always at hand as an open channel, through which fresh supplies of light and strength from that boundless fountain may be poured into our souls, to fit them for the work and conflict to which they are called." Faith in his system then, instead of an act, is an organ or faculty of perceiving that which is invisible, and is the same as Mr. Morell's "intuitional consciousness;" a power of seeing God, independently of media; by which is in fact, however, meant a capacity of forming an *idea* of an infinite and eternal being, irrespective of all evidences of his existence. His exhortation to "cultivate faith in the existence of the invisible and eternal," is consequently, not an exhortation to *believe* in that existence; but only to cultivate the "*capacity or organ* our nature carries in itself, for perceiving and apprehending such spiritual things," as sense is the organ through which we stand in union "with things seen and temporal." This cultivation, therefore, lies wholly back of the exercise of belief. The capacity of perceiving spiritual things is to be the subject of it, not the perception and belief of their existence. But how is such a faculty to be cultivated? How can a power of seeing without means, be supposed to admit of any augmentation in

strength? If a being by virtue of his nature can perceive any one thing exterior to himself, independently of media, must he not be able with equal ease to perceive any other? If Dr. Niven can, by his organ of faith, actually see God's essence, angels in heaven, and the spirits of the just made perfect, without the aid of any intervening medium, can there be any obstacle to his seeing anything else in the same way? Must not such an organ necessarily be a faculty of omniscience? To a capacity of seeing without eyes, the remoteness or minuteness of objects cannot be a hindrance to their being beheld. It must, from its nature, be as adequate to the perception of one class of things as another, and things at the utmost distance, as things that are near. But apart from that consideration, what benefit could result from the cultivation of the capacity of faith without evidence? Would such a faith be rendered stronger by the nurture of the faculty? Would it become any better by an augmentation of its strength? Would a beggar's power of believing, or his belief that he is rich, grow any stronger and better by his endeavor to cultivate that power or faith without any evidence that he is wealthy? Could he by that means join himself "in a real and living way to the pleroma" of riches, and cause "fresh supplies" of money to be poured "from the boundless fountain" of property into his purse, to fit him for the work and conflict to which he is called? Why would an attempt to supply his wants by such an expedient, be any more useless and absurd, than it were to undertake to cultivate a power of seeing and believing spiritual things without means?

Such is Dr. Niven's first counsel to the Baccalaureans of Marshall College. Stript of the cloud of deceitful words in which it is involved, it is nothing less than an exhortation to endeavor to remedy the evils of a natural and necessary atheism, by cultivating a power of conceiving of God as a real existence. He in effect tells them, you have no evidence of the being of God. If he exists to you, it can only be as an idea, and that idea must be the product of your own unassisted minds; and your faith in his reality must be a gratuitous and reasonless faith. But the idea of God, and of his existence, is essential in order to morality. Cultivate, therefore, your

organ of idealizing him, and regarding him as a real existence. "Only so can you be true to yourselves, only so can you hope to be truly useful, or truly honorable in your generation."

His next advice is, to "cultivate the principle of reverence;" "reverence for the absolute and universal." By the "absolute and universal," he means, God considered simply as an existence, irrespective of the manifestations he has made of himself, his acts, and relations. His advice therefore to reverence him, independently of all displays of his perfections and will, and evidences of his being, is as absurd, contradictory, and atheistic, as the exhortation to believe his existence without evidence. He soon abandons this view, however, and asserts that the idea which we should make the object of reverence, is the idea of a personal agent, and the life or cause of all other being and life. He says:—

"All reverence carries in it an acknowledgment of God as its ultimate object and ground; and it involves also, essentially, the conception of God as an intelligent personal being, *and not simply in the form of an infinite abstraction*. Even where this may not be clearly perceived, and the mind seems to be overwhelmed only with the sense of the absolute as a merely *natural power*, the true interior spring of its emotion is still always the obscure apprehension of a divine *life* behind this, which is felt to underlie all in the character of self-existent thought and will. Such an emotion, even in the breast of a Spinoza, is the involuntary tribute of the human spirit to the fountain of its own life, which serves of itself to demonstrate, against all intervening speculation, its true living reality as the self-conscious ground of the universe." "Only in the presence of the Divinity, apprehended as free, self-moving, all embracing spirit, and only in the sense of our relation to it as the centre and end of our own being, can any such sentiment legitimately fill our minds."

That is, he must be contemplated not as a mere abstraction, or idea, but as an intelligent agent and cause, in order to be justly an object of reverence. But if, as Dr. N. has been teaching, in believing his existence, we were to regard him only as an abstraction or mere essence, irrespective of all manifestations, acts, and relations; and if, as he asserts, that faith is the necessary foundation "of this reverence," how is it possible to contemplate him in a wholly different relation

as an object of veneration? How can we found an affection towards him as a real and personal existence, on a view of him as a non-real, or mere conceptional existence? Dr. Niven is manifestly not unaware of this difficulty. He treats the apprehension of God as a personal agent and cause, as naturally far weaker than as a mere abstraction, and as gaining a place in the mind in an obscure and unintelligible way, in spite of its contradictory speculations. And the secret of his believing it, doubtless, is like Spinoza's, that the system on which he speculates is pantheistic, whether he regards God and the universe as merely ideal or real; and that God must be contemplated as having relations to us, in order to be an object of religious regard. If he is not considered as having any relations to us, we cannot consider ourselves as sustaining any to him, and no room consequently can exist for claims by him on us, or duties from us to him. A relationship, therefore, that generates rights and obligations, must be admitted in order to the possibility of religion.

On the other hand, however, if, as Dr. Niven holds, though he is, in the exercise of reverence, to be contemplated in the relations he actually sustains towards us, yet the reverence is not to be exercised towards him *as* sustaining those relations, but solely as a bare existence, whether real or ideal, independently of all his relations and acts,—then, obviously, a title to our religious reverence is not peculiar to him, but is common to all other existences, whether real or ideal. If the bare fact, that he is an existence, makes him a proper object of religious veneration, then the fact, that angels, and men, and the material world are existences, must also render them proper objects also, proportionally to the measure of their being, of a similar veneration. And such, accordingly, is Dr. Niven's doctrine:—

“But now it would be a grand mistake again, on the opposite hand, to suppose that, because all reverence has regard ultimately to God, in the way here affirmed, there can be no room for its exercise towards any object less than God. This would be, in truth, to fall into the very abstraction which the case requires, as we have already seen, that we should religiously avoid. It is not the absolute as such simply, but the

absolute in the form of self-revelation, God in the world, before which our spirits are thus required to bow. In this view *Nature* itself may be the object of reverence, not on its own account *outwardly considered*, but as it serves to manifest to the view of faith the sublime presence and wonderful attributes of him *who dwells in it*, and makes it the perpetual mirror of his glory. Reverence is due to the *Name* of God, whenever it comes to utterance in any way, in the stars of heaven or in the flowers of the field, in rolling seas or everlasting hills, in the birds of the air, the fish of the sea, and the beasts of the forest. The universe of nature as a whole and in all its parts, is not merely a sign of what God is, *but the very symbol and sacrament of his presence, a true revelation, as far as it goes, of his eternal power and Godhead.*"

In other words, it is God himself, according to Spinoza and Swedenborg, materialized and psychicalized, or according to Hegel, idealized; and, therefore, it is to be revered for the same reason that his nature is, considered antecedently to its development or manifestation in these forms. It is God, he represents, that is the object of veneration in this shape or nature, as much as when he is considered simply as the absolute. It is "the absolute in *the form of self-revelation*, God in the world," that is, God materialized, in finite forms. He, on the same ground, exhibits all intelligent beings as entitled to veneration.

"God, however, reveals himself in the world, not merely by such outward symbols which themselves have no part in *the life of the spirit*, and so are shadows only of *the divine substance they are made to enshrine*, but still more gloriously also through the world of mind itself, in virtue of which the very image and likeness of his own nature look forth upon us from the bosom of the universe, under a created form. *This is entitled to our reverence always, not only as the shrine of something higher*, but also *for its own sake*; though only for its own sake again, of course, *as it is felt to be comprehended in that which is more general* than itself separately considered, *and so finally in the universal mind itself*, forth from *which as a parent fountain all other minds proceed*. Man thus, in his single capacity, *becomes an object worthy of veneration even with angels*; because his personality, constituted by reason and will, sets him in real union with the very being of spirit under its universal form, and makes him to be something far more in *this view* than his own individual life.

"As such an efflux from God, still bound through every point of its

separate existence with the ocean of light and love from which it proceeds, the human spirit everywhere challenges our awful respect. We are bound to reverence it in all men. Even an infant may claim, in such view, the inmost homage of our hearts, for it carries in its tiny life potentially the high and *holy mystery of self-acting intelligence*, in comparison with which the sun itself is a very small thing."

The reason that the human mind is to be venerated, is thus precisely the same as that for which God himself in the abstract is to be revered; viz. because it is *mind*, a "self-acting intelligence;" and, in a word, divine, or a part of God himself in a finite form. His exhortation to "cherish reverence for the absolute and universal" thus turns out to be an exhortation to regard the whole universe, physical and spiritual, as a mere materialization and intellectualization of God in finite forms, or modifications of his infinite nature, and especially to deify all intellectual beings, whether angels or men, and contemplate them with the same "awful respect" and religious reverence, with which God himself, irrespective of these embodiments of his nature, is to be regarded.

But if God and the universe are thus one; if the latter is the form in which he now exists and exhibits himself, it follows that all the acts and operations of the universe are his acts, and all the acts especially of finite intelligences are his, and are expressions and manifestations of his thoughts and will, in the same manner as the acts of individual creatures are exhibitions and expressions of their nature and will. Dr. Niven, accordingly, treats them as revelations of God.

"God reveals himself in the form of self-acting spirit, not by inspiring truth and law into *every man separately* taken, . . . but by a single inspiration rather . . . which is at once as broad and full as the compass of our whole humanity."

That is, *inspiration is not a personal gift to a few individuals*, but is common to *all*, and because all are parts of God!

"Our acknowledgment of his authority, then, in this form, can never be genuine and full, save as it is *mediated* by a due respect to the living organism of mind, through which alone it is brought to challenge our

regard. What we are required to reverence here, as before, in the constitution of the outward world, is *a divine revelation*, an actual *self-manifestation* of God's glory and name; which, in this case, meets us, however, in the form of created intelligence and will, and not as before in the form simply of blind nature. This *system of created intelligence and will, the life of man in its general or collective character*, is ITSELF THE REVELATION we are bound to acknowledge and respect."

In other words—the only way in which God reveals himself is by becoming materialized and psychicalized in finite forms and acting in them. He makes a revelation of himself, accordingly, in all the forms and operations of the material and spiritual universe. Any one of those revelations, consequently, is as declarative of his thoughts and will, and as authoritative in proportion to its extent as any other. That made through "*the life of man in its general or collective character*" being the greatest, is especially "*the revelation we are bound to acknowledge and respect.*" But, if whatever each individual does is thus the act of God, and expressive of his thoughts and will; it naturally follows that whatever large bodies of men do, and for a long succession of years or ages, must be a revelation of his will, and be regarded as emphatically a law for their future guidance. Such, accordingly, is Dr. N.'s theory.

"Do we ask now in what way this homage is exacted at our hands? The answer is plain. Through the ethical constitution of society (itself God's work), as it starts in the family, rises into the state, and completes itself at last in the glorious idea of the church. . . . God's truth and God's will come not to men, not even through the Bible itself, in any abstract and naked style; and so to be the object at all of reverence or faith they must be apprehended as a real revelation, under the form of life and spirit in the actual structure of the human world."

That is, all the acts of men in their domestic, political, and ecclesiastical relations; and especially in the last two, in which they combine in great numbers, and act together for long periods, are authoritative revelations of his will, and the only revelations he makes or can make of what he approves and requires! All the acts of men in those relations are, accordingly, indices of his character, manifestations of what

he is, and what he approves; and, consequently, to be regarded by us with the approbation and reverence with which we should contemplate his other acts. It follows, therefore, that all that men have done, in large combinations, as rulers, conquerors, tyrants, usurpers of his rights, perverters of his truth, apostates, and persecutors of his people, is justifiable and holy. There is no evil in their malignant passions, no sin in their impious rebellion, no unrighteousness in their cruel oppression and slaughter of one another. Such is the hideous abyss of falsehood and blasphemy into which this pantheistic scheme precipitates its votaries. In converting God into man and men into God, and exhibiting all their acts as his, it in effect denies their evil nature, and ascribes to them the spotlessness of his wisdom and sanctitude. Of all the aspersions of the Almighty which folly or malice have ever framed, this is probably the greatest!

He finally exhorts the young men to "cultivate the life and power of true freedom." And by true freedom he means exemption from all laws but that of their own minds:—

"It lies in the very conception of intelligence that it should be a law to itself, and not obey blindly and mechanically a power foreign to its own nature. Self-consciousness, the image of God in man, completes itself in self-activity." . . . "Liberty is an ethical fact that stands just in this, that the single will, in virtue of that divine autonomy or self-motion which belongs to it by its creation, flows over the boundaries of the individual life in which it has its rise, and makes itself one with the pure ether of truth that surrounds it, the glorious sea of light in which it is carried and borne."

"The authority which freedom respects and obeys, is, of course, always the will of God. All law, as well as all life, comes from this source alone. It must be well borne in mind, however, that we have to do with this, not as an abstraction brought nigh to us immediately in the way of mere *thought*, but as an actual self-manifestation of God's will in the *living world of which we are a part*."

Such, if the theory be correct, must necessarily be the fact. If each individual is a part of God in a finite form, and all his acts and affections God's, and revelations of his will, they must, of course, be the supreme law of that individual. To adopt or submit to any other, were to repudiate the immedi-

ate revelation made in his own consciousness, and submit to what must at best be a less direct and emphatic manifestation of God's will. Each one is thus taught to take his own ideas, passions, and wishes, as his only authoritative law, and emancipate himself from all subordination to God and to man !

Such is the issue in which this undeification of God and deification of man terminate. Dr. Niven first teaches his pupils to believe in God only in the abstract, or as an existence wholly without relations to them, by which they are to place themselves, ideally at least, out of his jurisdiction. Next he counsels them to regard themselves, their fellow-men, and other created things, as the real and only deity with whom they have any concern ; and the life and agency of the race collectively as constituting the character and revealing the will of that deity. And, finally, to guard still more effectually against their taking God as their law-giver, he directs them to make themselves their sole law, and thereby legitimates all the passions, wishes, and acts they may choose to cherish and exert as innocent and holy ! Was there ever a more monstrous system of impiety devised ? Was there ever such a wholesale sanction given to every species of iniquity towards God and man ? The license of sin by the Roman court in its worst form ; the pretensions of the pope to the throne and prerogatives of God, in its most blasphemous shape, sink into insignificance compared to this unblushing deification of the whole race, and ascription to their follies and crimes of the unsullied glories of divine wisdom and sanctitude ! Yet this atrocious scheme is taught in the dread name of the Eternal by one whose office it is to expound his word. Nor are the young men of Marshall College alone imbued with it. It is taught also, though perhaps less openly, in other academic institutions, and in several theological seminaries ; and the press generally, secular and religious, is the instrument, when its votaries wish, of its dissemination through the community. What other result can be expected from its inculcation by so many powerful agencies but a rapid spread of unblushing infidelity ?

II.

In Dr. Niven's view of man and life, a few vague, false, and atheistic *ideas* are to be the grand means of virtue, happiness, and usefulness to individuals and communities. Bishop Hughes' theory of a good world, a good religion, and a good government, is at the other speculative pole, and equally a mere idea; though he would be reluctant to designate it by that name; as he regards "ideas" as a most mischievous class of things, restless, prone to propagate themselves, influential, and causes of most of the political and religious evils with which the age is distracted. The recent revolutions in Europe have all come into existence, he assures us, in a "lecture," lately delivered, on the "Church and World," under the influence of ideas. The "sufferings" of "the masses" have stimulated them indeed, in a degree, to "a certain uneasiness;" but the true causes of their revolt from their despotic rulers, and endeavors to obtain civil and religious freedom, were "ideas;" the idea, we suppose, that they have rights, that the object of governments should be to promote the well-being of those who are governed; that freedom is better than vassalage, knowledge than ignorance, and happiness than misery. The bishop's beau-ideal of a political community, is one in which the masses are in subjection to the rulers, and the rulers in subjection to the papal hierarchy; and his beau-ideal of a church is the Catholic exercising the supremacy in spiritual and civil things, which it asserted anterior to the Reformation. The grand remedy of the evils that prevail in the world, accordingly, is a return to the Romish church, and a re-instatement of the pope, in the absolute power which he exerted from the twelfth to the sixteenth century. How this would cure the miseries of the Catholic world, which is vastly more debased, ill-governed, and wretched than the Protestant, he does not very satisfactorily explain. He affirms, however, that the Catholic church is truly friendly to the freedom and civilization of "the masses," and their only real, hearty, and consistent patron. He asserts, that "there was *at all times*, among the old Catholic nations of Christendom, a remarkable tendency in favor of *real democracy*," and that "accordingly, this last

prospered under the patronage of the Sovereign Pontiff and of the church, as much as any other form of government." We regret that he did not designate the democratic governments of the old Catholic nations, that prospered under the patronage of the Sovereign Pontiff. They have unfortunately escaped the notice of Baronius, Raynaldus, De Marca, Bossuet, Gibbon, and other writers, who would naturally have discovered them, were there any traces of their existence on the pages of history. It is with very peculiar eyes that he has read the annals of the church. "All the elements of civilization, all the necessary elements of society in the progress of rational liberty" in the nations of Europe, were furnished, he says, by the Catholic church. "One of the crimes, indeed, in the accusations of modern times, is, that she undertook to support despotic kings." But that is a mistake. "She never recognised and never permitted to be recognised, a despot. When the church had sway, nations had no despots; I mean of the *absolute* stamp." His meaning must accordingly be, that however *tyrannical* towards their subjects, they were not *absolute* despots, inasmuch as they were *under the dominion of the pope*, and obliged to submit to his dictation, in order to preserve their crowns! Of what benefit, however, was that to their subjects? Was pontifical supremacy employed in protecting them from the tyranny of their rulers? The world was indeed full of despots before she obtained her supremacy; but the moment she reached the summit of power, she dispatched them, and the nations thereafter basked in freedom and bliss, till the opening of the sixteenth century, when, "stimulated to a certain uneasiness," by a set of new "ideas," they snatched her sceptre from her hands, and denied her the happiness of continuing to make them blest! "It is true, that when she commenced her mission, or rather when she had passed herself through a sea of blood, up to the period of her *emancipation*, according to human liberty, she found not one single free government on this globe. There was not one but what was despotic; and, I may add, that when her authority or influence in such matters began to be assailed in the sixteenth century, she had left within the whole of Christendom, *not one despotic government.*" The most brutal debasement, the most abject servi-

tude, the most cruel oppression of their people, the atrocious torture and slaughter of the servants of God, because of their allegiance to him, were not the work of despotism, it seems! The latter, especially, were only "the elements of *civilization*, the necessary elements of society in the progress of rational liberty," that "were furnished" "by the Catholic church!"

As the church was thus the sole author of freedom and civilization, on her being divested of her power, these blessings, of course, vanished from the earth, and tyranny and barbarism succeeded in their place. "When that which is now mis-called the Reformation came forth, the central force of *Christian civilization* was by the event impaired and partially destroyed, the power of *acting on society* in any concentrated and energetic form, was marred, if not utterly paralysed." The Pope could no longer depose the Protestant princes; he could no longer by an interdict close all the churches of their kingdoms, debar their subjects from the rites of religion, nor prohibit the burial of the dead. He could no longer stretch the witnesses of God on the rack, or burn them at the stake; and deprived of these mild means of civilizing them, his influence completely vanished. "Consequently things took altogether a new direction. Instead of recognising any general *standard* on any question of a moral character, every one was supposed to be able to form a standard for himself." The word of God in the bishop's judgment, it seems, is not a "general standard on any question of a moral character." When, therefore, the Protestants rejected the authority of the Pope, they were under the necessity of *making* a standard on moral questions. "From that moment the authority of him who spoke in the supreme voice of the church was discarded, and each sovereign appropriated to himself the headship of religion as well as the state. Throughout that period you will find *the beginnings of encroachments on liberty*." "The Protestant princes broke away from the church absolutely. She was even forced to lower her authoritative voice, and to speak in gentler tones to those who still recognised her spiritual dominion. *The natural result was*, that after this change and this diminution of the power of the church, *Catholic princes* moved almost as rapidly as others in the same direction of *despotism*," and

liberty consequently expired. How singular that this fact has wholly escaped the notice of the subjects themselves, of those princes, and the honor of discovering it been reserved to a bishop of this hemisphere! By the encroachments on liberty, however, he means the obstruction of the church in the exercise of her despotic power. A people's enjoying their just rights, and being well governed, evidently does not, in Bishop Hughes' view, involve their exemption from oppression, protection in their property and persons, liberty to worship God according to their views of his will, and advancement in civilization and happiness. They may consist with their suffering every species of evil from their rulers. Whether they are free or not depends altogether on the party by whom they are harassed, overwhelmed with miseries, obstructed in the worship of God, and destroyed! If it is the Catholic hierarchy that crushes them, they are for that reason free and blest with civilization. If Protestant princes or Catholics who disregard the usurpations of supreme power by the Pope, tread them in the dust, they are the vassals of a cruel tyranny! The overthrow of the despots, therefore, who now trample down Europe, and elevation of the enslaved and debased to freedom, knowledge, and refinement, would not on his theory involve any improvement in their political or moral condition. It would only be to subject them to the additional domination of the Pope.

The millennium to which he looks forward accordingly, if he anticipates such a period, is a return of the ignorance, the superstition, the tyranny, and the persecutions of the dark ages;—a theory of the cure of the moral and political evils of the world, and the deliverance and triumph of the church, false and absurd as it is, quite as rational and probable as that of Protestants of the class to which Dr. Nevin belongs.

III.

Very different are the views presented by the Rev. Mr. Reynolds in a discourse on the church, addressed to the synod of Pittsburgh. Though he assigns to the church too high an office in the reformation and conversion of the world, supposing that she is in her present form the kingdom symbolized by the stone that smote the image and afterwards be-

came a great mountain, and filled the whole earth, yet he presents a very just view of the agency by which she is to accomplish the good she achieves. He has little faith in organizations to prevent individual evils that prevail—slavery, intemperance, sectarianism, fanaticism. He holds that the only means by which the church can administer a thorough remedy to the miseries of the wretched, and conduct the perishing to salvation, is to proclaim to them the Saviour and guide them to him. “The only permanent reformation will be found to be that which sends men in their individual capacity to examine the iniquity of their own hearts, and to sigh and cry until he who is the true light shall appear unto them We know of only one light in this world of darkness, and that is Christ; all others, however specious, are false and deceitful.” There was never a period, perhaps, when there was greater need of a realization of this truth.

For Dr. Niven read Dr. Noxin.

ART. VIII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. NARRATIVE OF AN EXPEDITION INTO CENTRAL AUSTRALIA, performed under the authority of her Majesty's Government during the years 1844, '5 and '6, together with a notice of the Province of South Australia in 1847. By Captain Charles Sturt, F.L.S., F.R.G.S., in two volumes. London: P. & W. Boone, 1849.

ADELAIDE, the capital of Southern Australia, from which Captain Sturt began his journey, is on the western side of the Gulf of St. Vincent, about lat. 35°, and long. 138° 35'. It was already known that a mountainous and sterile region, commencing not far north of that district, extends several degrees into the interior, and stretches to the north-east, westward of the Murray and Darling. It was known also that from that direction no large streams join those rivers. It was thence presumed that a range of mountains or highlands must run from the south-west to the north-east, through the central parts of the continent, from which rivers descend on the westerly and north-westerly side either into an interior sea or the ocean, and that the country, accordingly, through which they pass must be suitable for cultivation, and possibly

furnish a channel of communication with the western or northern ocean. It was to explore that region, and ascertain whether such is its character, that Captain Sturt undertook the expedition of which he has here given a narrative. He hoped to find the waste into which he was to penetrate of but narrow dimensions, and the line on which he was to proceed, leading to a fertile region, and waters on which he might advance towards the ocean on the west or north. In all these expectations, however, he was disappointed. His party consisted of fifteen besides himself, with 11 horses, 30 bullocks to draw the carts, and 200 sheep for food. After advancing along the Murray to the junction of the Darling, they proceeded up the latter, to lat. $32^{\circ} 30'$, and long. 142° , where it trends to the north-east, when quitting it, they struck into a desert of sandy ridges and plains, and rocky hills, nearly on the same meridian of longitude, and after encountering great difficulties and dangers from excessive heat, and want of vegetation and water, reached a position in lat. $29^{\circ} 40'$, where they found such a supply as to sustain them through the next six months, during which the streams in every direction were so dried, as to render both a further progress and a return impracticable. The thermometer rose repeatedly to 131° and 132° in the shade, and 150° and 154° in the sun. At the close of that period heavy rains falling and filling the rivers and lagoons, they proceeded on a north-west line to lat. $28^{\circ} 30'$, where they formed another camp, in which most of the train was left, while Capt. Sturt, with four or five attendants, advanced in the same direction to lat. $24^{\circ} 30'$, beyond the 128th meridian of longitude, through a vast waste of barren hills, sandy ridges, and arid plains, with but here and there water in the deep gullies cut by floods, and patches of vegetation. At that point, no indications appearing of the termination of the desert, and both water and grass wholly failing, they were compelled to return to the camp. Captain Sturt subsequently made another long excursion to the north-north-west, and again to the east, but met only a succession of naked hills and sterile plains, and was forced back by the failure of vegetation and water. No more dreary and inhospitable waste exists on the globe. Instead of ranges of mountains from which rivers descend to the coast, it is depressed nearly to the level of the ocean, and could scarcely send the waters that often flood it, through the barriers by which it is surrounded, were they not from the excessive heat immediately absorbed by the thirsty soil, or wasted by evaporation. After almost unexampled hardships, and many narrow escapes from death by thirst and hunger, they abandoned the hope of crossing the desert, and returned towards the coast, which, with the loss of but one of their number, they reached in January, 1846, seventeen months from their departure.

The easternmost point to which Capt. Sturt penetrated was on the line of the Victoria, the river discovered by Sir T. Mitchell, and supposed by him to run to the Northern Ocean, but afterwards found to turn to the south-west and lose itself, a short distance beyond the point to which he advanced, in a vast waste of rocks and sands. It seems probable, from these discoveries, that the desert which touches the sea on the south-western coast extends nearly the whole breadth of the continent, and occupies a large part of its central regions. Along the line of the Murray and Darling, where much of the soil is rich, and game and fish can be obtained, the native population is numerous; and small tribes and single families were met at several of the creeks and lagoons, in which water was found, far within the desert. They are extremely barbarous and wretched, living in low huts formed of sticks and grass overlaid with earth, without dress, without agriculture, and without any other implements than nets for game and spears for fishing and war. Iron ore abounds in the rocky hills of the desert, and on many of the flats and low grounds there are deposits of salt. Near the coast of Southern Australia there are immense mines of iron and copper. Large districts of that province are adapted to cultivation, and already yield rich harvests and sustain numerous herds and flocks. Captain Sturt's narrative, written with good sense, and detailing a series of novel and exciting incidents, is one of the most agreeable that we have read.

2. *THE MERCY SEAT*; Thoughts suggested by the Lord's Prayer; by Gardiner Spring, D.D., Pastor of the Brick Church in the city of New York. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1850.

THE topics presented by the Lord's prayer,—our relations to God, his will, his kingdom, our dependence, and wants, the desires we are to cherish, and the blessings we are to seek,—are among the noblest and most attractive in theology, and form together a fine combination for a doctrinal and practical work; and they are treated by Dr. Spring in this volume in a manner peculiarly suited to the present time, in which religious publications are in too great a degree addressed to the fancy, and designed to entertain rather than instruct. He is plain and didactic; his views simple and natural; and his discriminations of truth from the errors that have usurped its place, clear and impressive. Such a work, in which religion is treated as a reality, and urged on the intellect and heart by the considerations which the Scriptures themselves furnish, is greatly needed.

3. *HISTORY OF THE PURITANS IN ENGLAND, AND THE PILGRIM*

FATHERS. By Rev. W. H. Stowell and D. Wilson. One volume. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

THERE are none who owe more to their ancestors, or are under a higher obligation to study their history, and cherish their memory, than the descendants of the Puritans. A knowledge of their principles, and the part they acted, is essential to a just understanding of the great changes that have taken place in the civil and religious world, during the last two hundred years. Not only their descendants here, but the nations of Europe generally, owe to them in a large degree their present religious and political liberties.

Mr. Stowell exhibits in the first part of this volume, a well-wrought view of the early years of the Reformation in England, and the rise and history of the Puritans from the time of Elizabeth to the Act of Uniformity under Charles II. in 1662. It is written with candor; embraces, though brief, all the principal personages and events of their history; and presents a just estimate of their virtues, sufferings, and achievements.

Mr. Wilson gives, in the last part of the volume, a series of highly spirited and beautiful sketches of the Pilgrim Fathers, their settlement in New England, and the adverse and prosperous events that distinguished the first years of their colonies at Plymouth and Boston.

4. **A PASTOR'S TRIBUTE TO ONE OF HIS FLOCK: THE MEMOIRS of the late Hannah L. Murray**, by Gardiner Spring, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Brick Church. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

It is peculiarly appropriate in a pastor to cherish the memory of those of his flock who are distinguished for worth and usefulness, and present their example to others, when it can yield instruction and encouragement. This is a brief memorial of one of that character:—a lady of gifts, fortune, and literary culture, who was long known for her activity and liberality in the promotion of charitable and religious objects, and esteemed for her social and christian virtues. Dr. Spring has inwoven in the narrative many notices of the ministers of the city and vicinity, who were contemporary with Miss Murray, and references to important events in his own church, that are highly interesting, and add to the value of the volume.

5. **THE KINGDOM OF GOD.** A Discourse preached before the Synod of New Jersey, October 17, 1849. By Charles K. Imbrie, Pastor of the first Presbyterian Church, Rahway, N. J. Published at the

request of several members of the Synod and others. New York: Franklin Knight. 1850.

No theme could have been selected more deserving of attention, or better suited to an effective address, than that which is here treated; the kingdom God has instituted in our world, which is to supersede the civil and religious tyrannies that now rule the nations, and continue for ever. That it is one of the most important subjects of revelation, is seen from the consideration that it embraces the future destiny of our earth and our race, and the scheme of God's government over us through our immortal existence. That it is not understood and needs to be restudied, is obvious from the fact that widely different and opposite views are entertained respecting it. That the belief that is generally held, involves some radical error, is strongly indicated by the fact, that it leads to the almost total neglect of a large part of the sacred word that is employed in revealing God's purposes and will. Of the Scriptures that are not historical, more than half are prophetic. Is it credible that a method of construction that leads practically to their rejection, can be just? Is not that result which it generates, itself a proof of its error, as much as the neglect and depreciation of the sacred oracles at large by the Catholics is, that their views of them are false and injurious? It is certainly a startling fact, that the Protestant and Catholic churches concur thus in respect to so large a portion of the volume of revelation. What a proof those persons at least give that they are acting in as great ignorance, and under as deep a delusion, who, while they ostentatiously denounce the Papists for their neglect of the Scriptures, not only agree with them in this large measure, but are as intolerant, as resentful, and as denunciatory towards those who study the prophecies, and avow and proclaim their teachings, as the most bigoted and domineering Romanists? When trees yield the same deleterious fruits, is it not apparent, however different their position may be, or the culture to which they are subjected, that they belong to the same species? When the waters sent forth by different fountains are tinged by the same poisonous ingredient, is it not indicative that the earth through which they pass is charged with the same deadly element? And finally, that the principles by which the views that are generally held in respect to Christ's kingdom, are deduced from the word of God, involve some great error, is manifest from the fact that they cannot be applied to the doctrinal and historical parts of the sacred word, without wholly subverting their meaning. Is it to be believed that laws of interpretation that are fatal to all other truths, are here the means of discovering and unfolding it? Were this great and palpable fact properly realized, the feeling would be universal and resistless, that this

subject needs and deserves more than any other, the careful consideration of Protestants.

It is presented to the Synod by Mr. Imbrie, in at once a very conciliatory and a very effective manner. After stating several principal points in regard to which there is a general agreement, he treats of some of the important questions, in respect to which dissimilar and opposite views are maintained. First, in regard to the restoration of the Israelites, especially in reference to the conduct of missions. Secondly, in relation to the nature and accompaniments of God's kingdom on earth. And thirdly, in respect to the manner by which that kingdom is to be established. He presents the opposite systems that are held on these subjects with clearness and candor, and on the one hand, by the contrast they present and the different influences they naturally exert, shows convincingly the importance of just views of them; and, on the other, by pointing out the unsubstantial ground on which the common theory rests, and alleging passages in which the opposite view is taught, demonstrates in a very striking manner the Scriptural doctrine: 1. That the Israelites are to be restored; 2. That the kingdom of God is to be real and visible, not merely figurative or spiritual; and 3. That Christ's advent and the resurrection of the holy dead, are to precede the millennium, and that these great verities need to be received and allowed their natural influence, in order that the people of God may properly discharge the duties to which they are called. After responding to several objections that are often offered to these doctrines, he closes with a noble appeal to the synod to yield the subject the attention to which it is entitled, and which is now rendered peculiarly necessary from the neglect and misconception into which it has fallen.

The mode in which the theme is treated throughout is happy, exhibiting an admirable union of modesty and courage; of courtesy and decision; of proper deference to man, and supreme regard to God. No person of candor can read the volume, we think, without feeling that the subject has the highest claims to the earnest consideration of the church; and that the views which Mr. Imbrie presents are sustained by proofs from the Scriptures, which the arguments usually alleged by the advocates of the opposite system are totally inadequate to set aside.

The discourse is peculiarly suited to the time. A greater disposition than usual to read on the subject, is shown not only by those in the sacred office, but by the intelligent and thoughtful generally, and a desire felt for works in which the teachings of the Scriptures are presented in their own language, unperturbed by the false and bewildering theories on which the prophets are usually construed. The unprejudiced and earnest inquirer after truth, will find the volume what he

needs ; and it will obtain, we doubt not, a wide circulation and exert a salutary influence.

6. **JOHN HOWARD AND THE PRISON WORLD OF EUROPE.** From original and authentic documents. By Hepworth Dixon. With an Introductory Essay, by Richard W. Dickinson, D.D. New York : R. Carter & Brothers. 1850.

THE life of Howard deserves to be studied for the extraordinary exemplification it presents of the vast amount of good that may be accomplished by an individual of sense, high aims, and indomitable resolution. He owed his brilliant career, indeed, in a degree, to peculiar advantages, and a favorable conjuncture of circumstances. Had he not been rendered independent by inheriting a fortune, he would have been precluded from devoting himself to the service of the miserable. Had health and happiness filled the few years that followed his succession to his father's estate, he would not have been induced to enter the train of undertakings which led to the great business of his life. And had he not found the public far more ready to be influenced on the subject than at any former period, he would not have met the encouragement that prompted him to continue his endeavors to remove the defects which then prevailed in the structure of prisons, and the treatment of their inmates. He was summoned to his mission, at the moment the world was prepared to receive it, and he wrought, by his extraordinary exertions, a greater and more important revolution in the policy of the civilized world, than perhaps was ever achieved by any other individual. The horrors of imprisonment in Great Britain, at the period when he commenced his labors, the wanton cruelties, the brutal outrages, to which the unfortunate, and often the innocent were subjected, almost exceed belief, and have no parallel except in the atrocities of the slave trade.

This volume, though not written with the taste we could wish, is the best on the subject we have seen, and furnishes, with a sufficient detail of his private life, a highly interesting narrative of his public career. The most ample evidence appears of his piety in the large quotations which the biographer has introduced from his private diary. A just estimate of his character and labors, and an appropriate tribute to his memory, are presented by Dr. Dickinson in his introductory essay.

7. **GOD'S WORD THE SOURCE OF DIVINE LIGHT.** Two Discourses delivered in the Chapel of the General Theological Seminary, on occasion of the Annual Matriculation on the third Sunday in Advent,

December 16, 1849. By Samuel W. Turner, D.D., Professor of Biblical Learning and Interpretation of Scripture. New York: D. Dana, jun. 1850.

Two hundred years ago, it could scarcely have been thought probable that the question—What is the source and standard of religious truth? what is the legitimate rule of faith? which was then agitated between Protestants and Papists,—should in this century become a great and ardent question between different classes of Protestants. Yet such it is at the present time; and the answers that are given to the inquiry are as various, and many of them as false as at any former period. There are some now, as there were then, who regard tradition; and others who claim the church as the most legitimate teacher, and invest them with authority over the Scriptures; and there is a still more numerous class who ascribe that office to reason, treat it as at once the parent and the judge of truth, and make little use of the word of God, except to veil beneath the drapery of its facts and terms, the hideous offspring of their philosophic infidelity. It is Dr. Turner's object, in the first of these discourses, to point out the inadequacy and deceptiveness of mere reason, tradition, and the church, as authoritative teachers and guides, and to show that the "word of God" is the only "authentic source of Divine light," that it is given to us as "an infallible" instructor, and is perfectly suited to its office; and in the second discourse, to indicate the means by which a true knowledge of its teachings is to be obtained—by a suitable acquaintance with the sacred languages, by the aids of the Holy Spirit, who is promised to those who seek him, by the exercise of sound sense, and by diligent and devout study. He urges with earnestness the duty of receiving and investigating the sacred oracles *as the word of God*, communicated to us for the purpose of making us acquainted with his will; not as a mere record of what fellow men have *thought* to be a revelation from him; and enforces the necessity of an intimate and thorough knowledge of them as a preparation for the sacred office. The discourses are marked by excellent sense, and are highly appropriate to the time, when not a few of those who are employed in educating young men for the ministry, are, under a pretence of superior Biblical learning, in fact, setting aside the word of God, and substituting uninspired books and an absurd philosophy in its place.

THE ABLE MINISTER OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, an Anniversary Discourse, delivered before the Literary Societies of the Methodist General Biblical Institute, at Concord, N. Hampshire. Nov. 7, 1849.

By Rev. D. W. Clark, A.M., Pastor of the Vestry St. M. E. Church,
New York. Boston : G. C. Rand & Co. 1850.

THIS is a sound, earnest, and persuasive address, first, on the qualifications for the sacred office, among which he enumerates as chief, piety, good sense, independence, and decision, and an intimate knowledge of the word of God; and next on the means by which those gifts and acquisitions are to be cultivated. The counsels given are highly appropriate, and are urged with a force and warmth that make them impressive.

LETTERS ON THE PROPHETIC SCRIPTURES. By the Rev. Edward Winthrop, M.A., Rector of St. Paul's Church, Norwalk, Ohio. New York : Franklin Knight. 1850.

WE are glad that those who have carefully studied the prophecies, and adopted just views of their import, are disposed to present the result of their inquiries to the public, and that they are encouraged by the desire of many in the churches for a better knowledge on the subject. If proper books are furnished, and judicious efforts made by the friends of truth to give them circulation, we have reason to believe they will meet with extensive patronage, and a large body of the pious be soon led to a hearty reception of the revelation God has made respecting the future.

Mr. Winthrop treats in this neat volume of some of the principal themes in respect to which curiosity is chiefly felt, and information most needed; the premillennial advent of Christ; the state of the church anterior to his coming; the powers denoted by the wild beast of the Apocalypse, and great Babylon; the drying of the Euphrates,—which he refers to the alienation of the people of the ten kingdoms from the apostate hierarchies, denoted by great Babylon; not as is usual with commentators, to the decline of the Turkish empire;—the restoration of the Israelites; the first resurrection; and the descent of the new Jerusalem; and discusses them in a manner—sober, perspicuous, and argumentative—that is highly adapted to give satisfaction to the reader. His method of maintaining his views is quite unlike that which is employed by the opposite party. Could the anti-millenarians sustain their theories by a tenth part of the evidence with which he demonstrates his principal positions, it would be a formidable task to controvert them. But founded, as their scheme is, on a misapprehension of the laws of interpretation, and the work of conjecture and hypothesis, it falls at the first shock of a critical assault. There is not one of its doctrines that can be maintained by means that a scholar would not deem it discreditable to use on any other subject. Mr. Winthrop, on

the contrary, interprets the Scriptures according to the established laws of language, and employs them in evincing his views in the same manner as they are used by the learned in the proof of the other doctrines which they teach. His arguments present a very striking contrast in the knowledge they display of the sacred word, and their clearness and unanswerableness, to the absurd errors, superficial declamation, and turbid logic of such writers as Mr. Steele, Mr. Beattie, and others, who have lately assaulted the views he maintains. We recommend his volume especially to the numerous members of the churches who are desirous of information on the subject, and wish a simple, direct, and effective statement of the great teachings of the Scriptures respecting it.

10. *THE CHRISTIAN LIFE A FIGHT OF FAITH.* By Rev. Herman Hooker. Philadelphia: H. Hooker. 1850.

THIS little volume is a practical treatise on the difficulties and the aids of a religious life. The author exhibits it not as a work of ease, involving little else than a mere profession of faith, and observance of rites, but as a conflict in which strong foes of the heart and the world are to be encountered and overcome, and not by the unassisted strength of the believer, but only by the teachings of God's word, and the power of the Holy Spirit.

11. *GENERAL HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH.* From the German of Dr. Augustus Neander. Translated from the first; revised and altered throughout, according to the second edition. By Joseph Torrey, Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in the University of Vermont. Volume third, comprising the third and fourth volume of the original. First American Edition. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1850.

THE period of nearly five centuries, from 590, treated in this volume, embraces a great number of distinguished persons and important events. It was in those ages that the papacy made some of its greatest strides, both in superstition and the usurpation of power over the church out of Italy. It was then that England was Christianized, and that the last of the churches of the ten kingdoms was legalized by the state, that the gospel was introduced into Germany, that Mahomet arose, that his successors conquered a large share of the eastern empire, that the Pope became a civil prince, and that the schism took place between the bishops of Rome and Constantinople. That was the period of the contests respecting image worship in the east, and predestination and

the mass in the west; and of the rise and persecution of the Paulicians in Armenia, and the Albigenses in France. Several of the emperors, bishops, and popes of the period were men of extraordinary powers, and exerted, perhaps, as large an influence on their contemporaries and successors, as any that have followed. The volume presents a large body of minute information on topics of interest that are but slightly treated in most other church histories.

12. **EXPOSITORY LECTURES ON THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS.** By the Rev. R. S. M'Ghee, A.M., Rector of Holywell, Hants. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1849.

INSTEAD of a philological commentary, in which the writer simply states the import of the text, Mr. M'Ghee presents in this work a plain, full, and practical exhibition of all the various topics of which the epistle treats, and illustrates and confirms his views of them by the collateral passages of the other parts of the New Testament. The lectures, which were originally preached to his congregation, are designed for readers of all classes, and may be read with benefit by all who seek a knowledge of the great truths of redemption.

13. **A SERMON.** Preached at the Ordination of Rev. E. H. Greely, in Haverhill, N. H., Nov. 9, 1849. By Rev. Nathan Lord, D.D., President of Dartmouth College, Hanover. Dartmouth Press. 1849.

ONE of the most obvious and important duties to which the ministers of the gospel are called, is to witness to the great truths of God, and especially at periods when they are misrepresented and denounced. They are set not merely for the communication, but for the defence of the gospel, and are forewarned that if they neglect it, they will be held responsible for the evils that result from their unfaithfulness. If we are to judge, however, from the course many pursue, they have formed a very different view of their duty. They neither regard it as incumbent on them to discountenance and resist error, and vindicate the fundamental doctrines of Christianity when assailed and calumniated, nor deem it of much moment if the Christian system is rejected, and another gospel substituted in its place. It is treated as a question of party expedience and popularity. Will it obstruct the schemes of ambitious leaders? If so, the voice of truth is silenced; the will of God contemned; the well-being of the flocks committed to their charge, disregarded; the wishes of some aspiring demagogue exalted to supreme authority, and the objects of an hour made to outweigh the infinite interests of a future life.

Dr. Lord does not concur in this policy, but holds it to be the duty of those in the sacred office to proclaim and vindicate the truth when it is attacked by the hostile, and deserted by the timid; and he has, accordingly, uttered his testimony in this Discourse to the great doctrine of the cross, or Christ's expiation; of the church, or chosen subjects of salvation; of regeneration by the Spirit of God; and of the resurrection of the holy dead anterior to the millennium, in contradistinction from the false doctrines of philosophy and theology that now prevail extensively, and if not cherished, are allowed by many who profess much zeal for the spread of Christianity and the welfare of the church, as unimportant deviations from the faith once delivered to the saints. He confutes and rebukes with a just severity the superficial and daring speculatists of the German and American schools who deny Christ's expiation, the Spirit's influences, and other cardinal facts and truths; and exhibit religion as a mere naturalism, and the Almighty as only man's guardian and benefactor; not his monarch, who has attributes and rights that require him to enforce his laws, though it be to the destruction of those who rebel. We wish his example may be followed by other faithful ministers. Were those generally who still hold the great doctrines of the gospel, boldly to avow and maintain them, and denounce the false systems that are substituted in their place, the churches would be shielded in a great measure from the errors to which they are exposed, and put on their guard against the artful and unscrupulous teachers who are endeavoring to betray them to apostasy.

14. *MEMOIRS OF SIR THOMAS FOWELL BUXTON, BARONET*, with selections from his correspondence. Edited by his son, Charles Buxton, Esq. London: John Murray. 1848.

THIS is a highly interesting memorial of one who partly by his peculiar powers, and partly by the favorable opportunities of the period, rose suddenly and unexpectedly to unusual conspicuity and influence; and exemplifies in a striking manner the mode in which the sphere of one's life, and the agencies he exerts, sometimes turn on slight incidents. Had his birth occurred a few years earlier or later, or had half a dozen apparently unimportant events been omitted from the series that determined his course, he would either have acted in an essentially different relation to the public, or, perhaps, been known only as a private individual. He was educated at Dublin. After leaving the university, he became a partner in a brewery in London, and took for several years a principal part in its management. His powers as a speaker, which had been in a degree unfolded at the Uni-

versity, became known to the public by an address at a meeting for the relief of the poor of the capital in a period of great suffering, and immediately led to solicitations by Mr. Wilberforce and others to take an active part in the benevolent undertakings of the period, and to his introduction to parliament, that he might advocate them on that theatre. His first philanthropic effort was for the reformation of prisons and an amelioration of the criminal laws; and the aid which he rendered in the accomplishment of those objects, gave him at once a high position with his associates, and influence with the government. He soon took the place in a large degree of Mr. Wilberforce as the leading advocate of the abolition of slavery, and from 1824 exerted perhaps a more efficient agency than any other, in the achievement of that great measure. He had a principal share in putting an end to the slave-trade, which was long carried on in violation of law at the Mauritius; and it was by his exertions that the government was induced to protect the Hottentots at the Cape of Good Hope from the encroachments of the colonists, and to restore to them the territory of which they had been unjustly deprived. After twenty years devoted assiduously to these humane objects, he, in 1838, lost his seat in parliament, but not his influence with the public or the government. His last effort for the benefit of the wretched, was the projection of the expedition to the Niger, in the hope of checking and finally extinguishing the slave-trade, by treaties with the chiefs, the introduction of agriculture, and the promotion of commerce. The volume presents a history in a degree of each of these great measures, the difficulties with which they were attended, and the means by which they were finally accomplished. As a token of the estimate in which his services were held by the government, he was, after the close of his parliamentary career, made a baronet. He was highly estimable in his private relations, an ingenuous and ardent disciple of Christ, eminently social, frank, generous, noble-minded, and marked especially by an inflexible adherence to his religious principles, a fearless advocacy of the right, and an indomitable resolution in pursuing the ends which he attempted to achieve. The evening of his life, though overclouded in a degree by the disappointment of his hopes in respect to Africa, was yet cheered by many enjoyments; and his death, which took place in 1845, was calm and victorious. The peculiarities of his brilliant career, the beauty of many of the characters that are delineated, the ease and vivacity of the letters, the great variety and interest of the incidents that are detailed, and—which is of almost equal importance,—the omission of what is unessential, and avoidance of prolixity, give a charm to the volume, which the biographies of public men seldom possess.

HUNGARY AND TRANSYLVANIA, with remarks on their condition, social, political, and economical. By John Paget, Esq. With numerous illustrations. 2 Volumes. London: John Murray. 1839.

HUNGARY, while the principal theatre in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the struggle between the Turks and the nations of Germany, was the object of great interest to the whole of Europe, and was probably nearly as familiarly known to statesmen, military commanders, and the cultivated generally, as Austria, Bohemia, or Russia. At the close of that conflict it lost much of its importance, and for a hundred and fifty years has held but a subordinate place in the wars and diplomacy of Europe.

The contest of which it has lately been the scene, has again drawn to it the eyes of the civilized world, and rendered a better knowledge desirable of its geography, resources, inhabitants, and institutions. These volumes furnish far more full and satisfactory information respecting it than any other work that we have seen. Mr. Paget, who is an English gentleman of intelligence, traversed the whole country, visited all the important cities, became acquainted with many of the nobles and other persons of distinction; visited them in their families, joined them in their public amusements, observed their manners, studied their politics, and inquired into the state of their arts. His narrative is written with uncommon ease and sprightliness, and abounds with interesting incidents. His descriptions are minute and graphic, and impress the reader with much of the vividness of conception which the presence of the scenes themselves would produce; his judgments of men and institutions are candid, and his views enlightened and liberal.

Hungary is not inferior perhaps to any portion of Europe of equal extent, in the beauty of its scenery, the excellence of its climate, the richness of its soil, and the variety and value of its products. It is encircled by ranges of lofty mountains. The regions at their feet are diversified by hills and vales, while the central part, a hundred miles or more in width, and more than two hundred in length, is spread out in a continuous steppe or plain much like the prairies of our western States. Several of its rivers, beside the Danube, are navigable by steamboats. It abounds in the richest minerals; gold, silver, copper, tin, iron, lead, and coal. The soil is generally good, and much of the southern part inexhaustibly rich, and yields grain of every description, flax, hemp, tobacco, and wine. The vast plain which lies along the Theiss is, in the interior, chiefly devoted to pasturage, and sustains immense herds and flocks.

The population was estimated by Mr. Paget, at the period of his visit, ten or twelve years ago, to be about 12,000,000. It is now supposed

to be 14,000,000, of whom 5,000,000 are Magyars; 1,250,000, Germans; 2,250,000, Wallacks; and 5,000,000, Slaves of different tribes. Of the remainder, a large part are Jews. The Magyars, who migrated from Eastern Asia, and conquered the country 1000 years ago, are far the most cultivated. Their institutions are in a considerable degree liberal. The political power has been wholly in the hands of the nobles until 1848, when the right of suffrage was extended to all classes. The peasants are not, as some have represented, absolute serfs, but rather tenants of the nobles, who are the landowners. They have a legal right to the occupancy of the soil which is in their possession. The nobles, at an earlier period than the barons of England, extorted from their monarch a charter of rights, and have for more than six hundred years maintained a struggle for the preservation of their liberties. Their views have become greatly liberalized during the last fifty years, and the way seemed prepared, had they become independent, for the establishment of institutions partaking largely of the freedom and equity of ours.

Besides the Catholic and Greek churches, which are the most numerous, there is a large body both of Lutheran and Reformed Protestants. The Catholics and Greeks are nationalized, and their prelates have had a seat in the house of magnates of the national legislature. The Protestants are merely tolerated. Besides a large university at the capital, there are several subordinate ones in other cities, and numerous academies belonging to the several religious denominations, and schools in every village. The population of all classes, with few exceptions, can read.

Although, therefore, they are generally but little cultivated, they yet have all the elements of a great and powerful empire, and their success, had they triumphed in their late struggle, would have exerted a momentous influence on the future condition of Europe. On the other hand, their defeat and subjection again to Austrian domination is to prove the source, not improbably, of still more important effects to the west of Europe, by the augmentation which it yields to the power of Russia. Austria is now but a dependent on her, and instead of a barrier, is converted into an auxiliary, it is to be apprehended, to the conquest of the Lower Danube, and finally perhaps of Constantinople and the whole of the western Turkish Empire. No struggle for freedom which the world has lately witnessed, was fraught with more important results either to despotism or liberty.

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ART. I.—A DISCOURSE delivered before the Convention of Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts, in Brattle Street Meeting House, Boston, May 30th, 1850. By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in the Andover Theological Seminary. Reprinted from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, for July, 1850. Boston: Perkins & Whipple. Andover: W. F. Draper, 1850.

. BY THE EDITOR.

THE theme selected for such an occasion by one occupying a position like Professor Park's, may justly be supposed to be regarded by him with peculiar interest, and the views he advances deemed of more than ordinary importance. He cannot be believed, in addressing such a body, to be indifferent whether he makes a favorable exhibition of himself or not, and sustains or impairs his reputation and influence. He must naturally endeavor to produce not only a good, but the best impression. If then the doctrines he advances are novel, involve an essential deviation from the general faith of Christians, and are likely to meet with strenuous objection, it is to be presumed that they have at least been maturely considered, that they are sincerely held, and that he has presented

them in their least exceptionable form, and expressed them in terms as little likely as possible to excite alarm, or occasion animadversion. If, therefore, they seriously affect the great body of revealed truth, they may be regarded as an exponent of the general system of religious thought which he entertains, and is to endeavor to infuse into the minds of his pupils; and if they are mistaken, superficial, contradictory, and indicate an ill-furnished, or ill-disciplined mind, they may be taken as an index of his powers as a thinker, and his attainments as a scholar; and made the ground of a judgment respecting the influence he is likely to exert. The doctrines and spirit of this Discourse render it peculiarly proper that it should be contemplated in these relations.

It is generally held that there is but one true theology, just as there is but one true God, one moral government, one work of redemption, one system of moral relations; and in natural things, one power of gravitation, one ratio of numbers, and one geometry. Professor Park's object in this Discourse, however, is to show that there are two legitimate theologies, and to state the dissimilarity of their natures, and describe their different offices. He says:—

“There are two forms of theology, of which the two passages in my text are selected as individual specimens, the one declaring that God never repents, the other that he does repent. For want of a better name, these two forms may be termed, the theology of the intellect, and the theology of feeling. *Sometimes*, indeed, both the mind and the heart are suited by the same modes of thought, but *often* they require dissimilar methods, and the object of the present discourse is, to state some of the differences between the theology of the intellect and that of feeling, and also some of the influences which they exert upon each other.”—P. 4.

Theology is the science which teaches the existence, attributes, and character of God, his laws, the measures of his government, and his purposes, the doctrines he has revealed, and the duties he has enjoined. If then there are two legitimate theologies, there are two legitimate scientific views or systems of thought on these subjects, and systems, that—if they have the natures, and fill the offices Professor Park

ascribes to them—are essentially unlike. If the one is suited only to satisfy the intellect, and because of its exact truth, and the other only to satisfy the heart, and because of the omission, modification, or rejection of that truth, they must be radically diverse from each other. They must vary not merely in degree, or the number of views in which they contemplate God and his government, but in the nature of the exhibitions they present of them. Nothing else can be a ground of the different offices they are said to fill, and the influences they are supposed to exert. Nothing else can be a reason for distinguishing them. The God then of the one must in being, attributes, and acts, be essentially unlike the God of the other; and the laws, measures of government, purposes, doctrines, and duties of the one, in important respects, different from those of the other.

The proposition he attempts to establish thus bears on its face the marks of gross error and self-contradiction, and is fraught with the subversion of the whole system of revealed truth. If the Jehovah of the intellect is the true Jehovah, and yet is a different entity, or a being of different attributes and acts, from the Jehovah of the heart, then the Jehovah of the heart who is the object of awe, love, trust, and homage, is not the true Jehovah. If the Divine laws, doctrines, and dispensations, contemplated by the intellect, are true, and yet are essentially different from those which are contemplated by the heart as divine, then those which are contemplated by the heart are not truly God's dispensations and laws. The Saviour whom the heart adores and loves is not the real Saviour; the work of redemption which it approves, and on which it founds its hopes of eternal life, is not the real work of redemption; and the salvation which it expects, and in which it rejoices, is not the real salvation. The doctrine he proposes to demonstrate is thus a bald and repulsive solecism, proceeding on the assumption that the intellect and heart are in religion in antagonism; and that there are accordingly two different and antagonistic Christianities; one which God has instituted, which is true, but is not suited to the heart; another which is devised by the heart, but is not suited to the intellect; and that it is the latter that is the means of exciting the religious affections; while that which God has revealed is

unfitted for that office. Piety is consequently wholly severed from the knowledge of God. The being who is loved and worshipped, is but a creature of the feelings; and all experimental religion is thence of necessity a delusion. If that is denied, and it is held on the other hand, that such exercises of feeling are, nevertheless, a genuine religious and the only religious experience that is possible, it then, at least, follows that the dislike and rejection of God and his government, contemplated according to truth, is an indispensable condition of piety, and, therefore, that all religious feeling is necessarily false and without virtue.

If this is not adapted to make a favorable impression of Professor Park's principles or intellect, we are sorry to say its effect is not likely to be diminished by the mode in which he endeavors to demonstrate his doctrine. As we proceed in the discussion, the most ample evidence will appear that this is the scheme he endeavors to maintain; that he holds that the truth which God has revealed is not adapted to awaken pious feeling, but is instinctively repelled by the "healthy affections;" that it is the office of the heart to suggest and frame an antagonistic theology for the excitement of its love, adoration, and trust; that the instincts, tastes, and dispositions of the mind, are the proper criteria of a theology, not the truths God has revealed the proper criteria of those dispositions and affections; and, consequently, on the one hand, that all true piety is the work of man in alienation from God, and on the other, that the religion God has instituted is necessarily impracticable, and without virtue.

His views of the theology of the intellect are seen from the following passage:—

"What then are some of the differences between these two kinds of representation?"

"The theology of the intellect *conforms to the laws, subserves the wants, and secures the approval of our intuitive and deductive powers.* It includes the decisions of the judgment, of the perceptive part of conscience and taste—indeed, of all the faculties which are essential to the reasoning process. It is the theology of speculation, and, therefore, *comprehends the truth JUST AS IT IS*, unmodified by the excitements of feeling. It is received as *accurate, not in its spirit only, but in its*

letter also. Of course, it demands evidence, either internal or extraneous, for all its propositions. Those propositions, whether or not they be inferences from antecedent, are well fitted to be premises for subsequent trains of proof. This intellectual theology, therefore, prefers general to individual statements, the abstract to the concrete, the literal to the figurative. In the creed of a Trinitarian, it affirms that he who united in his person a human body, a human soul, and a divine spirit, expired on the cross, but it does not originate the phrase that his *soul* expired, nor that *God*, the mighty Maker, died; [and because those propositions are not true.] Its aim is not to be *impressive*, but intelligible and defensible. Hence, it insists on the nice proportions of doctrine, and on preciseness both of thought and style. Its words are so exactly defined, its adjustments are so accurate, that no caviller can detect an ambiguous, mystical, or incoherent sentence. It is, therefore, in entire harmony with itself, abhorring a contradiction, as nature abhors a vacuum."—P. 4.

The characteristic of this theology thus is, that it comprehends and expresses "the TRUTH, *just as it is*;" and, of course, that truth, though Professor P. does not directly state it, which God reveals in his word and manifests in his works. It is "accurate, not in spirit only, but in the letter also," and is supported by "evidence" that "conforms to the laws, subserves the wants, and secures the approval of our *intuitive and deductive* powers." It is precisely the system of truth, therefore, which God has communicated for our instruction and guidance, and which, accordingly, sanctioned by his authority, has the most unexceptionable and absolute title to our faith and submission.

This theology, he avers, however, is not suited to the heart.

"It is adapted to the soul in her inquisitive moods, *but fails to satisfy her in her craving for excitement.* . . . As it avoids the dashes of an imaginative style, as it qualifies and subdues the remark which the passions would make still more intense, it seems dry, tame to the mass of men. It awakens but little interest in favor of its old arrangements; its new distinctions are easily introduced to be as speedily forgotten. As we might infer, it is suited, not for eloquent appeals, but for calm controversial treatises and bodies of divinity."—P. 5.

He speaks, also, of the "dissonance of pious feeling with the mere generalities of speculation," p. 28; and employs

other expressions to indicate that the theology of truth is unacceptable to the feelings.

It is thus, he represents, wholly unsuited to the wants of our moral nature. It is adapted to the soul in her inquiries after knowledge, but fails to satisfy her craving for excitement; that is, to awaken her to emotion, and excite her to strong feeling. It makes no powerful impression on the affections. It enkindles no awe, love, trust, or joy. "It is not suited to eloquent appeals." It is in "dissonance with pious feeling;" and the reason lies in *its nature*, not in the mode in which it is presented. It is because it is *the truth*, and expressed without disguise in a demonstrative manner; not because it is exhibited without caricature, without exaggeration, or without metaphor. If it were not its truth that renders it uninfluential and unsatisfactory to the heart—if the views it presents were the same as those embodied in the theology of feeling—then it would not be a different theology, but the same, with no other difference than the mode in which it is exhibited. If it is to the truth which it expresses that the theology of feeling owes its power over the heart, and that truth is identically the same with that which is embodied in the theology of the intellect, then they not only are not different theologies, but they furnish no reason for the opposite impressions which he ascribes to them.

His representation, therefore, is of no ordinary significance. It is an indictment of the truth, the simple, pure, demonstrable truth which God has revealed, as unadapted to interest the heart and move it to holy affection, and insusceptible of being made the instrument of a determining influence on it. It is the opposite, therefore, of the doctrine of the Scriptures, that the truth is the means by which the Spirit sanctifies the mind and excites it to love, joy, trust, thankfulness, submission, zeal, and other holy affections. It teaches that it is not God contemplated in his true character, that is the object of pious regard; that it is not Christ in his true nature and offices as Redeemer that is the object of faith and love; and that it is not the great facts and truths of his redemptive work that inspire the holy affections which the sanctified exercise. It implies, therefore, that the affections towards God, Christ, and the work of redemption that distinguish the pious, have their

ground in untrue views, and instead, therefore, of being virtuous, are mistaken and evil. They are a homage of error, a love, adoration, trust, and worship of an imaginary and false God, in place of the true.

As the two theologies differ from each other and are contrasts, the characteristics of that of the intellect—a revelation from God, truth, harmony with reason, demonstrableness, precision,—are not traits of the theology of the heart. Instead, that is marked by the opposite characteristics. It is devised or suggested by the feelings, in place of being revealed by God; it is a misrepresentation, instead of a statement of truth; it is vague, exaggerated, and without evidence, instead of clear, accurate, and indubitable; and such it is accordingly exhibited in the delineation he gives of it.

“In some respects, but not in all, the theology of feeling *differs from that of intellect*. It is the form of belief which is SUGGESTED BY and ADAPTED TO the wants of the well-trained heart. It is embraced as involving the substance of truth, although when LITERALLY interpreted it MAY OR MAY NOT BE TRUE.”—P. 5.

It is of course to be interpreted *literally*, if the terms in which it is *expressed* are used *literally*. It is only on condition that a share of the language in which it is embodied is employed by a trope, that it is to that extent to be interpreted as tropical. His description indicates accordingly, that although it is embraced as involving the substance of truth, yet when justly interpreted, it may be wholly devoid of that element. If, however, it is not expressed absolutely in literal, but in a measure in figurative language, and is interpreted according to its nature, it will not follow from such an interpretation that it is true; inasmuch as tropical language, as well as literal, may be employed in the expression of error. By his own representation, thus, though embraced as involving the substance of truth, it may when properly explained, be wholly false. Yet this statement still needs explanation. What is meant by the substance of truth in a proposition that is admitted to be false? Is it that *the subject* of the affirmation is a reality, though that which is predicated of it is false? If God is the subject of the proposition, is the proposition con-

sidered as involving the substance of truth, on the ground that God is a real existence, although that which is affirmed of him—suppose it to be, for example, that he does not exist, or that he is not the author of the revelation ascribed to him in the Scriptures, or that he is not the moral ruler of the world—is false? What else can it be? We see not what other meaning can be assigned to it. And if that is its import, how much does it add to the value of the theology of the heart, that it *treats* of Jehovah and other real verities, though it totally *misrepresents them*? He proceeds—

“It studies not the exact proportions of doctrine, but gives especial prominence to those features of it which *are and ought to be most grateful to the sensibilities*. It insists not on dialectical argument, but receives whatever *the healthy affections crave*.”—P. 5.

But how is it to be decided that the affections that “crave” this theology *are* “healthy?” It is no favorable mark of them that they embrace that as substantially true, which, when properly interpreted, may be wholly false. By what test is the heart to ascertain that its affections are “healthy,” and “ought” to be gratified by this theology? It disapproves, according to Professor P., and repels the guidance of the intellect. It dislikes the truth God has revealed in his word presented in its purity, certainty, and the power of unquestionable evidence. It must of necessity, therefore, be its own law and judge, and regard all the sensibilities and affections with which it is animated as “healthy.” It is thus invested with an absolute mastery over its own obligations; is constituted its own arbiter; and generates a theology which assumes, that its sensibilities and affections, though in direct antagonism to God, are legitimate and holy. He uses many expressions of much the same import.

“It is satisfied with vague, indefinite representations. It is too buoyant, too earnest for a moral result, to compress itself into sharply drawn angles. . . . It is often the more forceful because of the looseness of its style, herein being the hiding of its power. . . . Of course the theology of feeling aims to be impressive, whether it be or not minutely accurate. Often it bursts away from dogmatic restraints, forces its passage through or over rules of logic, and presses forward to expend

itself first and foremost in affecting the sensibilities. For this end, instead of being comprehensive, it is elastic; avoiding monotony, it is ever pertinent to the occasion; it brings out into bold relief, now one feature of a doctrine, and then a different feature, and assumes as great a variety of shapes as the wants of the heart are various. . . . It assumes these discordant forms, so as to meet the affections in their conflicting moods. Its aim is not to facilitate the inferences of logic, but *to arrest attention, to grapple with the wayward desires, to satisfy the workings of the heart.* In order to reach all the hiding-places of emotion, it now and then strains a word to its utmost significancy, even into a variance with some other phrase, and a disproportion with the remaining parts of the system."—Pp. 6, 7.

"The free theology of the feelings is *ill fitted for didactic or controversial treatises*, or doctrinal standards. Martin Luther, the church fathers, who used it so often, became thereby unsafe polemicists. Anything, everything, can be proved from them; for they were for ever inditing sentences congenial with an excited heart, but *false as expressions of deliberate opinion.* But this emotive theology is adapted to the persuasive sermon, to the pleadings of the liturgy, or the songs of Zion. By no means can it be termed *mere* poetry, in the sense of a *playful fiction.* It is no play, but solemn earnestness. It is no *mere fiction*, but an outpouring of sentiments too deep, or too mellow, or too impetuous to be suited with the stiff language of the intellect. Neither can its words be called *merely figurative*, in the sense of arbitrary or unsubstantial. They are the earliest, and if one may use a comparison [which he, however neglects to employ], the most natural utterances of a soul instinct with religious life."—P. 8.

All this emphatically shows, that in his estimate it is a real theology, distinct and different from that of the intellect, which God has revealed. It is not a mere mode of expression; it is not a mere poetic exemplification of truths presented didactically and historically in the Scriptures; it is not a mere exhibition of fictitious feeling, but is an outpouring of "sentiments" that are genuine, deep, and impetuous, and constitute the religion of the heart.

"They"—those utterances—"are forms of language which circumscribe a doctrine, a substance, which, fashioned as it may be, the intellect grasps and holds fast; a substance which arrests the more attention and prolongs the deeper interest, by the figures which bound it. This form of theology, then, is far from being fitly represented by the term *imagina-*

tive, still farther by the term fanciful, and farther yet by the word capricious. It goes deeper; *it is the theology both of and for our sensitive nature*; of and for *the normal emotion, affection, passion*. It may be called poetry, however, if this word is used, as it should be, to include the constitutional developments of a heart moved to its depths by the truth."—Pp. 7, 8.

But how is this last expression to be reconciled with his representation, that it is a theology wholly different from and antagonistic to that of the intellect? He speaks here, also, as though the truth were something separate from his poetic theology. His theory is, not that the truth in its purity and simplicity as it is revealed by God, and contemplated by the intellect, first impresses the heart, and arouses it to ardent emotion; and that then the heart under that intelligent excitement generates the theology of the feelings, in order to sustain and give expression to the affections, with which the truth presented by the intellect had inspired it. Instead, his representation is, that the truth as revealed by God, and contemplated by the intellect, is not only unsuited to move the heart to holy affections, but is absolutely displeasing to it and repellent. By "the truth," then, with which "the heart is moved to its depths," he means this "theology" itself, which is "of and for our sensitive nature;" and his proposition accordingly is, that *this theology* "may be called poetry," if "the word is used to include the constitutional developments of a heart moved to its depths" *by this theology*. But why is this theology to be called poetry, if the word poetry is used to include the developments of a heart moved by it to its depths? that is, is used, not "as it should be," but improperly and absurdly to denote the effects it produces. Poetry does not consist in any degree in the influences it exerts, or the effects to which it gives birth. It is not poetry because it produces the effects that spring from it, but it produces its effects, because it is poetry. The amount of his statement then is,—if the word poetry is absurdly used to denote the effects this theology excites in the heart, then it may also be used to denote this theology itself which excites those effects! What a brilliant display of his discriminative powers! What adroitness in settling an intricate question! And what a happy exemplifica-

tion of the superiority of his method of treating subjects, over that of the stiff accuracy of the logician! He has in this, as in a score of other passages, lost himself in a cloud of glittering words and contradictory conceptions; and shown himself to be superficial, in place of exhibiting the subtlety and loftiness of a genius, and uttered nonsense instead of poetry.

“And as in its essence it is poetical, with this meaning of the epithet, so it avails itself of a *poetic license*, and indulges in a *style of remark*, which, for sober prose, would be unbecoming, or even when associated in certain ways, *irreverent*. All warm affection, be it love or hatred, overleaps at times the proprieties of the didactic style. . . . It is the very nature of a theology framed for *enkindling the imagination*, and *thereby inflaming the heart*, to pour itself out when a striking emergency calls for them, in words that burn—words that excite no congenial glow in technical students, viewing all truth in its dry light, and disdaining all figures which would offend the decorum of a philosophical or didactic style, but words which wake the deepest sympathies of quick-moving, wide-hearted, many-sided men, who look through a superficial impropriety, and discern under it a truth which the nice language of prose is too frail to carry into the heart, and breaks down in the attempt.”—P. 9.

We might add other passages of the like import, but these are sufficient to show that he regards this theology as essentially different from that of the intellect; that he exhibits the heart as framing it for its own satisfaction, and making it the expression of its natural instincts and feelings; and that he represents its vagueness, antagonism to the truth, and self-contradiction, as merits instead of defects, and the ground of its adaptation to satisfy the sensibilities. Instead, therefore, of deserving the high commendations he bestows on it, it is, by his own showing, wholly false, and must be injurious and offensive to God in the utmost degree, and unsanctifying, deceptive, and mischievous to men.

But the whole of the assumptions on which he founds this extraordinary doctrine are the merest fictions, at war with the word of God, and contradicted by universal experience.

It is not a fact, as he asserts, that truth expressed with directness, simplicity, and logical precision, is not suited to affect the heart and move its holy affections, and to intensity.

No proposition could have been advanced by him more mistaken and preposterous. So far from it, naked facts, simple, clear, and indisputable truths, great and directly apprehended realities, are adapted in a much higher measure than any mere vague and fanciful conceptions, to impress the sensibilities, and give birth to strong emotions and affections: and it is by them that all the highest and noblest forms of feeling, all the deepest movements of the passions, are called into exercise. Of this every one must be too conscious to need that it should be formally demonstrated. What are the conditions in life in which the feelings of men are most powerfully excited? Are they not those in which events take place that most directly and intimately touch their well-being; when prosperity or misfortune, the reception or the loss of blessings, suffering or relief from it, are genuine and naked realities to them; when illnesses harass and exhaust them; when calamities strike from their hands the possessions they have toiled to accumulate; when difficulties and disasters obstruct their favorite schemes; and when death snatches from them their dearest friends? And are not the anxieties, the fears, the griefs, the agonies of those periods; or if they are seasons of prosperity and happiness, are not the joys, the gratitude, the exultation that possess and transport them, occasioned by those adverse or grateful events contemplated as they are? When stripped of their wealth by sudden catastrophes, reduced to dependence and want, and involved in hopeless enthrallment, are the alarms, the agitations, the griefs, the despair with which they are overwhelmed, the result, not of those evils themselves, but only of a fanciful exaggeration of them, or a poetic conception of misfortunes of a different kind? Is the heart in such conditions so stoical as to remain unmoved, unless the imagination interposes, and gives the evils that are felt an artificial form and color, or swells their dimensions beyond the limits of truth? Are the woes and the tears of the widow and orphan prompted—not by the bereavements that have befallen them, but by mere artificial views of them, or fictions of calamities of a different nature? It is not necessary to give a formal answer to these questions. The consciousness of every one who has a heart in his bosom will repel Professor Park's theory as an absurd misrepresentation of our nature,

the work of a superficial speculatist, rather than of a keen and philosophic observer of the workings of the emotions and passions. It is the real, not the imaginary world that is the scene of the genuine joys and sorrows of life. It is the sober realities of life, not caricatures of them, or poetic fictions, that are the causes of those joys and sorrows.

As they are the actual conditions and occurrences of life, contemplated as they are, that make the profoundest impressions on the heart, and excite its most vivid affections; so when those conditions and events are presented to the mind through the medium of language, the delineations and statements that are the most exactly accordant with fact, the most simple and direct, are the most impressive and influential, and exert a power over the sensibilities of readers and hearers most like that which the events themselves exert on those who experience them. Descriptions, recitals, narratives, expressions of sentiment, utterances of joy and sorrow, are effective just in proportion as they are exact exhibitions of that which they are intended to present; while they lose their adaptation to interest and affect, just in the measure that they are circuitous, vague, turgid, or bombastic. Fictions themselves, also, if influential, owe all their power over the affections, not to their being fictions, but to their exhibition of the actors and acts, the catastrophes and passions which they describe *in such an accordance with nature* that readers and hearers regard them, for the moment, as *realities*. The characteristic, accordingly, of the best writers is, that they present persons and things in their genuine forms and attitudes, and utter sentiments and portray feelings that are universally recognised as natural to men in such conditions. Thus the charm of Homer's and Shakspeare's fictions, lies chiefly in the truth of the delineations which they present of men in the circumstances in which they exhibit them. But this great law of the mind is nowhere more impressively exemplified than in the Sacred Scriptures. The most touching of their narratives are such as those of Abraham, Isaac, Rebecca, Jacob, Rachel, Joseph, and Ruth, that are confined to the mere statement of facts expressed with the greatest directness and simplicity. They are not peculiarly figurative. Their power lies in the naturalness and interest of the conditions and inci-

dents which they describe, and the genuineness and depth of the feelings and passions which they portray. Had they deviated from what every one recognises as appropriate to our nature—had they been overloaded with vague or exaggerating epithets, disfigured by bombast, or debased by false sentiment, they would lose their power over our sympathies, and be regarded with indifference or disgust.

But this superior adaptedness of truth and fact above fiction to affect the heart, is as obvious and indisputable in religion, as in the ordinary affairs of life. What representation can be more false and injurious to God, or unjust and reproachful to his children, than Professor Park's doctrine, that contemplated as he is in his being, attributes, and relations, the revelation he has made of himself, his laws, and the measures of his government, he is not suited to affect the hearts of his children and move them to holy affections! That the truth in respect to him, stated directly, and with simplicity and precision, is not adapted to touch their sensibilities; but from its stiffness, abstractness, and logical accuracy, necessarily leaves them unmoved; and that he cannot become the object of strong and fervid affection, unless contemplated in some false relation, or invested with an exaggerated and fictitious character! It is an assertion that he is not, in fact, a proper object of our love and trust; that he is not only devoid of attractiveness, but positively distasteful to the sanctified mind; and that he needs to be disguised, and conceived as a different being, in order that he may command the reverence, the delight, and the adoration of true worshippers. Can a more dreadful impeachment be uttered of his perfections? Can a more offensive misrepresentation be devised of the sentiments with which his children regard him?

It is an accusation of his law also, and the whole system of his administration founded on it, as altogether unjust: for he presents himself to us, in his law, as being what he is, and requires us to recognise and obey him as such. We are called to acknowledge and honor him as Jehovah, the self-existent, eternal, and almighty, the creator and upholder of all, our benefactor and ruler, infinitely just, wise, and good. If, then, he is not a proper object of such a regard; if our holy affections are from their nature incapable of being excited by him;

if from the very genius of holy love, awe, trust, and adoration, he is necessarily repellent to us, then his law, enjoining the exercise towards him of such affections, is totally unjust. He has asked a homage of which he is not the proper object, and to which he has no title.

It is a like impeachment also of Christ, and his whole work of redemption; for it is made a condition of our salvation, that we receive and trust in him according to his nature, offices, and work, as God-man, mediator, who made expiation for us by his death, who rose for our justification, and who is to raise and reign over us for ever. If then he cannot be contemplated by us according to his true nature and work with the affections he requires, if he is necessarily unsuited and repellent to the renewed heart, then his requisitions are unjust.

Professor Park thus exhibits the whole circle of realities on which the Divine government is professedly founded as in utter antagonism with the dispensations and requirements of that government; and represents the heart as under the necessity of ascribing to God another character and administration, and devising for itself another religion, in order to the possibility of piety. No statement, however, was ever put forth more utterly without foundation, or in more total contradiction alike to the teachings of the Scriptures, and the consciousness of God's children. The Scriptures most indubitably exhibit the piety of the sanctified as exercised towards God, contemplated as he is in his being, perfections, rights, and sway. They present him, considered intellectually, as the sole and absolute object of homage. Thou shalt love Jehovah, thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with ALL THY MIND, and with all thy strength. He is thus to be loved as contemplated by THE INTELLECT, and with all its powers, as well as with the whole emotive and voluntary nature; and they are exhibited as in harmony with each other, not as opposites. There is no intimation that they are to be exercised on the basis of different and antagonistic theologies. In order to a proper worship, accordingly, men are required to worship him in spirit and in truth. "The true worshippers worship the Father in spirit"—with the mind, intellectually, "and in truth, for the Father seeketh such to worship him;" not those who offer a mere external homage,

or if they worship with the mind, instead of him, make an imaginary deity the object of their adoration. "God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth." As his nature is real, not ideal, and spiritual, not material, a contemplation of him by the intellect, according to his real and spiritual nature, is indispensable in order to a true adoration of him. A homage, in any other view, is not a homage of him, but of a different and imaginary entity. Such worshippers "worship they know not what."

It is the great object of his administration, accordingly, to bring men to the acknowledgment and homage of him as he is. "Without faith it is impossible to please him; for he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him." He must, therefore, be believed to be what he is. If he is not, he is not the real object of faith, nor the being whom the believer approaches. "And this is life eternal, *that they should know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.*" In harmony with this, it is everywhere exhibited as the characteristic of his children, that they know, fear, love, trust, and serve him; and as the character, on the other hand, of those who are not his children, that they do not know him; that when they know him intellectually, they do not glorify him as God, but become vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart is darkened; that they change his glory who is uncorruptible, into an image made like to corruptible man, and his truth into a lie, by the fabrication of a theology like Prof. Park's, suited to the instincts and tastes of their unsanctified hearts; and, accordingly, "worship the creature more than the creator who is blessed for ever." And it is announced as one of the great results that is to be secured by the dispensation he is now exercising over men, that they are to be made to know that he is Jehovah; that whether saved or lost they are to be brought to a full conviction of the truth in respect to his being, perfections, rights, and government; to see the reality of all their errors, and the folly and unrighteousness of all their sins, and feel that he is justifiable in all the representations he has made of himself, in his demands, and in the measures by which he enforces them.

In accordance with this, those exhibitions which he has

made of himself that are the clearest and fullest, and those delineations in his word of his attributes, manifestations of the principles of his government, and expressions of his will, that are the most simple, direct, and absolute, have the greatest power over the heart, and are the principal instruments of impressing it, restraining it from sin, exciting it to obedience, and advancing it in sanctification. He approaches us most directly and immediately in his requirements, his prohibitions, his promises, his invitations, and his threatenings; they are a more powerful means than any other of awakening the conscience and moving the affections; and they are expressed with the greatest simplicity, precision, and strength. There is not a single metaphor or comparison in the ten commandments; and pronounced by the voice of the Almighty, they probably made a profounder impression on the Israelites who heard them, than any other utterance that ever fell on human ears. There is probably no other part of the Old Testament of equal length that is presented in such simplicity of thought, such pointedness and precision of expression, and such sharpness and strength of delineation, as the blessings and curses addressed to that people by Moses, at the close of his ministry, Deut. xxviii.; and they probably touched them with a sense of the great realities of God's sway over them and their relations to him, and raised them to a solemnity, awe, faith, love, submission, and devotedness, that were never awakened by any other message spoken by human lips. Those passages of the Old Testament, descriptive of God, that are usually regarded as the most sublime, and strike the heart with the greatest force, are marked by similar directness of thought and simplicity, and force of expression. What other delineation of his moral dispositions and the character of his government surpasses, in these relations, that which he proclaimed to Moses, "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands; forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children unto the third and fourth generation!" What other portraiture of the person and reign of the Messiah equals at once in simplicity and grandeur that which is drawn by Isaiah,

"For unto us a child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace; of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever!" What other exemplification of his omnipotence surpasses that given by Moses in adaptation to touch the heart and inspire it with a sense of his immeasurable power and greatness—"And God said let there be light; and there was light!" or that of the psalmist, "He spake and it was done, he commanded and it stood fast!" That which is sublime in God's acts and purposes strikes the heart with an energy as much greater proportionally than that which is sublime in nature, as he is greater than his works. Yet what transcends in that relation the announcement by Christ—"The hour is coming in which all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of Man and shall come forth, they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation!" There are no tropes, there are no fancies, there is no poetry in this. That is the character also of the prayer which the Saviour required his disciples immediately to address to the Father, and make the vehicle of their homage and supplication, and designed, therefore, for the heart as well as the intellect. There is no poetry, there is no imagination, there is no obscurity in it. Every subject it mentions is treated as a reality; God, his attributes, his revelation of himself, his rights, his kingdom, his will, his providence, man's dependence, obligations, guilt, and need of forgiveness, and God's power and readiness to bestow, through eternal ages, the blessings that are necessary for his salvation. What a confutation of Professor Park's doctrine, that the theology of fact and truth—God, contemplated as he is in his nature and government, is not suited to the filial heart, and cannot excite it to holy affection; but that it is a factitious, distorted, and false theology that fills that office.

It is in these aspects of fact and truth, accordingly, that God and his government are contemplated by his children in their faith, reverence, love, and obedience; and it is the

realities of his being, his will, and his government, as he has revealed them in his word, and manifests them in his providence, that are the instruments through which they are impressed and excited to their holy affections. Their sanctification takes place exclusively through the truth. False views have no share in that work. It is in the consideration and realization of God *as he is*, his perfections, his rights, his will, Christ's mediatorship, his sacrifice, the conditions of pardon through his death, the influences of the Spirit, and their relationship and responsibility to God, that they feel their convictions of sin, and need of a gracious forgiveness; that they repent; that they fear, adore, and love; that they accept Christ as their Saviour, rest on him for redemption, and rejoice in the expectation of his kingdom. Let the inquiry be made of the whole body of the pious, if such is not the fact, and they will respond in the affirmative, with an assurance and energy proportional to their intelligence, the largeness of their experience, and the purity and strength of their religious affections. The sanctification of believers, consequently, usually corresponds to their familiarity with the great truths God has revealed in his word, and the simplicity, accuracy, and largeness of their views of them. And, finally, as a last corroboration of this, *their* ministry is usually blest in the highest measure, as the means of converting and sanctifying men, who present the great truths of God's word in the greatest clearness, accuracy, and fulness. Let the appeal be made to the whole body of evangelical ministers, to the most intelligent of the church, and to the history of past ages, and the response will unanimously confirm this statement. Seasons of awakening are always seasons of peculiar thoughtfulness of the truth, and generally periods when the great facts and doctrines of the gospel are taught with unusual clearness, pointedness, and demonstration; and those facts and doctrines are the considerations which the Spirit of God employs to awaken and convince men, and lead them to repentance, faith, and love, the renunciation of the world, and the dedication of themselves to God. The intrusion of a false teacher among a people in a deep religious excitement, and presentation to them of a fanciful and false gospel, so far from being favorable to their just impression, or harmless, would be

regarded by the most intelligent and experienced as of the utmost danger to both awakened and unawakened hearers. There is not an evangelical minister in the country, we will venture to say, of tolerable sense and practical knowledge, who would not, at such a period, regard with extreme alarm the address to his congregation of a discourse teaching the doctrine Professor Park advances, that the theology of the intellect,—the truth which God has revealed, is not suited to move the hearts of his children, and cannot be the means of a true conviction of sin, penitence, faith, love, or joy; but, that in order to them the instincts and sensibilities must devise a new and antagonistic theology in harmony with themselves. We put it to the enlightened and wise; to those who have the deepest knowledge of the heart, and the largest acquaintance with the influences of the Spirit, and the consequences that usually follow false teachings at such crises, whether such a discourse would not prove, according to all that can be deemed most sure, mischievous and fatal, just in proportion as it met with credence; whether a doctrine can be conceived, no matter what it is,—universalism, infidelity, atheism itself, more utterly subversive of the realizations and affections that are the essential elements in the processes of conviction, conversion, and sanctification.

Such are the proofs of the error of his doctrine, that the truth expressed with directness, simplicity, and logical precision, is not suited to touch the heart, and excite it to holy affections. Let not the reader, however, content himself with this brief exemplification of its contradictoriness to the Scriptures, and the observation and consciousness of men generally. Let him test it also by his own experience and knowledge of others, and compare it for himself with the word of God. Let him reflect whether the seasons of his strongest emotion, his heartiest penitence, his deepest humbleness and self-renunciation, his most earnest desires for sanctification, his fullest faith, his warmest love, and his loftiest hopes, are not the seasons when he has the clearest, the best defined, and the most comprehensive views of God, as he is exhibited in the plain delineations of the Scriptures, of Christ and his redemptive work, and of the great truths and doctrines of his word; and whether the strength of his

feelings is not ordinarily proportional to the precision and energy of his apprehensions. Let him try the question also by the teachings of inspiration, in such passages as the seventh and eighth chapters of Romans, the first seven chapters of John's gospel, his first epistle, and other parts of the sacred volume which treat of the opposite characters of truth and error, and of the sanctified and natural heart, and he cannot fail to derive from them a far profounder realization of the certainty and importance of what we have advanced, than can be produced by anything we can utter. There is not a point in the whole circle of human speculation less open to doubt than the utter and monstrous erroneousness of Professor Park's doctrine.

What estimate is to be formed of his doctrine is shown, however, in a single passage. Professor P. is not the first who has attempted to substitute a theology of the feelings for the word of God. "Son of man, prophesy against the prophets of Israel that prophesy; and *say thou unto them THAT PROPHECY OUT OF THEIR OWN HEARTS*, Hear ye the word of the Lord. Thus saith the Lord God, *Woe unto the foolish prophets THAT FOLLOW THEIR OWN SPIRIT*, and have seen nothing. O Israel, thy prophets are like the foxes of the desert. Ye have not gone up into the gaps, neither made up the hedge for the house of Israel to stand in the battle in the day of the Lord. *They have seen vanity and lying divination, saying*, the Lord saith; and the Lord hath not sent them; and they have made others to hope that they would confirm the word. Have ye not seen a vain vision, and spoken a lying divination, whereas ye say, the Lord saith it, albeit I have not spoken. Therefore, thus saith the Lord God, because ye have spoken vanity and seen lies, therefore, behold I am against you, saith the Lord God; and my hand shall be upon the prophets that see vanity, and that divine lies; they shall not be in the assembly of my people, neither shall they be written in the writing of the house of Israel; neither shall they enter into the land of Israel: and ye shall know that I am the Lord God," Ezek. xiii. 1-9.

Yet in the face of this and similar passages, v. 10-23, Jeremiah xiv. 14, xxiii. 23-26, in which God declares them to be false prophets, who prophesy out of their own hearts, and denounces

on them the most terrible judgments, Professor Park boldly advocates that method of theologizing as the only one that can free Christianity from contradictions, and promote a true piety! What mark can be exhibited more decisive of a false teacher?

He is equally mistaken also in the other assumption on which he founds his theory, that the object of figurative and poetic diction is exclusively to affect the heart, and excite it to emotion and passion. Instead, its main design is to assist the understanding by the illustration and exemplification of that which has already been presented in a direct and simple form to the intellect. That is universally the aim of similes, which, when extended to many particulars, are among the most beautiful and effective ornaments both of poetry and prose. The subjects to which they are applied are always expressly mentioned, and they are employed to illustrate them by the resemblances which are borne to them by others with which they are compared. The higher power of the truths or facts which they are employed to exemplify, to touch the heart and move its "healthy affections," is the result, accordingly, of the clearer comprehension which the intellect gains by them of those facts and truths, not from the mere resemblance itself, considered irrespective of the knowledge it conveys. The adaptation of the figure to please the fancy and awaken a sense of beauty, is merely subsidiary to its higher office with the intellect, not its main characteristic or function. Thus the object of Christ's parables, which are a species of comparison embracing many particulars, is to present the truths and facts they are employed to exemplify, with clearness and distinctness to the intellect, not, in place of that, to delight the imagination by a combination of bold and brilliant similitudes. They are means of instruction, not mere instruments of amusing the fancy, or gratifying the taste for parallels. Their influence on the heart is altogether consequent on their influence on the intellect. And such is the office of all the ordinary similes of the Scriptures. It is the design, for example, of the comparison, Isaiah xxix. 8, to show by sensations and feelings with which all are familiar, the frustration and chagrin which the enemies of Jerusalem are to experience in their last attempt to conquer that city. After foreshowing its

siege, the despair of its inhabitants, and the interposition of God for its deliverance, the prophet predicts the disappointment its enemies are to feel in being debarred from its spoils. "And it shall be as when a hungry man dreameth, and behold he eateth, but he awaketh and his soul is empty; or, as when a thirsty man dreameth, and behold he drinketh, but he awaketh and behold he is faint, and his soul hath appetite. So shall the multitude of all the nations be that fight against Mount Zion." Can anything be clearer than that this is addressed directly to the intellect, not to the heart; and is designed like a definition, to enable the Israelites to understand how sudden and how absolute the disappointment of their enemies' expectation of plundering them is to be; not simply to excite *their* affections in the anticipation of that result. And such is the office also of all the other comparisons of the Scriptures, and of the orators and poets. Let those who wish to ascertain for themselves whether such is the fact, try the question with the similes quoted in the analysis of the figures of the Scriptures in the third number of the Journal, in the review of Dr. Bushnell's Dissertation in the fifth number, and in the articles on the figures of Isaiah. They will find them all in accordance with this representation.

Such is the fact equally also with the metaphor, the main difference of which, from the comparison, is, that it directly declares the subject to which it is applied to be that which it resembles; as God is a rock, a fortress, a high tower. Thus the object of the author of the Proverbs in declaring that "the hoary head is a crown of glory, if it be found in the way of righteousness," is to show the estimate in which the upright man, who has grown grey with age, is held; or to illustrate the dignity and venerableness of aged virtue; not directly to address the heart, or excite its emotions and affections. The design, in like manner, of the declaration, "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick; but when the desire—the object or event desired—cometh, it is *a tree of life*,"—is to set forth the exhilaration and quickened sense of life and energy that are occasioned by the occurrence of events that are fervently desired, in contrast with the depressing and disheartening effects of delay and disappointment, in respect to objects and occurrences to which it looks with ardent wishes and hopes;

not to excite the affections in regard to such events and objects. And such is the office of all the principal figures of the sacred volume, and of the orators and poets.

The whole basis on which he builds his doctrine is thus mistaken, in respect to the laws of the mind and the office of poetry. It is as singular an error, and indicates as strange an inacquaintance with the subject, to suppose that figures and poetry are designed exclusively for the heart, and are the only instruments by which its affections are excited, as it is to hold that truth is designed only for the intellect, and has no power over the moral feelings.

Professor P., however, having, as he thinks, established this preposterous doctrine, proceeds to consider the influences which his two theologies exert on one another.

“ Having considered some of the differences between the intellectual and the emotive theology, let us now glance, as was proposed, at some of the influences which one exerts on the other.

“ And *first*, the theology of the intellect illustrates and vivifies itself by that of feeling. As man is compounded of soul and body, and his inward sensibilities are expressed by his outward features, so his faith combines ideas logically accurate with conceptions merely illustrative and expressive.”—P. 10.

This, and the remarks or illustrations which follow, are as singular a specimen of irrelevance as we recollect to have seen, and indicate a total forgetfulness or misapprehension of the doctrine he is professing to maintain. He has endeavored to show that the theology of the intellect is wholly distinct from that of feeling, and antagonistic to it; and that each is suited only to the faculty or susceptibility that generates it. That of the intellect he describes as literally and absolutely true; and that of the heart, as vague, self-contradictory, and often false. He here, however, proceeds to remark and argue as though he had exhibited the theology of the intellect as consisting of mere abstract ideas, and the theology of the feelings as a mere theology of visible and tangible forms, or a *theology of the senses*;—a doctrine as unlike that which he proposes to exemplify, as the senses are unlike the heart, or the heart the intellect. The whole of his allegations under

this head are, accordingly, altogether inapplicable to his object. His establishing the general statements which he advances can contribute nothing towards proving, that such a theology as that which he ascribes to the intellect, does or can illustrate and vivify itself, by such a theology as that which he assigns to the heart. The proposition is in fact a solecism. How can a theology that is true, that is clear, and that is certain, illustrate and vivify itself by one that is vague, self-contradictory, and false? How can a theology that God has revealed, vivify itself by a theology which the heart has framed, in order to satisfy its instincts and passions that are at war with truth and with him? But his theology of the intellect is not a theology of mere abstractions, but a theology of *realities*, contemplated according to the literal and absolute truth as they are—if divine, as divine; if spiritual, as spiritual; if human and objects of the senses, as human and as objects of the senses, and each demonstrated by evidences suited to its nature. Nor is his theology of the heart a theology exclusively of the senses or of material forms, but a theology of fictions, whether abstract or concrete, spiritual or material. It is fabricated by the heart to suit its sensibilities and affections, according to their general nature, and the objects which they “crave,” whether they are material or spiritual, sensual or imaginative. The fact, accordingly, if it be a fact—it is certainly a queer expression—that man’s “faith combines ideas logically accurate with *conceptions* merely illustrative and impressive,” has no connexion with the proposition he alleges it to prove, that truth vivifies itself by falsehood: nor have the averments that follow:

“Our tendency to unite corporeal forms with mental views may be a premonition, that we are destined to exist hereafter in a union of two natures, one of them being spirit, and the other so expressive of a spirit as to be called a spiritual body. We lose the influence of the literal truth upon the *sensibilities*,”—he probably means *the senses*,—“if we persevere in refusing it an appropriate image. We must add a *body* to the soul of a doctrine, whenever we would make it *palpable*,”—an object of the senses,—“and enlivening. It is brought, as it were, into our presence by its symbols, as a strong passion is exhibited to us by a gesture, as the idea of dignity is made almost *visible* in the Apollo Belvidere.”—Pp. 10, 11.

What subject could he have introduced more entirely foreign to the point he is proposing to establish? His theme is not the resurrection of the body. It does not require him to show that the glorified body is called spiritual, because it is to be "so expressive of a spirit," rather than for any other reason. It does not make it necessary that he should prove, that in order that "the literal truth" may impress *the senses*, it must be exhibited in a material form. The question is not whether men can or cannot discern with their visual organs things that are not objects of vision; or feel with their hands things that are not perceptible by the touch. He might as well have introduced a dissertation on perspective, or the process by which the mind gains its knowledge of the existence and nature of the material objects that transmit influences to it through the senses.

What he is to demonstrate is, that a theology of the intellect that treats of both spiritual and material existences, invisible and visible, and with exact truth, can illustrate and vivify itself by a different and antagonistic theology, framed to suit the heart at war with that truth, and vague, contradictory, and false. In order that it may illustrate itself by that factitious theology, there must be a resemblance between them, so that the features of the one may exemplify those of the other, and assist to a clearer apprehension of them. But what resemblance can there be between truth and error; between that which is distasteful and that which is pleasing to the heart in alienation from God; between that which excites enmity, and that which inspires love? And how can that which is false vivify that which is true? Can anything be more obvious, than that Professor Park has wholly quitted his subject, and is altogether unaware of the irrelevance of the new discussion on which he has entered?

He goes on, however, to represent, that it is the heart that generates the tendency to conceive of incorporeal things under material forms, and clothe abstract truths in a dress that exhibits them as perceptible by the senses.

"The whole doctrine, for example, of the spiritual world, is one that requires to be made *tangible by an embodiment*. We have an intellectual belief that a spirit has no shape, and occupies no space; that a

human soul, so soon as it is dismissed from the earth, receives more decisive tokens than had been previously given it of its maker's complacency or displeasure, has a clearer knowledge of him, a larger love or a sterner hostility to him, a more delightful or a more painful experience of his control; and at a period yet to come, will be confined to a body unlike the earthly one, yet having a kind of identity with it, and furnishing inlets for peculiar joys or woes. It is the judgment of some that the popular tract and the sermons of such men as Baxter and Whitfield, ought to exhibit no other than this intellectual view of our future state. But such an intellectual view is *too general* to be embraced *by the feelings*. *They* are baulked with the notion of a spaceless, formless existence, continuing between death and the resurrection. *They* regard the soul as turned out of being when despoiled of shape and extension. *They* represent the converted islander of the Atlantic as rising, when he leaves the earth, to the place where God sitteth upon his throne; and also the renewed islander of the Pacific as ascending, at death, from the world to the same prescribed spot. When pressed with the query, how two antipodes rise up in opposite directions to one locality, *they* have nothing to reply."—Pp. 11, 12.

Could it be expected that any but a trifler, of a low grade of intellect, would puzzle himself with such a question? It is of the same class as the objection to the earth's revolution on its axis, founded on the fact, that the kettle of mush hung on the fire at night, is unspilled in the morning. Yet this, it seems, is one of the difficulties that perplexes and baffles such philosophers as Professor Park, and can be solved only by the contrivance of a factitious and false theology, that after all has not the remotest relation to it!

"*They*"—the feelings—"are not careful to answer any objections, but only speak right on. They crave a *reality* for the soul, for its coming joys or woes, and will not be defrauded of this solid existence by any subtilized theory."—P. 12.

He thus represents the conception, which is natural to all, of the souls of the departed as having a human or angelic form, and the scene of their existence as a real place,—as the work of *the feelings*, in contradistinction from the intellect. No mistake, however, could be greater, or betray a more singular misapprehension of the laws of the mind. The heart is not a

conceptive power. It never discharges the functions of the intellect or imagination. Its office is to feel, not to conceive; to be excited to emotion and affection by the perceptions of the mind, whether they are mere thoughts, or realities in veritable forms, or forms conceived by the imagination; not to create such perceptions for its excitement. What feeling is there that can be supposed to give birth to these effects? Let Professor Park name the emotions or affections which he regards as originating them. Does fear, hate, dread, love, joy, hope, or any kindred feeling, fulfil that office? They are all themselves the effects of perceptions that precede them in the mind, and are directed altogether to the objects of those perceptions—not to a different class. They cannot be the causes, therefore, of another class to which they have no relation whatever. Does desire fulfil that office? But desire, like other affections, is itself excited by a perception or thing perceived or conceived, that precedes it, and is the sole object to which it is directed. It cannot, therefore, any more than any other affection, give birth to another and different perception. Professor Park's ascription to the heart of this investiture of incorporeal and invisible things with visible forms, is thus wholly inconsistent with the laws of our nature. He confounds the functions of the intellect with those of the heart, and ascribes to the latter that which is the peculiar and exclusive work of the former. He deserts, also, the Kantian philosophy, on which his whole speculative and theological system is founded. It is the fundamental and distinctive doctrine of that philosophy, and the doctrine on which the theology Professor Park has embraced ultimately rests, that the understanding, in contradistinction from the senses, generates all the mind's perceptions and ideas of external forms. How is it, if master of his own theory, that he thus contradicts its most essential element, and prepares the way for the subversion of his whole philosophic and theological system?

But in exhibiting the conception of the soul as invested with a form during its disembodied life, and existing in a real scene, as wholly factitious and the work of the heart, he contradicts the Scriptures also, as well as his philosophy; for they exhibit disembodied souls and other spiritual agents in visible forms. Thus, Christ represents Abraham, Lazarus, and Dives,

as having forms, organs, and senses in their intermediate state, and as existing in real, material places. The souls of the martyrs are exhibited in the Apocalypse, as having forms, existing in a material world, uttering voices, hearing a reply, and being clothed in white robes. Paul represents himself, also, when caught up to Paradise, as in a real world, and as hearing words, though uncertain whether he was in his natural body or not. God the Father, in like manner, in his theophanies, angels in their appearances to the patriarchs, prophets, and others, and Moses at the transfiguration, are exhibited as in forms modelled essentially after that of man. This mode of conception, thus, is not left to be fabricated by the heart, as an ingredient in a new and more perfect theology than that which God has revealed. It is sanctioned by him in his word, and is one of the instruments he has employed in the revelation of the future. And that mode of conceiving of intellectual beings has its ground in our intellectual nature, and is as unavoidable as it is habitual. In conceiving of a finite intelligence as active, and capable of communication with other intelligences, we necessarily conceive of him as having powers by which he can perceive existences external to himself, and act on them. But we cannot conceive of any other means for that purpose than those of the senses, and the organs by which they are acted on, with which we are now familiar. We have no ideas of any other instruments of a perception of external things, and a communication with or agency towards them. If we conceive of God, also, as visible, we must conceive of him as having a material form. The supposition, therefore, of a vision of him, of angels, and of disembodied spirits, and of their addressing us, or acting on other existences in our sight, necessarily involves the supposition, that they are invested with material forms, and have organs of vision, speech, hearing, and motion, like our own, or those of other bodied agents with which we are acquainted. Without it, the supposition of their visibility would be a self-contradiction. It is the law of our nature, therefore, and instead of involving us in any error, is both beneficial and wise. Had the prophets been represented as seeing God, angels, and souls, without their being clothed in material forms, it would have implied that they had a power of perceiving existences exterior to

themselves without means, which would be equivalent to a power of omniscience ; for if they could discern one and many such existences, why could they not all ? But it would have been inconsistent with their finite nature, and an imputation to them of one of the peculiar attributes of God, to have assigned to them such a power. Truth and wisdom, therefore, forbade such a representation, and rendered the use of the method God has employed, not only appropriate but indispensable. And it is not attended with any evil. The mind is not misled by it. It is aware that its conceptions differ from the nature of the intelligences which they respect, and continues to regard them as mere spirits, while it conceives of them as having forms. And the law, moreover, has this important advantage, that the conceptions formed by all mankind of those beings are essentially the same, while, were they subject to no such law, but each formed his conceptions arbitrarily, under the influence of other parts of his nature, they might be infinitely diverse, and make the expression of their ideas to one another impossible. Their apprehensions of them are now as clear, and communicable with as much ease, as on any other subject.

These great and palpable facts, however, have wholly escaped the notice of Professor Park. He imagines that, instead of the Omniscient, the heart alienated from him, and dissatisfied with what he has revealed, has devised this beautiful contrivance, and made it the basis of another and far better theology than that of his word ; and finally, to complete the circle of his mistakes, he ascribes to the heart this method of conception, and supposes the intellect employs it as a foreign aid to illustrate and verify its theology, of which it is a natural and necessary instrument. Were ever higher proofs given of a want of clear and accurate apprehensions ? Were ever more absurd misconceptions put forth by a writer of a theme which he flattered himself he was treating with the discrimination of a genius and the learning of a scholar ?

He, however, has not simply quitted his theme and lost himself in the mazes of another subject ; he next turns and directly contradicts the doctrine he has been advancing, and represents the theology of the intellect and the heart, instead of opposites, as parallels and aids of each other.

"But the sensitive part of our nature not only quickens the percipient, by requiring and suggesting expressive illustrations, it also furnishes principles from which the reasoning faculty deduces important inferences. I therefore remark, in *the second place*—

"The theology of the intellect enlarges and improves that of the feelings, and is also enlarged and improved by it. The more extensive and accurate are our views of literal truth, so much the more numerous and salutary are the forms which it may assume for enlisting the affections. A system of doctrines logically drawn out, not only makes its own appeal to the heart, but also provides materials for the imagination so to clothe as to allure the otherwise dormant sensibility. The perceptive power looks right forward to the truth (for this end was it made), from it turns to neither side for utilitarian purposes, but presses straight onwards to its object; yet every doctrine which it discovers is in reality practical, calling forth some emotion, and *this emotion* animating the sensitive nature which is not diseased, deepening its love of knowledge, *elevating and widening the religious system which is to satisfy it*. Every new article of the good man's belief elicits love or hatred, and this love or hatred so modifies the train and phasis of his meditations, *as to augment and improve the volume of his heart's theology*."—Pp. 13, 14.

How thankful should the world be to Professor Park for the detection and development of the great fact he here announces with the artless air of an original discoverer, half unconscious of his own merits, and thoughtless of the applause of which it is to make him the object; that "extensive and accurate views of the truth" are of service in influencing "the affections;" and that a system of doctrines logically drawn out actually "makes its own appeal to the heart!" Who ever before made so deep a plunge into the recesses of our nature, or soared to a height from which he obtained so wide a view of "the landscape" of our intellectual and sensitive constitution? But how is this startling novelty to be reconciled with the doctrine he has been advancing, that the theology of the intellect—"truth just as it is"—is not suited to interest the heart, but leaves it cold and torpid, or inspires it with distaste and aversion? How is it to be harmonized with the representation with which it is associated in this passage itself, that though that "theology makes its own appeal to the heart," and "every doctrine" which "the perceptive power" discovers, is in reality practical, calling forth some emotion,

yet the "sensibility" would remain torpid, were it not that the imagination interposes and so clothes the "materials" furnished by that theology, as to "allure the otherwise dormant" affections? If "every article of the good man's belief elicits love or hatred," his theory of the impotence of the theology of truth to influence the heart is mistaken, and his assumption unauthorized that such a necessity exists as he represents, of an antagonistic theology to furnish motives to allure and stimulate the affections.

But not content with thus retracting what he had asserted in respect to the intellect, he next proceeds to a similar contradiction of his doctrine respecting the heart.

"It is a tendency of pietism to undervalue the human intellect for the sake of exalting the affections; as if sin had less to do with the feelings than with the intelligence; as if a deceived heart had never turned men aside; as if reason had fallen deeper than the will. Rather has the will fallen *from* the intellectual powers, while *they remain truer than any other to their office*. It cannot be a *pious* act to underrate these powers, given as they were by him who made the soul in his image. Our speculative tendencies are original, legitimate parts of the constitution which it is irreverent to censure. We *must* speculate. We must define, distinguish, infer, arrange our inferences in a system. Our spiritual oneness, completeness, progress, require it. We lose our civilization, so far as we depreciate a philosophy truly so called. *Our faith becomes a wild or weak sentimentalism if we despise logic.*"—P. 14.

Is it possible to utter a more direct retraction of the theory he has been asserting, or more effectually sweep away at a stroke the whole ground on which he affirms the necessity, and assigns the office of an "emotive theology?" He has hitherto represented the truth as contemplated by the intellect as altogether cold and powerless—a dead and life-destroying abstraction. But of what worth can it be, if such is its character; or how can the disposition of the intellect to speculate and reason, be of such high consideration, if its labors issue only in such a mere mental petrification? Why is it that Professor Park intermixes these contradictory representations? Is it that he may have the means of claiming that he still holds the views that are commonly entertained of the office of the intellect and the influence of truth? Or is it that, notwith-

standing the air he assumes of profound research and sharp discrimination, he is still unaware of the incompatibility of his contradictory statements? But what is of still higher importance, how is what he here alleges of the weakness and deceitfulness of the heart, reconcilable with the office he has before assigned it, of framing its own religion and fabricating its own theology in absolute independence of God and truth, and investing its system with an authority above his? But he adheres but a moment to this, ere he turns and again assigns the heart the function he had before ascribed to it, and makes it the arbiter of its own obligations and the supreme judge of the truth.

“But the theology of reason not only amends and amplifies that of the affections; it is also improved and enlarged by it. One tendency of rationalism is to undervalue the heart for the sake of putting the crown on the head. This is a good tendency when applied to those feelings that are wayward and deceptive; but an *irrational* one when applied to those which are unavoidable, and, therefore, innocent; still more to those which are holy, and, therefore, entitled to our reverence. Whenever a feeling is constitutional and cannot be expelled, whenever it is pious and cannot but be approved, then such of its impulses as are uniform, self-consistent, and persevering, are data on which the intellect may safely reason, and by means of which it may add new materials to its *dogmatic system*.”—P. 15.

But how is it to be known that a feeling is *pious* and to be *approved*? By what criterion are those which are wayward and deceptive to be discriminated from those which are innocent and holy? Not according to Prof. P. by the theology of the intellect; not by “the truth just as it is;” for that, he asserts, has no adaptation to move the affections, and cannot, therefore, be a test of their moral character. It is their own theology alone, he affirms, that is suited to the feelings, and rouses them into exercise; and it is that alone, therefore, that is a criterion of their nature; as it is at once their exciting cause, and the standard of their piety. He thus, again, installs the feelings in the office he had before assigned them, and makes them their own judge and law; and, accordingly, whatever they are, as long as they are satisfactory to themselves

they must, on his theory, be regarded as innocent and holy. He adds:—

“ These universal feelings provide us with a test for our own faith. Whenever we find, my brethren, that the words which we proclaim do not strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the choice men and women who look up to us for consolation, when they do not stir the depths of our own souls, reach down to our hidden wants, and wake sensibilities which otherwise had lain buried under the cares of time ; or when they make an abiding impression that the divine government is harsh, pitiless, oppressive, devoid of sympathy with our most refined sentiments, reckless of even the most delicate emotion of the tenderest nature, then we may infer that we have left out of our theology some element which we should have inserted, or have brought into it some element which we should have discarded.”—Pp. 16, 17.

On his theory, then, that sentence lies in all its energy against “the theology of the intellect”—“the truth just as it is ;” for he asserts that that has no adaptation to impress and move the affections. He avers, and builds on the ground of it, his whole theory of an antagonistic theology, that it does “not strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the choice men and women,” that it does “not stir the depths of our own souls,” that it does “not reach down to our hidden wants, and wake sensibilities which otherwise had lain buried under the cares of time ;” but that, instead, it is wholly inapplicable and distasteful to the feelings, and that it is only by the interposition of a counter theology that they are aroused from their dormancy, and excited to a vigorous exercise.

But apart from this game of self-contradiction, which he plays through several pages with such singular nimbleness, how do the propositions he now advances, on the supposition of their truth, yield any proof of the position which he alleges them to sustain ? How does the fact that “a system of doctrines logically drawn out makes its own appeal to the heart,” and that “every doctrine” which is discovered by “the perceptive power” calls “forth some emotion,” show that “the theology of the intellect enlarges and improves that of the feelings ?” That it may enlarge and improve the feelings themselves, by calling them into vigorous exercise, and exciting them in a right direction, is quite possible and credible ; but that is a

wholly different affair from enlarging and improving "*a theology of feeling*" that is antagonistic to itself, and absolutely false. Or how, on the other hand, does the fact that *the affections* of the heart are impressed and excited by the truths of "a system of doctrines logically drawn out," demonstrate that *the theology of the heart* also enlarges and improves the *theology of reason*? The affections themselves are, on his theory, wholly different from *the theology* of the affections. The influence of the affections on the intellect is wholly different from an influence on *the theology* of the intellect; and an influence of the theology of the affections, on the theology of the reason, a different thing still. The Professor has thus again confounded things that are wholly distinct, and treated causes and effects of one species as though they were causes and effects of another. Admitting the several truisms he has paraded through a long series of paragraphs, with all the pomp of novelties just detected and evolved to charm and astonish mankind, and they contribute nothing whatever to the object for which he offers them. They only show that he has but very confused views of the subject he affects to treat with so much talent and learning.

He has not yet exhausted, however, his fund of inconsistencies. In the next instance which he offers to exemplify the influence of his two theologies on each other, he reduces the *theology of feeling* from the rank he has heretofore assigned it, of a theology and a cause, to the mere modes or forms of thought and diction in which the intellect *describes* or the heart *expresses* the affections; and exhibits it, accordingly, as *the mere effect* or *consequence* of those affections, instead, as before, of representing it as framed by the heart as an indispensable means of rousing its "otherwise dormant sensibilities," and the exciting cause of its feelings. He says:

"But while the theology of reason derives aid from the impulses of emotion, it maintains its ascendancy over them. In investigations for truth, the intellect must be the authoritative power, employing *the sensibilities as indices* of right doctrine, but surveying and superintending them from its commanding elevation. . . . I therefore remark, in the *third* place,

"The theology of the intellect explains that of feeling into an essen-

tial agreement with all the constitutional demands of the soul. It does this by collating the *discordant representations* which the heart allows, and eliciting the one self-consistent principle which underlies them. It places side by side *the contradictory statements* which receive, at different times, the sympathies of a spirit as it is moved by different impulses. It exposes *the impossibility of believing all these statements*, without qualifying some of them, so as to prevent their subverting each other. In order to qualify them in the right way, it details their origin, reveals their intent, unfolds their influence, and by such means eliminates *the principle in which they all agree for substance of doctrine*. When this principle has been once detected and disengaged from its conflicting representations, it re-acts upon them, explains, modifies, harmonizes their meaning. Thus are the mutually repellent forces set over against each other, so as to neutralize their opposition, and to combine in producing one and the same movement."—Pp. 17, 18.

What is it now which the intellect, with such exemplary condescension and vivacity, employs itself in freeing from seeming error, and reducing to self-consistency? A theology that is antagonistic to its own, as Professor P. has hitherto represented? Not at all; but simply the different terms and forms of expression which the mind employs in the description or utterance of its affections! and affections, of course, that exist anterior to its delineation and expression of them; and are excited by causes wholly distinct from those modes of description and utterance. This is apparent from the exemplifications which he proceeds to allege.

"Seizing strongly upon some elements of a comprehensive doctrine, *the Bible* paints the unrenewed heart as a stone needing to be exchanged for flesh; and again, not as a stone, but as flesh needing to be turned into spirit; and yet again, neither as a stone, nor as flesh, but as a darkened spirit needing to be illumined with the light of knowledge. Taking a vigorous hold of yet other elements in the same doctrine, *the Bible* portrays his heart not as ignorant and needing to be enlightened, but as dead and needing to be made alive; and further, not as dead, but as living and needing to die, to be crucified, and buried; and further still, not as in need of a resurrection, or of a crucifixion, but of a new creation; and once more, as requiring neither to be slain, nor raised from death, nor created anew, but to be born again. For the sake of vividly *describing other features* of the same truth, the heart is exhibited as needing to be called or drawn to God, or to be enlarged, or

circumcised, or purified, or inscribed with a new law, or endowed with new graces. And for the purpose of awakening interest in a distinct phase of this truth, all the preceding forms are inverted, and man is summoned to make himself a new heart, or to give up his old one, or to become a little child, or to cleanse himself, or to unstop his deaf ears and hear, or to open his blinded eyes and see, or to awake from sleep, or rise from death. *LITERALLY understood, these expressions are dissonant from each other.* Their dissonance adds to their *emphasis*. Their *emphasis* fastens our attention upon *the principle in which they all agree.* *This principle is too vast to be uttered in a single formula,* and, therefore, branches out into various parts, and the lively exhibition of one part contravenes an equally impressive statement of a different one. The intellect educes light from the collision of these repugnant phrases, and then modifies and reconciles them into the doctrine that *the character of our race needs an essential transformation by an interposed influence from God.* But how soon would this doctrine lose its vivacity, if it were not revealed in these dissimilar forms, all jutting up like the hills of a landscape from a common substratum."—Pp. 18, 19.

What a complication of self-contradictions, if we are to believe Professor Park! What a seemingly deliberate attempt by the great teacher to confound and baffle his creatures by representations of the heart that set consciousness and reason at defiance; and what a triumph of the intellect to detect the "vast" principle by which they can be interpreted, so as to be a vehicle of the doctrine that the character of our race—not the race itself—needs an essential transformation! Is not the reader thoroughly perplexed, and ready to start back with horror, at the discovery that God treats us in such a "harsh, pitiless, insincere" way, and shows himself to be so "devoid of sympathy with our most refined sentiments, and reckless of even the most delicate emotion of the tenderest nature?"—P. 16. What, however, is the solution of this awful mystery, which, by some singular cause, has heretofore escaped the pious, but which Dr. Bushnell and Professor Park have had the rare fortune—not to detect and unfold—but to copy from the neologists of Germany, whom they take as their guides? Nothing else than that *this language is figurative*; some of it being employed by the metaphor, and some by the hypocatastasis; and being, therefore, to be interpreted as such, involves no more contra-

diction or mystery than the most literal that is employed in the statement of self-evident or indisputable truths! Is there a boy in New England, of such an age as to play with a paper kite, who, when his parents or associates in describing its motions, employ the expressions,—it soars, it sails, it flies, it stoops, it turns its head to this or that point, regards them as making assertions that are mysterious, contradictory, and impossible to be reconciled, except by a careful comparison of them with each other, and the detection of some “vast” and recondite principle on which the language is used? Is there any one of the phrases that is not as easily understood by itself, as when compared with the others? Is there a child in a million who would make a mistake in construing them, or imagine that they involve any intricacy, or not understand the nature of the motions they express, as easily as though, instead of the use of a metaphor, the movements of the kite were formally compared to that of a bird when it soars, flies, and turns its head, of a ship when it sails, or of a person when he stoops? The darkness then that, according to Professor P., enshrouds the passages he refers to, and gives them such a fearful air, springs from the use of a portion of their terms by figures, which every one is accustomed to use in conversation, and understands with as much facility as any other forms of expression!

Of this, however, Professor P. seems to be unaware. He treats this application of language as extraordinary, and peculiar to the Bible and religion. He appears to imagine that men have no experience, in their ordinary intercourse with one another, of such a usage of terms;—that the first impression of every one must be, that they are employed *literally*; and that it is only by an energetic and adroit effort of the intellect that it can be seen that that is a mistake, and a principle detected, by which they can be so explained, as to have a just and natural meaning! Has he been duped by the sophistries of the neological writers, whom he follows in his speculations; or is he practising on the susceptibilities of the congregational ministers of Massachusetts?

These figurative expressions he calls “the heart’s phrases,” and represents them as embodying “the theology of the feelings.” Such a statement from a writer, who had even a

slight comprehension of the subject he is treating, and can recollect what the point is which he is professing to prove, would surprise and astonish us. But the confusion of mind which it betrays, appears to be characteristic of Professor Park. The passages in which these expressions occur, *are not the utterances of the heart*. They had not their origin with men. *They are utterances by that OMNISCIENT BEING whose statements of "the truth just as it is,"* Professor P. asserts *are not satisfactory to the heart*, but are regarded by it either with a dead indifference, or an irreconcilable aversion ! It is HE who exhibits the unrenewed heart as a stone that needs to be changed to flesh, the mind as dead and needing to be made alive, its passions and affections as needing to be crucified, and its whole nature as requiring to be created anew. It is he who denominates the penitent a broken heart, and the humble a crushed spirit. The pretence that these expressions are invented by the heart, and in order to an utterance of pious feelings, for which the language God employs in the revelation of "the truth just as it is," is not suited ; and that it embodies in them a theology of its affections that is antagonistic to that which he has presented in his word, is a flagrant and unpardonable misrepresentation. And this is a fair specimen of the whole tissue of the pretexts by which Professor P. attempts to make out that the heart has a language and theology of its own, in contradistinction from that of the Scriptures and the intellect. The process consists, first, in an assumption that the heart is itself an intellectual as well as an "emotive" power, of a different species from that of the reason itself, and ill-suited to be its yoke-fellow ; next, in defaming the truth God has revealed, as it is contemplated by the intellect as unfitted to impress and excite the heart ; thirdly, in exhibiting the heart as inventing a theology of its own, and a vocabulary and phraseology to express it, for the purpose of moving its sensibilities, and stimulating them to holy action ; and finally, in representing that the language which God employs in describing the unrenewed and renewed mind, is invented by the heart as its own peculiar language, and that it expresses the doctrines of that theology of the feelings which he holds, the heart has fabricated in antagonism to that of God ! Was ever before such a complication of

misrepresentations and absurdities made the basis of a theory that is to solve all the intricacies of theology and mysteries of the affections? How is it that Professor P. ventures to put forth such a scheme? Is he unaware of the import of his own principles? Has he adopted his system from Schleiermacher and others without examination? Or is he constitutionally paradoxical, animated by a passion for novelties, and ambitious of the reputation of an original and venturesome thinker? In whatever relation his scheme is viewed, how is it possible to regard it as the work of any other than a superficial and presumptuous mind? How could a considerate person convince himself of its truth, or persuade himself of the propriety of any of the representations he has given of it? The mind, indeed, sometimes employs the phrases in question in the acknowledgment of its sins, and need of renovation by the Spirit, and in supplicating his influences; but it does not follow from that, that they are pre-eminently the language of the heart, in distinction from the intellect; inasmuch as the intellect uses them also with at least equal frequency in the statement of the truth which God employs them to express; and it is the intellect, moreover, not the heart in distinction from it, that employs them in those confessions themselves and supplications. The whole series of his pretences is thus altogether groundless and unjustifiable.

He goes on to mystify the subject through several other passages. We quote only one.

"We may instance another set of the heart's phrases, which, instead of coalescing with each other in a dull sameness, engage our curiosity by their disagreement, and exercise the analytic power in unloosing and laying bare the one principle which forms their basis. Bowed down under the experience of his evil tendencies, which long years of painful resistance have not subdued, trembling before the ever recurring fascinations which have so often enticed him into crime, the man of God longs to abase himself, and exclaims, without one modifying word, 'I am too frail for my responsibilities, and have no power to do what is required of me!' But, in a brighter moment, admiring the exuberance of divine generosity, thankful for the large gifts which his munificent Father has lavished upon him, elevated with adoring views of the equitable One, who never reaps where he has not sown, the same man of God offers his unqualified thanksgiving; 'I know thee that thou art

not an hard master, exacting of me duties which I have no power to discharge, but thou attemperest thy law to my strength, and at no time imposest upon me a heavier burden than thou at that very time makest me able to bear.' In a different mood, when this same man is thinking of the future, foreseeing his temptations to an easily besetting sin, shuddering at the danger of committing it, dreading the results of a proud reliance on his own virtue, he becomes importunate for aid from above, and pours out his entreaty without one abating clause; 'I am nothing and less than nothing; I have no power to refrain from the sin which tempts me; help! Lord, help! for thou increasest strength to him who hath no might.' But, in still another mood, when the same man is thinking of the past, weeping over the fact that he has now indulged in the very crime which he feared, resisting every inducement to apologize for it, blaming himself, himself alone, himself deeply for so ungrateful, unreasonable, inexcusable an act, he makes the unmitigated confession, with his hand upon his heart, he dares not qualify his acknowledgment, 'I could have avoided that sin which I preferred to commit; woe is me, for I have not done as well as I might have done; if I had been as holy as I had power to be, then had I been perfect; and if I say I have been perfect, then that shall prove me perverse.' Thus, when looking backward, the sensitive Christian insists upon his competency to perform an act, and fears that a denial of it would banish his penitence for transgression; but, when looking forward, he insists upon his incompetency to perform the same act, and fears that a denial of this would weaken his feeling of dependence on God. Without a syllable of abatement, he now makes a profession, and then recalls it as thus unqualified, afterwards reiterates his once recalled avowal, and again retracts what he had once and again repeated. It is *the oscillating language of the emotions*, which, like the strings of an Æolian harp, vibrate in unison with the varying winds. It is nature in her childlike simplicity, that prompts the soul, when swayed in opposing directions by dissimilar thoughts, to vent itself in these antagonistic phrases, awakening the intenser interest by their very antagonism. What if they do, whenever modified, contradict each other? An impassioned heart recoils from a contradiction no more than the war-horse of Job starts back from the battle-field."—Pp. 19, 20.

He thus, in the first place, represents these statements, when contemplated by the intellect, as absolutely contradictory to each other, and incapable of being reconciled except by some recondite and mysterious principle, which none but a transcendental philosopher, like himself, can detect and apply;

and next, that they are the statements and—the language in which they are expressed—the language of the emotions in contradistinction from the understanding. Neither of these assertions, however, has the slightest color of truth. In averring that these statements are contradictory to one another, he assumes that the mind, in uttering them, contemplates itself in identically the same relation. But every one, who has a knowledge of himself, is aware that that is not the fact. Instead, it contemplates itself in wholly different respects. In speaking of its ability and obligation to obey the law of God and its guilt in transgression, it refers to its faculties as a moral agent, by which it is a subject of his law, and formed to render such a service as he enjoins; but in speaking of its weakness, liability to offend, and need of the aids of the Spirit, it refers to the strength of its appetites, passions, and natural affections which incline it to sin, and the powerful temptations to which it is exposed. And these are perfectly consistent with each other, and are felt to be consistent by every human being, however perverse he may be, and bold in his speculative denial of it. A consciousness that it has the requisite faculties for the service God requires, is one of the indispensable grounds of the mind's feeling that it is under obligation to obey him. Take away that conviction, and persuade it that its nature is not suited to be placed under such a law, and it will feel itself excusable in neglecting obedience. There is no contradiction, therefore, between these propositions. They are made of the mind in different relations, and are both literally true and consistent with each other, in the references in which they are made. Professor P. treats them, moreover, as though such expressions in respect to the mind's ability and inability for certain actions, were peculiar to religion. They are not, however. Similar phraseology is used by men in respect to all the affairs of life, and is universally understood as consistent and true in the relation in which we have explained it. When a rich man is asked to contribute a thousand dollars to some benevolent object, and he replies, that he cannot; no one regards him as affirming that he has not the necessary faculties, or the requisite property. He is understood simply as stating, that he is withheld from giving it by a reason which he deems sufficient. His saying, he cannot,

is not interpreted by any one as in contradiction to his physical ability. When, on the other hand, a poor man is solicited to contribute a similar sum, and he answers, he cannot, no one supposes him to mean that he has not the requisite disposition, or that he has not the necessary faculties to exert the volition, or the organs to take the money from his pocket. The statement of each is perfectly true in the relation in which it is made; the language in which each is expressed is perfectly proper; and each is universally interpreted in the sense in which it is employed, when the condition of the parties is understood who use it. Any one who should attempt to mystify it, as Professor P. does the language of the Scriptures, and treat it, when contemplated by the intellect, as contradictory and false, would be regarded as an absurd and perverse trifler.

His representation is equally in contradiction to fact, that this language is the language of the emotions in contradistinction from the intellect. He offers not a shadow of proof of it; nor could he, had he undertaken it. How convenient, how philosophic a method of establishing a doctrine, that is to spread its influence over the whole domain of theology, and convict the word of God of a total inadaptation to our nature, to take it thus for granted, and assume that the reader, out of deference to the genius that propounds it, will admit it, though at the cost of disregarding the most indisputable facts with which he is familiar, and mystifying his habitual consciousness! As the propositions expressed by the language in question are true; as the truths they express are perceived by the intellect, and asserted in the word of God; and as that language is employed by the intellect in expressing those truths, it is, in as emphatic a sense as any other, the language of the intellect. It cannot with propriety be said, in any equal measure, to be the language of the emotions. This whole pretence, indeed, that the feelings have a language which they invent, which is peculiarly their own, and which they employ in the utterance of themselves, is an absurd delusion. The use of language requires a knowledge of the meaning and grammar of words, perception, memory, judgment, and volition. But the emotions are not a perceiving, remembering, judging, and willing power. They are involuntary.

It is the intellect that perceives and remembers the import and uses of words. It is the mind, as a whole, that is conscious of the emotions and affections that are awakened in it; and it is the perceiving and voluntary faculties that see what language is suited to express the feelings, and select and employ it. The feelings only furnish *the occasion and motive* for its selection and employment. The only sense in which it can be called the language of feeling is, that it is sometimes employed *by the intellect* to express the emotions and passions. It is the language of the intellect, in the far higher sense, that it is the intellect alone that understands, selects, and uses it. Professor Park proceeds, throughout his whole discourse, on the absurd assumption, that the heart is a perceptive power, co-existing with, separate from, and antagonistic to, the intellect! What an expert in the mysteries of our nature! How admirably qualified to furnish the world with a theology that is to supersede that which the Omniscient has revealed!

Having expatiated through several pages in this style, he adds his fourth remark :—

“The theology of the intellect and that of feeling tend to keep each other within the sphere for which they are respectively designed, and in which they are fitted to improve the character.”—P. 23.

He proceeds, throughout his argument under this head, on the assumption, on the one hand, that the language of the intellect is employed solely in the statement of bare facts and abstract truths, irrespective of their relation to the heart, which we have shown is wholly mistaken and solecistical; and on the other, that all the language of rhetoric, poetry, and the imagination, and all the phraseology which is ever employed to express the feelings, or facts and truths that affect the feelings, is the language of the emotions; and that they are wholly distinct, dissimilar, and generally contradictory to each other; and *what he attempts to prove on these assumptions is*, that language ought always to be interpreted in accordance with the mode in which it is actually employed; that which is the language of the intellect, and is used in the statement of mere abstract truths, as used by that faculty for that purpose; and that which is employed by the imagination

or heart in expressing facts and truths in the concrete, and uttering feeling, as the language of feeling employed for that purpose; and finally, that when it is not interpreted in this manner, but the language of the intellect is confounded with that of the emotions, the most disastrous consequences follow!

Bold propositions these! The validity of what he alleges in support of them, of course, depends altogether on the propriety of his assumption, that there is such a language of the affections—which we have shown to be false. That language is to be interpreted according to the principle on which it is used, nobody denies; and as it is not employed on the principle which he asserts, it is not to be interpreted in accordance with his theory. His argument is thence, again, as it has been at every other stage of his Discourse, a mere pompous array of false ideas and contradictory and delusive words. Of the mode in which he takes for granted what he should prove, and misrepresents what he affects to explain, the following is an example:—

“At the time the words were uttered, there could not be a more *melting* address than, ‘If I your Lord and Master have washed your feet, ye ought also to wash one another’s feet;’ but when this touching sentiment is interpreted as a legal exaction, an argument for a Moravian or a Romish ceremony, its poetic elegance is petrified into a prosaic blunder.”—Pp. 23, 24.

He treats this as the language of the affections in contradistinction from the intellect. If such a language, however, as he imagines exists, it most certainly is not here. This is employed in the first clause in presenting an act, and an act that had been exerted; and in the next, in deducing a logical inference from that act, and that act and inference are, in the most absolute sense, objects of the intellect. It is, moreover, the nature of the Being who had exerted the act, and the conditions in which he had performed it—which are also objects of consideration by the intellect—that gave it its significance, and made it the proper ground of that inference. It was the fact that he was Jehovah incarnate, and that he was about to ascend to the throne of the universe, that invested it with its immeasurable grandeur, and made it a resistless proof that the

disciples owed the duty which it was designed to teach and enforce. Of this the apostle himself assures us. He says it was in the consciousness of his deity and the knowledge of his speedy return to the skies, and reception of all power in heaven and earth, that he gave his disciples that exemplification of what they ought to do to one another; and in these relations it was contemplated by him, and is to be contemplated by us by the intellect. That is the only faculty that can contemplate either him or his act, or the conclusion he deduced from it. Besides, the language in which they are presented is Christ's language, not his apostles'; and it was employed by him in teaching them a truth, in demonstrating to their intellect a duty, not in an appeal to their mere feelings. It was the truth only which he showed them that could affect their feelings—not the language in which it was uttered. There is no sense then in which it can be called the language of sentiment or feeling, in distinction from the language of the intellect, of fact, and of logic. The pretence is a sheer deception. The passage is, in truth, an argument; the premise of which is the condescension of Christ; the inference the duty of the disciples to condescend to each other. If Jehovah, your master, as he is about to ascend to the throne of the universe, stoops to perform such an office, ye also ought to perform that office to one another. Is there a purer piece of logic in the whole circle of human language; and that logic which Professor Park repudiates and denounces as cold and repellent to the feelings? What an extraordinary talent he displays at confuting himself, and demonstrating that he is a stranger to the subject on which he affects to philosophize with such singular accuracy!

But the remark which he makes on this passage is as entirely beside his purpose, as his assumption is false that it is the language of the emotions. He says, "But when this touching sentiment"—he should have said this premise and conclusion—"is interpreted as a legal exaction, an argument for a Moravian or Romish ceremony, its *poetic elegance is petrified into a prosaic blunder.*" That is, if the passage, instead of being interpreted as an argument showing that they ought to condescend to one another, is regarded as a mere command to wash one another's feet, it is grossly perverted.

Admitting now that such is the fact, and what does it amount to, except the truism which no one denies, that a gross misinterpretation of a passage necessarily divests it of its proper meaning! But how does that contribute in any measure to the demonstration of the point he was to establish under his fourth head, that "the theology of the intellect, and that of feeling, tend to keep each other within the sphere for which they were respectively designed, and in which they are fitted to improve the character?" Is there any connexion whatever between the two propositions? How does his showing that a certain thing when done, involves very bad consequences to that which is the subject of it, demonstrate that two other things that are not agents nor causes, and cannot possibly have any cognisance of those consequences, have a tendency to keep each other in the sphere for which they were respectively designed? What transcendental logic! Who can doubt that Professor Park has subjective grounds for railing at the art of reasoning, as stiff, cold, and repulsive? But we are afraid he is as deficient in the knowledge of natural things, and of poetry, as he is of logic. He says, "When this touching sentiment is interpreted as a legal exaction, *its poetic elegance is petrified into a prosaic blunder.*" Most will probably persuade themselves, that if a poetic elegance were to undergo a petrification, it would be a poetic elegance still, though petrified; not changed to prose, and a prose blunder. It is only those who have the peculiar perceptive powers of Professor Park, and have lost themselves in the bewildering fog of German neology, that can see that in a process of petrification, poetry must necessarily be turned into prose, and elegance into deformity.

His next example displays an equal accuracy of conception.

"There are moments in the stillness of our communion service, when we feel that our Lord is with us, when the bread and the wine so enliven our conception of his body and blood as, according to the law of vivid conception, to bring them into our *ideal* presence, and to make us *demand* the saying, as more pertinent and fit than any other—'This *is* my body; This *is* my blood.' But no sooner are these phrases transmuted from hearty utterances into intellectual judgments, than they

merge their beautiful rhetoric into an absurd logic, and are at once repulsed by a sound mind into their pristine sphere."—P. 24.

What, in the first place, does Professor P. mean by bringing the body and blood of Christ into his ideal presence, so vividly as to make him demand the saying as more pertinent than any other—This is my body, This is my blood? Is it that in such "moments" he uses the language *literally*, and actually regards the bread and wine as Christ's body and blood? If so, then his "feelings" are guilty of the identical perversion of the passage, which he denounces as an "intellectual judgment," and his "theology of the intellect and that of feeling," instead of keeping "each other in the sphere for which they were respectively designed, and in which they are fitted to improve the character"—unite in the same error which he says is "repulsed by a sound mind." If that is not his meaning, but he simply intends that in such moments of conception he regards the bread and wine as really symbols or *representatives* of Christ's body and blood, then the import of his statement is, that there are moments in the stillness of the communion service, when under the enlivening influences of the bread and wine, he feels that his Lord is with him by such a vivid conception, that he really contemplates the bread and wine as the representatives of his body and blood! What rare moments they must be to a transcendentalist! What a violent stretch of his *conceptive* powers; one extraordinary prerogative of which is,—let metaphysicians and philosophers notice it,—that they bring things into his "*ideal presence!*" But how does this prove the proposition which he alleges it to sustain? How does the fact, that there are moments when he puts a right construction on this passage, support his position, that the theology of the intellect and that of feeling tend to keep each other within the sphere for which they were respectively designed? Is there any connexion whatever between them?

In his other remark on the passage he exhibits a still greater confusion of mind. "But no sooner are these phrases transmuted from hearty utterances into intellectual judgments, than they merge their beautiful rhetoric into an absurd logic, and are at once repulsed by a sound mind into

their pristine sphere." Quot verba tot mysteria. Here are almost as many mistakes and absurdities as words. In the first place, the statement this bread is my body, this wine is my blood, is not the utterance of the heart, in distinction from the intellect. Instead, it expresses the great truth, that the bread and wine are symbols of Christ's body and blood. His institution made them really such; and it is that fact that gives them their power over the heart; not the heart that constitutes that fact, and is the cause of their being contemplated in that relation. In the next place, how are "*these phrases* transmuted into *intellectual judgments*?" The phrases are combinations of words, employed to express facts or truths, not "intellectual judgments." Judgments are *acts* of the mind, not words. Neither do the phrases become "intellectual judgments," when the mind interprets them as declaring that the bread and wine actually are Christ's body and blood. Nor are the supposed facts which they are then regarded as asserting, "intellectual judgments." It is the *decision*, that the language expresses those facts, that is an intellectual judgment, not the fact itself. How is it that Professor Park is not able to state the simplest proposition, without involving himself in a labyrinth of solecisms? But, in the third place, on the supposition that the language, instead of being interpreted appropriately as metaphorical, is taken as literal; how does that "merge its beautiful rhetoric into an absurd logic?" There is no logic absurd or unabsurd in such an interpretation. It is not an argumentative process: it is the work of arbitrary assumption instead of logic. Is it credible that Professor Park had any clear conception of the import of his language? Can any probable reason be imagined for his using this phrase, except that it embodies—though utterly irrelevant—a sort of antithesis, for which he seems to have a morbid passion? But overlooking these inaccuracies, and admitting that what he avers is true, how does it demonstrate what he alleges it to sustain? How does the supposed fact that "transmuting hearty utterances into intellectual judgments, merges beautiful rhetoric into absurd logic," prove that the theology of the intellect and that of feeling tend to keep each other within the sphere for which they are respectively designed? Is there any doubt that the

Professor's logic is absurd, however it may be with theirs whom he attempts to criticize?

We will add one other passage, in which he exhibits in an equal degree his misconception of the language he affects to interpret, and inacquaintance with the sentiments and operations of the sanctified mind.

"So there is a *depth of significance*, which our superficial powers do not fathom, in the lamentation, 'Behold! I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.' This will always remain the passage for the overflow of his grief, whose fountains of penitence are broken up. The channel is worn too deep into the affections to be easily changed. Let the schools reason about it just as and as long as they please. Let them condemn it as indecorous, or false, or absurd, and the man who utters it as unreasonable, fanatical, bigoted. Let them challenge him for his meaning, and insist with the rigidity of the judge of Shylock, that he weigh out the import of every word, every syllable, no more, no less:—they do not move him one hair's breadth. He stands where he stood before, and where he will stand till disenthralled from the body. 'My meaning,' he says, 'is exact enough for me; too exact for my repose of conscience; and I care just now for no proof clearer than this:—Behold! I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. Here on my heart the burden lies.'"—P. 24.

Professor Park treats this language as employed by the Psalmist in a confession that he himself sinned in his conception and growth anterior to his birth; and as now used with that meaning also by the penitent who repeat it. His whole representation of both the sanctified "and the schools," proceeds on that assumption. That, however, is not the meaning of the language. It certainly affirms nothing of the kind. What it declares in the last clause is, that his mother conceived him in sin; not that he sinned in being conceived: and that which it avers in the parallel clause is, that he was shapen in iniquity; not that he sinned in being shapened; that is, that his mother committed iniquity while he received his shape; not that he exercised iniquity while, antecedently to his birth, he was moulded into the human form. The sin and iniquity are predicated of his parent, not of him. It is a mere confession and acknowledgment that he was conceived

and borne by a sinful parent. The vast parade made by Professor Park, therefore, of mystery, seeming absurdity, and contradiction in the passage, is altogether gratuitous, and founded on his gross misapprehension or misrepresentation of its meaning. Those who employ its language in its true and obvious sense, ascribe to it no such solecism as he imagines; but use it to acknowledge a great and indisputable fact, that is a proper ground of humiliation before God. He proceeds to depict the mode in which he regards the penitent as uttering that and other language in the confession of sin; and we ask the reader, as he peruses it, carefully to notice its character, and consider whether, instead of a just delineation of a mind under a profound sense of the evil of its affections, the facility with which it is drawn into transgression, and its offensiveness to God, it is not rather the portraiture of an unsanctified, heartless, and deluded fanatic, who is endeavoring, by a torrent of words, either to rouse himself into feeling, or else to make a parade of sensibility to which he is in fact a stranger.

"Here on my heart the burden lies, and I *feel* that I am vile, a man of unclean lips, and dwell amid a people of unclean lips, and I went astray as soon as I was born, and am of a perverse, rebellious race; and there is a tide swelling within me and around me, and moving me on to actual transgression, and it is stayed by none of my unaided efforts, and all its billows roll over me, and I am so troubled that I cannot speak; and I am not content with merely saying that I am a transgressor; *I long to heap infinite upon infinite, and crowd together all sorts of self-reproach*; for I am clad in sin as with a garment, I devour it as a sweet morsel, I breathe it, I live it, I *am* sin. My hands are stained with it, my feet are swift in it, all my bones are out of joint with it, my whole body is of tainted origin, and of death in its influence and end; and here is my definition, and here is my proof; and definition or no definition, proof or no proof, here I plant myself, and here I stay, for this is my feeling, and it comes up from the depths of an overflowing heart: 'Behold! I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.'"—Pp. 24, 25.

We put it to the pious reader, whether this picture is not most unlike the workings of his mind, in the seasons of his deepest realization of his sinfulness; whether it is not a cari-

cature so extreme and absurd, as to indicate that the mind that drew it, is unacquainted with the mode in which the penitent utter themselves at such seasons. We put it to the ministers of the churches who have the largest experience of the heart, whether were an individual in a season of awakening to express himself in such a manner, it would not beget an irresistible conviction that he had no true sense of sin, but was either totally deceived in regard to the character of his feelings, or designing to deceive others by the parade of assumed sensibility. Such a specimen of rampant battology, it has never been our fortune before to see. When the great masters of human nature, Homer, the Greek dramatists, Shakspeare, Milton, depict men acting under deep passion, they do not exhibit them as uttering such a patchwork of scraps gathered from all the poets and orators, and put together without coherence, and without climax. That is not the mode in which the mind acts when touched with a profound feeling, especially of its sins and miseries. It does not then require a torrent of words to vent its emotions. It utters itself with brevity. Nor do the Scriptures present such delineations of the confessions of the penitent. It is the heathen whom Christ represents as using vain repetitions in their addresses to the deity, and thinking that they shall be heard for their much speaking. It is the self-righteous Pharisee whom he depicts as loquacious and egotistical. The Publican he exhibits as smiting on his breast and simply crying for pity, "God be merciful to me a sinner." All the confessions of the pious recorded in the Scriptures are, in like manner, distinguished for their simplicity and brevity; and that is the law of the mind when under realizations that pierce and overwhelm it. It then means what it utters, and has no need to ransack the dictionary for terms to express its convictions, or exhaust itself by running through a long scale of variations in phraseology. There is no surer mark of the absence of all true feeling. There is no more decisive proof of a weak, a fanatical, or a hypocritical mind. After this caricature, he proceeds to give a directly opposite view of the consequences of treating the language of the Psalmist as referring to his sin, instead of the sin of his parent.

"But when a theorist seizes at such living words as these, and puts them into his vice, and straightens or crooks them into the dogma, that man is blamable before he chooses to do wrong; deserving of punishment for the involuntary nature which he has never consented to gratify; really sinful before he actually sins; then *the language of emotion*, forced from its right place, and treated as if it were a part of a nicely measured syllogism, *hampers and confuses his reasonings*, until it is given back to the use for which it was first intended, and from which it ought never to have been diverted."—P. 25.

But this is precisely the construction he has himself placed on the language. He represents the penitent as confessing that he is *himself sin*; asserts that the passage from the Psalmist "will always remain the passage for the outflow of his grief"—not who is touched with humiliation at the thought of his descent from apostate and sinning *parents*, but "whose fountains of *penitence*," of which *one's own sins alone can be the object*, "are broken up;" and exhibits him as using it, notwithstanding the objections that are urged by the schools against its being employed as a confession of personal sin. "Let them reason about it," he says, "just as, and as long as they please. Let them condemn it as indecorous, or *false*, or *absurd*, and the man who utters it as unreasonable, fanatical, bigoted; let them challenge him for his meaning, and insist, with the rigidity of the judge of Shylock, that he weigh out the import of every word, every syllable, no more, no less;—they do not move him a hair's breadth. He stands where he stood before, and where he will stand till disenthralled from the body. 'My meaning,' he says, 'is exact enough for me; too exact for my *repose of conscience*,'" which cannot be disturbed except by what it considers *as its own sin*. Professor Park, therefore, notwithstanding his attempts at a pointed and effective contrast, exhibits the penitent, and the theorist, as alike treating the Psalmist's expressions as a confession of personal sin. Was ever more decisive evidence given by a writer of an extreme deliquium of mind; a total failure to distinguish the objects he attempts to discriminate and set forth as opposites? By his own showing, his theology of feeling runs into the identical error which he ascribes to the theology of the intellect. They join hand in hand, instead of keeping "each other within the sphere for which they were

respectively designed, and in which *they improve the character.*" He goes on to finish his imaginary contrast of the influences they exert.

"When men thus lose their sensitiveness to the *discriminations between the style of judgment and that of feeling*, and when they force the latter into the province of the former, they become prone to *undervalue the conscience*, and to be *afraid of philosophy*, and to *shudder at the axioms of common sense*, and to *divorce faith from reason*; and to *rely on church government* rather than on *fraternal discussion.*"—P. 25.

And these, with the exception of the last, which is the fault, doubtless, in his judgment of those who propose to discipline his friend and co-laborer, Dr. Bushnell, are precisely the effects that result from his own theology. Those who embrace his theory "undervalue conscience," and disarm it of its power, by representing, that "the truth just as it is," is not suited to affect the feelings, of which that is one of the strongest and most important; inasmuch as they exhibit all the operations of conscience, in reference to the law of God and sin, as altogether morbid and illegitimate! They "are afraid," also, of the "philosophy" of fact and truth, in distinction from assumption and fancy, and "shudder at the axioms of common sense." They openly defame the truth as cold, lifeless, and unsuited to influence the moral feelings; and denounce exact definitions and rigid logic as repellent to the heart, and adapted only to cause it to shiver from want of sympathy, or shudder with abhorrence. And finally, they formally and professedly "divorce faith from reason." It is the fundamental doctrine of this system, that faith is not, and cannot be, founded on evidence, on the pretence that there is no evidence of God's existence, and of course, therefore, none of a government exercised by him, or a revelation of his will; but that his being, law, administration, and purpose, are altogether ideal, and have their ground only in the feeling of the heart, which ascribes to them a reality, merely in order to satisfy its moral wants! Professor Park's express object, accordingly, in his *Discourse* is to show, that "the theology of reason is so uninfluential, that the heart is under the necessity, in order to the exercise of holy affections, to fabricate an antagonistic system that is suited to satisfy its peculiar instincts and sensibilities!"

Such is the climax of self-contradiction in which his Discourse terminates! Many other passages are equally obnoxious to animadversion; but what his doctrine is, and what the estimate is that we are to form of him as a thinker and a scholar, has become sufficiently apparent. Of all the writers whom we have had occasion critically to examine, we recollect no one who exhibits such a mixture of opposite qualities that confound and nullify one another. Gleams of intelligence, that flash for a moment, and then expire in an abyss of darkness; palpable contradictions earnestly maintained without a suspicion of their inconsistency; a doctrine put forth to disentangle and explain the phenomena of religion, which, in fact, assumes that no such religion exists, as the term denotes, and appropriates the name to a system of a totally opposite nature; arguments that confute his doctrines employed to sustain them, and reasonings advanced to convict those of error whom he opposes, that in fact demonstrate the truth of their views and overturn his own; inaptness in his examples; irrelevance in his illustrations; an inability to retain the meaning of a proposition through a paragraph, that is employed in explaining, demonstrating, or applying it; an affectation of philosophic depth while displaying the greatest superficiality; an air of delicate discrimination when confounding the most dissimilar propositions; professions of an impassioned love of that which is pure and good, while avowing a dislike of that which is true; pathetic confessions of weakness, blindness, and error, intermixed with an impeachment of the theology God has revealed, and substitution of one of his own fabrication in its place, as alone suited to raise the mind from its debasement to holiness; an ambition of appearing an original thinker, while deducing his whole patchwork of incoherent ideas from other authors; a glitter of novel, antithetic, and specious words, employed to decorate rank and repulsive errors! Such is the exhibition he makes of himself. No signal appears of a clear, strong, comprehensive, well-disciplined, and well-furnished mind. Instead of a scholar, he seems a mere declaimer; in place of a grave and gifted divine, a crude sentimentalist! What a prospect those young men enjoy, who are to receive from him their theology!

His philosophy of religion is the same essentially, as that of Schleiermacher and Morell, who represent "the intuitional consciousness" as the proper source of theology, and inspiration and revelation as natural processes. Mr. Morell regards "the essential pre-requisite of Christian theology" "*as a religious nature awakened by the development of the Christian life;*" and a "religious life" as "*consisting in emotion and intuition;*" and presenting the "*truth to the mind in the concrete.*" Professor Park represents "the theology of feeling" as generated by the same process. "*It is the form of belief which is suggested by and adapted to the wants of the well-trained heart.*" "It gives especial prominence to those features of doctrine which are and ought to be *most grateful to the sensibilities.*" The heart is thus, in each instance, the source and prompter of the theology; and the theology embodies nothing but propositions which the heart presents in the concrete, or the objects that engage its desires, and express the character of its affections. The Scriptures are in effect repudiated by both.

There is a very close affinity between Professor Park's speculations and those of Dr. Bushnell. They not only rest on the same basis, and terminate in essentially the same results; but Professor Park advances on several points the same views. He rails like Dr. B. against logic. That he can assent, as readily as he, to directly opposite creeds, is obvious from his two systems of theology. If he desires to exhibit himself as orthodox, he has only to make a profession of faith in the theology of the intellect. If he wishes to discard that, and avow his neological belief, he has only to profess his faith in the theology of the heart. Like Dr. B., he represents the Scriptures as filled with discordant and contradictory statements that cannot possibly—if taken in their natural sense—be believed to be true. And finally, like Dr. B., he appropriates to the heart the office of interpreting the Scriptures, and making them the vehicle of such doctrines and sentiments as suit its instincts and desires. If he has not avowed all the dogmas advanced by Dr. B. his principles are equally false, and need but to be followed to their legitimate results, to induce, like his, the rejection of the whole Christian system.

Of the nature of the influence he is to exert on his pupils

there can be no room for question. It will, undoubtedly, be such as will naturally spring from his principles. It is to be expected that he will exert himself, as he has in this discourse, to prejudice them against the great teachings of the word of God as discrepant, contradictory, and solecistical. It is to be presumed that he will depreciate and ridicule "the truth just as it is," as unsuited to the heart, dull, stiff, and repellent, and unworthy of the interest and approval of men of genius and learning. He will, of course, on the other hand, exalt the heart to the throne of the revealer and legislator, and intrust it with the task of framing a theology that suits its own tastes and wishes, and make that the instrument and criterion of piety. He will infect his pupils with a sickly taste for what he calls poetic views of religion, and imaginative representations of the great things of redemption and a future life; discard and denounce logic, discourage doctrinal preaching, and recommend declamation in its place; and those whom he wins to his views, he will naturally, like others who compass sea and land to make proselytes, make more eager and unscrupulous in the propagation of his errors than himself.

The boldness with which Professor P. advances his views, indicates a strong confidence that they will meet acceptance with at least many, and contribute to his reputation and influence, rather than obstruct or injure him. Is there any probability that his expectations will not be verified? Will his avowal and inculcation of the doctrine of his discourse expose him to any danger of losing his office; or occasion the desertion of the institution by the young men who are to prepare for the sacred office? This question is nothing less than whether a large share of the ministers educated in New England are to be imbued with the principles of neology, and draw with them in a measure, at least the churches with which they are to be connected. Professor P. and his coadjutors aim, undoubtedly, to revolutionize them. Are they to go on as they have hitherto, almost without obstruction, and achieve their object; or are they to meet an effective resistance? What more momentous question was ever asked? May God, in his infinite mercy, interpose and rouse his people to a sense of the danger with which they are threatened, and inspire them with wisdom and fidelity to retain and defend the truth.

The perversion of the institution with which Professor Park is connected, in such a measure as his discourse implies, from the objects for which it was established to the propagation of a false theology, exemplifies, in a striking manner, how uncertain the issue is of even good undertakings that are to be conducted by imperfect men. It was established for the better qualification of candidates for the sacred office, to teach and defend the great doctrines of the gospel. Richly endowed, and fostered and cherished by the churches with extraordinary affection, ere a generation has passed away, it has become, in a large degree at least, the seat and propagandist of a worse form of error than that which it was mainly designed to oppose! With what terrible emphasis such instances of the perversion of institutions, devised by the best men, guarded by the wisest provisions, and favored, in many relations, by the most propitious circumstances, demonstrate the hopelessness of the redemption of the world by the schemes and labors of men! Instead of converting others, those who have professed the faith and are intrusted with the work of teaching it, apostatize themselves, and become the propagators of a religion as hostile to Christianity as any that prevails among those who have changed the truth of God into a lie, and worship the creature more than the Creator! How welcome and joyous to the disciples of Christ should this fact make the purpose he has revealed of interposing himself to put an end to these evils, and make the world under another and more efficacious administration, the dwelling-place for ever of righteousness and peace!

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- ART. II.—1. J. A. ERNESTI INSTITUTIO INTERPRETIS NOV. TESTAMENTI. Editionem quintam suis observationibus auctam curavit C. T. Ammon. Lipsiæ. 1809.
2. S. F. N. MORI SUPER HERMENEUTICA NOV. TEST. ACROASES ACADEMICÆ Editioni aptavit præfatione et additamentis instruxit H. C. A. Eichstadt. Lipsiæ. 1797.
3. BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS, or the Art of Scripture Interpretation. From the German of G. F. Seiler, D.D. Translated by Rev. W. Wright, LL.D. London. 1835.

Of the subjects that need to be understood, in order to the

just interpretation of the prophetic Scriptures, there is none more important than the principles and laws of figurative language and symbolization. A knowledge of them is rendered necessary, not only by the frequency with which figures and symbols are employed by the prophets, but in an equal measure by the assumption that is common with expositors, that they occur in passages in which no trace of them exists. A large share of their constructions of the principal predictions are founded on the theory that language may be metaphorical without a metaphor, and persons and objects symbolical representatives without being symbols. Many things have conspired of late years to produce the impression that this branch of the art of interpretation, as well as others, is now far better understood than at former periods. The institution of theological seminaries, appointment of teachers of the sacred languages, and publication of books on the subject, have naturally awakened the expectation of great improvements in every department of exegesis; and the belief that they have been achieved, has been fostered in a degree by the pretensions of some who have employed themselves in the culture of sacred learning, and by the lavish commendation of their attainments by the religious and secular press. Representations are almost continually put forth that great advances have been made in every branch of biblical knowledge, and that the new exegesis is in fact a new art reduced to the precision and accuracy in a large degree of a science; while no hints are given that those statements are not as true, in regard to the interpretation of the figurative and prophetic, as the historical portions of the sacred word. Thus Professor Stuart says:—

“Who is ignorant of the innumerable controversies that have arisen about the tropical and literal sense of a multitude of passages in the sacred writings? Almost all the enthusiasm and extravagance that have been exhibited in respect to religion, have had no better support than gross material conceptions of figurative language, or, *not unfrequently, language that should be PROPERLY understood has been TROPICALLY construed.* There is no end to the mistakes on this ground. Nor are they limited to enthusiasts and fanatics. They develop themselves, not unfrequently, in the writings of men, grave, pious, excellent, and in other parts of theological science very learned.

*Indeed, it is but a RECENT THING that it has come to be considered a science, and a special and essential branch of theological science—to study the nature of language, and above all the nature of the oriental biblical languages. Long has this been admitted, in respect to the classics, and all works of science in ancient languages. But in regard to the Bible, the most ancient book in the world, and written in a language, the idiom of which is exceedingly diverse from our own, it seems to have been very generally taken for granted that no other study was necessary to discover its meaning than what is devoted to any common English books. At least, a Bible with marginal references, studied by a diligent and careful use of these references, may surely, as many seem to think, be understood in a satisfactory manner. In very many cases, the first thing has been to study theology; the second to read the Bible in order to find proofs of what had already been adopted as matter of belief. This order is now beginning to be reversed. The nature of language, of Scripture language, of figurative language, and of interpretation, is now beginning to be studied as a science; and the acquisition of this is one of the greatest ends of study, as it is the only proper mode of leading a theologian to the knowledge of what the Bible really contains. Here too is the common arbiter of the disputes that exist in the Christian world. The nature of language and of tropical words thoroughly understood will prostrate, among all intelligent and candid men who really love the truth, a great part of all the diversities of opinion that exist.”—*Principles of Interpretation*, translated from *Ernesti*, p. 73.*

“The nature of language,” he thus assures us in the most comprehensive import of the term, and especially “the nature of Scripture and figurative language,” and the art of “interpretation,” in the highest sense, are now “studied as a science;” and as great a revolution wrought, he implies, in the treatment of tropes and symbols, as in any other branch of the art. And such are the representations that have been urged on the public ear for twenty-five or thirty years, in inaugural and anniversary addresses, harangues before literary societies, appeals for donations for the institution of libraries and professorships, prefaces of dictionaries, grammars, and commentaries, reviews of books, and notices of preachers and orators. Are they then justifiable? Are facts in harmony with these statements? Or are they who make them both themselves mistaken, and misleading those who credit their representations?

We do not intimate that no advances whatever have been made in biblical knowledge. That the primary branches of the philology of the sacred languages have been very successfully cultivated; that better lexicons, grammars, and other helps have been produced; that many historical and geographical questions have been investigated with much ingenuity and learning, we do not deny. They, however, are but the humblest parts of "the science" of interpretation. A student may be a good grammarian, and yet be no interpreter. He may be a very good teacher of languages, and instruct a class in the first elements of Greek and Hebrew, or the forms of the nouns, pronouns, verbs, and adjectives, their derivation, and their syntax, and yet be in extreme ignorance or error in respect to the higher branches of hermeneutics. He may know nothing of the laws of figures and symbols. He may be wholly at fault in his theology. He may be a mere theorist, and employ all his learning and ingenuity in misrepresenting the sacred word; he may deny the inspiration of the Scriptures, treat them as the mere work of men, and make it his business to force their teachings into the mould of a presumptuous and infidel philosophy.

Making ample allowance, then, for whatever improvements have been made in the lower parts of biblical learning;—has the art of interpretation, we still ask, reached that perfection which its cultivators and eulogists represent? Are the canons which they professedly make the basis of their expositions, adequate to guide the student to a just explication of the sacred word? Especially, are their views correct of the nature and laws of figures and symbols? Do they give the learner the requisite instruction respecting them? Have they in fact—as far as tropical language is concerned—made any progress towards a scientific interpretation of the prophetic Scriptures? Are their canons any less inadequate; are their theories any less erroneous; are their explanations any less mistaken, absurd, or even monstrous, than those that prevailed before the introduction of the new exegesis?

We answer without hesitation;—they are not. No set of men were ever, in our judgment, under a more unhappy misapprehension of the nature of their attainments than the boasting and boasted disciples of the modern German herme-

neutics. No body of men were ever more deceived than those who are led by their pretensions to suppose that they have rescued the Scriptures from arbitrary construction, and determined their true meaning by just and indisputable laws. That such is the fact, we shall produce the most ample proofs.

The most appropriate criteria of the method that now prevails of treating the sacred word, are, in the first place, the systems of hermeneutics, or principles of interpretation, that are held as of authority, and made the basis by professors of the sacred languages of their studies and instructions; and in the next, the interpretations they themselves and others of their class put,—under the guidance of those canons,—on the prophecies of the Old Testament. If we show that most of their laws of interpretation are at best vague, irrelevant, or altogether nugatory, and give no information for the explanation of figures and symbols; if we prove that, in place of adhering to those of their canons that are in any degree sound, they violate them frequently, found many of their explanations on the most groundless and monstrous theories, and misrepresent and confound instead of interpreting the prophets, we shall sufficiently establish our charge. The most learned, complete, and authoritative treatises on the interpretation of the Scriptures, are those of Ernesti, Morus, Seiler, or other German works of the same character. These, or others that are drawn from them, are used as manuals, and their canons are professedly made the ground of the fashionable exegesis.

I. In the first place, then, these treatises give no adequate instruction respecting the principles and laws of figurative language. That the method of interpretation that prevailed a century and a half ago was in a great measure unscientific, and founded on erroneous and preposterous hypotheses, is generally conceded. But, in order to the correction of great errors, no aids are more essential than an exact exposition of their nature, and confutation of them by the statement and verification of the truths to which they are opposed. The works in question, however, give no hint whatever of the nature of the errors that prevail in respect to the figures of the Scriptures. They present no intimation that the metaphor, especially, which is the most important figure, is entirely

misunderstood ; and that it is to mistaken theories of the office it fills, that a very large share of the false constructions that are put on the sacred word owe their origin. Had erroneous methods become current of calculating eclipses, reckoning latitude and longitude, or measuring lines and areas on the earth's surface, it would not be sufficient to put the learner on his guard against them, simply to state some general truths that have no direct relation to them. They would need to be specifically pointed out and confuted, and the truths which they contradict formally asserted in their place. Were a canon of interpretation followed in the courts of the civilized world, by which all legal titles to property were misconstrued in such a manner that the right of possession was denied to the real owners and assigned to supposititious persons, no manual of judicial interpretation would be suited to the necessities of the learner, that did not specifically designate that as an abuse, point out the false principle on which it proceeded, and assert in its stead and maintain the true rule of construction. Let us imagine such a theory applied to national debts. The Rothschilds hold a large amount of the stocks of the European governments, the certificates of which exhibit them as the owners, and give them the right, at their pleasure, of transferring them to any other persons whom they choose. Let us now suppose that claims were instituted by other parties to the ownership of those stocks, on the pretence that the language of the certificates expressing that ownership is metaphorical, and that, by the law of the metaphor, the name of the person or thing to which the figure is applied, is itself also used tropically ; and, consequently, that the Rothschilds are not their owners, but, instead, some unmentioned persons for whom their name is a mere metaphorical substitute ; and let us assume that that pretence were recognised by the courts of England, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, and other countries as legitimate, and made the basis of their judicial decisions. Would not such a method of construction be considered a flagrant outrage ? Would it not be universally felt to be totally subversive of the rights of property ? Could a manual for the interpretation of statutes and titles be of value that took no notice whatever of such an error ? Could a jurist have any claim to be considered a master of his art,

who regarded such a view of language and legal titles as legitimate, and acted on it in his profession? Yet such a theory and practice would present an exact parallel to those which prevail in the interpretation of the Scriptures. It is assumed by almost the whole body of interpreters, both that much of their language, which is wholly free from metaphor, is metaphorical; and that the persons and things to which the figure is supposed to be applied, are themselves also used by a metaphor, in virtue of which it is held that the agents or objects of which the passages treat, are not those that are mentioned in them, but a wholly different class. It is by this expedient, which is not any less an outrage in theology than in law, that the reference of a vast crowd of predictions in the Old Testament to the Israelites, who are literally their subjects, is denied, and the Christian church or Gentiles substituted in their place.

Now, of the error of this theory; of its inconsistency with the law of the metaphor; of the misrepresentation of the sacred word with which it is fraught; of its *existence* even, not a hint is given by the writers on hermeneutics whom we have named. No one would be led by the perusal of their volumes to suspect that such an engine is employed by the great body of fashionable commentators to wrench their true meaning from the revelations made by the Almighty, and force them into a concurrence with their theories; and that until it is struck from their grasp, there is not the slightest hope of a just and scientific interpretation by them of his prophetic word!

Let the reader pause and consider this startling fact. Can they be proficient in the art of interpretation who see nothing exceptionable in this theory? Can they be masters of the laws of language who perceive nothing mistaken in such notions of the nature of the metaphor? Can their canons be adequate guides to the truth, that present no cautions against such a perversion of the sacred word? Is it not apparent that they are unaware of the import of their own scheme; that they are unconscious that such a solecism lurks in their principles, and needs more than any other a corrective? Is it not manifest that while they are construing a vast portion of the most important predictions as though they were tropical, they are, in fact, ignorant what it is that constitutes language figu-

rative, and unacquainted with the laws by which it is to be interpreted?

2. They give no adequate statement of the nature of the metaphor. A definition of the figure, to present the information to the learner that is requisite, should show first, that it is a property of language, or lies in a peculiar use of words, not of the agents or objects which the words are employed to denote. Next, that the whole of the words in the sentence or expression in which it occurs are not employed by the figure, but a part of them only; and, thirdly, it should indicate which are and which are not the words that are used by it. Such an explication is rendered indispensable by the fact that these peculiarities are usually overlooked by interpreters, and the persons and things to which the metaphor is applied, treated as though they stood only for analogous objects; and the literal language also with which it is conjoined, as though it were used by the figure. We give examples, that the reader may see the necessity of a just understanding of the laws of the metaphor, in order to a correct interpretation of the prophecies. In the prediction, "The ransomed of the Lord shall return and come to Zion with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads," Isaiah xxxv. 10, there obviously is no metaphor in the use of the word Zion, as that figure lies in the affirmation of something of a person, object, or place, that is not proper to it, but only resembles something that is proper, or may literally happen to it; as the sky *frowns*, which is an expression peculiar to the human face, and not possible to the heavens; and the clouds *fly*, which is a movement peculiar to winged animals, and not possible to clouds. But there is no such use of Zion, nor appropriation to it of a term expressing an event that is incompatible with its nature. It is possible to that city that the Israelites should return to it with joy. Yet Zion is treated by Vitringa and many commentators, not as standing for Jerusalem, or a mountain within it, but as used by a metaphor to denote the Christian church. He says, "The meaning is, that they are to seek communion with God, and advancement in that communion by communion with the true church, which in respect to its origin, and mystically on account of the agreement of attributes, is, in a spiritual sense, called Zion." *Sensus est illos quæsituros esse communionem*

Dei, et profectum in communione Dei in communione ecclesiæ veræ quæ tum originis respectu, tum mystice ob convenientiam attributorum sensu spirituali *Tsion* dicitur. He thus, by his false theory of the law of a metaphorical or mystical use of terms, totally changes the prediction, and makes it foreshow an act towards a wholly different object; a change as arbitrary and as monstrous as it would be in the Jurists of Europe to interpret the names of the holders of national stocks, as used in a metaphorical or mystical meaning to signify persons or beings of a different order.

He ascribes a mystical sense also to the verbs expressing the acts that are predicted. To go and return to Zion, are not incompatible with the nature of the ransomed Israelites, but are proper to them. Those verbs, therefore, are not used metaphorically. Vitringa, however, treats them as employed by that figure to denote acts of *the mind* instead of the body; and acts towards the *church* in place of Zion. "Therefore," he says, "to go and return to Zion in the mystical sense, is to seek communion with God, in the communion of the church, according to a specific method and canon publicly made known." Ergo ire et redire Tsionem mystico sensu, est querere communionem Dei in communione ecclesiæ secundum certam viam et canonem publice demonstratum.

He expresses himself in this interpretation as though the sense which he ascribes to the prediction was the sense of the words. It is not their sense, however, even if his judgment of the import of the passage is right. Zion cannot possibly be used by a metaphor to denote the Christian church, unless by an affirmation, direct or indirect, that it is that church. But there is no such affirmation in this or any other part of the Scriptures. Vitringa, in fact, founds his construction on a tacit assumption, that Zion stands *as a representative* of the church, because of its resemblance as a scene of God's presence, and the offering of a true worship. He treats it, accordingly, as a symbol, instead of a metaphORIZED term; and the acts of going and returning to Zion as symbols of analogous acts of seeking God, by communion with the church. These, then, are examples of the error of assuming that the metaphor, instead of being a peculiar use of terms, is a representative use of the persons, acts, or objects which they are employed to denote.

On the other hand, in his construction of the following metaphorical prediction, he treats the literal as well as the tropical language as though it were used by the figure. "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them, and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose. It shall blossom abundantly and rejoice, even with joy and singing; the glory of Lebanon shall be given unto it, the excellency of Carmel and Sharon; they shall see the glory of the Lord, the excellency of our God," Isaiah xxxv. 1, 2. Here the figure lies altogether in the words glad and rejoice, by which acts and affections are predicated of the desert and wilderness that are peculiar to intelligent beings; to indicate that they are to undergo a change to verdure and beauty that will be to them what joyous exhilaration and gladness are to the human countenance. The terms desert, wilderness, and solitary place, are, of necessity, employed literally. There is no intimation that they are used by a metaphor for analogous places or things, as there would be were they employed by that figure; and the supposition that they are not used literally, is in effect the supposition that there are no means of knowing what it is that they are employed to denote. Without an explicit affirmation to that effect, there is no more means of proving that they stand for the Christian church, than that they denote the civil governments, literary institutions, agricultural and scientific societies, or any other organizations that exist in the world. If they are used by a metaphor, then, there is no possibility of determining what it is that is the subject of the prediction. Vitringa, however, assumes that they are used by that figure to signify the Christian church. "It is clear," he says, "that by the desert and solitary place, is to be understood some subject that is intelligent, and thence the church of God, and the now alien people and nations that are then to join the church, —for the predicates and theme of the prophecy admit that and no other subject." *Hic vero dubium non est, per desertum, solitudinem, aridum, intelligi subjectum aliquod rationale, et quidem ecclesiam Dei populosque et gentes huc usque à gratia et communione Dei alienas quæ ecclesiæ accrescerent; attributa enim et argumentum hujus orationis hoc et nullum aliud subjectum ferunt.* This is an instance of the treatment of the literal terms that stand for the subject to which the

metaphor is applied, as themselves also employed by the figure. These examples show the necessity of a definition of the figure that indicates these characteristics; a knowledge of them being indispensable to the just interpretation of the passages in which it occurs.

But the standard systems of interpretation present no such exposition of the properties of the figure. Ernesti, for example, gives no direct definition of the metaphor, and specifies only one peculiarity, by which a passage in which it occurs is distinguished he thinks from such as are literal; viz. that the subject and predicate are heterogeneous. "There is no question," he says, "that a trope is to be acknowledged in those propositions, the subject and predicate of which are heterogeneous, of which kind are all that are disconnected," or unlike, "corporeal and incorporeal, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, and the like, and different species of the same genus. For things that cannot exist in the same subject because of a natural repugnance, of which sort are those we have enumerated, cannot be logically and literally predicated of one another; as logical verity is the very basis of the literal. Should they, therefore, be predicated of one another, it must be metaphorically." *Illud autem dubitationem non habet, tropum esse agnoscendum in enunciatis iis quorum subjecta et predicata sunt heterogenea; cujus generis sunt disjuncta omnia, corporeum et incorporeum, animatum et non animatum, rationale et expers rationis, et similia, item species ejusdem generis diversae. Nam quæ in eodem subjecto esse non possunt, propter naturalem repugnantiam, cujus generis sunt ea, quæ diximus, ea de se dialectice, adeoque proprie prædicari non possunt; quod dialectica veritas est fundamentum proprietatis. Itaque si prædicantur tamen; sequitur id fieri improprie.*—Pp. 118, 119.

The term heterogeneous is altogether inappropriate. If taken strictly, it would exhibit all propositions as metaphorical, as there are no subjects and predicates that are not of different natures or orders. The mind and its affections and acts, for example, the body and its motions, the earth and its revolutions on its axis and round the sun, the atmosphere and its phenomena, differ altogether from each other in nature. Yet that is no obstruction to a literal predication of its affections

and acts of the mind ; of its revolutions of the earth ; or of its phenomena of the air. His definition is thus extremely inexact ; comprehends all propositions whatever, and millions on millions, therefore, that are not tropical to one that is truly such. Metaphorical affirmations are affirmations connecting subjects and predicates like those which he specifies, that are *incompatible* with one another, not simply that are of a different genus.

But apart from this error, he gives no indication which part of such a proposition it is in which the metaphor lies—the subject or the predicate. For aught that he defines, it may be in the one as well as the other ; as the subject is as incompatible with the predicate, as the predicate is with the subject. Nor is there any intimation that both cannot be used tropically. The learner is only informed by the definition of a general characteristic of metaphorical propositions. To what part of such propositions that characteristic belongs, or whether it is common to all their terms, the inquirer is left to ascertain as he can.

The definition given by Morus is nearly the same. “Some words are proper, others tropical. To use proper words is nothing else than to use those words which are at hand and invented, that a certain thing may be designated by a specific name. To use tropical words will be to exchange the settled name of a thing for another name of a similar, related, or associated thing. Thus he who has denominated the face *rosy*, the skin snowy, has undoubtedly spoken tropically ; because he has transferred the settled name of a thing, and used it in reference to another thing with which it does not literally accord. As, therefore, the use of terms in this manner is inverted and transferred to another subject, such words are called tropes.” *Alia igitur verba sunt propria, alia tropica. Propriis verbis uti, nihil aliud est, nisi uti iis verbis, quae adsunt et inventa sunt, ut certa res certo nomine appelletur. Tropicis verbis uti, est permutari nomen rei certum cum alio nomine rei similis vel relatae vel conjunctae. Ita qui dixit roseam faciem, cutem niveam, haud dubie tropice loquutus est, quia permutavit certum rei verbum, usurpavitque de alia re, cui proprie non conveniret. Quia igitur usus vocabulorum hoc modo invertitur et transfertur ad aliam rem, ideo dicuntur talia verba τρόποι.*—Vol. i. p. 260.

This is certainly sufficiently vague and inaccurate. He confounds the words themselves with the use to which they are appropriated, as though those that are literal must necessarily be used literally; and those that are tropical, are themselves tropes. All words, however, are literal, and when employed metaphorically, do not lose their literal meaning, but are simply transferred, as they are, to a subject of which that which they properly denote is not literally predicable, but only a resembling nature, property, act, or condition. All words, therefore, that are used metaphorically, are still what he calls proper words, as absolutely as those that are only used literally; and their being used in either way, is no obstruction to their being employed in the other. But apart from this vagueness and confusion, he gives no indication which part of a sentence it is in which the metaphor exists, if it is metaphorical; nor any intimation that only a part of the words of a proposition can be used by that figure.

His next definition is copied with slight variations from Ernesti. "The interpreter will have no doubt that a trope is to be acknowledged in those propositions, of which the subjects and predicates are heterogeneous. Of that class are all disconnected and opposite things; corporeal and incorporeal, for example. Thus men are called gods; but by nature man and God are opposites. It must be regarded, therefore, as a trope. Such opposites also are animate and inanimate, rational and irrational. Thus, the earth and the meadows are said to smile, stones to cry out, and walls of buildings to express joy and give thanks. It is manifest that these cannot be said literally, for they will not bear a critical test." *Neque enim dubitationem habet, tropum esse agnoscendum in propositionibus iis, quarum subjecta et praedicata sunt heterogenea, cujus generis sunt disjuncta et opposita omnia, v. c. corporeum et incorporeum. Sic homines dicuntur Dii; at per naturam rei homo et Deus sunt opposita. Fluit hinc, agnoscendum esse tropum. . . . Talia opposita porro sunt animatum et non animatum, rationale et expers rationis. Sic terra sic prata dicuntur ridere, lapides clamare, parietes gestire, gratias agere. Manifestum est, non posse hæc dici proprie; nam logicum examen non patitur.*—Vol. i. pp. 278, 279.

Here again the terms heterogeneous and opposite are alto-

gether inappropriate, embracing the subjects and predicates of all propositions, instead of such only as he alleges as examples that are incompatible with one another. But apart from this, he gives no specification in which branch of the proposition it is that the figure is employed; nor any intimation that the whole of its terms cannot be used by it. His definition is, consequently, wholly nugatory; for as things that are expressed by metaphors differ from the subjects of which they are affirmed, the terms denoting the subject may, as well as those denoting the predicate, *be supposed* to be used by a metaphor, on the ground that the predicate is incompatible with its nature; as is seen by the passage last quoted from Vitringa, in which he alleges the consideration, that the acts predicated of the desert and solitary place are proper only to rational beings, as a proof that those places stand by a figure for a subject that is intelligent, and the church of God. This instance and thousands of others of the kind that might be produced from authoritative commentators, show the total inadequacy of these vague and false definitions, and the necessity of an exact specification of all the laws of the figure, in order to enable the learner to reject the false constructions which he everywhere meets, and discern and demonstrate the true meaning of the Scriptures.

Seiler's description of the metaphor is still more vague and barren. "Orators, poets, and others, who aim at rendering their propositions agreeable, and who give scope to their imagination, are accustomed to use words in an *improper* sense. This improper sense consists in the using of one word in place of another on account of some connexion or relation wherein they both stand to each other. This connexion and relation is either a purely imaginary and arbitrary connexion, which depends on *our subjective conceptions*, and is a resemblance whence arises the metaphor; or a difference, a relation of its opposite, whence arises irony and antithesis; or it is a real objective relation" to which he refers synecdoche and metonymy.—P. 49.

A more meagre, confused, and false definition of the metaphor cannot well be conceived. He first mistakes a relation between things for which words stand, for a relation between the words themselves, and exhibits a trope as consisting in the use of one word in place of another, on account of that

relation existing between them ; whereas it is a relation subsisting between *the things* which the words are employed to denote, that is the ground of the use of the name of the one in place of the name of the other. It is because Judah resembled a lion's whelp in courage, nobleness, and strength, that he is said to be one, not because *the words* lion's whelp are like the words courage, strength, and nobleness. And next, he exhibits the relation on which the metaphor is founded, as subjective or merely conceptional, instead of objective and real. But no error could be greater or more palpable. It is true only when the subject to which the metaphor is applied is conceptional. In all instances where the subject is real, the relation is real, and must be, in order to the existence of a resemblance. It was because Judah actually resembled a lion's whelp that he is called one, not because he was merely *imagined* to resemble that animal. It is because the motion of a ship actually resembles that of a bird flying rapidly, that it is said to fly, instead of sail ; and because the motion of a cloud slowly wafting through the air, actually resembles that of a vessel moving regularly along the water, that it is said to sail. His definition, therefore, instead of being of any value, mystifies the subject, and can only confuse and mislead the learner.

These definitions of the metaphor, thus, in place of apprising the learner of all the characteristics that need to be known, in order to his avoiding the errors that are common, and giving it a just interpretation, leave him wholly without information on the most important points ; and in their best relations are meagre, inexact, and deceptive, and present indubitable evidence that their authors never entered into a critical analysis of the figure, nor caught a glimpse of its most essential features.

3. In addition to these definitions, they give several rules to enable the student to determine whether terms are used tropically or literally, that are in like manner extremely vague and inadequate.

Thus Ernesti says, " Whether an expression is literal or metaphorical, we commonly discern, on recalling the thing to the internal or external sense ; that is, renewing the internal or external perception of it ; and when that can be done, the

decision is easy ; and that is the reason that, in respect to the writings of men, a doubt very rarely or never occurs whether an expression is proper or tropical ; as the things of which they treat being human, and subject to the senses either interior or exterior, may be referred to them." *Proprie an tropice aliquid dictum sit, vulgo cognoscimus, re ad sensum vel internum vel externum revocanda, h. e. repetenda ejus vel interna vel externa perceptione ; quod ubi fieri potest, facile est judicium ; eaque causa est, quare in scriptis humanis, aut rarissime, aut nunquam dubitatio talis incidat, tropice aliquid an proprie dictum sit, quod res ab iis traditæ, quia sunt humanæ, et sensibus vel internis vel externis subjectæ, ut-cunque revocari ad sensum humanum possunt.*—P. 116. But no criterion is here given by which it is to be discerned whether an expression, the subject and predicate of which are thus referred to the senses, is metaphorical or not. Suppose them to be put to that test, and their nature and relations to each other discerned, Ernesti gives no hint what the peculiarity is, which is to show that the expression is tropical or not. If the learner discovers it, he must look somewhere else for the information ; and he will not find it, as we have already shown, but in a very partial degree, in the definition that writer gives of the metaphor.

The rule given by Morus is the same. "The meaning of the direction, 'in tropes, the nature of the subject is to be considered,' is that the external and internal senses are to be consulted, that it may be seen what is to be regarded as tropical, and how it is to be interpreted. When, therefore, the mind is said to be inflamed, we renew our internal perception, and from that judge the expression tropical. When we denominate any one rich in *mind*, the internal perception teaches that it is to be understood of much knowledge or virtue. In like manner, when snows of the head are said to adorn an old man, we revert to the external sense, and perceive the meaning to be that white hairs resemble snows." Here, in like manner, the learner is left without any direct designation what the criterion is, by which that which is tropical is to be distinguished from that which is literal. If the reader detects it, it must be from the examples, in some other part of the treatise, not from this rule. The direction, moreover, to try

the subject and predicate by the external and internal senses is preposterous, as it implies that it is only by that process that the inquirer can become aware of their compatibility or incompatibility with one another; and assumes, therefore, that no such knowledge is possessed of the nature of the things that are conjoined in metaphorical propositions, that their incompatibility is seen and felt, without a new consideration and comparison of them. But what can be more mistaken and absurd; or what could be more unfortunate, if true? What must be the dulness and ignorance of a person, who, on meeting the expression "Judah is a lion's whelp," should need to call up a fresh and vivid image of Judah and of a lion's whelp, and compare them, in order to see that the proposition is metaphorical; or on reading the prophetic delineation, "Joseph is a fruitful bough, a fruitful bough by a well, whose branches run over the wall," should need to conjure up an exact conception of Joseph and a bough in such a condition, and compare their natures, forms, and colors, in order to make himself sure that the meaning is, not that they were identically the same, but only that they resembled each other? What adepts in the art of analysis and definition were these celebrated hermeneutical doctors! How exquisite is the discrimination of the critics who have studied their works, perhaps translated them, and employed them as text books, without either detecting the puerility of these directions, or perceiving the total omission of such as are requisite to lead the learner to a just construction of the figure!

The same absurd direction is given by Seiler. "The nature and state of the thing itself must be considered, and how it presents itself to our external or internal sense. Where a power, property, or action, is ascribed to any person or thing, to which experience shows that it does not belong, and which it cannot possess or perform consistently with reason, a trope must obviously be acknowledged; as *to sleep beneath the earth*; *the smiling landscape*," pp. 52, 53. The criterion which he here states, though just where it is apposite, is wholly inapplicable to a large proportion of metaphorical language. It is not by experience alone that predicates are shown to be incompatible with the subjects of which they are affirmed, and, therefore, metaphorical. Observation is a far larger

source of that knowledge. Nor is an inconsistency with reason the only obstacle to the compatibility of such predicates with their subjects. It exists between millions of things that are altogether devoid not only of reason, but of consciousness and life; as between all subjects and predicates of propositions, in which a mere physical act or affection is affirmed of a physical thing, as flying of a ship, sailing of a cloud, clapping hands of waves, smiling of a landscape, and sleeping of the dead. This inexactness and confusion are conspicuous characteristics of the definitions and rules given by these writers on this subject, and present the most convincing evidence that they never carefully investigated it, but, which is obvious to those who have read the works of their predecessors, copied from them their chief statements with little improvement.

Their other principal rule for determining whether expressions are literal or metaphorical, is still more inaccurate and nugatory. Ernesti says, that, "in respect to divine things that are known solely by revelation, and cannot be referred to the senses, the only way in which it can be ascertained whether an expression is literal or metaphorical, is by an appeal to usage," p. 121. The same rule is given by Morus and Seiler. It is, however, altogether mistaken and absurd. Whether a term is used metaphorically or not, in a given instance, does not depend on its having been used metaphorically by others, in respect either to the same, or another subject. It is the incompatibility of that which it literally denotes, with that to which it is applied, that constitutes its appropriation metaphorical;—not its having or not having been transferred to that or other subjects by other writers. If its literal meaning is appropriate to that to which it is applied, its use cannot be metaphorical, however it may have been employed in other expressions. The rule is in fact therefore nothing more than a direction to ascertain whether the word is used literally or by a metaphor; and suggests no means whatever by which the learner is to determine that question. It cannot be shown to have been used metaphorically in any one instance, except by a reason that will equally show that it is used in that manner in any other in which it is employed by the figure.

4. And finally, they show the inadequacy of their views by wholly omitting to give rules for *the interpretation* of metaphors, and treating them as though their meaning was so palpable and self-evident as to render rules unnecessary. Thus Ernesti says; "of the understanding of tropes," or knowledge of the interpretation they are to receive, "there are two sources; one is in the things themselves, the other in the *usus loquendi*. That knowledge is drawn from the things when they rest on an obvious similitude; from the *usus loquendi*, first, by understanding the general custom of the Hebrew and Greek languages in respect to tropes; and next, by the comparison of passages in which the same things are expressed literally, or in which the same word occurs in a context of the same kind, so that the meaning is obvious." *Intelligentia autem tropicorum duos fontes habet: quorum alter est in rebus ipsis; alter in usu loquendi. Ex rebus intellectus ducitur, cum nituntur perspicua similitudine, quae sit in promptu: ex usu autem loquendi primum cognoscendi universa consuetudine linguæ hebraicæ in tropicis verbis, itemque græcæ; deinde per comparationem locorum, in quibus eadem res proprio verbo exprimitur, aut in quibus idem verbum est in contextu ejusmodi, ut sensus sit in promptu, p. 124.* But this is obviously no rule for their interpretation. It is merely stating that the understanding of their meaning is to be obtained, first, by understanding the subjects and predicates of the propositions in which they occur; which is equivalent to the extraordinary statement that the learner is to understand them by understanding them; and next, by understanding the usage of the languages in which they occur in respect to tropes; which is equivalent to the equally singular and useful statement, that the learner is to understand each particular metaphor by understanding all the others that occur in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures!

The directions given by Morus are equally nugatory. He says, "Another admonition is, that it is not enough that a construction of some sort or other is put on a trope, but care must be taken that it is understood accurately; that is, first, so that the interpretation may exhaust or adequately express the trope; and, secondly, so that that may be indicated which is meant by the comparison in the passage interpreted."

Alia est admonitio haec ; ne satis sit tropum intelligere utcunque, sed videndum an accurate intelligatur ; accurate, h. e. 1. ita ut interpretatio exhaustiat tropum, vel ut exprimat tropum adequate, quemadmodum logici dicunt ; 2d. Sic ut ponatur tertium comparationis ad hunc locum in quo versor, pertinens. Qui non sic intelligit locum, intelligit eum tantum utcunque. Vol. i. p. 300. This is plainly nothing more than the admonition that the trope must be accurately and adequately interpreted ; or in other words, that the interpreter must not fall into any error, either of omission or commission, in stating its meaning ! How he is to avoid those errors, and reach that accuracy and completeness, he is to find out as he can !

The canons of interpretation given by Seiler are equally absurd. He says, " The following rules are required for the explanation of tropes. 1. It should be shown that in the particular passage, an improper sense must be adopted." But this is no rule of interpretation ;—it is only a statement that before a passage is interpreted as tropical, it must be ascertained that it actually is of that character. What the process is by which, after it is known that it contains a metaphor, the figure is to be explained, the learner is left to ascertain as he can.

2. " The probable grounds should be shown on which the author has used this precise word in place of another." But that is no rule whatever for its interpretation. The question what the ground was of his employing it, is wholly different from the question what the relation is in which it is used, which is the only inquiry the interpreter needs to institute. What a rare talent these writers possessed, of missing the points at which they were professedly aiming !

3. " It should be observed what beauty and force of expression—what variety—would be lost, if the proper sense be adopted in place of the trope." But this, in like manner, is no rule for the explanation of the figure ; and must follow its interpretation, not precede it. How can the interpreter appreciate the force and beauty of a metaphorical expression, antecedently to his ascertaining its meaning ?

4. " Let the point of resemblance be accurately shown, or the relation and connexion of the things, and the true and

complete sense of the author be thus exhibited," p. 54. But this is not a rule of exegesis; it is simply a statement of what the writer deems necessary in order to a complete interpretation. It is nothing more than saying: in order to give the complete sense of the author, you must point out the resemblance that subsists between the subjects and predicates which he unites in his tropical propositions! or in other words, in order to show his meaning, you must show the nature of the media by which he expresses it! How he is to do that, however, is left to be determined by his own ingenuity!

Such are the canons which these celebrated writers present for the interpretation of metaphors! Was so superficial and inaccurate a system ever before passed off on a learned profession? Is there a parallel in the systematic treatises and text books of any other branch of knowledge, of such a total omission of everything that most essentially belongs to the subject, and is most important to the learner? Could more ample evidence be given that they can never have thoroughly studied the subject, and were unaware of its chief elements, and its relations to the prevalent methods of interpretation?

II. In the next place. But language is not the only instrument God has employed in the revelation of his purposes. Another class—representative agents, objects, acts and events, of a wholly different nature, and employed on wholly different principles, is the medium through which a large part of the prophecies are made. A system of Scriptural hermeneutics, therefore, in order to be complete, must define the nature, and state the laws of that instrument, apprise the learner of the mistaken theories that prevail in regard to it, and furnish him with the requisite means of working out and sustaining a true construction of those parts of the sacred volume, and avoiding and confuting such as are false. Almost all the great revelations of the future—those of John, Daniel, and many of Ezekiel's and Zechariah's, are made through that instrument. What instruction now do these systematic writers on the interpretation of the sacred word, who profess to present all the rules that are requisite to a perfect discovery and verification of its meaning, give on this subject? **NOT A SOLITARY DIRECTION IN RELATION TO IT IS FOUND ON**

THEIR PAGES. NOT A SYLLABLE IS UTTERED BY THEM IN REGARD TO IT! The theme is not even named. The student would never learn or suspect from their works, that such an instrument of prediction is employed by the Most High! They supposed, for aught that appears, that the symbols of John, Daniel, and the other prophets are to be interpreted, like the narratives of the gospels, by the mere laws of philology! What higher proof could be given of a total misconception of the subject? What more decisive evidence of the entire inadequacy of their canons of exegesis to the interpretation of the sacred volume? The fancy that their hermeneutical systems are perfect, is, therefore, altogether mistaken. The extreme commendations lavished on them by those who have adopted and introduced them into our seminaries, are totally unmerited. So far from being safe and adequate manuals of interpretation, they give no instruction whatever on the most important branches of the subject, and will infallibly mislead those who take them as their guides.

III. And, finally, their inadequacy to the office they are designed to fill, is exemplified by the fact, that those who profess to follow them are addicted to the grossest misinterpretation, both of the language and of the symbolic prophecies; and show that they are as wholly unacquainted as these writers were with many of the subjects of which they profess to treat.

1. Thus the current methods of interpretation, as indicated in periodicals that treat of exposition, prefaces, criticisms, commentaries, and manuals of exegesis, exhibit an entire inacquaintance with the laws of the metaphor, and misrepresent the sacred word in forms and on a scale that were never surpassed in extravagance, and could not be continued for an hour, were the laws of that figure understood. The predictions, for example, of the restoration of the Israelites to their national country and re-establishment as an independent people, of the coming of Christ and the resurrection of the holy dead anterior to the millennium, of the destruction by him of the anti-christian powers at that period, of his personal reign on earth during the thousand years and the reign of the risen saints with him, the renovation of the physical world at that epoch, and the perfect repeal at length of the curse of

the fall, and restoration of the race to a condition essentially like that in which it would have existed had the first pair maintained their allegiance, are misrepresented, misconstrued, and charged with a foreign and false meaning, on the assumption that they are metaphorical. That is the reason offered by the whole series of anti-millenarian commentators, from Origen and Jerome to the present time, for rejecting the philological sense of the passages in which those events are foreshown, and assigning to them a different signification. That, however, would be absolutely impossible, were the nature of the metaphor understood; as in a large part of those predictions there is not a shadow of that figure. The assertion that they are metaphorical is as mistaken and solecistical as it would be to ascribe that character to the propositions that are expressed by the multiplication table. These writers, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the existence of a metaphor in a passage is not necessary to constitute it metaphorical; but that it may have that character as well without the figure as with it. The theory, accordingly, on which they proceed is, that all passages that literally teach what in their judgment does not accord with the wisdom of the Almighty, are to be regarded as tropical, and furnished with a sense that suits their notions of what they ought to mean.

The process, however, by which they, in fact, interpret a large share of them, is wholly inconsistent with the laws even of the metaphor, and founded on the assumption that the language in which they are expressed, is not, in reality, the medium of the sense with which they are charged, but instead, the persons, objects, acts, and events which that language designates and describes; in other words, that the instruments of those prophecies, instead of words, are SYMBOLS, the existence of which the writers on hermeneutics, whose manuals we have been considering, do not even recognise!

They construe in that manner, for example, the prediction in regard to Zion—"Lift up thine eyes round about, and behold, all these *gather themselves together and come to thee*: as I live, saith the Lord, thou shalt surely clothe thee with them all, as with an ornament, and bind them as a bride. *For thy waste and thy desolate places*, and the land of thy destruction, *shall*

even now be too narrow by reason of the inhabitants, and they that swallowed thee up shall be far away. The children which thou shalt have after thou hast lost the other, shall say again in thine ears, The place is too strait for me : give place to me, that I may dwell. . . Thus saith the Lord God, Behold, I will lift up mine hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people ; and they shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders ; and kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers ; they shall bow down to thee with their face towards the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet ; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord," Isaiah xlix. 14-23. Now, these writers assume that the subject of this prophecy is not Jerusalem, nor the hill of that city of which Zion is the proper appellative ; but, instead, that though the name literally denotes that city, the city itself, in fact, stands representatively for the Christian church, because of an analogy that subsists between them ; and that that is, accordingly, the subject of the prophecy, and the return of the Israelites to their ancient metropolis, which it announces, a mere symbol of the accession of converted Gentiles to the church. But this, in the first place, is wholly inconsistent with the nature of the metaphor ; 1, As that is a peculiar use of *words*, not of the agents or objects which the words denote ; 2, As in a metaphorical proposition, the figure always lies in the predicate, not in the subject of which the affirmation is made. If it is said the boat gallops, the landscape smiles, the figure lies in the verbs, not in the nouns. The boat and landscape are used literally, and that which is affirmed, is affirmed of them. If therefore, this prediction were, as these writers erroneously assert, metaphorical, Zion, the subject of the several affirmations, would still be used literally as the name of the capital of Judea, and be the subject of the prophecy. They contradict the law of the metaphor, therefore, in their construction, and treat that city as though it were a symbol. The principle, accordingly, on which they proceed, is identically the same with that on which the jurists of Europe would act were they to assume that the names of the Rothschilds and other holders of national stocks that are inscribed in the certificates, do not stand for those parties, but are employed representatively for

wholly different persons, and whomever it may please the interpreter to suppose; and on that pretence, assign those supposititious persons the rights of ownership and possession!

The lawlessness and enormity of the latter would not in the least exceed that of the former. The one would not be any more subversive of the rights of property, than the other is of the truth of God's word. The one is as unworthy of Christian scholars, as the other is of learned and honorable jurists.

In like manner, when it is foreshown that "it shall come to pass in the last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills, and all nations shall flow unto it; and many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem," *Isaiah ii. 2, 3*; it is asserted that the terms, the Lord's house, Zion, and Jerusalem, are used metaphorically; while it is tacitly assumed that those objects are employed as symbols of the Christian church: and that that church, therefore, not the temple, Mount Moriah, nor Jerusalem, is the subject of the prophecy; all which, as in the former example, is utterly inconsistent with the laws of the metaphor, and monstrous.

So, also, when it is predicted that the Jewish tribulation having closed,—“Then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man in heaven; and then shall the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory,” *Matt. xxiv. 30*; it is claimed that the passage is metaphorical, although there is no metaphor nor any other figure in it; and assumed, therefore, that a trope is not necessary to constitute a passage tropical;—a paradox on which no one would venture who was not wholly unaware of the nature of the figure. That assumption, however, does not answer their purpose. In order to erase from the passage the prediction it expresses of the coming of Christ in the clouds, it is necessary to treat him as a symbol, and make the Holy Spirit, Providence, or men the subject of the prophecy. They, accordingly, interpret him and his coming as representative merely of an effusion of the Spirit

on men, a dispensation of Providence, or a condition of mankind!—a violation of the Sacred Word never exceeded in the annals of ignorance and folly. We might add, were it needful, a vast number of such perversions of the Scriptures. It is on this system of false principles that they interpret nearly the whole body of the prophecies of the Old and New Testament. It is apparent, then, from these examples, that those who follow the exegetical canons of the writers in question, are not led by them to the just interpretation of figures and symbols, or the unfigurative portions of the Sacred Word, but, instead, that misconception and perversion are the natural result of their principles, and that their errors, in the explication of the prophecies especially, are as numerous, as great, and as discreditable as those that marked the writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

IV. To complete the proof that they are not aware of the import of their own canons, or the nature of the figures they attempt to explain, these singular errors to which they are addicted are, in a measure, in violation of some of their own laws. Thus Ernesti says—"Allegories are not to be referred to the meaning of words; they are rather accommodations of their literal sense, and of things to the illustration of something that is taught, which, if apt, and not immoderate, may be of some service; but if managed by the unlearned and dreamy, usually issue in mere fancies that are senseless, and often ridiculous."

"The typical sense, as it is called, is not a *sense*, properly speaking. It is not a function of words, but of things, which God employs as signs of future events. Nor are genius and care in the interpreter necessary in searching for it; for it is unfolded by the showing and testimony of the Holy Spirit himself; beyond whose suggestions we ought not in this relation to be wise. They who treat of the design, or intention, as they call it, of the Holy Spirit, exercise very little judgment, and encourage the humor to introduce types everywhere; for the design of the Spirit cannot be known by us, except as he has indicated it." Enimvero *allegoriæ* ne sensus quidem loco numerandæ sunt. Sunt enim potius sensus, qui proprie dicitur, et rerum ad aliquod caput doctrinæ illustrandum, accommodationes; quæ si aptæ sint et moderatæ usum

aliquem, nec illum contemnendum habere possunt; sin ab hominibus indoctis, et ingenio literarum disciplinis non subacto, indulgentibus tractentur, plerumque in lusus inanes, sæpe etiam ridiculos abeunt.

Ipse ille *typicus sensus*, quem vocant, proprie non est *sensus*, quem in arte vocamus, est enim non verborum sed rerum, quas Deus voluit esse signa rerum futurarum. Nec in eo quærendo opus est interpretis cura et ingenio. Ipsius enim Spiritus S. indicio ac testimonio patet; ultra cuius admonitum sapere velle in hoc genere non debemus. Qui consilium modo, intentionem vocant, Spiritus S., commemorant parum subtiliter faciunt, aperiuntque viam libidini typos ubique comminiscendi. Nam consilium Spiritus S. intelligi nobis, nisi ipsius indicio, non potest.—Pp. 22, 24.

Much the same views are presented by Morus; and Professor Stuart states in a note in his translation of Ernesti, that,

“It is impossible adequately to describe the excesses and absurdities which have been committed in consequence”—he means, we suppose, in the indulgence—“of the allegorizing spirit. From the time of Origen, who converted into allegory the account of the creation of the world, the creation and fall of man, and multitudes of other simple facts related in the Bible, down to the Jesuit, who makes the account of the creation of the greater light to rule the day to mean the Pope, and the creation of the lesser light and the stars to mean the subjection of kings and princes to the Pope, there have been multitudes in and out of the Catholic Church who have pursued the same path. The most sacred doctrines of religion have often been defended and assailed by arguments of equal validity and of the same nature as the exposition of the Jesuit just mentioned. The spirit which prompts this may in some cases be commendable; but as it is a mere business of fancy, connected with no principles of philology, and supported by no reasons drawn from the nature of language, so it is, for the most part, not only worthless but dangerous. And of what possible use in the end can a principle be, which can prove the most important doctrine either of Judaism or Christianity, as well from the first verse of the first chapter of Chronicles, as from any part of the Bible? or rather, of what use can the Bible be, if it may be interpreted by such principles?”—Pp. 11, 12.

Yet, notwithstanding this specific denunciation of the lawless

allegorization of the Scriptures, it is by that very method, or a process of essentially the same nature, that these writers, and those who follow them, interpret the predictions of the Old and New Testament, respecting the return of the Israelites, the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, the advent and reign of Christ on the earth, and the resurrection of the saints at his coming and reign with him during the thousand years. They spiritualize those passages by assuming, that the Israelites are mere representatives of Gentiles, and their return to Palestine, representative of the conversion of the Gentiles to the Christian faith; that Jerusalem and Zion are symbols of the church; and the resort of the Gentiles to that ancient place of worship, symbolic of their accession to the church; the personal and visible reign of Christ on earth, representative of his spiritual reign; and the resurrection and reign of the saints, of the renovation and obedience of men in the natural body: thus making the persons, places, acts, and events mentioned in those prophecies mere symbolic substitutes for others of a wholly different order. They profess, indeed, to treat those predictions as metaphorical, but by an entire mistake; as, in the first place, a large share of them involve no metaphor whatever, nor any other figure; and in the next place, were that which is predicted in them expressed by a metaphor, the persons and places of which the passages directly treat—the Israelites, Jerusalem, Christ, and the holy dead, would still be the subjects of the events which they foreshow; as it is an invariable law of that figure that the agent or object to which it is applied, is the agent or-object of that which the prediction it expresses foreshows. They thus give, in this inconsistency, the most convincing proofs that they are neither accurately acquainted with the laws of figurative language, aware of the import of the principles on which they found their constructions, nor conscious that many of the interpretations to which they are led by their theory, are as absurd and solecistical as the most preposterous put forth by the ancient allegorists.

Such is the system of hermeneutics which is represented by those who adopt it, as adequate to the just interpretation of the Scriptures, and an infallible remedy for the extravagances and follies of the rash expositors of former periods. Making

the most generous allowances for the superiority it possesses in the lower branches of the art, it is still, manifestly, in relation to figures and symbols, the just understanding of which is of the utmost importance, altogether defective, and the instrument of as general and gross a misconstruction of the prophetic word as any system that has preceded it.

It clearly should occasion no surprise, that those who are educated for the sacred office in seminaries in which this method of explication is taught, are either left without instruction, or misled in respect to the proper mode of interpreting the prophets. How can they be expected to acquire a knowledge of the principles of symbolization, when the fact that symbols are one of the great instruments God has employed in the revelation of the future, is wholly overlooked? How can they be expected to become familiar with the nature and offices of the figures of the Scriptures, when no just instruction is given in respect to them, but instead they are mystified and misrepresented in such a manner, as to be the means of a direct and gross violation of the Sacred Word? How can it be supposed that they will be withheld from the abuse of the Scriptures by the conversion of its predictions and narratives into allegories, and the interpolation of agents, acts, and events as the subjects of its affirmations, when they are systematically drilled into that method, and taught to regard those with distrust, who follow in their expositions the laws of language and symbols? They will naturally be misled, as long as this mistaken method continues to be pursued.

ART. III.—THE SECOND ADVENT, OR, What do the Scriptures teach respecting the Second Coming of Christ, the End of the World, the Resurrection of the Dead, and the General Judgment. By Alpheus Crosby. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co., 1850.

THE author's object in this volume is to show, that the Scriptures exhibit the great events which he enumerates in his title, as having long since taken place, and forbid the

expectation of them as still future ; first, on the ground that they were predicted as of the same period, and one of them, Christ's coming, as very near ; and next, on the assumption, that as they have not occurred literally, the language in which they are predicted must be figurative, and has had its verification in events of a wholly different species ; the overthrow, as he supposes, of Jerusalem by the Romans under Vespasian, destruction of the temple, termination of the ritual worship, and slaughter and dispersion of the Israelites. He relies for the establishment of his propositions almost altogether on a mere allegation of passages, without any proof that their meaning is that which he assigns to them, or attempt to reconcile his constructions with the representations of other parts of the Sacred Word. He states his several positions affirmatively, and quotes the Scriptures as indubitably having the meaning which his theory avers ; or contents himself with suggesting the difficulties of a different construction, and expects his readers, by assenting to his first propositions, to acquiesce in his conclusions as demonstrated, respecting the language which he quotes, although he alleges no direct evidences of it.

We notice his work, first, because he claims the sanction of philology for his treatment of the predictions of Christ's second coming, the end of the age, the resurrection of the dead, and the judgment of the race, as figurative. He was educated, he intimates, at Andover ; has cultivated the modern hermeneutics, and been professor of the Greek language and literature in Dartmouth College ; and implies that he has been led to the result in which his investigations have terminated, by interpreting the Bible "by the common principles of language," and the application of sound rules "to prophetic exegesis ;" and next, because the assumption on which the validity of his conclusions depends—that language is figurative although it involves no figure whatever—is common to him and all others, who assign to the predictions of Christ's coming, the resurrection and reign of the saints anterior to the millennium, and other associated events, a figurative meaning ; and that, therefore, if they can vindicate their theory of interpretation, it is impossible for them to show that Professor Crosby's conclusions are not its legitimate results. This, indeed, is not seen, or not acknowledged by many, who, while they discard

his theory, reject the doctrine of Christ's personal reign during the thousand years. We have seen a number of notices in which his views are treated as almost too obviously false to need a formal refutation, without a hint that the assumption on which he proceeds is identically the same as that on which the writers found their theory of a spiritual, instead of a personal reign of Christ, and a figurative instead of a literal resurrection of the saints and reign on earth during the millennium. They have, however, but candidly to look at the nature of their own system of interpretation, to see that its fundamental principle is the same as his. The inquiry, then, whether his pretensions are legitimate or not, is of high importance. The question whether the new exegesis is what it professes to be, almost absolutely perfect, and an infallible guide to the truth, or, in respect to figures and symbols at least, radically defective, and in truth, a system of quackery, not only depends on it, but the question, also, whether any of the great truths commonly supposed to be taught in the Scriptures are verifiable by the legitimate laws of language. If the assumptions on which these parties proceed are just, there is not a fact or doctrine, a prediction or promise of the Sacred Word, that may not as easily and effectually be swept away, as they set aside the great announcements respecting Christ's coming and reign which they assail.

We shall show that none of his premises justify the conclusions which he deduces from them; that his constructions of many of the passages which he quotes are wholly mistaken; and that his pretence that philology authorizes his treatment of the great predictions whose meaning he affects to determine by it as figurative, in place of being vindicable, indicates that he is unacquainted with the nature of figures, and is not, therefore, a master of his profession.

His first proposition, that "the Scriptures often speak of a second, but never of a third coming of Christ," does not require consideration.

His next, that "with the second coming of Christ the Scriptures associate the end of the world," or rather of the age, as he admits it should have been translated, "the resurrection of the dead, and the general judgment with its awards," instead of yielding support to his conclusion—that that which

they denote has already passed,—disprove it; unless, irrespective of the question whether they have been accomplished or not, he can demonstrate that the language in which they are announced is, by the established usages of speech, metaphorical, and therefore indicates a different class of events from those which it literally denotes. His argument is,—Christ's second advent, the end of the age, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgment, have not actually taken place; therefore they cannot be the events that are really predicted in the prophecies, that taken literally foreshow them; and consequently, the language of those prophecies cannot be literal, but must be figurative. But that argument is wholly false and absurd. It implies that no prediction can be literal unless it has already been fulfilled; and thence, that there cannot be a literal prediction of an event that is future; and sweeps away, therefore, all our certainty of the most important revelations that God has made to us, such as our immortal existence, and happiness or misery according to our life here. If the fact that Christ has not yet come in person in the clouds of heaven, raised the holy dead, and judged the living, proves that he is never to come in that manner and exert those great acts; why does not the fact that we have not already entered on a life after death, and been adjudged to eternal happiness or misery, prove equally that we are never to be the subjects of those great events? It implies, also, that the question, whether a prediction is literal or metaphorical, does not depend on its structure, and is not determinable from the mode in which its terms are applied, but on its having been literally accomplished or not. On his theory, the question whether a bank or promissory note is literal or metaphorical, an engagement to pay the sum which it specifies, or only to exert some wholly different act, turns, not on its language, or the mode in which its terms are used, but on the acts the drawer has exerted towards it; or on its having or not having been paid. If it has been literally paid, that proves that it is literal; if it has not been literally paid, that demonstrates that it is metaphorical, and denotes something wholly different from a promise to pay the sum which it specifies. What admirable logic! What a brilliant result of the new exegesis!

But if Professor Crosby cannot prove that the language in

which the affirmations of these predictions are expressed, is metaphorical from the mode in which it is used, by showing that it is transferred from objects to which it is properly applicable, to others of which it is not literally true, he cannot demonstrate from any other consideration that it is figurative. He might as well attempt to change the nature of mathematical figures, or the ratios of numbers to each other. He might as well undertake, by mere syllogism, to reduce men from intelligences to brutes, or raise brutes to intelligences. Language that is metaphorical is such, because of the mode in which it is used ; and being metaphorical, cannot be made literal by logic, any more than anything else can be by such a process invested with a new nature.

His third proposition, that "our Saviour both variously intimated, and even expressly declared, that his second coming, with its associate events, would take place before the death of some who were then living," is not only wholly unproved by him and mistaken ; but, on his theory of figurative language, cannot by any possibility be shown to be true ; nor could it had the intimations and declarations to which he refers been expressed in any other language. For he assumes in his argument that the word "death" in Christ's expression, is used literally to denote a corporeal decease, or the separation of the soul from the body. But, on his view of the nature of the metaphor, he cannot have any evidence that it is employed in that manner ; as, according to him, the fact that a term is not transferred from a subject to which it is properly applicable, to one of which that which it literally denotes, is not really true nor possible, is no proof that it is not used metaphorically. *It may, he assumes, be metaphorical, though there is no metaphor in the mode in which it is used !* He builds his argument thus on an assumption that contradicts the position on which the system he endeavors to maintain by it rests ! How is it that this fact escaped his perspicacity ? On his principles then, Christ's declaration that there were some standing in his presence who should not taste of death till they saw the Son of Man coming in his kingdom, no more proves that his second advent has already taken place, than it proves the occurrence of any other event ; inasmuch as there is no evidence that any of those who were then standing

in his presence have undergone a metaphorical death. Mr. Crosby must show what a metaphorical death is, and demonstrate that some one who was then standing in the Saviour's presence has suffered that death, before he can verify his argument. He, however, will not find that an easy task, we apprehend. Can he designate any one of the persons who then stood before Christ, and prove that he has been the subject of a metaphorical death? Who is the individual? What is the nature of that death? What are the proofs that that individual has undergone it? How is it that Professor C. has omitted to explore this field of inquiry so suited to gratify his love of novelty; and unfolding so fine a theatre for the display of his genius and learning? Is he apprehensive that something more than the grammar and dictionary, those grand instruments of the fashionable philology, are requisite to its successful investigation?

But apart from this consideration, which demolishes his whole system, his representation that Christ expressly declared that his second coming, with its associate events, would take place before the death of some who were then living, is wholly mistaken. He has fallen into that error by confounding Christ's presence on earth, and institution of his kingdom in its first form, soon after his resurrection, with his second coming, and institution of it in its second form, at the commencement of his millennial reign. There are two institutions and two forms of his kingdom. It received its first institution at the commission probably of the disciples before his ascension, and during his presence, therefore, at his first coming. Thus it was proclaimed, as at hand, by his forerunner, and during his ministry by himself also and his apostles. John came preaching and saying, "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Matt. iii. 4. Jesus came preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God, saying, "the time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand," Mark i. 14, 15; and he commanded his disciples to preach, "The kingdom of heaven is at hand," Matt. x. 7. It is the prediction of *the coming of THIS KINGDOM*, accordingly, and Christ's presence at its institution, that Professor C. has mistaken for a prediction of his second coming, before the death of some who then stood before him should take place. This is manifest from

the language of Mark. "And he said unto them, verily, I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here which shall not taste of death, till they have seen *the kingdom of God come with power*," ix. 1. The parallel passage in Luke relates also exclusively to the kingdom. "But I tell you of a truth, there be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see *the kingdom of God*," ix. 27. In Matthew the Saviour is exhibited as present at the institution of his kingdom. "Verily I say unto you, there be some standing here which shall not taste of death till they see *the Son of Man*, ἐρχομενον, *come in his kingdom*," xvi. 28. The event foreshown in these passages is undoubtedly the same, and is the institution of the kingdom of heaven, which was proclaimed by him and the apostles during his ministry as at hand. In other passages he represents his casting out demons by the Spirit of Jehovah, as a signal to them, before its visible institution, that it had already come. "If, by the Spirit of God, I expel demons, certainly the kingdom of God has come to you." That miracle indicates that he who is to institute that kingdom is already in your presence, and exerting his almighty power, Matt. xii. 28; Luke xi. 20.

It is of the kingdom in this first form, that he taught the Pharisees and his disciples that it was not to come with observation. Luke xvii. 20-32. "And being questioned by the Pharisees, *when cometh the kingdom of God?* he answered them and said, The kingdom of God cometh not with observation;" is not to commence in a form that is obvious to the senses, by the personal presence and manifestation of the Messiah in his glory. "They shall not say, look here, or look there," as though Christ had revealed himself at the temple, in some city, or in the desert; "For, behold the kingdom of God is within you." In its first dispensation, it is a kingdom over individuals only who profess to believe in the Messiah; not over the nations and world universally. That this is his meaning is shown by his pointing out to his disciples the false expectations they entertained that he was publicly to manifest himself at the establishment of his kingdom; and forewarning them that the revelation of himself, when it took place, instead of being confined to some narrow scene, would be visible in all places, and conspicuous to all eyes. "And he said unto

the disciples, days will come when ye will desire to see one of the days of the Son of Man, and will not see it." He then indicates that there would be a general expectation that he would visibly reveal himself. "And they will say to you, See here, or see there," as though he had appeared in some local scene. But he commands them not to be misled by such representations. "Go not forth, nor follow." He then shows, first, that when he comes visibly it will be in a wholly different form; and next, that at the time of his advent, instead of a general expectation of his coming, the world will be taken by surprise, as it was at the flood, and as the inhabitants of Sodom were at its overthrow. "For as the lightning that lighteneth out of the one part under heaven, shineth unto the other part under heaven, so shall also the Son of Man be in his day. . . And as it was in the days of Noah, so shall it be also in the days of the Son of Man. They did eat, they drank, they married wives, they were given in marriage, until the day that Noah entered into the ark, and the flood came and destroyed them all. Likewise as it was in the days of Lot; they did eat, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded; but the same day that Lot went out of Sodom, it rained fire and brimstone from heaven and destroyed them all. Even thus shall it be in the day when the Son of Man is revealed," v. 24-30. While he thus apprises them that the expectation of his visible presence in his kingdom, in its first form, was to be disappointed, he shows that a time was at length to come when he would reveal himself in his glory to all eyes, and gather to himself all his true disciples, v. 31-37.

His disciples, during this form of his kingdom, were not to be freed from all evil, as they seemed to expect, and raised to a complete redemption, but were to be subjected to severe trials. Instead of princes triumphing over their enemies, they were to be as lambs among wolves. Instead of a scene of peace and bliss, the world was to be a vale to them of sorrow and tears. "They shall lay their hands on you and persecute you, delivering you up to the synagogues, and into prisons, being brought before kings and rulers for my name's sake. And ye shall be betrayed both by parents, and brethren, and kinsfolks, and friends, and some of you shall they cause to be

put to death. And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake," Matt. xxiv. 12-17. Sorrow, calamities, and sufferings, were to be the characteristics of their life, and were to be expected and welcomed. "In the world ye shall have tribulation." "The servant is not greater than his Lord. If they have persecuted me, they will also persecute you." "Count it all joy, when ye fall into diverse trials; knowing that the trying of your faith worketh patience." "We glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope."

Into the kingdom, in this form, the devil introduces his own children, and intermixes them with the children of the kingdom, like tares with wheat, and they are to continue together till Christ's second coming, at the end of the age, when his angels are to gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them that do iniquity, and cast them into a furnace of fire. Then the righteous are to shine forth like the Son in the kingdom of their Father. The kingdom in which they are to shine is the same as that out of which they who do iniquity are to be gathered; it is only then to receive a new form, and be placed under a different dispensation, Matt. xiii. 24-43. During this dispensation some of the evil who enter the kingdom, and are spared by God's forbearance, are to show that they are wholly thankless and malignant, by tyrannizing over their fellow servants, Matt. xviii. 23-35. Multitudes of those who are invited to partake of the blessings of salvation, from worldly occupations, and a love of pleasure and wealth, reject them, Matt. xxii. 1-10. While Christ is absent preparing for the introduction of a new dispensation, some of his subjects revolt and refuse submission to him, and are to be judged and punished at his return, and institution of his kingdom in its second form, Luke xix. 12-27.

And the period during which the kingdom was thus to subsist without Christ's visible presence, did not terminate at the overthrow of Jerusalem, and dissolution of the Jewish polity. It is expressly foreshown that Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles shall be fulfilled; and that it is not till after that long tribulation that the Son of Man is to come in the clouds, with power and glory, and give his people redemption, Luke xxi. 24, Matt. xxiv. 29-31.

What then is the period denoted by the times of the Gentiles? The meaning of the prediction is not that Jerusalem should be trodden by the Gentiles till the Romans, having completed its desolation, withdrew their armies. That would be a mere prediction that it should be trodden by them as long as they occupied it, which would give no information of the length of the time during which it was to continue in desolation. Instead of such an indeterminate prediction, the times of the Gentiles are a definite period that was understood, undoubtedly, by the disciples, and are the times during which it was foreshown to Daniel the daily sacrifice was to be taken away and the place of the sanctuary cast down by the Romans, represented by the fourth wild beast. This is manifest from Christ's express representation that the destruction of Jerusalem, and slaughter and dispersion of the nation he was predicting, was that which was foretold by Daniel, Matt. xxiv. 15. The whole length of the period embraced in that vision, was twenty-three hundred evenings—mornings, a symbol of twenty-three hundred years; at the end of which the sanctuary is to be cleansed, Danl. viii. 9–14. That period has not yet terminated; and as Christ is not to come, we are explicitly shown, till after the tribulation of that long season has passed, his second advent has not yet taken place. This prophecy thus, instead of yielding any countenance to Professor Crosby's construction, presents the most resistless demonstration of its total error. What admirable indications of critical research and philological skill he and the writers whom he quotes and follows, present, in overlooking these proofs, stamped in the plainest characters on the face of the prediction, that the coming of Christ, foreshown in it, cannot have taken place at the destruction of Jerusalem?

The reference of the prediction of Christ's coming to the subversion of the Jewish polity is refuted also by every other consideration that affects the question. That catastrophe was not attended by any of the extraordinary events that are to distinguish Christ's advent. There were no portents in the sun, moon, and stars, or the seas; his sign was not seen in heaven. There was no mourning because of it of all the tribes of the earth. Most of the nations had no knowledge of the capture, or even existence of the city; and to the popula-

tion of the Roman empire generally, its fall was undoubtedly a source of exultation, instead of alarm. The Son of Man was not seen coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. His angels were not sent with the sound of a great trumpet to gather together his elect from the four winds from one end of heaven to the other. There is no more ground for the reference of any of these events to that epoch, than to any other in the history of the world at which there is the most absolute evidence that they did not occur. Prof. Crosby might with as much propriety assume that they took place at the fall of Rome or Constantinople. Mr. Miller might, with as much reason, have claimed that they occurred at the period which he assigned for Christ's advent. The pretence that these predictions are figurative does not, even if admitted, furnish any ground for the assumption that they had their accomplishment at the overthrow of Jerusalem; for, on Prof. C.'s theory of figures, he has no more evidence that the prediction of the overthrow of Jerusalem is not also altogether metaphorical and significant of some wholly different event. Any argument by which it can be proved that that part of the prophecy is literal, will prove with equal certainty that this is also. How happened it that this consideration escaped his notice?

Prof. Crosby regards the declaration, v. 32, this generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled, as decisive that they must have been verified at the fall of Jerusalem. The passage, however, in which it occurs, refutes instead of supporting his construction. After foreshowing that there should be signs in heaven, and upon the earth, distress of nations with perplexity, men's hearts failing them for fear, Christ adds, "And then shall they see the Son of Man coming in a cloud with power and great glory; and when *these things begin to come to pass*, look up and lift up your heads, *for your redemption draweth nigh*; and he spake to them a parable. Behold the fig tree, and all the trees; when they now shoot forth, ye see and know of your own selves that summer is now nigh at hand. So likewise ye, when ye see *ταυτα γινόμενα*,—*these occurrences*, know ye that *the kingdom of God is nigh at hand*. Verily, I say unto you, this generation shall not pass, till *ταυτα*—all this—that is, the train of events announced

in the prophecy—"begins" or appears. Here that to which the signs in the sun, moon, and stars, and the distress of nations, bear the same relation as the spring bears to summer, is the coming of the Son of Man in the clouds, the redemption of his people, and the establishment of his kingdom. But there were neither any such signs in those heavenly bodies, nor any such distress and terror of the nations at the fall of Jerusalem; nor was there any visible advent of Christ at that epoch, redemption of his disciples, or new institution of his kingdom. It had been instituted in its first form nearly forty years before, and has not received any other institution since. The occurrences, *the commencement of which* is to be a sign of *their redemption*, are to follow the long tribulation during the times of the Gentiles, not to precede it. But on the other hand, the *αἰα* of Luke, and *αἰα αἰα* of Matthew and Mark, which were to commence before that generation passed, were the train of events foreshown in the prophecy, the signs of which had just been mentioned; viz. the persecution of the disciples, the slaughter and capture of the Jews, and the treading of Jerusalem,—that were to extend down to the time of the signs of Christ's coming. The verb *γινῆται*, improperly rendered in the common version fulfilled, often has the sense here ascribed to it—of commencing, appearing, or being present. In this prediction he indicates the period when the tribulation, that is to last through the times of the Gentiles, was to begin; in the other, he gives the signs of his coming that are to follow the close of those times. The whole of the grounds on which Prof. C. places his construction of the passage, is thus mistaken.

Christ's kingdom is to continue in its first form till his second coming. It is then to be instituted anew and placed under a different dispensation. That he is then to receive the dominion of the earth and reign over it, as its king, in a new manner, is abundantly taught in the sacred oracles. Thus, in Daniel's vision, it was after the destruction of the fourth wild beast that the Son of Man came in the clouds of heaven to the Ancient of Days, and there was given him dominion and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him,—a dominion that shall not pass away, and a kingdom that shall not be destroyed: and it is at that epoch

that the kingdom and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, are to be given to the people of the saints of the Most High, who are at his coming to be raised from the grave and reign with him, Dan. vii. 13-28. In like manner, at the sound of the seventh trumpet, it is announced that the sovereignty of the world has become our Lord's, and he shall reign for ever, Rev. xi. 15. The peculiarity that is then to distinguish his dominion of the world is, that he is to reign in it; that all people, nations, and languages are to serve him; and that his risen saints are to reign with him. It is indicated also in Christ's prediction of the signs of his coming;—When ye see these things that are to precede his advent in a cloud, as spring precedes summer, know ye that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand, Luke xxi. 31, which implies that it is then to receive a new institution. Christ teaches, also, that it is then to assume a new form in the prediction in the parable of the wheat and tares; that after the removal from it, at his coming, of all that do iniquity, the righteous are to shine in it as the sun. It is implied, likewise, by Paul, that his kingdom is to be established at his coming. "I charge thee before the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at *his appearing and kingdom*," 2 Tim. iv. 1. The great changes that are then to take place in its administration will constitute it in an emphatic sense a new kingdom; and the events that are to signalize its introduction will distinguish it in the utmost degree from that which precedes it. 1. He is to come in the clouds of heaven, and be visible to every eye at its institution. 2. He is to reign in it as its king. 3. His saints are to be raised from the dead and reign with him. 4. Satan is then to be banished from it, and imprisoned in the abyss. 5. The wild beast and false prophet who now usurp his throne and persecute his witnesses, will then be destroyed. 6. All the wicked will then be gathered out of his kingdom. 7. His dominion will extend over the nations universally, not over individuals merely. 8. The curse is then to be repealed, and instead of sorrow, the world be made a scene of bliss. 9. Christ is then to manifest himself to men visibly. 10. That kingdom is to endure for ever. It is thus, at that epoch, to present a total contrast to its present form.

This twofold institution and form of the kingdom, reconciles all the passages respecting it which Professor C. perplexes and confounds, by referring to the subversion of the Jewish capital and polity. It explains, and is corroborated by the parable of the nobleman who went into a distant country to receive a kingdom and return; some of whose subjects revolted during his absence, and were, on his receiving the kingdom and returning, judged and punished by him, Luke xix. 12-27. But that is wholly inexplicable, if Christ is not to receive the dominion of the earth in a new form during his absence, and exert his kingly power in a wholly different manner on his return. It shows how, though the kingdom of God was at hand at the commencement of Christ's ministry, it is also to be at hand when the signs appear of his second coming. It explains the consistency of his representation, that some who stood in his presence should not taste of death till they saw his kingdom come with power; with the revelation to Daniel and John, that he should not receive the dominion of the earth, to exercise a personal reign in it, and bring all nations to obedience, till his second coming.

Professor C.'s fourth proposition that "the apostles evidently expected that the second coming of Christ, with its associate events, would take place before the death of some who were then living," is equally unauthorized. Their teachings on the subject are in entire harmony with Christ's. As he showed in the prophecy we have been considering, that the space that then remained of the times of the Gentiles was to intervene between the dissolution of the Jewish capital and sanctuary, and his second coming; so they taught that a long period of trials, apostasies, and judgments, was to pass before his advent was to take place. John expressly represents that the epoch of his coming was to be after the period of the wild beast had closed, and the time of its judgment had arrived. Paul explicitly taught the Thessalonians that the day of his coming was not then immediately at hand, but that a train of apostates was first to arise in the church and make themselves objects of worship in the place of God, and reminded them that he had apprised them of it before, 2 Thess. ii. Peter also foretold that in the last days scoffers would arise who would deride the promise of his coming, because of the long

space that had passed since it was predicted; and reminded those whom he addressed, that as one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day, the delay of his advent is no proof that it is not to take place. While Christ and the apostles thus foretold that a vast series of events, that must necessarily occupy a considerable period, was to precede his advent, they also taught that the exact time of his coming was unrevealed, and that its arrival would take the world by surprise. "But of that day and hour knoweth no one; no, not the angels of heaven; but the Father only." And that uncertainty was the ground of a command to watch and be ready for its approach. "Watch, therefore, for ye know not what hour your lord doth come." "Of the times and the seasons"—that are to precede Christ's coming—"brethren, ye have no need that I write unto you. For you yourselves know perfectly, that the day of the Lord cometh as a thief in the night. For when they shall say, peace and safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them, and they shall not escape. But ye brethren are not in darkness, that that day should overtake you as a thief," 1 Thess. v. 1-4.

These commands and exhortations, however, and the fact that believers were led by the teaching of the apostles to look with earnest expectation and desire to Christ's coming, as the great crisis of their being, Prof. Crosby regards as evidence that his advent was contemplated by them as almost immediately at hand, and must, therefore, long since have taken place. But that inference is wholly unauthorized. In the first place, it is confuted by the fact that Christ and his apostles, on the one hand, taught that it was not *subsecus*, immediately to take place; and on the other, predicted a great succession of events that was to precede it, that must naturally occupy a long period. In the next place, it proceeds on the mistaken assumption, that those commands and exhortations were designed only for the generation to which they were originally addressed. But that can no more be presumed in respect to them, than any other commands that are appropriate to the generations of subsequent periods, and are enforced by a reference to Christ's coming and the judgment that is to follow, as that of 1 Thess. iv. 3-6. "For

this is the will of God. . . . that no one go beyond and circumvent his brother in the matter; because the Lord is the avenger of all such, as we have forewarned you and testified." Watchfulness and a readiness for the event were rendered appropriate and obligatory, by the fact of the uncertainty of the time of its occurrence; and the command to live in preparation for it was proper—not only as an expression of duty which was incumbent on those to whom it was originally addressed; but also because, like the other directions and exhortations of the New Testament, it was designed for all others who were to precede Christ's coming; and, especially, because an actual expectation of his advent, and readiness for it, are to be the characteristic of his true people, and witnesses at the time of his arrival. To have omitted those directions, would have been to omit to command a most palpable and important duty; and to leave his most faithful disciples without the aids that are requisite to a preparation for his coming, and the discharge of the peculiar duties to which they are to be called in reference to it. And, in the third place, it overlooks the fact that Christ's advent is to be a great epoch to the saints, when the event that is for ever to distinguish them from the lost, and render their redemption and blessedness complete, is to take place; and an epoch, therefore, to which, if they understand it, they naturally—whatever space may intervene before its arrival,—look forward with the utmost fervor of desire. The great gift that is for ever to mark them as God's children, and separate them from the unrighteous, is then to be conferred on them, viz. their resurrection from the dead in glory and immortality, and elevation to the offices of kings and priests in Christ's kingdom. It is that that is to contradistinguish their destiny from that of the unsanctified, and consummate their redemption. It is in that form that they were taught by the apostles to contemplate their salvation. Though they were distinguished in this life from the unholy by a partial sanctification; and are in the intermediate state, by a perfect freedom from sin, and a lofty blessedness; yet the lot of each is in both, in important respects, essentially the same. In this life they are alike subjected to trials, sorrows, and a sentence to death; and in the intermediate state, to death's actual dominion.

But at Christ's coming, this last, which is the great public penalty of sin, will also be withdrawn from the holy, and they will be discriminated in every respect from the lost, by a perfect exemption from the penalty, as well as the dominion of sin. With this view of the high place which their resurrection or change to immortality at Christ's coming holds in their redemption, it was perfectly rational that the believers even of the apostolic age looked forward to it with earnest desire, and fixed their thoughts and hopes on it, rather than on any intermediate event; and the fact, accordingly, that that great epoch, which held such a place in the thoughts and expectations of the primitive disciples, is no longer the object of special desire or consideration to believers, is a portentous proof that their notions of redemption have greatly changed from those of the first age, and become deeply mixed with error.

These views which were entertained by the apostles and their disciples of the place which their resurrection holds in their salvation, thus furnish an explanation of their waiting and looking for the coming of Christ, as the great epoch of their hopes and expectations; while, on the other hand, on Professor Crosby's theory, it is wholly inexplicable. There was nothing in the fall of Jerusalem, and slaughter, dispersion, and captivity of the Jews, to excite so profound an interest in the believers of Thessalonica, Galatia, or the seven churches of Asia, and prompt them to watchfulness and desire. The supposition of their watching for it is indeed preposterous, as it was an event that did not in any respect affect their personal safety and well-being. Men watch for events that directly concern them, not that simply respect others who reside in remote countries, and whose misfortunes are confined to themselves. It would be absurd to exhort the people of the United States to watch and be ready for an earthquake in Chili, or the eruption of a volcano in Italy. The passages which Prof. C. alleges on this subject, thus confute his theory instead of supporting it.

To this series of propositions which form the basis of Prof. C.'s system, he adds two others, which embody the conclusions which he regards as their necessary result.

PROPOSITION V.

"The second coming of Christ, with its associate events, the end of the world, the resurrection of the dead, and the general judgment, must have already taken place, and all expectation of these events as still future is forbidden by the Scriptures.

"The question of *time* determined, that of *mode* succeeds. *How* have these events taken place? In what consisted the fulfilment of the predictions relating to them? These are questions alike interesting and important; *but they open a new and broad field of inquiry, into which we cannot now enter.* Let it here suffice to ascertain *in what direction this field lies.* It is needless to say, we shall search in vain all the volumes of history, to find anything like a literal and outward fulfilment of these predictions. Even the predictions of *the end of the world, or age, which, in its proper sense, has literally come to pass, are too much involved in imagery* to be made an exception. *It requires no argument, therefore, to establish the following proposition as an UNAVOIDABLE CONCLUSION FROM THOSE WHICH HAVE PRECEDED:—*

PROPOSITION VI.

"The predictions in the Scriptures of the second coming of Christ, the end of the age, the resurrection of the dead, and the general judgment with its awards, **MUST BE EXPLAINED IN A FIGURATIVE OR SPIRITUAL RATHER THAN A LITERAL SENSE, and in such a sense as admits an application to what has already taken place.**

"Any attempt to determine the precise nature and character of this sense, which I should myself term a *spiritual* rather than a merely *figurative* sense, must involve a careful study of the teaching of the Scriptures, in respect to the nature and characteristics of the Messianic dispensation—that new and glorious kingdom, which forms the great subject of the New Testament, and to which the events above named were to constitute an introduction. Let me commend this investigation to the studious, the thinking, and the devout, as presenting most distinctly the great peculiar problems of Christianity, those which are alike grandest in theory, and most practical in application. *Among the most important subsidiary inquiries are such as relate to the nature and significance of oriental, and especially of Hebrew and prophetic IMAGERY; to the design and character of our Saviour's teaching; to the nature and objects of the apostolic office, and of apostolic Christianity; and to the distinctive characteristics of the several great dispensations or economies under which the world has been placed.*

"I conclude by expressing my fullest conviction, my most assured

belief, that the predictions of our Saviour respecting the great events which we have now considered, have been all fulfilled in *the precise sense* which he himself contemplated, when he uttered the sublime attestation, 'heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away;' and that this is no *lower* or *more earthly* sense, but the very *highest, noblest, heavenliest*, of which the words are susceptible."—Pp. 98–100.

That is, he expresses "the most assured belief," that those predictions have no literal meaning whatever, but only a "*figurative*" one, "the precise nature and character" of which he does not pretend to determine, but holds that it is to be deduced chiefly from the nature of oriental and Hebrew *prophetic imagery*, and partly from what is taught respecting the divine government in other parts of the Sacred Volume.

He thus founds and attempts to justify his exhibition of the second coming of Christ, the end of the age, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgment, as having already taken place, on the assumption that the passages in which they are predicted are altogether figurative; asserts that that conclusion is unavoidable; and represents that it is the result of the laws of philology. But if such be the fact, why did he not demonstrate it? If he is sure that that conclusion is unavoidable, he must be aware of the media by which it is connected with its premise. If he is really certain that these predictions are figurative, he must be, in an equal degree, aware of the nature of the figures which they involve, and the process by which they obtain the sense which he ascribes to them. Why, then, did he not point them out? It was precisely the work which he professedly undertook, the very task that was requisite to the attainment of his object, and to which all his other labor should have been merely introductory and subsidiary. He could no more neglect it with credit to himself, than a mathematician could neglect to define and verify a principle by which he attempted to explain the phenomena of the universe. If his assumption respecting figures is just, and his declining to explain and establish it arises from a consciousness that it is not in his power, it demonstrates that he is not a master of the question he has undertaken to debate, and not competent, therefore, to assert, that by the laws of philology those predictions are metaphorical. If that assump-

tion is not just, but mistaken, then that demonstrates also, that he is no master of the subject, and has no qualification for the office he has assumed. What can be more unprofessional and unscholarly than thus to found the interpretation of a large part of the sacred volume on a principle or law, of which he can neither demonstrate the reality nor explain the nature? Is it any better than the sheerest quackery? an attempt to disguise ignorance under the pretence of accurate knowledge? The term figurative manifestly stands in his vocabulary, for something that is altogether unknown both in kind and quantity; and his protestation of his assured belief in the result in which his speculations have terminated, is, accordingly, nothing else than an acknowledgment that he is incapable of stating a principle by which his conclusion can be substantiated; and a confession that his belief is without any intelligible reason! The import of his sixth proposition, therefore, expressed without disguise, is, that "the predictions in the Scriptures of the second coming of Christ, the end of the age, the resurrection of the dead, and the general judgment with its awards, must be explained on some principle, the nature of which is wholly unknown, in order to assign to them a sense that admits of the supposition that they have already been accomplished!" And this acknowledgment and profession that ignorance is the medium of his construction of these predictions, is undoubtedly in accordance with truth. It is indicated by his whole method of procedure. It is because of a total inacquaintance with the peculiarity of figures, that he supposes language may be proved to be metaphorical by the fact, that that which it expresses has not been literally accomplished, or other considerations that are independent of its nature. It implies that there is nothing peculiar in the metaphorical use of terms that distinguishes it absolutely from their literal use, which is as mistaken and absurd as it were to suppose that there is nothing in the mode in which verbs are used that distinguishes them from nouns and adjectives, but that their office depends on grounds that lie wholly out of the relations in which they are employed. It is because of an inacquaintance with the nature of figures, that he assumes that language may be figurative, although it involves no figure whatever; for it is on that supposition that he founds his attempt

to prove, that the predictions he undertakes to explain are figurative. But that is as false and absurd as it were to assume, that vocal sounds have a certain specified sense without having any sense whatever, or mathematical figures certain qualities without having any qualities whatever. A passage is metaphorical because of the mode in which the term or phrase expressing the affirmation which it embodies is used; and passages in which terms are used in that mode, are, in virtue of that fact, metaphorical, and cannot be made literal by any process of logic. Their literal meaning must be changed and become identical with what was at first a metaphorical meaning, in order that they may become literal. Thus, the expressions the sky frowns, the thunder growls, the rain-drops dance, are metaphorical, because they ascribe acts to those several objects that are not proper to them, nor compatible with their nature, but are transferred to them from other agents to which they are appropriate, in order to indicate that there is a strong resemblance of the one to the other; and being metaphorical they cannot by any possibility be literal. The qualities of the two are as incompatible and as unpredicable of the same expression, as the properties of the circle and the square are of the same figure. And finally, it is because of his want of acquaintance with his own principles, as well as with the nature of the metaphor, that after assuming that the passages which he treats as figurative are such, notwithstanding there is no figure in them, he yet supposes, that those which he treats as without a figure, such as the prediction of the overthrow of Jerusalem, and the fulfilment of the prophecy before the death of some of those who were present when it was uttered, must of necessity be regarded as literal. If the prediction of Christ's coming in the clouds with power and glory may be metaphorical, notwithstanding the terms in which the affirmation is expressed are not used by a metaphor, then clearly, for aught Prof. C. can prove or render probable, the prediction that the temple should be demolished, the Jews carried into captivity, and Jerusalem trodden of the Gentiles, may be metaphorical also, and denote wholly different events, although there is no metaphor in them. His assumption thus confutes his own construction of the prophecy as completely as, were his premise and conclusion admitted, it would those whom he

assails. Is it credible that he would have written a volume that thus carries with it its own refutation, had he understood the import of the principle on which he proceeds? The whole process, indeed, by which he attempts to reach his result is as ill-reasoned as it is unphilological. If, as he avers, the considerations which he adduces demonstrate, that the predictions of Christ's second coming, the end of the age, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgment with its awards, cannot hereafter take place, and are forbidden by the Scriptures to be regarded as future ; then they demonstrate that those predictions are *false* ; not, what is wholly irrelevant, that they are *figurative*. That conclusion against their *truth*, is the conclusion that results logically from his premise. It is no more demonstrated by it that they are figurative, than it is that they are written in Chinese, the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians, or Sanscrit.

The false assumption on which Professor Crosby thus proceeds, that language may be figurative without a figure, and consequently that the principle by which it is figurative is wholly unknown, is unhappily not peculiar to him, but common to the whole body of interpreters, whether orthodox in other respects or not, who reject Christ's premillennial advent, the resurrection of the holy dead anterior to the thousand years, the restoration of the Israelites, and other teachings of the prophetic Scriptures ; and is especially characteristic of the philologists who profess to be the disciples of the new German exegesis, and are tinctured with neology ; and it is the instrument by which they attempt to set aside the great doctrines of redemption, and both they and the orthodox endeavor to erase from the sacred page, the revelations God has made of the future. The writers and teachers particularly, who have acquired a degree of reputation as biblical scholars, and profess to adhere rigidly in their interpretations to the laws of philology, adopt that preposterous notion of figures. Any one may see from their treatises or expositions, that however carefully they follow the laws of philology in the treatment of simple historical and didactic passages, the moment they attempt to interpret a prophecy, they discard their established laws and usages of speech, and proceed on a theory which they can neither verify nor explain. Their knowledge is

almost literally confined to the mere grammar of the sacred languages. With its higher elements, the nature and laws of figures and the principles of symbolization, they are not only unacquainted, but they proceed on assumptions so erroneous, as necessarily to misrepresent every passage to which they are applied, and to overturn, if carried to their legitimate results, every truth that is taught in the Scriptures. If this is not the fact, let it be proved. If it can be shown that their rejection of Christ's personal advent, the resurrection of the holy dead anterior to the thousand years, and his reign with the glorified saints on earth during that period, are not founded on an assumption that language is figurative without a figure, let it be demonstrated. When that experiment is made, let it be shown by what process, on the theory that language may be figurative without a figure, it can be proved that any of the passages are literal that teach Christ's deity, expiation, and resurrection; the renovation of the mind by the Spirit; justification by faith; the existence of the soul after death; the resurrection of the dead; the immortality and blessedness of the redeemed; the punishment of the lost; or any other fact or doctrine that is taught in the Inspired Volume. Nothing, we apprehend, but the grossest delusion can prevent its being seen to be wholly impracticable.

The false principles on which they thus proceed, prove that the science of interpretation, in place of having reached the high perfection which is ostentatiously assigned to it by some of its professors, is extremely defective, and the instrument of misrepresenting the Scriptures on a far greater scale, than of unfolding and vindicating their true teachings. We do not state this for the purpose of detracting from the just merits of those who are engaged in the exposition of the sacred languages, but to show the necessity, in order to their credit as scholars, as well as to the discharge of their official duty, that they should relinquish their unscientific and absurd hypotheses, and investigate this subject with the care which they bestow on others, and adjust their interpretations throughout to the indisputable laws of philology. There was never a more urgent necessity, either to the reputation of the profession or the maintenance of the truth; and such, with whatever dislike it may be received by the narrow-minded and

prejudiced, will be the judgment of all who are animated by the genuine spirit of learning. Who that is candid and liberal will hesitate to admit, that it is unworthy of scholars to construe a large portion of the Scriptures on an assumption which they can neither verify nor explain? Yet such is the theory, that language may be figurative without a figure, on which expositors proceed in a large proportion of their interpretations, and by which they set aside, without hesitation, what they are aware is indisputably the true meaning, if the passages are interpreted by the usual laws of language; and they employ their theory for the very purpose of escaping that meaning, and substituting constructions that harmonize with the views they have formed on other grounds, of the aims of the divine administration, or the nature of the salvation that is bestowed on the redeemed. Was the word of God ever subjected to a violation more gross, and unworthy of those who profess to be masters of language, and governed in its explication by its ascertained and indisputable laws? Was there ever a more open admission than their theory involves, that the principle on which they profess to found their constructions is wholly unknown and inexplicable? As there is nothing which distinguishes figurative language from that which is literal, except that it involves a figure, the assumption that language may be figurative without a figure, is an assumption that that which is figurative has no peculiarity by which it can be distinguished from that which is not; and, therefore, that that which constitutes it figurative is wholly undefinable and unknown. Is it the part of learning, of fidelity to God, of integrity to the church, to build vast systems of explication on a theory which thus bears on its face a confession, that its results are but the offspring of ignorance and presumption!

It is equally unscholarly also, it will be admitted, to found their interpretations of one part of the Scriptures on assumptions that are the converse of those on which they proceed in the construction of others of the same nature;—yet this is characteristic of the interpreters generally now most in repute. While they treat a large part of the historical and a portion of the didactic Scriptures as literal, because they involve no figures, they construe other portions as figu-

rative, though without a figure, simply *because of the topics of which they treat, or the truths which they reveal*. But that is obviously as just a reason for treating all the other passages as figurative. What can be more unbecoming a scholar than thus to build his interpretations on arbitrary theories, and make the import of the sacred oracles depend on his whim and caprice?

It is unprofessional also, and unscholarly, it will be acknowledged, to interpret the prophetic Scriptures on principles, that if applied to the other parts of the sacred volume, subvert the facts and doctrines which they teach. Yet such is their method. If the ground on which they treat the great predictions of the future as figurative be legitimate, there is not a proposition in the whole compass of revelation that can be proved to be literal, and express the meaning that is assigned to it by the usual laws of language. It can no more be shown on the ground of that theory, that the narrative of Christ's crucifixion is not metaphorical, than it can that the prediction, Matt. xxiv. 30, of his coming in the clouds of heaven is not. It can no more be demonstrated that he rose from the grave, than it can that the saints are to be literally raised anterior to the thousand years.

It is inconsistent with a thorough knowledge of the art of interpretation—it will likewise be conceded—to proceed in the exposition of the Scriptures on principles that are inadmissible in the construction of other writings. Yet, such is the theory by which they construe the prophecies. A lawyer or judge who should attempt to exculpate a criminal arraigned for a misdemeanor, on the pretence that the language of the indictment was metaphorical, although there was no metaphor in it, would be universally regarded as having lost his senses, or become regardless of truth. Yet, that is the pretence on which the genuine meaning of a large part of the prophetic word is set aside, and a false import thrust in its place. If it were applied to the affairs of common life, there is not a commercial obligation, there is not a title to property, there is not a legal instrument of any description, that would not be emptied by it of its legitimate meaning, and become charged with a sense altogether unnatural and false. Can the friends of truth and learning need any more effective

consideration to induce them to discontinue such a method of interpretation? Can the keen sighted, who observe the spirit of improvement which animates every department of society, avoid the conviction, that, however the sluggish, the prejudiced, or the reckless may desire to perpetuate the reign of ignorance, there are crowds who will discern and prefer the truth, and devote themselves to its culture. In the arts and sciences the detection of a mischievous error, or discovery of an important principle, is immediately proclaimed, and attracts the scrutiny of innumerable eyes. He who should choose to remain ignorant of it, or disregard it, and go on in the repetition of false views, from pride, obstinacy, or selfishness, would instantly divest himself of authority, and sink into neglect and contempt. It surely is not too much to expect that the friends of biblical learning will exhibit an equal alacrity in embracing the aids of which they are apprised, to the just interpretation of the Scriptures.

ART. IV.—A DESIGNATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE FIGURES OF ISAIAH. CHAPTER IX.

THE first verse of the English version of this chapter is, in the Hebrew, the last of the eighth. At the close of that chapter, the Israelites who rejected God's word, and looked to the wizards of the Assyrians for guidance, are exhibited as wrapped in a night of impenetrable darkness, flying in uncertainty and confusion from their enemies, and overwhelmed with anguish and despair. The figure is continued in this chapter, and the dissipation of the darkness foretold.

1. Hypocatastasis. "But at length there shall not be darkness to him who had been distressed," v. 1. Darkness is, as before, put for bewildered ignorance or false views; and in the following verse, the rising of a great light, for the appearance of a prophet and deliverer. The teachings and acts of Christ, whom the light represents, were, and are to be to them in relation to their redemption, what the light of the sun is to those who have been shrouded in impenetrable gloom.

2, 3. Comparisons. "As the former time"—of the darkness—"was disreputable to the land of Zebulon and to the land of Napthali; so the latter glorifies the way of the sea, the border of Jordan, Galilee of the Gentiles," v. 1. The former time during which it was conquered by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans, and held in subjection by them, lessened its reputation, as a cloud of darkness perpetually brooding over it would depress it in the estimate of men. The latter time is to add to its repute, and glorify it—as the rise of a splendid orb that dissipated such a darkness and invested it with effulgence, would advance it in the estimation of its inhabitants, and make it the object of admiration and delight.

4, 5. Hypocatastases. "The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light: they that dwelt in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined," v. 2. A people walking in darkness, on whom an effulgent orb flashes a bright light, releasing them from uncertainty, and enabling them to see their true condition, are put for the people in bondage, alienation, and error, who were to be taught and delivered by Christ: and a people dwelling in the land of the shade or darkness of death, on whom the light of the sun has beamed, are put for the Israelites in a condition of apostasy and thralldom, when enlightened and redeemed by the Messiah. That the prediction is of him is expressly shown, Matt. iv. 14–17. What an impressive exemplification of the estrangement and vassalage in which they were to exist, anterior to his coming, and of the change to be wrought by him in their views and condition! A land of the shade or darkness of death, is a land where the eyes have lost their power of discerning the light, and where the darkness, therefore, is absolute.

6. Apostrophe. "Thou hast multiplied the nation; thou hast increased the joy," v. 3. This is a direct address to God as the author of the deliverance which is promised; and gives great emphasis and beauty to the prediction. The blessing to be bestowed is to be the gift of God, and seen and acknowledged as his work.

7, 8. Comparisons. "They rejoice before thee as with the joy of harvest; as they rejoice who divide the spoil," v. 3.

This joy seems not to be purely religious, but a natural exhilaration and gladness like that which is occasioned by being put in possession of the rich bounties of providence, and the spoils of a victory over enemies. The period to which it refers is, doubtless, therefore, still future ; when the nation is to be increased by the restoration of the exiled tribes ; and they are to be filled with joy at a final triumph over their enemies. This is indicated by the next verse, in which a deliverance from the tyranny of their enemies is shown to be the cause of their joy.

9. Hypocatastasis. "For the yoke of his burden, and the rod of his shoulder, and the staff of his driver, hast thou broken, as in the day of Midian," v. 4. A burdensome yoke, and the rod and staff of a cruel taskmaster, the instruments of vassalage and tyranny, are put for bondage and oppression, and the breaking of those implements for ending that bondage and tyranny by the destruction of the oppressors.

10. Comparison. "As in the days of Midian," when the armies of that people that were "like grasshoppers for multitude, and their camels without number," were thrown into a tumult and panic by the stratagem of Gideon, and destroyed by their own swords, and the swords of the Israelites, Judges vii.

11. Metaphor, in the use of food of fire, for fuel. "For every greave put on in the tumult, and the garment rolled in blood, shall be for burning, and food of fire," v. 5. This indicates that the enemies of the Israelites are to be destroyed by fire, and is a prediction of their destruction by the Messiah, at his second advent foretold, chap. lxvi. 15, 16. "For, behold the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots, like a whirlwind, to render his anger with fury, and his rebuke with flames of fire ; for by fire, and by his sword, will the Lord plead with all flesh, and the slain of the Lord shall be many." That it is at that epoch that the prophecy is to be fulfilled is indicated also by the panic with which their enemies are then to be seized, which is to be like that of the Midianites, when terrified by Gideon's trumpets, and by the great spoils that are then to be taken. "And it shall come to pass in that day, a great tumult of the Lord shall be among them ; and they shall lay hold every one on the hand of his neighbor, and his hand

shall rise up against the hand of his neighbor. And Judah also shall fight at Jerusalem, and the wealth of all the heathen round about shall be gathered together, gold and silver, and apparel, in great abundance," Zech. xiv. 13, 14. That it is Christ who is then to destroy their enemies, and give them the deliverance in which they are to exult, is directly shown in the next verse.

12. Metaphor in exhibiting the government as like a burden on his shoulder. "For unto us a child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government is on his shoulder, and his name is called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. Of the increase of the government, and of the peace, there shall be no end upon the throne of David, and in his kingdom to establish it, and to confirm it in justice and in righteousness from henceforth and for ever. The zeal of the Lord of Hosts shall do this," v. 6, 7. This renders it clear that the redemption of the Israelites from their enemies, which the prophecy foreshows, is to be wrought at the second coming of the Messiah, when he is to ascend the throne of David, and assume dominion over "all people, nations, and languages." The deliverance he is to achieve is, indeed, treated by many commentators as a deliverance of the Christian church instead of the Israelites; and his reign on the throne of David, as a spiritual reign over the church, in place of a personal reign as the king of the Israelites and the monarch of the world; on the assumption that the prediction is metaphorical. But it is wholly mistaken. There is no metaphor in the passage, except in the expression, the government is on his shoulder; which is not a definition of the nature of the government as spiritual, in contradistinction from personal; but merely exhibits him as exercising and sustaining it, in distinction from its being borne by others. The other parts of the prediction which define the nature of his government, as on the throne of David, and in his kingdom, as to advance continually in greatness, as to be exercised in peace, as to be established and confirmed in righteousness, and as to be eternal, are entirely literal. They are predicates that perfectly agree with him as the king both of Israel and the Gentiles, and the Lord of lords who is to reign by virtue of his

rights as God-man over the world he has ransomed by his death.

The writers who treat that part of the passage which relates to the throne and kingdom of David as metaphorical, proceed on the assumption that it may be such without involving a metaphor. Were that theory, however, admissible in respect to that expression, it would be equally applicable to the other portions of the prediction, and make the birth of the Messiah, his names, the increase of his government in greatness, its peace, its establishment in righteousness, and its perpetuity, merely tropical or spiritual instead of literal; and convert the prophecy into a jumble of unmeaning epithets. For in what sense can a tropical or spiritual birth be ascribed to Christ, who is God manifest in the flesh? With what meaning can he be said to be metaphorically or spiritually given to the Israelites as a Son? What, if used tropically, can be the import of his appellatives Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, and Prince of Peace? The supposition that they are employed by a metaphor, is a supposition that they are not literally true of him; and is equivalent to a denial that he was either really born and a son, or that he is God, the Almighty, the Eternal, and the Prince of Peace! He cannot be really God if he is only in some relation *like* him; which is the meaning of the term if employed by a metaphor! Such is the result to which the assumption leads that the prophecy is metaphorical: directly denying the manhood and the deity of the Messiah, and converting his nature, his prerogatives, and his reign itself into enigmas and shadows. Would it not be well for those who resort to this expedient to escape the prediction of his personal reign on earth, to consider the issue to which it carries them? They make ardent professions of concern for his glory, but the method they take to advance it, is to wrench from him his divinity and crown, and reduce him to a spectre without a nature or name!

Were it conceded, however, that the prediction is metaphorical, it would not express the sense which these writers ascribe to it. If the prophecy, "Of the increase of his government upon the throne of David and in his kingdom, to establish and confirm it, there shall be no end," were metaphorical, the meaning would be that his government should

be *like David's* on his throne, and over his kingdom, and as such should continually advance in greatness, flourish in uninterrupted peace, and be without end. But uninterrupted peace, and continual growth in greatness, were not characteristic of David's reign, nor the reign of his descendants over his kingdom. Instead, his was a reign of foreign and domestic wars; his throne was on several occasions in imminent hazard, and his kingdom began almost immediately after his decease to decline, and sank, on the revolt of the ten tribes, to comparative weakness. There is nothing in it, therefore, in that relation, to exemplify Christ's kingdom in its establishment in peace and progress in greatness through eternal years.

But these commentators are under as great a misapprehension of the principle on which they construe the passage, as they are in respect to the relation in which its language is used. They do not, in fact, interpret it as though it were metaphorical, but instead, as though it were symbolic. They treat the Israelites as standing representatively for the church; the throne of David for Christ's throne in heaven; and a personal and visible reign for a spiritual one. But this is, in the first place, wholly without authority, and a flagrant violation of the passage. Its characteristics not only are not those of a symbolic prophecy, but are such as demonstrate that it is not of that nature. In symbolic revelations the symbols were always exhibited to the prophet. But Isaiah did not see the great personage, of whom this prediction treats, seated on the throne of David, and exercising such a government as is here ascribed to him. The prediction is in the future, not in the past, as it would have been had the language been employed as in a symbolic prophecy, merely in the description of the representative agents, acts, and events. In the next place, were it admitted to be symbolic, it could not bear the meaning which these interpreters ascribe to it. The Galilean Israelites, who dwelt in the shadow of death, could not, before their conversion, be symbols of the church under Christ's triumphant reign, as they were then opposites, not an analogous class. Apostates cannot be symbols of true worshippers. Nor could they after their conversion be symbols of the church, as they were then themselves its members.

The throne of David, if a symbol, cannot be a symbol of Christ's throne in heaven. The supposition is solecistical and monstrous. David's throne was not to angels and men what Christ's throne in heaven is to the universe. He not only had no dominion over other worlds and orders of being, but he had none over the Gentile nations of the earth. If David's throne is the representative of another, it must, by the laws of symbolization, represent a throne on earth, on which a government is exercised over human beings. Palestine under a curse of depopulation and barrenness, cannot be a symbol of heaven. Its inhabitants in vassalage to enemies cannot, even at the moment of their extrication from them, be symbols of redeemed saints. Instead of resembling one another, they are the most distant opposites. Nor, in the third place, can a personal and visible reign symbolize a mere spiritual and invisible one. If the reign of Christ on David's throne were a symbol, it would be a symbol of a real and visible reign, though of a different and analogous order. This whole theory of a metaphoric symbolization is thus false and preposterous in the utmost degree, and serves no other end than to wrench its true meaning from the prophecy, and charge it with a supposititious and contradictory sense.

The passage is thus a clear and direct announcement that Christ is to exercise his eternal sway as Jehovah, on the throne of David and in his kingdom, and therefore in this world; that his government is for ever to advance in greatness, which implies that his subjects are continually to become more numerous, and thence that the race is for ever to multiply; that it is to be a reign of peace and righteousness, which supposes that all nations are to become subject to his sceptre; and that the zeal of the Lord of Hosts shall effect these great results, which indicates that they are embraced in his gracious purposes, and that their accomplishment is to redound to his glory. It cannot be wrested from this meaning except by a method as arbitrary and monstrous as that by which Jewish commentators, Grotius and others, make Hezekiah its subject.

Another prophecy is commenced in the next verse, that probably was uttered at a later period, after the judgments

before threatened had been in a measure inflicted by the first invasion of the Assyrians.

13, 14. Metaphors in the use of the verbs sent and fell, which properly express motions of physical bodies, and denote that the word of God was directly addressed to the Israelites, and was known by them to be from him, as clearly as they would have known it, had a material object fallen on them from the sky. "The Lord sent a word to Jacob, and it fell upon Israel," v. 8.

15. Metaphor in the use of greatness of heart for haughtiness or self-confidence. "And all the people—Ephraim and the inhabitants of Samaria—shall know or understand it, that in pride and greatness of heart say," v. 9. They were to be made to experience the truth of the predictions of evil which God had announced to them by the prophet.

16, 17. Hypocatastases. "That in pride and greatness of heart say, The bricks are fallen, but we will build with hewn stone: The sycamores are cut down, but we will replace them with cedars," v. 9. Bricks are put for materials of edifices and ramparts that were easily overturned by their enemies: and sycamores for the trees that were the natural growth of their fields; and the boast that they would build with hewn stones, and plant their lands with cedars, was a boast that they would erect structures that could not be demolished by their foes, and instead of abandoning their country to the desolation with which it had been swept by the Assyrians, or merely raising it to its former beauty, by replanting the trees that grew in it spontaneously, would adorn it in an unexampled measure, by substituting the most rare and precious for the sycamore. It indicated, therefore, that they had not learned the great lesson which God's judgments were adapted to teach them, but continued to be in the utmost degree incorrigible and self-confident.

18. Metaphor in the employment of *raise above*, which properly denotes an elevation to a superior height, to denote the gift of greater power. "And Jehovah shall raise up above him,"—Ephraim,—“the enemies of Rezin, and he will excite his own enemies together; Assyria before, and Philistia behind,” v. 11.

19, 20. Metonymies in the substitution of Assyria and Philistia for their population, v. 12.

21. Hypocatastasis. "And they shall devour Israel with open mouth," v. 12. Their eating them ravenously, is put for their eagerly pursuing them with outrage, oppression, and slaughter. What other exemplification could have been chosen to exhibit with such force the brutal ferocity with which their enemies were to destroy them! To slaughter and waste them was to yield the Assyrians and Philistines a gratification like that which they felt when satiating their voracious appetites.

22. Metaphor. "Notwithstanding all this his anger is not turned back," v. 12. To turn back or away, is a motion proper only to organized beings or physical objects. It is used by a metaphor to denote that God had not intermitted his anger, notwithstanding the punishments he had inflicted on them; but still regarded them with unaltered displeasure.

23. Hypocatastasis. "But his hand is stretched out still," v. 12. This attitude of preparation to inflict another stroke, and continue to chastise them as with a scourge, is put for the arrangements of his providence, by which the Assyrians, who were the instruments of his justice, were to continue to harass and destroy them.

24, 25, 26. Hypocatastases. "For the people have not turned to him who smote them, and Jehovah of Hosts they have not sought," v. 13. Turning and seeking are movements that are proper to organized beings, in relation to objects of the senses. They are put for analogous acts of the mind. To depart literally is an external act. To depart from God is to sin. To return to him is, accordingly, to become obedient, and exercise towards him the affections and acts that are in harmony with his rights and will. In like manner, his smiting them, which is proper only to a human being, is put for his exercising a providence, by which they were subjected to punishment.

27, 28. Hypocatastases. "And Jehovah has cut off from Israel head and tail, branch and rush, in one day," v. 14. An animal is employed as a representative of the Israelites, and the excision of its head and tail, by which it would not only be deprived of life, but made shapeless and hideous, put for

the removal of the men of rank and false prophets, who held corresponding places in the national organization. Branch and rush, the extremes of the vegetable world, are used in the same manner, and their excision employed to exemplify the extermination of those two classes.

29, 30. Metaphors. "The ancient and honorable, he is the head; and the prophet that teacheth lies, he is the tail," v. 15. Here they are directly affirmed to be those parts of an animal which were before employed to indicate their destruction. These simple forms exemplify all the laws of the metaphor. 1. The figure lies in the predicate, or affirmative part. 2. It consists in ascribing something to the subject that is not literally true of it, but which it only resembles. 3. The name of the subject itself is used literally. It is the ancient and honorable, and no one else, that is declared to be the head; and the prophet teaching lies, and no one else, that is affirmed to be the tail, which Jehovah had cut off. What but the most wanton and senseless denial were it of the meaning of the passage to assume that the subjects of these predicates are themselves also used by the figure in the same manner as the nouns head and tail; and that they mean, therefore, not the ancient and honorable and prophet teaching falsehood, but persons of a different and analogous class? or to assume that they are used as symbols, and represent persons or agents of some other resembling orders? Who are such analogous agents? Can anything be more obvious than that there are no means of identifying them, or determining them with any measure of probability; and that that method of interpretation in effect leaves the passage without any intelligible import? Of what value is the affirmation, if it is wholly unknown of whom it is made? Yet, it were no grosser or more absurd violation of this passage to interpret it by that monstrous theory, than it is of the scores and hundreds of others of this prophet which it is employed to wrench from their true to a false sense.

31, 32. Hypocatastases. "The leaders of this people are seducers, and they who are led of them are ingulfed," v. 16. There is no direct affirmation that certain persons are leaders of the people. The ancient and honorable having already been designated the head of the nation, it is apparent, without

a formal statement, that they are the individuals meant; and they are exhibited as exerting an act of one species to indicate their exerting one of another. To lead, is literally to guide or conduct along a material way, as a path, or road, or on a line towards another place. It is used here, instead of an analogous influence on the minds of the people. The ancient and honorable and the false teaching prophets, drew them away from truth and obedience to false views and sin, as guides lead those out of the way whom they undertake to conduct safely through regions with which they are unacquainted. The people also are represented as led by them like an animal by a halter, to denote the abject manner in which they were influenced by them in their opinions and conduct. To exhibit the destruction in which they are involved, they are represented as led into a bog or quagmire, into which they sink and perish. See chap. iii. 12.

33. Metaphor as in the 11th verse in the use of turned back. "Therefore, Jehovah will not rejoice over their young men; neither will he have mercy on their orphans and widows, for every one of them is profane and an evil-doer, and every mouth speaks folly. For all this his wrath is not turned back," v. 17. Impiety and incorrigibleness had become universal, so that avenging judgments were with propriety inflicted upon all.

34. Hypocatastasis. "But his hand is stretched out still," v. 17. God is exhibited in the attitude of a human person in readiness to inflict another blow, to indicate that his providence was arranged so as to continue their punishment.

35. Metaphor, in the exhibition of wickedness as burning. "For wickedness burneth."

36. Comparison. "For wickedness burneth as the fire." What literal language could indicate with such emphasis the certainty of their destruction?

37. Hypocatastasis. "For wickedness burneth as the fire. Thorns and briers it consumes; it kindles in the thickets of the forest, and they"—the thickets—"wrap themselves in ascending smoke," v. 18. Thorns, briers, and thickets, are put for the wicked, and the action of fire on them is used to exemplify the destruction which sin brings on its perpetrators. And what an impressive image of the dire and irresistible

ruin with which God smites them! As a fire burning the undergrowth of a forest, envelopes its loftiest and most beautiful trees in a cloud of smoke, and blackens and blasts them, so wickedness destroys its perpetrators, and in forms that, like the flame and smoke of a burning forest, are conspicuous to all eyes, and from their resistlessness and awfulness, carry terror to all hearts.

38. Hypocatastasis. "Through the wrath of Jehovah of hosts the land is darkened, and the people is like food of fire," v. 19. A cloud of smoke enveloping the land, is put for other forms of disaster with which it was struck; and the people as the fuel on which the fire fed, for the analogous modes in which they drew down the wrath of the Almighty on it. The whole realm of nature can scarcely furnish another image so expressive of the terrific forms of ruin with which they were smitten, and their inability to escape or resist it. The avenging instruments which God employed to destroy them, were as suited to their nature as fire is to blast or burn a forest, and they were as powerless under their influence as trees under a scorching flame.

39. Comparison, in the exhibition of the people as like fuel, that burning generated a smoke that darkened the land. The people were the cause of the desolation with which the land was overspread.

40 Metaphor, in the use of food of fire instead of fuel, v. 19.

41. Hypocatastasis. "And one does not spare another, but he tears on the right hand, and is hungry still, and devours on the left, and yet they are not satisfied; each eats the flesh of his own arm; Manassah Ephraim, and Ephraim Manassah, and they together against Judah," v. 19, 20. Their tearing and eating one another like beasts of prey are put for the other forms in which they harassed and destroyed one another. What a terrible picture of the enmities, oppressions, wars, and slaughter with which they were to waste one another! Divided into parties and animated by cruel and insatiable passions, they were to be to one another what wild beasts made ferocious by hunger are to the inferior animals that fall in their power.

42. Metaphor, as in the 11th and 16th verses, in the use of turned back, which literally denotes a motion in space to indicate that, notwithstanding these terrible inflictions, God's

anger continued unabated. "For all this, his wrath is not turned back, but his hand is stretched out still," v 20.

43. Hypocatastasis, in the exhibition of God in the attitude of a person extending his hand to strike ; to denote that he was still conducting his providence over the instruments of his vengeance in such a manner that they would continue to inflict his anger on the Israelites.

1. Christ is not only to reign for ever on the throne of David and exercise a government that is continually to advance in greatness, but his exerting that administration is of infinite interest to the Almighty, and most intimately concerns his glory. "The zeal of the Lord of Hosts shall do this." It is the administration which his boundless wisdom has devised. It befits his attributes and station. It is suited to display his perfections and subserve the well-being of his kingdom. What a rebuke this assurance uttered by himself administers to their unbelief and presumption, who venture to deny that such are his purposes, and on the ground that they are inconsistent with his dignity and sanctitude, and would degrade him to a level with his debased creatures! Yet that is the pretence on which not a few deny Christ's future reign on the earth ; and such is their self-confidence that they resort to the most gross and preposterous violations of his word, to wrench from its pages the revelation he has made of that design. They treat it as though it were unworthy of the Saviour to reign here over the beings whom he came into the world to redeem! They represent that it would be to divest himself of his dignity, to manifest himself visibly to those whose very nature he has assumed. They imply that were he even to restore mankind from the ruins of the fall, and make them as beautiful, as holy, as wise, and as blessed, as they would have been had they not apostatized, they would still be of so sensual and debased a nature, as to be unfit to be his subjects, unless stationed at an immeasurable distance from his throne. But these daring critics of the Eternal surely can have but very inadequately considered the import of their judgment. If they truly think it a degradation to the Saviour to reign over bodied beings like us, they must, to be consistent, deny that he created our first parents or their posterity. How can they suppose that he has called moral

beings into existence, who from their corporeal nature are unfit, even if holy, to be admitted by him to the relation of children? They must, also, for the same reason deny that he died for our race. How can they suppose him to have taken upon himself our nature, and given himself a ransom for us, if we are so base a species, that even when rescued from the thralldom of sin, and raised to the glories of his likeness, it were still a dishonor to him to communicate with us directly, and reign over us in person? Was there ever a more flagrant contradiction to his truth? Was there ever a more monstrous impeachment of his perfections? If it was not unworthy of him to create and redeem us; if it is not incompatible with his dignity to uphold us, and maintain a government over us through eternal years, how can it be inconsistent with his majesty to reveal himself to us visibly, and reign over us in our nature which he has assumed? If it is befitting his infinite perfections to hold the sceptre of our world in that nature in heaven, and reveal himself in it to all other orders of intellectual beings, how is it that his exercising an immediate administration in it over us here, can be derogatory to him and inappropriate to us?

Let those beware who thus attempt to make themselves a law to the Almighty, and wrest his word that it may utter their ignorance and folly! It is not a light thing even unintentionally to traduce the Holy One of Israel; to impeach his wisdom; and to brand with the charge of senselessness and debasement the great scheme of government which he is for ever to exercise over our world, and under which the race is at length to be rescued from the bondage of evil, and exalted to a beauty of nature and grandeur of character and condition equal to that which would have distinguished them, had they never swerved from obedience. The great principles of his administration now over men are the same as when this prophecy was uttered. Those who now disregard the clear teachings of his word, accuse his wisdom, and take their own reason or the false teachings of creatures for their guides, are guilty of as great an offence against him as the unbelieving and incorrigible were then, and are obnoxious to a similar doom.

It is God's prerogative to decide what administration he will exercise over the world. His attributes are equal to his

station, and he will make his visible rule on earth worthy of his perfections. Let us resign the destiny of the world to him to whom alone it belongs to appoint it, and fixing our thoughts on the vastness of his purposes of love, and the completeness of the redemption from evil he is to achieve, confide in him to direct its form and shape its results in a manner worthy of his wisdom. Our inability to accomplish such a scheme is no proof of an inadequacy in him. That we can conceive others that appear far more eligible, is no evidence that this which he has chosen, is not immeasurably more suited to him than any other, and will not prove the means of far higher blessings to his kingdom.

2. What decisive proofs were given by the Israelites of the inadequacy of mere teachings, warnings, and punishments to reform them! God made a direct announcement to them of the calamities with which he was to strike them by the agency of the Assyrians, and verified his word by the conquest and devastation of their country, the capture and sack of their cities, and the exile of vast crowds of them to other lands: yet, instead of a penitent return to him, they defied his power to destroy them, and boasted that they would rebuild their ruined cities with a strength and solidity that should render them impregnable, and replant and adorn their fields with more beautiful trees than those which were their natural growth. They were then wasted by the Syrians and Philistines, smitten by pestilence and famine, and at length left to prey on one another, and suffer all the forms of evil with which God directly chastens his creatures, or they are themselves the authors; but instead of amendment they became more hardened in alienation, and showed at once the justice of his judgments and their insufficiency for their reformation. Even the most effective instruments which he wields by his providence, are, without the aids of his Spirit, inadequate to break the hearts of the rebellious and inspire them with submission and love.

3. With what joy and gratitude should we contemplate the purpose which the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, has revealed, of at length establishing his throne on the earth, bringing all nations to obedience to his sceptre, restoring the race from all the evils of the fall, and

reigning over it in peace and love through eternal years! How worthy of him as the second Adam is such a redemption of them, from the ruin in which they are involved by the first! How essential to the perfection of his work! How suited to the grandeur of his attributes! How accordant with the infinite sacrifice with which he purchased their salvation! How blinded by unbelief and ignorance must they be, who discern nothing of greatness and beauty in this infinite scheme of love! who find their benevolent wishes better satisfied with the salvation of myriads than of countless millions; and with a redemptive work of a few years, rather than of eternal ages!

- ART. V.—1. THE SIGNS OF THE TIMES, as denoted by the fulfilment of Historical Predictions, traced down from the Babylonish captivity to the present time. By the Rev. Alexander Keith. In two volumes. New York: J. Leavitt. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1832.
2. AN EXAMINATION OF MR. ELLIOTT'S THEORY of the first Six Seals and of the Death and Ascension of the Witnesses. By Alexander Keith, D.D. Edinburgh: W. Whyte & Co. 1847.
3. VINDICIÆ HORARIÆ, or Twelve Letters to the Rev. Dr. Keith, in reply to his strictures on the *Horæ Apocalypticæ*, together with brief notices of other criticisms on the seals and witnesses of the *Horæ*. By the Rev. E. B. Elliott, M.A. London: Seelys. 1848.

DR. KEITH'S strictures on Mr. Elliott's theory, and Mr. Elliott's defence of himself and criticism of Dr. Keith, may be taken as specimens of the unhappy method in which the prophetic Scriptures are treated in many of the volumes lately issued in Great Britain. Each unanswerably confutes the other; yet neither finds his arguments on proper grounds, nor is aware of the principles on which the questions in discussion are to be determined. They have no settled system of explication. They have not learned that there are laws of symbols and figures as clear and certain as those of

any other instrument of thought, the knowledge of which is indispensable in order to ascertain the import of predictions. The principal question in debate between them, accordingly, is not directly whether the constructions placed by them on the symbols are conformable to their nature; but, whether the events alleged as their fulfilment are such as those constructions require;—an inquiry that, however it may issue, cannot yield any proof that an interpretation is itself right. If Mr. Elliott's explication, for example, of the horseman of the first seal as representing Roman emperors, is mistaken, his showing that the history of the empire under the reign of the five emperors who followed Domitian, is what he has stated, cannot prove that his view of the symbol is correct; nor can Dr. Keith's showing that the events of that period were not such as Mr. Elliott represents them, prove that his view of the symbol is false. It can only demonstrate that it was not verified *at that period*; not that Mr. E.'s error lies in the explication of the horseman, instead of the selection of the age in which the persons whom he symbolizes exerted their agency. Mr. E. may misjudge of the symbol, though he forms a just view of the history. Dr. Keith may confute his representation of the history without confuting his construction of the symbol. Nearly the whole of their inquiries and discussions are thus thrown away on points that do not touch the questions at issue. When Mr. Elliott demonstrates, by the most resistless evidence, all the propositions which he advances in respect to the historical events in debate, he accomplishes nothing whatever towards verifying his interpretations; and when Dr. Keith confutes Mr. E.'s allegations, he achieves nothing except the proof that Mr. E.'s interpretations were not verified at the period to which he refers them. The result of their labor thus is not the evolution of the true meaning of the prophecies, but the mere demonstration that they have fallen into great errors; and their discussions answer no other end, than to annoy one another, bewilder the reader, and excite a distaste for the study of the subject. We trust men of sense, of learning, and of piety, will ere long become convinced of the inexpediency of that method of treating the sacred volume, and be led to regard an acquaint-

ance with the laws of symbols and language, as an indispensable requisite for the task of interpretation.

We shall not enter on this occasion into an examination of the strictures on Mr. Elliott's scheme or his Reply, but confine ourselves to a notice of the constructions placed by Dr. Keith in his Signs of the Times on the principal symbols of the Apocalypse.

He introduces his work with the announcement that he adopted his views of the meaning of the prophecy "on simply reading" it, without any preconceived theory, or any elaborate investigation.

"The writer may be permitted to state that without any preconceived theory, or any elaborate investigation, on simply *reading*, at no distant period, the Book of Revelation, he wondered that he could have been previously ignorant of the significancy of the Seals and Vials, which, however, it had never before entered into his thoughts to scan. The meaning seemed so manifest as to afford a practical illustration that the Apocalypse or Revelation, as the very term literally implies, denotes light and not darkness, or that its object, like its name, was to *make clear*, and not to mystify. Hence, looking throughout to the same simplicity of truth, he was led to a more enlarged and combined view of history and of prophecy, and sadly has he failed in the execution of the task, if he has not rendered it intelligible, as it might have been revealed to a child."—Vol. i. Preface, p. iv.

But how is it that he has thus rendered the prophecy intelligible? Not by unfolding its laws. He institutes no inquiry whatever respecting the principle on which symbols are used. It appears not to have occurred to him that they are a peculiar instrument of prediction; that they are employed on a principle that belongs solely to themselves; and that they are to be interpreted by rules adapted to their nature. He has not, in fact, therefore, attempted the task of *interpretation*. He has only assigned to the visions what "on simply reading" the prophecy, or the constructions of other writers, seemed to him their "manifest meaning!" And the chief impression under which he framed his constructions seems to have been, that the *language* itself, in which the symbols are described, indicates the characteristics of that which they represent. When, for example, a symbol is said to be *black*, he assumes

that it denotes in that which is foreshown, what the *word* black is used to signify in other passages of the Scriptures; and when a symbol is denominated death, he holds that it denotes what the *word* death is ordinarily used to mean in a history of war, pestilence, or famine. He is consequently not only mistaken in a large share of his explications, especially where he deviates from other writers, but where his conclusions are just, the reasons which he offers for their support are irrelevant and absurd.

This is exemplified by his interpretation of the first seal, in which he assumes that the horseman, instead of being a symbol, is a figure, and that the question of the meaning, therefore, is a mere question of philology, and to be determined by a reference to the sense in which the terms are employed in other passages of the sacred volume. He says:—

“The *figure* speaks for itself; and many Scriptures show what it is, and what *alone* it represents.

“On the opening of the first seal, the object seen was . . . a *WHITE* horse. Whatever the symbol might represent, *whiteness* is the mark appropriated as its own. The term *white* occurs in seventeen other instances in the book of revelation, and with the exception of two, descriptive of angelic purity, it can only be applied in every one of them to Christ or to his church. Nor can this be a sole exception; for the same *figure*, under the same character, or designation, is again introduced towards the close of the revelation, in a manner that can be descriptive only of Christ and his church.”—P. 176.

He proceeds, accordingly, on the supposition that the symbol is a figure, and the question respecting its meaning a mere question of philology, to quote the other passages in the prophecy in which the word white occurs. But into what error could he have fallen indicating a more entire inacquaintance with the subject? Would he attempt the solution of problems in arithmetic or algebra by the mere usage of the terms in which they are expressed? Are the mere words, in which Euclid states his forty-seventh proposition, the media of its demonstration, independently of any geometrical axioms and laws? The pretence were not more absurd

than the assumption is that symbols are to be interpreted by the laws of philology. The dictionary and concordance are as well suited to work out questions in mathematics as they are in symbolization.

He falls into another error in assuming that the color of the horse is the leading "characteristic" of the symbol, and shows "what *alone* it represents." So far from that being the fact, the warrior *horseman* is the representative agent of the seal, and it is *his act* alone in going forth conquering and to conquer, that symbolizes the agency that is foreshown. The horse is his mere instrument, or auxiliary, and white the mere color of the *horse*; and was employed doubtless because victorious Roman generals and emperors were borne by steeds of that color on entering the capital in triumph after a battle or campaign. A white horse was the badge of a victor; precisely as a bow was the badge of a warrior. Can anything be plainer? Dr. K., however, completely reverses the relation of the symbols, making the color of the horse, to which no conquering agency is or could be assigned, the leading representative, and the horse itself, the bow, and the warrior, mere subordinates; and representing it as the object of the symbolization by that color, to foreshow *holiness*; and the office of the horse and warrior to denote those who were to be the subjects of that virtue!

On the ground, moreover, on which he proceeds in that interpretation, he overturns his construction of the other parts of the symbol. If that color is to be explained, not by the principles of symbolization, but by the laws of philology, then the other symbols, or their names, must also be construed by the same rules, and the horse, accordingly, will represent a horse simply or horses, not, as he assumes, the church; and the rider a human conquering warrior, not the Son of God. Why did he not quote other passages from the sacred volume to ascertain what the words horses and rider mean, as well as the word white; and treat the determination of their import as the explication of the symbol?

He is wholly mistaken also in the supposition that the horseman is the Son of God. He says:—

"A single passage from this book might suffice to put beyond a

doubt the signification of the *figure*, and to show that Christ and the true church are designed by it. The same person, under the *same symbol*, who was seen going forth conquering and to conquer, is seen again after the warfare is accomplished, triumphant over all that opposed him; and he who at first had a crown given him, is seen at last with many diadems . . . still united to his church, which he does not leave in his triumph when he has led it on to victory."—P. 181.

But into what greater or more palpable mistake could he have fallen? It is expressly shown in the symbolization of the fifth chapter, that no created being was adequate to take the place of the Son of God in the visions. A human warrior assailing and conquering his fellow men, *who are not under his jurisdiction*, and compelling them to submission to his sceptre, has no adaptation to represent the Almighty Saviour, renewing, sanctifying, and pardoning his creatures and subjects, who are in revolt, and raising them to virtue and blessedness. They and their acts are in every relation unlike. A creature cannot represent the Creator. Their nature, agency, and relations are essentially dissimilar. The one is an effect; the other is a cause. The one is finite and sinful; the other infinite, independent, and holy. The one acts without authority and against the rights and well-being of those whom he assaults and subdues; the other is supremely just and gracious in his acts, and promotes by them the immortal well-being of those over whom he extends his conquering sway. What an astounding error to imagine that such a warrior,—a Nebuchadnezzar, a Cyrus, an Alexander, a Cæsar, an Attila, a Tamerlane, a Bonaparte, unjust, merciless, bloody, and wantonly trampling down the nations, to gratify a lawless and malignant ambition, resembles the Eternal Word, and is used to represent him in the conversion and sanctification of men!

It is inconsistent also with the office of Christ in the vision. He stood by the throne and opened the seal. What can be more unauthorized and incongruous, than to suppose that on opening the seal, he left that station, and assuming the form of the warrior, mounted the steed, and went forth conquering and to conquer? And, finally, Dr. Keith is wholly mistaken in representing that the personage on the white horse, in the

vision of the nineteenth chapter, is the same as this warrior. The name of that rider is expressly declared to be "the Word of God:" "the King of kings, and the Lord of lords." But this has no such name, nor is there any indication that his office is to judge the nations in righteousness, and tread the wine-press of the wrath of God. That personage is the Almighty Redeemer; this is but a man.

Dr. Keith's interpretation of the horse as representing the church is equally unauthorized and absurd. It has no adaptation to such an office. The church is not to Christ in the conversion of men, what a horse is to a warrior who rides him in battle. The horse is the instrument by which the warrior is conveyed to the scene of his contest, and moves to and fro on the battle-field. The church is not the means by which the Saviour enters the presence of those whom he conquers. It is the office of the church to communicate to men the truth by which they are sanctified: it is not the office of the horse, but of the rider, to discharge the arrows by which he wounds and subdues his foes. The agency of Christ towards *the church* is not what the agency of a conquering warrior is towards his horse. All those whom Christ subdues become his disciples and members of his church. Do all those whom a warrior conquers become parts, by that process, of his horse? Is it not singular that Dr. Keith sees nothing of these incongruities? And finally, if this horse is, as he avers, the same as that of the King of kings of the nineteenth chapter, and denotes the church there as well as here, of what are the white horses of that vision on which the armies of heaven are borne, representatives? Are they symbols of armies of churches that are not of Christ's church? And who then are the armies of heaven that ride those horses? Are they redeemers and kings of the churches denoted by their several horses, as Christ is the Redeemer and King of his? Such they must undoubtedly be, if Dr. Keith's views of the office of the horse are legitimate. Can anything be more lawless and monstrous than such a construction? He does not, however, adhere to this explication, but proceeds in his next interpretation, as though, in place of the church, he had exhibited the horse as representative of "the Christian religion." But that is as erroneous and

absurd as it is contradictory to the exposition he gives here. Those whom Christ conquers and brings into subjection to himself, receive his religion, embrace the blessings which it proposes, and live conformably to its principles. Do those who are conquered by a warrior, in any analogous manner, receive, embrace, and live conformably to his horse? Such are the constructions which Dr. Keith puts forth, "on simply reading the prophecy," without "any elaborate investigation" of the principles on which symbols are used, or consideration of the results which his assumptions involve. Can any one wonder that, proceeding on such a plan, he continued as "ignorant of the significancy of the seals and vials," as he "could have been," "had it never entered into his thoughts to scan" them?

Had he made himself acquainted with the nature of the prophecy, he would have perceived that symbols are the media of its predictions, not the words by which they are described; that they have a nature of their own, and are to be construed by peculiar laws; and that one of the most important of them is, that the symbol is neither of the same species as that which it represents, nor of one that is wholly dissimilar, but of a resembling class, and that this horseman, accordingly, cannot represent the Son of God, nor a warrior like himself, but must symbolize official persons of some other sphere, and ministers of the gospel, therefore, who are the only order that bear such an analogy to a military conqueror; for they are to the church what successful warriors are to the State. They add those to the church whom they win to Christ, and receive a crown for their victories. The horse is a mere auxiliary of the rider in the exercise of his office, and was necessary in order to exhibit him in that relation. How could it have been seen that he was a victorious commander had he not been mounted? Though even contending successfully with an antagonist, how, if exhibited on foot, could it have been apparent that he was a commander; and not a mere soldier, or gladiator? The color of the horse was a mere token that the rider was a victorious warrior; as it was the law of a triumphal procession that the conqueror should ride a white steed. This construction is conformable to the laws of symbolization, assigns an important sense to the represen-

tatives, is free from objection, and was verified by the rapid enlargement of the church in the second and third centuries.

His view of the second seal is open to equal objection. He says :—

“The same symbol must have the same significancy. If one horse represent the Christian religion, *another* horse must, in like manner, if there be perfect harmony in the vision, represent *another* religion. And each religion must have its author or its head, as each horse had its rider. An express similarity in these respects is required, where the symbol is designated as *another*. . . . Mahometanism is *another* religion, having no affinity with the Christian, and it accounts all Christians unbelievers. It is not pure, but bloody—not white, but red.”—Pp. 184–186.

This, like his construction of the horse in the former seal, is in every relation wrong. The religion of Mahomet did not stand in the same relation to him as his steed, nor fill the same office to his conquering disciples as the horses which they rode. Their horses were important instruments or auxiliaries in their conquests ; their religion was not. It was by the sword and by conquest that they propagated their religion, not by propagating their religion that they slaughtered and conquered. Of this Dr. Keith is fully aware. He says, “without the sword, Mahomet could effect nothing. Before he claimed the divine right of using it, or inculcated *fighting* for the faith, . . he fled from Mecca, a helpless fugitive. . . . And from that time *the sword was the weapon of his warfare*, by which his importance was to stand or fall. His doctrine then was that God . . . had sent him . . to force” men “*by the power of the sword* to do his will ; and, accordingly, he forbade his disciples to enter into any further disputes about his religion, but instead of that he commanded them *to fight for it*, and destroy all who should contradict his law.”—P. 187.

And he quotes several passages from Gibbon to show that it “became the universal doctrine of the Mahometans that *their religion is to be propagated by the sword*, and that all men were bound to fight for it.” It is wholly impossible, therefore, that the horse can be the symbol of Mahometanism. If it were, then the aim and effect of the agency of the horse-

man, in the vision, would have been to force those whom he assailed to receive and exercise his *horse*, as it was the object of Mahomet and his disciples, in their wars, to compel those whom they conquered to receive and exercise their religion. Does Dr. Keith see any indication in the symbolization that those from whom the horsemen took peace, and whom they excited to slaughter one another, were compelled to take and use *his horse*; as those who fell under the power of the Saracens were forced to adopt and practise their religion?

He deserts, moreover, in that construction, the principle on which he frames his interpretation of the other parts of the symbol. If the horse denotes a mere combination of religious doctrines and rites, why should not the rider also be taken as the representative of a mere series of propositions, or system of rites and dogmas? Why should it be assumed that he symbolizes an agent or agents of the same nature and profession as himself? What reason can Dr. Keith allege for this construction that will not convict him of inaccuracy in that? But the one is as mistaken as the other. The horseman must, by the laws of symbolization, stand for agents of a different profession, and exerting a different but analogous agency; and that which the horse symbolizes must be a species of instrument or auxiliary, that is to those represented agents in their sphere, what the horse is to the warrior in his. The exhibition of the warrior on a horse was requisite to show that he was a commander, and present him in action and the pursuit of his object instead of rest; and it accomplishes its office as a symbol by indicating, that the agents whom the rider represents are to be in the conditions also, and to enjoy the auxiliaries that are appropriate and necessary to the official agencies which they are to exert.

On the supposition, however, that the horse is the symbol of a religion, it does not necessarily follow that that religion is Mahometanism, and its propagators Saracens. Why, then, does Dr. Keith assume that the horseman is the symbol of Mahomet and his successors? Not on the ground of the symbol itself, but of a wholly different prophecy. He first assumes that the horse is the representative of a religion; next, that the rider is the symbol of a warrior like himself; his sword, the symbol of a literal sword; and his taking peace

from the earth and causing them to kill one another, representative of acts of that kind. Having thus reached the conclusion that the agents foreshown are warriors, and war and slaughter the agencies they are to exert, he then founds his assumption that they are symbols of the Saracens and their wars, on a passage in Daniel viii. 9-12, 23-25, which he regards as a prediction of that people. But this is in every respect inadmissible. The construction of the symbols should be founded wholly on themselves. If they present nothing indicating that those whom they represent are Mahometans rather than any other class of warriors, there can be no just ground for assuming that they denote Mahometans rather than others. If the horseman and his agency foreshow nothing but warriors armed with swords, taking peace from the earth and exciting mutual slaughters, why may not Roman emperors, or aspirants to the throne of the Roman empire, be taken as the persons symbolized, and their contests and slaughters as the acts that are foreshown? Dr. Keith, moreover, in treating the warrior horseman as a symbol of warriors like himself, proceeds on a view of the principle of symbolization the reverse of that on which he construes the passage in Daniel. The symbol of Daniel which he regards as standing for Mahomet and his successors is a horn, and is interpreted by the angel as representing a king. As the symbol, then, in that instance, is of a different species from that which it represents, why is not the horseman, also, to be taken as denoting agents of an order that differs from himself? Why does not Dr. K. receive the interpretation given by the angel of that and many other symbols, all of which exhibit that which is foreshown as of a different nature from that by which it is represented, as presenting a great law of symbols, and make it the rule of his constructions? To be consistent, then, with himself, and conform his explications to the inspired examples with which he is furnished, he must abandon his reference of the symbol of the seal to Mahomet, or other literal warriors, and find as their counterpart a class of agents of a different sphere.

But Dr. Keith is in great an error in interpreting the horn of Daniel as the symbol of Mahomet, as in regarding the horseman as the representative of that slaughterer. The actions

ascribed to that horn are, that "he magnified himself even to the prince of the host, and by him the daily sacrifice was taken away, and the place of his sanctuary was cast down; and a host was given him against the daily sacrifice because of transgression;" and in the explanation that is given by the angel it is stated that the period at which the king whom it denoted was to stand up, was to be "in the latter time" of the four dynasties that succeeded Alexander and his sons, when "the transgressions were come to the full," and that he should "destroy the mighty and the holy people," and "stand up against the Prince of princes." But the sanctuary was the temple at Jerusalem; the daily sacrifice, the sacrifice that was daily offered there; the mighty and the holy people the Jews; and the Prince of princes, the King of kings, and Lord of lords, the Almighty Redeemer. That horn, therefore, was not the symbol of the leaders of the Mahometans, but of the Romans. They were Roman princes and commanders who destroyed the temple at Jerusalem, and put an end to the offering of the daily sacrifice. It was they who opposed the Redeemer, and put him to death as a usurper; and it was they who destroyed the Jewish people. The Saracens exerted no such acts. There was no temple at Jerusalem to be cast down, at the time of their rise and reign. There was no daily sacrifice to be taken away, and no mighty Jewish people to be destroyed. They were no longer organized as a nation, and it was not on them that the Saracens made war.

Instead of this construction that is thus in every particular erroneous, had he made himself acquainted with the laws of the prophecy, he would have seen that the fact that the symbolic agent is a warrior who excites civil contests and bloodshed, shows that those whom he represents are not warriors, but official persons of another class that engage men in conflicts of a different kind, and excite them to inflict on one another a different species of death; and would have found such agitating and destructive agents in the aspiring and apostate ministers of the Christian church at the close of the second century, and through a long series of ages that followed.

The same false views of the relation in which symbols are

used, and the same inconsistencies, mark his explication of the third seal.

"The repetition of the same symbol manifestly requires a corresponding similarity in the nature of the object represented. From any incongruity or discordance in this respect, whatever might be the interpretation, conviction of its truth would cease to be reasonable. If the first symbol, that of the white horse, denotes the Christian religion, of which Christ is the head; and if the second, which was red, denoted, as was expressed, another religion, or the Mahometans, it follows as a most necessary consequence, that the third, or the black horse, must also and as expressively denote some form of religion, or have a direct reference to the prevalence of some system of faith or of religious opinions."

"The Papacy has here its first place in the book of the Revelation of the things that were to be. It was a system of spiritual blackness and bondage."—Pp. 191—193.

As his treatment of the horse of the preceding seal as a symbol of religion was wholly erroneous, it is equally so here; and his reference of the prediction to the papacy, or Roman Catholic religion, is accordingly wholly mistaken.

But he deserts again, in this construction, the principle on which he interpreted the chief agent of the second seal, by treating this horseman as the symbol of a different order of persons from himself. He was himself a Roman magistrate; the agency which he exerted had a reference to the prices of grain, and the culture of the fig tree and vine; and his badge was a balance. He was, therefore, doubtless a Roman emperor imposing and exacting taxes. But the popes are not in their ecclesiastical relation such magistrates. A balance is not their ecclesiastical badge. If, then, Dr. Keith was justified in treating the rider of the preceding seal as symbolizing agents of his own order, why is he not required also to regard this as representing a Roman emperor like himself in the imposition and exaction of taxes? And if the sword of that warrior was the representative of a sword, and his exciting civil wars and bloodshed symbols of similar acts by those whom he denotes, why is not the balance of this rider the symbol also of a balance, and his acts in respect to grain, oil, and wine representative of acts of the same kind, which they were to exert in respect to those articles? And why are not

wheat and barley, also, and oil and wine, held to be symbols of themselves, instead, as he construes them, of the word of God?

Though thus inconsistent, however, with himself, and unaware of the law which should have guided him to such a construction, he is right in treating those symbols as standing for orders that differ from themselves; and in regarding the grain, oil, and wine, by which the body is sustained in life, as denoting the word of God and other means of religious knowledge and sanctification, which are to the mind as the means of understanding faith, love, and hope, what food is to the body; and had he considered the import of the symbolization as thus construed, he would have seen that the agency which it foreshows, was exerted by a far larger class of persons than the bishops of Rome. The horseman is an emperor, who assumes an absolute authority over the means of corporeal subsistence, determines the rates at which they shall be surrendered to him, and transferred from one owner to another; and exercises his power in such a manner as to produce a scarcity, and even tempt persons to mutilate their vines and fig trees, in order, by rendering them unproductive at the period of assessment, which occurred once in fifteen years, to escape taxation. As the horseman thus denotes official persons of a different order from himself, and persons who exert an agency towards men in their moral and religious relations, analogous to that which he exerts towards them as corporeal beings,—those whom he symbolizes must be ecclesiastics, who usurp authority over the word of God and other means of instruction and sanctification, and use their power to deprive their people of the aids and supports of penitence, faith, love, peace, and joy, which it is the proper business of their office to yield. He must be considered, therefore, as representing all those usurping ministers of the church who have assumed such an authority over the means and business of religious instruction, withheld the word of God and the truths which it teaches from their people, prohibited others from communicating it to them, and reduced them thereby to a condition analogous to that of a population who are subjected to famine by excessive exactions, and unjust laws respecting the purchase and sale of food.

The great body of the ministers of the church, therefore, especially of the higher orders, from the second to the sixteenth century, and many to the present time, are, as well as the popes of Rome, to be regarded as represented by him.

In his explication of the fourth seal he quits the ground on which he frames his construction of this, and shows by the incongruities into which he falls, that he is unaware what the relations are which symbols sustain to that which they represent. He interprets the fourth horse of infidelity. The Roman Catholic religion, he says,

"Has recently been superseded by different principles in the minds of men; and the spiritual state of man puts on a new aspect, that is the paleness of death. From superstition the descent was easy to infidelity, and the blackness of darkness was changed into the lividness of death. And if Christianity, Mahometanism, and Popery have heretofore been seen holding their divided, however different, sway over the minds of men, not less marked than these, we may now come and see infidelity. John saw but the figure; we are witnesses of the fact. Modern sceptical philosophy, falsely so called, occupies the last space in the view of the hostile forms by which Christianity has been assaulted."—Pp. 204, 205.

Were infidelity, however, a religion, it could not be symbolized by the horse. What conceivable analogy is there between a horse, though livid, and a combination of propositions denying the truth of Christianity? Does the animal present any more resemblance to the disbelief and denial of God's being and the truth of his word, than to the disbelief and denial of any other reality or truth? But infidelity is not a religion, but a rejection and denial of Christianity. This he himself affirms. "Religion, the life of the soul, was extinct, and nothing but a death-like form could designate its state. Men had no hope in heaven, no faith in God, no thought of retribution." If then, as he avers on a preceding page, each horse of the seals must denote a religion, it cannot, in this instance, be the symbol of that mere negation of the Christian system. It is inconsistent also with the fundamental laws of representative prediction. If the horse be taken as an agent, it must, in order to analogy, be the symbol of an agent. There is no correspondence between such a living

being and a mere system of propositions, or such a system conjoined with a belief or disbelief of it. If, on the other hand, the horse be taken as a mere auxiliary of the rider, then that which it represents must stand in such a relation as an instrument to the agents whom the horseman symbolizes, as this steed bears to its rider. But infidelity was not to the philosophers who entertained and propagated it, what the horse was to his rider. Their infidelity was predicable of them. They entertained it. They were its authors and propagators. The horse was not predicable of his *rider*. He did not elaborate and give existence to it. Infidelity was not their auxiliary. It was their aim to communicate and give diffusion to it. In order to such a correspondence, therefore, as Dr. K.'s construction requires, it should have been the rider's aim to communicate and give diffusion to his *horse*, so that it should be the possession and auxiliary of others, as it was his! Does Dr. K. see any indication in the agency that is ascribed to him, that that was his object?

In his explication of the action of the horseman he assumes that he symbolizes warriors, and that his sword, and other means of destruction, and the death he inflicts, are representatives severally of themselves, instead of instruments and inflictions of a different species. But if that is justifiable, why does he not make the horse also the symbol of horses; and why did he not treat the wheat and barley also, the oil and wine, and the balance of the third seal, as standing for themselves? What could more clearly show than these continual variations of the principle on which he interprets the symbols, that he has no settled view of the relations that subsist between them and that which they represent? He refers the seal to the close of the last and beginning of the present century, and supposes the infidelity which it foreshows is that of the French and Germans; and the slaughters it denotes, those that attended and followed the French revolution. Instead of these mistaken constructions, the laws of symbolization require that the horseman should, as in the former instances, be taken as standing for ecclesiastics; the death which they inflict as religious, or a death of the soul; and the means by which they accomplish it, of natures that are to the mind what the sword, famine, pestilence, and wild beasts are to the body: and it

has had its verification through the long period of fifteen centuries in the usurpations, false teachings, suppression of the truth, and persecutions by which the ministers of the church have struck their people with a spiritual death.

He regards the fifth seal as "retrospective." He says :—

"It marks the trials and sufferings of the servants of Jesus during the long continued operation of the mystery of iniquity." "From the earliest to the latest period, the conflict through which Christians have to pass in fighting the good fight of faith, and being faithful unto death, is set forth to view, as well as the sure triumph of the faith in which they lived, and for which the martyrs died."—Pp. 214, 215.

This, however, is undoubtedly mistaken. The acts of the souls, instead of being representative of their lives here, were consequential on their martyrdom, and simply expressed their desire to know how long God was to delay avenging their blood on the inhabitants of the earth; while the gift to them of white robes indicates their justification; and the announcement that they were to rest for a little season, till the number of their fellow servants, also, who were to be killed, should be completed, shows that the period of the last slaughter of the witnesses, and the destruction of their persecutors was soon to arrive. Instead, therefore, of symbolizing acts and events on earth, they represent transactions in heaven; and in place of exhibiting the conflict through which Christians are called to pass from the earliest to the latest age, their period is but a short time before the advent of the Redeemer. Their epoch was probably during the progress, or at the close of the persecutions of the Reformation.

Dr. Keith takes but a slight notice of the sixth seal, on the ground that it is not yet fulfilled, and that it cannot be known what the events are which it foreshows until it is accomplished. But how, unless the symbols themselves are understood, can it be known what the events are that are their accomplishment? If no knowledge is possessed of the import of the signs, or the principles on which they are to be interpreted, how can it be ascertained that one set of agents and acts are those which they foreshow, rather than another? If the assumption on which Dr. Keith proceeds in most of his con-

structions is legitimate, that the symbol and that which it denotes are of the same species, then it may as well be known before as after their occurrence, that the earthquake of the sixth seal symbolizes a literal earthquake; the change of the sun to black, and the moon to bloodiness, such a change of those bodies; the fall of the stars, the descent of those orbs to the earth; and the departure of the heavens, their literal disappearance. And, on the other hand, if it is uncertain whether they are employed in that relation, or on the principle of analogy to denote resembling agents and events in the civil world, then it must be equally uncertain what their import is after the agents and events which they represent have come into existence.

He concurs with the great body of modern commentators in regarding the symbols of the first four trumpets as denoting the devastation and overthrow of the western Roman empire by the Goths, and other northern tribes, in the fifth century. He enters, however, into no analysis of the symbols, or evolution of the analogy that subsists between them and the events which he alleges as their accomplishment. The whole ground on which he rests his constructions seems to be that much the same terms that are used by the prophet in his description of the symbols and their effects, are employed also by Gibbon, in his delineations of the ravage of the empire, and slaughter of the inhabitants by the Goths. But can any assumption be more absurd, or expose to greater errors? If the expressions, "a furious tempest was excited among the nations of Germany," "*the dark cloud* which was collected along the coasts of the Baltic, *burst in thunder* upon the banks of the Danube, *the consuming flames* of war spread from the banks of the Rhine over the greatest part of Gaul," and others of the kind, prove that the events which the historian employs them to describe, are those which are represented by the symbol; does not the use of similar terms and expressions in the description of other invasions and wars show, with equal conclusiveness, that they also are the acts and catastrophes which the symbolic tempest foreshows? On the ground on which Dr. K. here proceeds, there is no more proof that the events which he alleges are those which are denoted by the symbol of the first trumpet, than they are which he regards as the

accomplishment of the second. But no fancy could be more groundless and preposterous than that the use of certain terms in the description of events is an indication that they are the events denoted by a symbol in which the same or synonymous terms are employed. It is to make the phraseology of historians, instead of the events which they relate, the media of the proof that predictions are accomplished. If no historian happens to use such terms by a metaphor, then an event, though it is precisely such as the symbol represents, is not to be considered as that which it denotes. If half only of the writers who narrate it, use such terms, and half employ other language, they must be considered as neutralizing each other, and the interpreter left without any evidence that it is that which the prediction foreshows. Yet it is on this absurd ground, that would confute every allegation he has made of events as accomplishing the prophecy, that he generally proceeds. Whether he treats a symbol and that which it denotes as of the same species or not, he seems to suppose that the language employed by the prophet in describing the symbol and the historian in narrating the event in which it was fulfilled, must, of necessity, be essentially the same; and, accordingly, when he turns over the pages of Gibbon, Scott, or other writers, to find the counterpart of a symbol, his search is for words and expressions that resemble those of the prediction. If the terms hail, fire, and others are employed by the prophet that imply that the symbol was a tempest, he looks for the words storm, tempest, thunder, fire, and others that are employed in the description of some great calamity. If the words sword, famine, pestilence, death, are used, passages in which they are conspicuous are selected as presenting the events in which the symbol has its verification!

It is on this theory that he alleges the conquering and devastating wars of the Vandals, on the coasts of the Mediterranean, as the events symbolized, under the second trumpet, by the dejection of a burning mountain into the sea, and destruction of ships. He assumes that the sea was the scene of the catastrophe, and the destruction of ships one of the calamities which it occasioned; and quotes passages, accordingly, in which, fleets, vessels, and the sea are mentioned, and naval battles are narrated.

"Heraclion, count of Africa, was tempted to assume the title of emperor. *The ports of Africa* were immediately filled with *the naval forces*, at the head of which he prepared to invade Italy; and his *fleet*, when he cast anchor at the mouth of the Tiber, surpassed the fleets of Xerxes and Alexander, if all the vessels . . . did amount to the incredible number of three thousand two hundred.

"The consciousness of guilt . . . prompted the guards of the Pyrenees to desert their station; to unite the arms of the Suevi, the Vandals, and the Alarici; and to swell the torrent which was poured with irresistible violence from the frontiers of Gaul to the *SEA of Africa*.

"Genseric cast his eyes towards the SEA; he resolved to create a *new naval power*, and his bold enterprise was executed with steady perseverance; . . . his new subjects were skilled in the art of navigation and ship-building; he animated his daring Vandals to embrace a mode of warfare which would render *every maritime country accessible to their arms* . . . and the *fleet* that issued from the port of Carthage again claimed the empire of the Mediterranean.

"The imperial navy of three hundred long galleys, with an adequate proportion of transports and smaller vessels, was collected in the harbor of Carthage in Spain. But Genseric . . . guided by secret intelligence, surprised the unguarded fleet . . . many of the ships were *sunk*, or *taken*, or *burnt*, and the preparations of three years were destroyed in a single day."—Pp. 236-239.

It is on the ground of these and other similar expressions used by Gibbon, that Dr. K. regards the events which they are employed in describing, as those that are symbolized by "a great mountain burning with fire, cast into the sea;" in consequence of "which "the third part of the sea became blood, and the third part of the creatures which were in the sea died, and the third part of the *ships* were destroyed." But if the use of the sea as the symbol shows that the sea was to be the scene of the events which are foreshown by it; and the use of ships, that ships were to be subjects of the catastrophe; then the use of a burning mountain proves with equal certainty, that a volcanic mountain was to be the instrument by which the sea was to be converted to blood, and the ships borne on its bosom, or anchored in its harbors, destroyed; and that the conversion of the waters into blood and destruction of the fish, were also to have a literal fulfilment, and Dr. K., accordingly, must show that such a

mountain was thrown into the Mediterranean at the period to which he refers the fulfilment, in order to demonstrate that it was verified at that epoch. The fact that the Vandals exerted the acts which he ascribes to them can be no evidence, whatever that that was the era in which the prophecy was accomplished. It is to desert and overturn his own principles to assume that they, instead of a burning mountain, were the agents of the catastrophe.

He falls into the same error in his interpretation of the symbol of the third trumpet, in assuming that the rivers and fountains are the scene of the events foreshown, but that, instead of a great star falling from heaven, Attila and his armies were the agents of the calamity. If the fountains and rivers are to be taken as designating the scene, why is not the star to be regarded as the instrument of the catastrophe, and the conversion of the water by it to wormwood, as the mode in which it wrought its effect? Besides, on the ground on which he proceeds, what adequate reason is there for the assumption that the wars of Attila rather than others are those foreshown by the symbol? The borders of the great rivers of Europe have been the theatre of hundreds of battles besides those of that conqueror.

He abandons this rule of construction again in explaining the symbols of the fourth trumpet, and construes the sun, moon, and stars, which were smitten with darkness, as denoting objects of a different order from themselves. He errs still, however, in treating them as symbols, sometimes of the throne of the Roman empire, sometimes of the imperial power, and sometimes of the Roman empire itself; instead of its supreme rulers, which are the only agents in the state that correspond to those heavenly bodies in the physical world.

He concurs with Mr. Mede and the great body of writers of the last two centuries, in referring the fifth and sixth trumpets to the Saracens and Turks. He regards the rainbow angel, that set his right foot on the sea, and his left on the land, as representing the reformation, instead of the reformers, as the laws of symbolization require; and interprets the seven thunders that uttered their voices immediately after his cry, as indicating wars; which is equally incongruous. They were not mere thunders, but intelligible voices, as is apparent

from the apostle's designing to write them: they were the response doubtless of a vast multitude to the cry of the angel; and the reason why they were not written probably was that they symbolized expressions of opinion that were erroneous. They have no adaptation, therefore, to represent wars. There is no analogy between the loud shouts, or tumultuous exclamations of a vast crowd, and wars. Thunders do not kill: it is the lightning that destroys, not the vibration of the atmosphere which it occasions. His attempt to reduce the wars that followed the Reformation through near two hundred and fifty years to seven is as unsuccessful and absurd as his construction of the thunders. Their number was not only several times greater, but many of them had no immediate reference to the doctrines or interests of religion, or the question at issue between the Protestants and Catholics.

He concurs with the best writers in regarding the witnesses as symbols of the churches of the Waldenses and Albigenses, but deems their death and resurrection future; and, though from his inacquaintance with the laws of analogy, unaware of the most efficient objections to the views Mr. Elliott entertains, he gives in his strictures a better confutation of his errors on that, than on any other part of the prophecy.

He falls into several important errors in his explication of the twelfth and thirteenth chapters of the Apocalypse, such as exhibiting the woman clothed with the sun, as denoting "the kingdom of heaven," instead of the true worshippers; her man-child as standing for "the children of the kingdom," in place of a line of civil rulers who were expected to repress the enemies of the church; and his being caught up unto God and to his throne, as denoting the assumption of the children of the kingdom to heaven, instead of a usurpation of the rights of God by the monarchs whom he symbolized; the representation that the forty-two months during which power was given to the ten-horned wild beast, are to be reckoned from the foundation of Rome, instead of the establishment of the ten kingdoms, after the overthrow of the western Roman empire; and others; but to notice them at length would require a larger space than we can appropriate to the discussion; and we proceed to his explication of the vials, in which

he repeats the incongruities and inconsistencies that mark his views of the trumpets.

He refers the first to the French revolution, and regards the insurrections, conflicts, and slaughters of that period, as the evils foreshown by the symbol. But that is inconsistent with the laws of analogy. As the evils caused by the vial were corporeal, they must, by the laws of symbolization, denote resembling disorders of the mind. There is no correspondence between the sufferings occasioned by ulcers on the bodies of individuals, that spring from causes within themselves, and injuries, wounds, and death inflicted on them by the hands of others. In order to a resemblance the cause must in each instance lie within, and be to the mind in that which is foreshown, what the ulcer which is its symbol is to the body. The vial had its accomplishment, accordingly, not in the contests and slaughters of the revolution, but in the malign principles, passionate excitements, tormenting inquietudes, and sense of injury and misery, which filled the minds of the French people at that period, and led to the revolution and its outrages.

He proceeds in his interpretation of the second vial, as in his view of the second trumpet, on the assumption that the sea on which the vial was poured, is "the site" also of the events which are foreshown.

"And the second angel poured out his vial upon the sea, and it became as the blood of a dead man; and every living soul died in the sea. In a more enlarged sense, we have to look once again, as in the days of Genseric, but after near fourteen hundred years, to the sea, to witness the similar but still deadlier effects of the latter vision.

"No prophecy of Scripture is of any private interpretation; the event finally unfolds it. At the end it will speak and not lie. And if the time be indeed past, and the judgment be *manifest*, the proof of it may be obvious, and the most potent of all authorities may be appealed to in illustration. . . . We need but to open an almanac, to see the close succession and connexion between the first and second vial, copying the words in their exact order."—Pp. 476, 477.

He accordingly quotes a notice of several naval victories of the British over the French, Spanish, and Dutch. But if, as he thus assumes, the symbolic sea denotes the literal sea,

the effects wrought in it must also represent effects wrought in the literal sea; and his reference of the prediction to naval battles, in place of being legitimate, is indisputably mistaken. No event can verify the prophecy on the principle on which he proceeds, but the actual conversion of the sea into blood, and the death of all the animals that inhabit it. He not only enters into no "elaborate investigation" of the mode in which symbols are employed, but holds that their import, instead of being determined from themselves, is to be learned solely from the events which they foreshow; and supposes that the mark by which it is known that an event is that denoted by a symbolic prediction is, that the historian who records it employs terms of the same import as those which are used by the prophet in the description of the symbol; which is to treat the prophecy as conveyed through language, instead of symbols, and is not only mistaken, but would confute every construction which Dr. K. has given in his volume. What position could be more unfortunate for an interpreter?

He founds his exposition of the third vial on the same false views.

"The reader may, perhaps, have already seen how prophetic terms may derive their most intelligible exposition from historical facts. And it is not now, when we have reached the period of *manifest* judgments, that the Word of God anywise needs *that man should come in with his terms of explanation*. But comparing things spiritual with spiritual, the meaning may be plain; and looking into events that fill their place in history, and that startled the world with their magnitude, no less than the foremost of naval wars, the proof may be as clear. *The sea was the scene of the second trumpet as well as of the second vial. And in like manner the third trumpet determines the site of the third vial.* . . The scene of the third trumpet was *the rivers and fountains of waters*; the fountains that rise, and the rivers that flow from the Alps and Apennines, and which render northern Italy a land of streams. There Attila the great star fell.

"The locality of the rivers and fountains of waters as a specific region in the Roman territory, abridged as it then was, and in reference to the downfall of imperial Rome, *may thus be held as determined*. And without attaching any diversity of meaning, or adopting any other significance to the *same words*, which would thus throw the subject loose to every imagination as to the winds, we have to look again to the *same*

rivers and fountains of waters, but to the whole, not merely to a part."—Pp. 486, 488.

He thus openly discards the main symbols as the media of the prediction, and treats the question of interpretation as a mere question of philology. The "*words*" are to determine the meaning,—not the nature of the symbolic objects of which they are the denominatives. And the prediction, consequently, is to be regarded as accomplished by events that occur in a scene bearing the same name as the symbol, and are designated by the terms that are used in describing that by which they are foreshown. He, accordingly, assumes that the rivers and fountains of northern Italy were the scene of the events revealed under the third vial; and that these events were the slaughters of the French, Austrians, Russians, and Italians, in their battles in Piedmont and Lombardy, immediately after the French revolution. But this is wholly untenable, even on the assumption on which he proceeds. If the rivers and fountains were the scene in which the predicted events were to take place, as the sea was "the site," according to his construction, of the events symbolized under the second trumpet and second vial, then the catastrophe here foreshown, must have literally taken place *in* the fountains and rivers: not merely on their banks or in the territories through which they pass. But the battles and slaughters of the French and their antagonists in their wars in Italy, from 1796 to 1800, were not fought in the fountains and streams of Piedmont and Lombardy. On his own ground, then, his reference of the symbol is wholly mistaken. He can no more assume that slaughters in the vicinity of "the Po, Tanaro, and a thousand other streams which descend from the Alps," are slaughters *in* those streams and their fountains, than that battles near the shores of the Mediterranean and Adriatic are battles on those seas. On his views of the mode in which the prophecy is fulfilled, he must find a battle that literally took place *in* the streams and fountains of Italy, and converted their waters into blood, in order to prove that it is that which is foreshown in the prediction. But, on the assumption that the rivers and fountains are thus "the site" of the catastrophe that is foreshown, he contradicts the expli-

cation given by the interpreting angel of the waters, as well as subverts his own construction. The angel treats the rivers and fountains as symbols,—not of themselves, but of men.

“ And I heard the angel of the waters say, Thou art righteous, O Lord, which art, and wast, and shalt be, because thou hast judged thus. For they have shed the blood of saints and prophets, and thou hast given them blood to drink, for they are worthy. And I heard another out of the altar say, Even so, Lord God Almighty, true and righteous are thy judgments.”

It is thus shown by the passage itself that the subjects of the predicted calamity were men, not fountains and streams. The streams and fountains were used as symbols. They had not shed the blood of martyrs and prophets, and could not be judged for that crime. Dr. Keith, however, has no suspicion that his construction is open to any such objection. Because there are numerous fountains and rivers in Piedmont and Lombardy, he regards it as so certain that they are “ the site ” of the predicted events, that there is no need “ that man should come in with his terms of explanation.” But were his assumption legitimate, would not the fact that the fountains and streams of Switzerland, Germany, Spain, and Portugal are very numerous, form an equal proof that they also were “ the site ” of the predicted catastrophe?

In place of these incongruities, had he studied the prophecy instead of the almanac to ascertain what it reveals, and made himself acquainted with its laws, he would have seen that the sea of the second vial, and the fountains and rivers of the third, are symbols of peoples and nations, as is shown by the voices of the angels, which treat the fountains and streams as denoting communities that had shed the blood of saints and prophets. The changes wrought in the waters accordingly represent resembling changes that were to be wrought in those nations. They were to be besmeared with each other's blood, and inflict on one another in that way a just judgment, for their persecution of God's true worshippers. The waters were no more to be “ the site ” of the event foreshown, than that event was to be their literal conversion to blood. As the

whole sea became like blood, and all the animals living in it died, it denotes a nation that sheds its own blood, and slaughters those who derive their support from it; and undoubtedly, therefore, symbolizes the French at the period of the revolution when they stained themselves as a people with each other's blood, and put to death their king, queen, princes, and a vast crowd of inferior officials. As fountains and streams are smaller and separate bodies of water, they are to be taken as standing for the separate tribes and nations of Europe, and their conversion to blood as denoting their being reddened with slaughter, and in the carnage, therefore, doubtless, with which they were wasted by the French, who invaded their territories in the wars that followed the revolution.

He falls into similar inconsistencies and incongruities in an interpretation of the symbol of the fourth angel who "poured out his vial upon the sun, and power was given unto it to scorch men with fire. He here, however, quits his theory, that symbols and that which they denote are of the same species; and treats the sun as standing for the emperor of France, instead of itself, and its scorching heat as representing the fire of his artillery, in place of its own rays.

"If we look to the political horizon, after the Italian campaigns of the close of the last century, a sun is seen arising, which, *manifest* as the sun in the firmament, soon shone with unparalleled brilliancy over Europe, scorched the nations in its course, and of which *the setting or the smiting* was scarcely less marvellous than the great heat of its scorching blaze . . .

"Divested of hypothesis—the Scriptural warrant for the appropriation of the emblem, the *sun* to Napoleon; the power that was given him, the scorching of men with great heat, or the grievous effect of his ascendancy, in chastisement of the nations, over the kingdoms of Europe . . . his fall, like the smiting of the sun; . . . all speak in such a manner as to show that this judgment, too, has been made manifest."—Pp. 533, 534.

And he proceeds to quote history and the almanac to prove that Bonaparte was the great luminary of the political firmament in Europe, at that period, and exerted an agency on the nations that answers to the sun's scorching by its rays. He

here, however, relapses again to the assumption, that the event denoted by scorching, is indicated by the employment by the historian of a term in describing it, that implies the use of fire; and he finds it in the metaphorical representation that Bonaparte's "artillery plunged incessant fire" on the Austrians and Russians at the battle of Austerlitz, where a large body of them were driven on to "small frozen lakes," and nearly twenty thousand almost instantly destroyed by a storm of shot, which dashed the ice to fragments, and precipitated them into the freezing water;—an extraordinary mode, certainly, of scorching men with fire.

"It was the battle of the emperors, and on that day the sun of Bonaparte not only arose with brilliancy, and eclipsed at once the two great rival luminaries of continental Europe, but *men were scorched with great heat* before it. Power was given unto him to scorch men with *fire*. He poured his ever-firing troops between the ranks of the enemy, and the artillery plunged incessant *fire* on them, till the spectacle of ruin was horrible, even in the sight and according to the word of the great destroyer. Such is the first of manifold illustrations of the *power* that was given to the emperor Napoleon to scorch men with fire. Such was the effect of the first burning rays which it emitted."—P. 548.

It would not be easy, we apprehend, to transcend this in absurdity. If the use of the word fire, in the description of the symbol, proves that that which is foreshown is also to be caused by fire, does not the use of the word sun, in that description, equally demonstrate that the sun is to be the cause of the evils that are foreshown? On what ground can Dr. K. justify his explication of the different parts of the symbol by such opposite laws? But he contradicts analogy as well as confutes himself in this construction. There is no adaptation in the emission of fiery rays from the sun, and scorching men with their heat, to symbolize the destruction of armies by artillery. There is no indication in the effect wrought by the symbol, that men died under the infliction. Instead, their blaspheming God, that had power over the plague, and repenting not to give him glory, shows that they still lived. Its effect was torture merely, not death. Dr. K. finally completes the error and absurdity of his construction

by representing that the pouring of the vial on the sun symbolized a personal infliction on Bonaparte, by which his military power was destroyed!

"Power was given to Napoleon, as emperor, to scorch men with fire, and men were scorched with great heat, yet the vial was poured upon the sun itself, till it could neither scorch nor hurt any more, and every ray of its glory was extinguished . . .

"The fated year approached, when Fortune, hitherto unwearied in her partiality towards Napoleon, turned, first upon himself personally, a clouded and stormy aspect,—or in other words, not less significant and expressive, the vial of wrath was poured out upon the sun, even upon him to whom power was given to scorch men with fire: and as under the former vial the French were, in the same place, the victims of the wrath of which they had been the executioners, so Bonaparte himself, or the imperial power identified with his person . . . was fated to destruction."—Pp. 504, 506.

And he refers for proof of it to the conflagration of Moscow and destruction of the French army by *frost* in their retreat from that city. "Napoleon at length rode out of Moscow through streets in many parts arched over with flames. He who had scorched men with fire, felt by more than an emblem, that he now was a victim rather than the scourge, that wrath was prepared for himself, and that the destruction of his power was begun," p. 569. But what misconception of the symbol could be more preposterous? The effect of the vial on the sun was that its rays were raised to a scorching heat, not that they were divested of their warmth! that it became the instrument of torturing men; not that it was itself tortured with its own heat! According to Dr. K., however, it was the sun that was scorched with fire, and the effect of the self-torturing heat, with which it became charged, was that it lost the power of scorching men! What an admirable exemplification of the expediency of giving interpretations "on simply reading the book," without entering into "any elaborate investigation" whether they are legitimate, or confute themselves and misrepresent the prophecy! Moreover, if the effect of the vial on the sun was the destruction of its power by fire, then, on the principles on which Dr. K. proceeds, it should have been by the action of fire on Bona-

parte personally that he was deprived of his power. Does Dr. K. see any indication in the history that Bonaparte was actually scorched by the fire of Moscow, and lost his power at that juncture? If, on the other hand, it was on his troops that the influence by which he was to lose his power was to fall, then they should have been destroyed by *fire*, not by frost and snows! It was of the latter, however, that they were the victims. The conflagration of Moscow simply compelled them to retreat. They perished by the storms and rigor of the winter, with which they were immediately overtaken.

His exposition of the fifth vial is marked by the same inconsistencies with the laws of symbolization. He regards Rome as the throne of the beast on which the vial was poured, and the darkness with which its kingdom was filled, as denoting the ignorance, superstition, and debasement of the papal nations of Europe immediately after the fall of Bonaparte. But Rome was not the throne or official station of the civil rulers whom the beast symbolizes. It was the capital of the papal states simply, not of the French, Spaniards, Prussians, Austrians, or any other people of the ten kingdoms. He errs in an equal degree in his views of the condition symbolized by the darkness with which its kingdom was filled. That darkness was the consequence of the effusion of the vial on the throne, and was extraordinary. But the ignorance and superstition of the papal nations, immediately after the overthrow of Bonaparte, was not the effect of his fall, nor were they extraordinary. In many respects the nations were in a better state, intellectually, than at the commencement of his career. Instead of ignorance and debasement, which have been their characteristics for many generations, the condition denoted by the darkness of the beast's kingdom was one of political uncertainty, confusion, and inability to see what were to be the effects of their own measures; analogous to the state of isolation and uncertainty in which a people would be placed, whose territory should, for a succession of days, be wrapped in impenetrable darkness: and the symbol, doubtless, has had its fulfilment in a degree, at least in the confusion and cross agencies of the nations of Europe since the revolution of 1848. They have been as unable to determine their

relations to one another, to act in concert, and with assurance and effect, and to anticipate the issue of their movements, as so many bodies of men would be, who should attempt to act in concert, and accomplish great and difficult undertakings, when enveloped in total darkness.

He gives the usual construction of the sixth vial as foreshowing the decay of the Turkish empire. "And the sixth angel poured out his vial upon the great river Euphrates; and the water thereof was dried up, that the way of the kings of the east might be prepared."

"The Turkish empire, under the same designation which it had previously borne, is here manifestly represented, anew . . . Symbolized by the Euphrates, the fall, and, finally, the dissolution of the Turkish empire, are marked by the drying up of the waters From first to last, the prophecy needs no comment but the history which it prefigured, or plainly foretold."—P. 611.

Where, however, is the evidence that the Euphrates is the symbol of the Turkish empire? What are his proofs that the prophecy "prefigures" the history which he alleges as its fulfilment? He offers none whatever. He simply avers that that empire is denoted by the river here, because it was represented by it under the sixth trumpet. That, however, is wholly mistaken and impossible. The Euphrates was not there the symbol of the Turks themselves, who invaded the Roman territory. They were represented by the two myriads of myriads of horsemen. The river was not there released from restraint so as to overflow its banks and deluge Syria, Asia Minor, and Egypt. It was the four angels that were loosed who were prepared to slay a third part of men. His construction is, therefore, not only groundless, but wholly inconsistent with the symbols. There is not the slightest indication in the passage, that the Euphrates denotes anything more than the boundary of the empire or line at which the horsemen commenced their work of slaughter. Nor is it possible to reconcile that interpretation of the river with the other symbols that are associated with it. If it is the Turkish empire that is denoted by that river, what and where is the great Babylon of the prophecy, beneath whose walls the

Euphrates ran? It certainly cannot be Rome. It cannot be the Roman Catholic church. It cannot be the nationalized hierarchies of the ten kingdoms: for they are not to the Turkish government or empire, what Babylon was to the Euphrates. What, moreover, is it that is to be conquered in consequence of the decay of the Turkish empire, as ancient Babylon was conquered by the drying up of the river? And who are the conquerors who are denoted by the kings of the east? Dr. K. suggests that they are the Jews. But are the Jews to be the destroyers of great Babylon? Are they to invade Europe, and overthrow Rome, or the Roman Catholic church, of which many regard Babylon as the symbol? Are they to be the agents by whom the denationalization of the hierarchies is to be accomplished, which are the bodies denoted by the great city? *Credat Judæus Apella.* But Dr. K. will not find even a Jew weak enough to believe that. The Israelites are, at their restoration, to go from the east and the west, and from the north and the south to *Palestine*, not to the ten kingdoms of western Europe. A tenth part of the city, moreover, we are expressly shown, is to be overthrown by a political revolution, consequent on the resurrection of the witnesses. The others are to be dejected from their station by the nations over which they have domineered, as is seen from the direction under which her destroyers are to act, "Reward her even as she has rewarded you." The reference of the symbol to the Turkish power, by Dr. Keith and others, is thus wholly mistaken; and presents a striking exemplification of the false and absurd grounds on which they often found their constructions of the prophecy. They offer but two reasons for regarding the Euphrates as denoting the Turkish empire or people. The first is, that in a prediction by Isaiah, of the invasion of Judea by the Assyrians, the king of that people and his armies are denominated "the waters of the river," and it is foreshown that "he shall come up over all his channels, and go over all his banks, and shall pass through Judah." But the waters of the river are not there employed as a symbol. They are only used by a metaphor, to illustrate the overwhelming force with which the Assyrian monarch was to invade and overrun Judea. It no more follows from the fact that he and his troops are in that instance

called by a figure "the waters of the river," that the Euphrates, when used as a symbol, denotes the king of Assyria and his army, than it follows from the fact that, according to Jotham's parable, "The trees went forth on a time to anoint a *king* over them, and said to the olive tree, Reign thou over us," that the olive tree, when used as a symbol in the vision of Zechariah and John, stands for a king of the trees. But admitting even that the river is there used as a symbol of the Assyrians, the Turks could not be considered as the people who are represented by it, as they are neither Assyrians, nor are they, at the present time, the chief population of Assyria. That country is inhabited mainly by Arabs, Kurds, Chaldeans, and other tribes; the proportion of Turks residing there is not large.

They offer, as another reason for that interpretation, that the Euphrates is used as a symbol in the vision of the sixth trumpet, in which the invasion of the eastern Roman empire, by the Turks, is foreshown. But the river is not there employed as the representative of the Turks themselves. They are symbolized by the army of horsemen, and their leaders by angels. The Euphrates simply denotes the boundary of the Roman empire, or barrier which the invading hosts overcame on entering the scene in which they were to execute their slaughtering office. The construction, which is thus placed on wholly false grounds, is confuted also by its incongruity with the other parts of the prophecy. It has no Babylon to be overthrown by the drying of the river. It has no agents answering to the kings of the east, for whom a way is to be prepared by the diversion of the waters from their channel. Yet, groundless, impracticable, and absurd, in every respect, as the construction is, there is none in which interpreters more generally concur, or which they are more reluctant to discard.

But the most extraordinary and discreditable misrepresentation of the prophecy into which Dr. Keith has fallen, is that in which, in closing his work, he exhibits the angel from the sun-rising having the seal of the living God, as symbolizing the Asiatic Cholera! It is not simply an error, but the want of taste, the total neglect of analogy, and the palpable disregard which it betrays of the great characters of the vision,

are disreputable. The wildest fanatics, the lowest quacks that have ever abused the prophecy, have offered it no greater outrage. It is inconsistent with a fundamental condition of symbolization. It is an invariable law in representative prediction, that agents stand for agents; and living agents for such as are intelligent: never for mere physical causes, or qualities. There is no analogy between a disease and an angelic being flying through the atmosphere. The angel, therefore, is the symbol of men; not of a pestilence. It is inconsistent with the office of the angel, which was to place the seal of the living God on the foreheads of his servants; by which it is to be made visible and conspicuous, that they are his children, in contradistinction from those who worship the beast and its image; as is shown by the vision of the fourteenth chapter, in which the sealed were seen standing with the Lamb on Mount Zion, and were declared to be redeemed from among men, being the first fruits unto God and to the Lamb. Does Dr. Keith hold that all those who died of the cholera, from 1817 to 1832, the period through which he traces its ravages, were the children of God, and are proved to be such by their falling victims to that disease; though notoriously, in a very large proportion, the lowest and most debased of the irreligious and profligate; and Pagans, Mahometans, Greek worshippers of images, Roman Catholics, infidels, and atheists, as well as evangelical Christians? Such, to be consistent with himself, must be his persuasion. Could he offer a grosser affront to the good sense of his readers?

It is inconsistent with the angel's address to those at the four corners of the earth having power over the winds. Who or what, according to Dr. K., do those angels symbolize? Are they representatives also of pestilence? Were there four other pestilences at the four corners of the earth contemporaneously with the cholera; and did the cholera publicly address them, and exhort them not to begin their fatal work till it could finish its own? But such inquiries are too remote for Dr. Keith. They lie, in his judgment, out of the proper sphere of the interpreter, and are presumptuous. He does not think it necessary to pause and ascertain what the results are to which his assumptions lead.

Such are Dr. Keith's interpretations of the principal sym-

bols of the Apocalypse. Can any higher evidence be required of his disqualification for the task he has undertaken? Can any further proof be necessary of the folly and presumption of attempting the explication of the prophecy, independently of the media through which its revelations are made? He openly disclaims the attempt to explain the symbols by rules, treats it as presumptuous, and holds that their interpretation is the proper work, not of theologians, but of the writers of history.

"In regard to symbolical predictions, no professed theologian, we think, can cope with the *unconscious* historian in the interpretation of the *past*; and after having waited for three centuries, subsequently to the conclusion of them all, till Gibbon *fully* expounded the significance of the first six trumpets, and also, for the same long period, till, if such even yet be the proper appellation, the name of the angel of the Reformation was known, it would scarcely be a demonstration of bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ, *were our souls to be lifted up in high speculation, or bold dogmatizing, concerning visions yet unexpounded by events, or were we to maintain that ANY PECULIAR MODE OF INTERPRETATION should be held a matter of faith, as to what shall be—or what shall not be—when at the end the vision shall speak and not lie, and refute all the fallacies that marred its form, and perhaps at best could but mimic its effect.*"—Pp. 639, 640.

If unconsciousness of what he is accomplishing were a qualification for an interpreter, Dr. K. has, we apprehend, quite an adequate share of it. He is totally unaware, it seems, that when he assumes that a passage in Gibbon *fully* expounds a prediction of the Apocalypse, he puts a construction on it as absolutely as he would were he to interpret it by the laws of symbolization! So totally insensible is he of the import of the act, that it does not occur to him, that unless his views of the symbol are correct, the events related in the history are no verification of it! What admirable perspicacity! He does not suspect that there is any "lifting up of the soul in high speculation, or bold dogmatizing, concerning visions yet unexpounded by events," in maintaining that no "peculiar mode of interpretation should be held as a matter of faith!" He does not see that it is the opposite of bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ, to assume that Gibbon is a better exponent of the revelation the

Redeemer has given the church, than the means themselves are through which that revelation is made! He does not suspect that there is any presumption in supposing that he is better able to determine what its import is, "on simply reading the book," without "any elaborate investigation," than by carefully studying it with all the aids which it furnishes for the discovery of its meaning! Indeed, so completely "*unconscious*" is he of the work he has undertaken, that he imagines that he has proved what the events are that are foreshown in the Apocalypse, without assuming the office of an interpreter, or incurring the responsibility of an explanation of the symbols. Accordingly, by his own admission, he has not studied it. He has not entered into any investigation of the principles on which its symbols are used. He is not aware that they are to be interpreted by laws. He has not any conception that they are founded on analogy. He has no knowledge, indeed, what analogy is. The whole circle of subjects with which he should have made himself familiar before attempting the task of exposition, lies as completely out of the sweep of his inquiries and thoughts, as though it had no existence! His work is, accordingly, what might be expected from such a preposterous course:—a complication of crude guesses, never right except "unconsciously" and by accident, usually wholly wrong, and disfigured throughout by the grossest contradictions and absurdities; and yet, begun and ended with an ostentatious self-congratulation, that he has avoided the presumption of attempting to make the prophecy express his own views, or interpret it by specific laws! He seems, indeed, to imagine that the events foreshown in the prophecy are almost altogether of a single class. No matter what the symbols are, or the explications of them given in the revelation itself—he sees little else indicated by them, except what is directly denoted, or at least suggested by the words, sword, blood, fire, death, darkness, and other similar terms. Almost the whole series of passages, accordingly, quoted by him, from Gibbon, Scott, and other historians, are employed in the detail of battles, slaughters, conquests, conflagrations, or the miseries and ruin that resulted from them. Can any higher proof be required, that if the Apocalypse is ever to be rightly interpreted, it must be by a method wholly different from that

which Dr. K. has pursued? Can any more ample evidence be needed, that if the people of God are to be led to a just understanding of what it reveals, they must be induced to discard such guides, and take the great Revealer himself as their teacher instead of Gibbon; and the media through which he has made known his purposes, in place of the suggestions of a crude and lawless fancy?

ART. VI.—CRITICS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

I.

THE judgment foretold by Christ, Matt. xxv., when the righteous and wicked are to be separated from one another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats, is regarded by some writers as a judgment of nations, in distinction from the individuals of whom they consist. A correspondent, who enumerates some of the grounds on which they found that construction, asks what the considerations are that show it to be a judgment of persons, rather than of communities.

It is indicated, it seems to us, by the whole representation.

1. By their separation one from another. Those who are to be judged are the living, exclusively. The term nation is used to denote a great community or race of the inhabitants of the earth, who are descended from the same ancestry, occupy the same country, or live under the same government. The separation that is to take place cannot be a separation therefore of nations from one another: for how should the living nations become intermingled so as to require such a re-division? The representation does not require us to suppose that the whole of the nations are to be assembled at one place and judged at one time. It will be verified should they be successively gathered before the judge, divided according to their character, and assigned their final award.

That they are to be living nations, is seen also from the fact that the righteous and wicked are to be intermixed, and require a separation from one another. They cannot be the

dead, inasmuch as the dead are separated into their two classes at death, and as their resurrection is to take place at different periods, 1 Corinthians xv. 23, are not to be intermingled again.

2. The fact that the separation is to be a separation of the righteous and the wicked, shows that it is not to be a separation of nations instead of individuals; as the nations are not, at Christ's coming, to consist universally either of the righteous or the wicked. There is to be "an innumerable multitude out of all nations, and kindreds, and tongues," who are then to be accepted and admitted into the kingdom which God has prepared for them from before the foundation of the world, as is shown in the vision of those who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb, Rev. vii. 9-17. They are not, however, to include whole nations, but to be gathered *out* of them. The Anti-Christian powers are to continue till Christ comes, and a large share of the nations are still to adhere to them, and furnish the crowds that are to constitute their armies. As then the nations are at that epoch to consist, as they now do, of good and evil, the separation that is to take place must be a separation of individuals of those two classes, not a separation of two such classes of nations.

3. This is apparent also from the acts that are ascribed to them. They are acts of individuals towards individuals; not of nations towards them. That nations are not to be the objects of the acts is clear. How could whole nations be at the same juncture, hungry, thirsty, destitute of clothes, without shelter, sick, and *in prison*? But this is placed beyond question by Christ's answer to the inquiry by each class, when they had exerted the acts which he ascribes to them—that inasmuch as they had done them unto *one* of the least of his brethren, they had done them to him. But it is equally clear that nations could not exert those acts towards individuals. How could whole nations, as such, give food, drink, clothing, and shelter to individuals in such a condition; attend them in sickness, and visit them in prison? They are manifestly acts that are not practicable to nations. They must, from their nature, be acts of individuals. They are to be exerted, moreover, by individuals in their private relations, not officially

as representatives or rulers of the nations, manifestly from the fact that the persons towards whom they are to be exerted are to be suffering persecution because of their discipleship to Christ. They, of the living, who are to enter Christ's kingdom, at his coming, are to go out of great tribulation. A short period before his coming there is to be a persecution in which the witnesses are to be slain. At the warning by the third angel, Rev. xiv. 9-13, not to worship the beast and its image, immediately before the harvest of the righteous, and vintage of the wicked,—which probably denote the same separation as that which is here foretold by Christ,—the saints, we are apprised, are, in a crisis of the utmost difficulty, to manifest their *patience*, and give proof of their faith, and, doubtless, by resisting the efforts of the beast, to compel them, against that warning, to pay it homage. A blessing is also pronounced on those who then die for the sake of Christ. And, finally, it is foreshown that at the great moment when Christ is to appear, the Anti-Christian powers are to be engaged in a war on his people, and it is the conduct of the two classes at that epoch, doubtless,—not in less trying and decisive circumstances,—that is to be taken as a test of their character. As those, then, who are to be the objects of the acts in question, are to be persons who are suffering persecution because of their discipleship to Christ, it must be the rulers or representatives of the nations who inflict on them the evils they suffer; inasmuch as they alone will have the power to persecute. It cannot be they therefore, but must be unofficial individuals, who administer to them in their necessities.

These considerations show decisively that it is to be a judgment of individuals, not of communities or nations.

But is it to be a judgment of all the individuals of the nations? We apprehend not. It is not to be a judgment of any except of the two classes who have acted the part ascribed to them; but only comparatively a small proportion of a nation could ordinarily act in such a direct reference to persons who were suffering persecution for their fidelity to Christ. More than half of a people would, except in rare circumstances, be prevented from it by their age. What part could children take in such acts? Thousands of others would naturally be withheld from it by poverty, obscurity, distance,

and other causes of such a nature that their not exerting those acts would not be a test of their character. The accusation, seizure, torture of the pious, or other open and public acts indicating a total heartlessness at their sufferings, when persecuted, have usually been confined to a small part of communities. The sufferers themselves here, it should be noticed, are not exhibited as among the judged, but only those who have acted towards them in the modes that are designated. For an equal reason, those who have not acted towards them in those modes, of course, cannot be among the judged. And that there are to be multitudes of the unconverted who are to survive the destruction at Christ's coming of his open and remorseless enemies, is indicated in several passages of the prophets, Isaiah lxvi. 19, Zech. xiv. 16-19. That some of all nations are to live and become the subjects of Christ's rule after that judgment, is taught in many predictions. Thus, at Christ's coming he is to be invested with a dominion that all people, nations, and languages should serve him, Dan. vii. 14. It is announced in the Apocalypse—at the seventh trumpet, when the saints who have died are to be raised and receive their reward—that the kingdom of the world has become the Messiah's. And after the descent of the New Jerusalem, the nations are said to walk in its light, bear to it their gifts, and be healed by the leaves of its trees of life. That multitudes of the nations are therefore to survive his coming, and still live in the natural body, is clear; and that fact is consistent with the prediction in Matthew, that all such as have shown that they are his disciples or his enemies by their treatment of his brethren in their persecutions, are then to be adjudged according to their character, to everlasting blessedness or punishment.

II.

To inquiries in respect to several other passages, and objections offered to some of the views we have advanced, responses are, for want of space, postponed to a future number.

ART. VII.—MISCELLANIES.

I.

THE NEW JERUSALEM NOT THE SYMBOL OF HEAVEN.

It is not unfrequently offered, by those in the sacred office, as a justification for the neglect of the prophetic Scriptures, that a knowledge of them is not necessary in order to their preaching the gospel; and the study of them is often directly and earnestly discouraged by the representation that it engenders fanaticism, and that those who cultivate it are "capricious and arbitrary" in their methods of interpretation. These parties doubtless suppose they are correct. They feel so sure of it, that they do not deem it necessary to institute any inquiry into their accuracy, or suspect that anything more than their assertion is requisite to satisfy their readers of their truth. We meet, however, with many indications that "capricious and arbitrary" interpretation is not peculiar to students of the prophecies, and that a just knowledge of what God has revealed respecting the future, would, if of no other service, show those who now neglect them, that much which they hold and dignify with the name of the gospel, is not entitled to that sacred appellation. We shall occasionally point out some of the mistaken views into which persons of that class fall, from their neglect to make themselves acquainted with the laws of figures and symbols, or institute a careful inquiry into the meaning of the passages which they attempt to explain.

It is not uncommon for preachers and writers of that class, in treating of the future life of the redeemed, to found their representations on the assumption that the New Jerusalem of the Apocalypse is a symbol of heaven; and that it stands for some orb, or scene in the celestial sphere, which, after the resurrection and judgment of the dead, is to be the abode of the redeemed. We have, within a brief period, heard several discourses from persons of distant parts of the country presenting that view; and met it in commentaries, essays, and periodicals, from quarters that indicate that it is very gene-

rally entertained. It is wholly unauthorized, however, and in open contradiction to the teachings of the prophecy: and is founded on a theory and bespeaks an inacquaintance with the laws of interpretation, that would not for a moment be tolerated in any other profession. Whatever it is that the symbol really means, it does not represent heaven: and that is so plain as to make the ascription to it of such an office discreditable to any who pretend to a knowledge of the laws of the prophecy. We ask the calm attention of the reader to what we shall say on the subject, not merely that he may reject that error, but that he may see the extreme misrepresentations of the word of God to which they are addicted, who deem themselves able to determine its meaning without investigation, and denounce those who found their constructions of its great teachings on its legitimate laws, as capricious and arbitrary.

Let us consider then with impartiality what is taught, Rev. xxi. and xxii, in respect to the New Jerusalem, and see whether it is not clear that it is not the representative of heaven.

In the first place, there is no direct and express representation that it denotes heaven. Such an unhesitating and positive assertion as is often made that it is the symbol of that world, ought to be justifiable, to have the most unequivocal authority for its support. Not a solitary hint, however, is given in the passage that that is its meaning. The imputation to it of that office is wholly gratuitous.

In the next place, the supposition that it is the symbol of heaven, is inconsistent with many of the representations that are given of it. Thus, it "descended *out of heaven* from God." It cannot, by any possibility, therefore, be the symbol of heaven from which it is thus distinguished. If it were that world itself, it could not proceed from it to another scene. It is a singular violation of the symbol, thus to ascribe to it a meaning that is in direct contradiction to one of its plain conditions. Next, it came from heaven to the earth; for the apostle on its descent, in order to see it, was taken to a high mountain. It cannot, therefore, be the representative of heaven. Whatever it is that it denotes, it is something

that descends *from* heaven and is stationed on *the earth*, and fills the office that is assigned it here.

Thirdly, it is stationed in a scene on earth where men, and men in the natural or unglorified body, dwell. It is announced by a voice from heaven that it is the tabernacle of God with men, and he shall, in dwelling in it, dwell with them, and be their God, and they shall be his people. "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away." Men are, therefore, still to exist in unglorified bodies, or these promises would not be appropriate to them. Were they then to be in spiritual bodies, it would be unnecessary to foreshow that they are not to die, nor suffer pain and sorrow. The supposition that they are to be obnoxious to those evils is incompatible with such a nature. And this change, by which they are to be exempted from the inflictions which they now suffer in consequence of the fall, is to be wrought in a measure, at least, by a change of the earth and the atmosphere, from the condition to which they were reduced by the curse, to their primitive healthiness, fruitfulness, and beauty; for "he that sat upon the throne said, Behold, I make all things new." Those things themselves, therefore, are to pass from their present condition into a new, and probably their original form. Fourthly, That it is to be on earth, and where men reside who are in the natural body, is indicated moreover by the representation that "the nations of them that are saved shall walk in its light, and the kings $\tau\tau\varsigma$ $\gamma\tau\varsigma$ of *the earth*, bring their glory and honor into it." Here is a specific statement that the kings who are to bring their glory to it, are the kings of *the earth*; that which it denotes, therefore, is to be on the earth. They cannot carry their honor to it, nor can the nations, their subjects, walk in the light of it, if it is to be stationed in another world. Those who walk in its light are to be in the natural body also, otherwise they cannot exist as nations. Such societies of men are peculiar to this world. Men do not exist as nations and under national kings in heaven. What a monstrous solecism, the supposition that it is the symbol of heaven, thus involves! Is it not strange that writers should persist in putting on it a construction that, in

this manner, contradicts every particular in the description that serves to determine the scene in which that which it denotes is to be stationed? And, finally, this is confirmed by the representation that the leaves of the trees of life that are to grow on the banks of the river running through its street, are to be for the healing of the nations; which shows that there are to be nations after its descent that will need to be healed; and it is indicated by the promise that there shall be no more curse, that there is to be a period when they all will be healed by it, and the curse for ever abolished. The supposition that it is the symbol of heaven, is thus not only without foundation, but is shown by the most irresistible evidence to be a misrepresentation of the passage.

In the third place, the city has no adaptation to represent heaven. It is exhibited throughout the description as situated on the earth, and sustaining its relations to the earth, and its kings and nations. But heaven is not to the earth what such a metropolis is to it; or what a city is to the kingdom in which it is the capital. Nor is such a metropolis to the earth, or to the nations of the earth, what these interpreters suppose heaven is to be. They hold that heaven is a world in which the whole body of the redeemed are to reside; not a mere capital in a world that is to be occupied by another order of beings of man's name and nature. What exquisite skill in the explication of symbols these persons display, who seem to regard themselves as having reached such a summit of wisdom, that it were a degradation to them to stoop to a careful investigation of the laws of the prophecy! What a profound self-knowledge and modesty they exhibit in the assumption that it is not themselves, but those who reject their baseless hypotheses, and construe the prophecies by their legitimate laws, who are obnoxious to the charge of capricious and arbitrary interpretation!

In the fourth place. But in addition to all these proofs of their error, there is in the passage an express explanation of the city as the symbol of the Lamb's wife, who is herself the representative of the risen and glorified saints. "And there came unto me one of the seven angels which had the seven vials full of the seven last plagues, and talked with me, saying, come hither, I will show thee *the bride, the Lamb's*

wife. And he carried me away in the spirit to a great and high mountain, and showed me that great city, the holy Jerusalem, descending out of heaven from God." It is something worse than caprice and arbitrariness that can confront this direct announcement by the interpreting angel and the prophet, and teach that, instead of the Lamb's wife, who represents his risen saints, the city is the symbol only of a remote world, or the scene in which the redeemed are to reside! How is it that men, who fear God, and mean to be guided in their views of his purposes by his word, can thus set aside its most unequivocal teachings, and assign to it so false and preposterous a meaning? Is there any other explanation, than that they have neglected to study the prophecy; that they have disdained, through prejudice, to avail themselves of the aids which they might have enjoyed for discerning its meaning; and that they are in consequence left to their self-confidence and pride? Let us remind them of the terrible retribution with which Christ forewarns us he will visit those who thus misrepresent his word: "I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, if any man shall add unto these *things*, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book. And if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and the things which are written in this book." Are not those who carelessly, or under the influence of a false theory, thus misrepresent its teachings, guilty of essentially the same offence as those who deliberately add by forgery to its predictions, or diminish them by erasure? Such a violation of the prophecy cannot at any rate be less than highly criminal; and we apprehend that not a few of those who are addicted to it, and especially those who are accustomed to denounce the conscientious and just interpreters of the prophecy, are, in fact, animated by as presumptuous and anti-christian a spirit as the ancient forgers were who attempted to substitute their supposititious revelations in its place. It is time at least that those who acknowledge their responsibility to God should discontinue this gross and careless abuse of his word. It is time that those who make pretensions to scholarship, and regard them-

selves as masters of "the science of interpretation," should be withheld by a concern for their own credit, if by no higher motive, from such misrepresentations of the sacred word, which it is their business to interpret by its legitimate laws.

II.

TYPES AND SYMBOLS.

Several articles of interest on the interpretation of the prophetic Scriptures have appeared in the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, edited by Dr. Kitto, London. A review in the number for July of works that have recently appeared in Great Britain on the Apocalypse, points out the errors into which several of their authors have fallen, and we hope may check the disposition which prevails there in a degree, to indulge in crude speculation, and build vast systems of explanation on slight and fanciful foundations. Among the volumes the reviewer notices, is Mr. Brown's on Christ's Second Coming—Will it be Premillennial? which is shown very clearly to have little title to the praise that has been bestowed on it by anti-millenarians in this country.

Another article on the Letter and Spirit of the Old Testament Scriptures, treats of the types of the ancient economy and the principles on which they are employed; and though presenting many just and important observations, is founded, we apprehend, on an erroneous view, and is deficient in minuteness and precision in its definitions. The writer regards not only the whole of the old dispensation, but all the great acts and events that took place under it, as typical; which is, in our judgment, to assign the office to a vast multitude of agents, acts, and occurrences to which it does not pertain.

Instead of its belonging to persons and events indiscriminately,

1. Things are types simply by being constituted such by God; not by virtue of their nature, or the natural resemblance that subsists between them and the things which they typify.
2. They are not used as types in their natural conditions or relations, but by a transference to new and artificial uses.
3. Their office is that of instruments or media by which men

may express or act out their faith, love, penitence, submission, and other affections enjoined by God. The office of sacrificial victims, for example, as types of Christ was that of representatives, towards which the offerers visibly expressed their belief of the promise of pardon, and acceptance through his expiation. They were substitutes for him towards which they could by their actions exercise and exhibit their convictions, their trust, and their desire and hope in respect to the forgiveness of their sins. 4. They were not prophetic, therefore, of that which they typified. They did not reveal or foreshow it. Instead, a knowledge of that which they typified was requisite in order to their use. The sacrifice offered by Adam and Eve was not the medium of revealing Christ to them, or giving them their first knowledge of his sacrifice. Instead, it was a representative substitute for him as already announced to them as their Redeemer, in the offering of which they manifested their acceptance of him as their sacrifice, and their faith in his expiation. 5. Types are natural things; not merely ideal or visionary; and they are representatives always of things that pertain to redemption by Christ.

Symbols are widely different from types. 1. They are altogether prophetic. Their office is to foreshow, not to illustrate, exemplify, or be used in an agency as a substitute or representative of something else. 2. They were often merely ideal or artificial, and were usually exhibited to the prophet in vision.

If these positions are correct, a very large number of persons and events which the author of the *Letter and Spirit* exhibits as types, are not entitled to that name.

The *Journal of Sacred Literature* has, besides the Editor, a body of able contributors, and contains many articles of interest. Several are directed against the false theories of the popular German metaphysicians and theologians; and we observe, in the last number, a notice of Dr. Bushnell's *Discourses*, in which they are treated with merited reprobation and ridicule. "It is a mortifying circumstance," the writer says, "that in Divinity the crudest opinions and most unfounded novelties gain notoriety, and, for a time, receive a degree of attention altogether disproportioned to their intrinsic value. This arises in part from the impossibility of applying

anything like demonstration to moral questions, and thus testing at once the new theories which fungus-like start into prominence out of an over-excited luxuriance of individual minds . . . We beg to assure Mr. Bushnell that he owes his notoriety to this difficulty of applying a test at once to ethical and metaphysical subjects; for we feel convinced that no amount of personal influence could save from immediate contempt a similar *rudis indigestaque moles* in other departments of the operations of mind.

"The statements of Mr. Bushnell regarding the formation of language, and its *modus operandi*, are most extraordinary, and display an ignorance of first principles which quite startled us, and prepared us for any wildness as to religious doctrines.

"If we wished to write a sarcastic review, no better materials are at our hand than this volume presents. It is suggestive, in a high degree, of materials for satire. But we write more in sorrow than in anger; and must conclude by expressing our regret that such a work should issue from the American press at all; but much more that materials so mischievous should have been presented to *young divines*."

ART. VIII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. **THE PSALMS** Translated and Explained. By J. A. Alexander, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Vol. I. New York: Baker and Scribner. 1850.

It will prove to readers generally a recommendation of this work above the author's commentary on Isaiah, or most modern expositions, that he confines himself to the translation of the text, and the explanations that are necessary to unfold its meaning, without entering into the minute details of philology, or presenting the various and conflicting constructions that have been put on it by other interpreters. It may be read with little embarrassment by those who are not acquainted with the language of the original. It is professedly founded on Hengstenberg's Commentary, and Dr. Alexander has availed himself of the aid of that writer's "translations, exegetical suggestions, and illustrative citations," while he has avoided, so far as we have observed, what is exceptionable

or of little necessity, and made an original and independent work. This is a legitimate use of the learning of foreign writers, and far more scholarly than to make up a commentary, as is the method in a large degree of some, of exegetical minutiae and expository observations, translated from German authors, with little original thought or critical judgment. He, indeed, who is qualified for the explication of the Sacred Word, will not find it easy to pursue that course. To one of large powers, genuine learning, and a proper spirit, the text will always be of far higher consideration, generate a greater number of thoughts, and make a profounder impression, than any mere commentary by men; and the labors of others of necessity, instead of superseding, be but subsidiary to his own. The explanations given by Dr. Alexander, though brief, are generally sufficiently minute. In the translation, he has adhered more rigidly than the common English version, to the order of the words in the original. It is a special merit of his work that he has avoided, in a great degree, the errors that are common in the exposition of figurative expressions, and either assigned them to their proper classes, or without designating them, given a just explanation of the office which they fill.

This volume, which closes with the fiftieth Psalm, is to be followed by two others, and not improbably, he intimates, by a critical introduction in a fourth, in which he will treat of the authorship of the Psalms, their structure, their arrangement, the principles on which they are to be interpreted, and other themes that are to be excluded from these. We recommend this work not only to those in the sacred office, but to all who desire a minute acquaintance with the teachings of the Sacred Word. They, especially, will do well to consult it who are disposed to assent to Professor Park's theory of a two-fold theology. They will find on every page the most ample evidence in the text and the explanation, that but one theology is known either to the Bible, or the hearts of God's people; that the truths which they utter when they address him, are the truths of his being, perfections, rights, law, promises, providence, and their own nature, condition, and character; and the language in which they express them, the language both of their reason and his word.

2. THEOPNEUSTY; or, the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.

By S. R. L. Gaussen, Professor of Theology in Geneva, Switzerland. Translated by Edward N. Kirk, Fourth American, from the Second French Edition, enlarged and improved by the author. New York: John S. Taylor. 1850.

It is a subject of congratulation that the demand for this excellent

work is such as to induce the issue within so brief a period of such a series of editions. It is entitled to a far wider circulation; and as its merits are understood, and the necessity felt of guarding the young against the doubts and disbelief of the inspiration of the sacred writers that are now cherished and spread by some of the expositors themselves of the Scriptures, the greater will be the disposition to give it a general diffusion and introduce it especially into the libraries of Bible classes, of Sunday schools, and of families. Professor Gaussen rejects the theory many entertain, that the Spirit merely communicated to the prophets and apostles such of the facts, truths, and thoughts recorded by them as had not before been imparted to them in a natural or supernatural way, and that they were then left to express themselves very much according to their own judgment, without any other aid than a stimulation of the memory, and a restraint from error; which is in effect a denial not only of their inspiration to write that of which they had a knowledge by natural means, but also to write in the exact manner they did that which was miraculously communicated to them. He maintains, on the contrary, that their inspiration was an inspiration to write precisely that which they wrote and in the identical form in which it passed from their hands, without any consideration whether it was previously in any measure a subject of their knowledge, or was then, for the first time, imparted to them; and that is indisputably the doctrine of the sacred oracles themselves. They teach that prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit," and that which they spoke and wrote is accordingly everywhere called the word of Jehovah, and the word he spoke by the mouth of the prophets.

A large share of the volume is devoted to the consideration of objections to the plenary inspiration of the sacred writers. Besides a satisfactory solution of difficulties, the reader will find in that part of the work much highly interesting and useful information. The proofs of his doctrine with which his closing chapters are occupied, are clear and ample. The style is marked by perspicuity, ease, and animation. There are no irrelevant passages, no misty disquisitions, no crude declamation. The translator has discharged his task with judgment and taste.

THOUGHTS SUITED TO THE PRESENT CRISIS, a Sermon on occasion of the death of Hon. J. C. Calhoun, preached at the chapel of the S. C. College. April 21, 1850. By James H. Thornwell, Professor of Sacred Literature and the Evidences of Christianity. Columbia, S. Carolina. 1850.

DR. THORNWELL exhibits, in a very impressive manner, the lessons

taught by the death of so distinguished a statesman at a period of national excitement. His bold and energetic style, and the views he presents of the responsibility of public men, for the measures by which they affect the welfare of the nation, the providence of God over individuals and communities, the relation of the present life to that which is to follow, and the necessity of piety to a preparation for death, are peculiarly appropriate to the occasion, and bespeak powers of a very superior order.

4. A DISCOURSE ON THE DEATH OF ZACHARY TAYLOR, Twelfth President of the U. States. Delivered at the Rutgers Street Church. By John M. Krebs, D.D. 1850.

THE death of one in a station like that filled by the late President, exemplifies in a very striking manner the dependence of nations on God's care, and the facility with which he can, by a single and ordinary event, unsettle their condition, and involve them in difficulty and disaster. The fall of a chief magistrate changes not only the position of a great crowd of dependants and co-laborers, but sometimes the destiny of whole nations; varies the course of thought in millions of minds, and strikes them with an unusual sense of the vanity of earthly honors, the inevitableness of death, and the vicinity of the retributions that are to follow. The sudden decease of a Princess Charlotte, a Duke of Orleans, a British Statesman like William Pitt or Robert Peel, or an American President at a crisis, varies on an immense scale the current of events, and gives, for a period, a different complexion to the sentiments of the civilized world,—bringing nations to a recognition of their relations to God, quickening in the thoughtful, generally, a feeling of their dependence, and exciting the wise and humble to put their trust in the Most High.

It is in that relation that Dr. Krebs contemplates the loss to which the country has been called. He treats it as exemplifying in an emphatic manner God's dominion, and as designed to teach the nation their subordination to him, to rebuke them for their offences, and to lead them to acknowledge him as the source of their prosperity, and rely on him for deliverance from the evils with which they are threatened. Such a Scriptural and earnest use of the event by the ministers and people generally will make it, though a calamity, the means of important benefits.

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ART. I.—A COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF DANIEL. By Moses Stuart, lately Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theol. Seminary at Andover. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1850.

BY THE EDITOR.

THIS volume, though founded on much the same principles of interpretation as his work on the Apocalypse, is in some respects less exceptionable. It is written in better taste. There are no attempts in it at extraordinary elegance, no disquisitions on æsthetics, and no dissertations on poetry. He makes less parade of his professional learning, is less ambitious to be thought original, and indulges less frequently in unnecessary repetitions. The peculiar theories which he entertains respecting the invention of the symbols by the prophet, and the mode in which they are employed, are advanced less formally; and as a large part of them are explained in the prophecy itself, and he had but to follow the text to give their true construction, a considerable share of the interpretations he presents are accurate. The main characteristics of the work, however, are much like those of his commentary on the Apocalypse. Like that, it is adapted to lessen the student's

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estimate of the prophecy as a source of information respecting the divine purposes, and diminish his reverence for it as a work of inspiration. Professor S. treats its predictions as confined almost entirely to the period that intervened between Nebuchadnezzar's first dream and the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, one hundred and sixty-five years before the birth of Christ. He sees nothing in it of the Roman domination, of the birth and death of the Redeemer, of the overthrow of the temple, interruption of the Mosaic rites, destruction of Jerusalem, and dispersion of the Jews by that people; and nothing of the apostasy of the Christian church, the persecution of the saints by usurping priests, or the second coming of Christ, institution of his kingdom on earth in a new form, and investiture of the saints with a dominion over the nations. All these great features he endeavors to obliterate, and limits the revelation to events that were to affect the Hebrews from their captivity at Babylon to the time of the Maccabees, and a bare announcement of the Messianic kingdom, which he holds was introduced at the institution of the Christian church. The information he gathers from the book differs little from that which he would have drawn from it, had he regarded it as a mere history written after the events he supposes it foreshows. He, in fact, contemplates it throughout from the ground of neology; betrays, at every step, his sympathy with the critics of that school, whom he generally takes as his guides; and is very nearly as distant as they from a just understanding of the events it reveals, and devoid of the lofty and comprehensive views it suggests, of the government God is to exercise over the world.

We shall only notice, on the present occasion, some of the views he advances respecting the sources from which the representative agents and objects of the prophecy were drawn, the office of the prophet in composing the book, and the construction he places on a part of the symbols.

He represents the use of symbols as a medium of prophecy by Daniel, Ezekiel, and Zechariah, as having its ground in the *taste* of those prophets formed by their residence among the Chaldeans, and familiarity with the religious and political symbols they were accustomed to employ.

"Daniel approaches nearest to Ezekiel and Zechariah in manner and style, although not in matter. Like those prophets, he deals everywhere with symbols and visions. They were the one his contemporary, and the other but little after him; and all three formed their style and their modes of thinking and expression in a foreign land, where symbol and imagery, and vision and dreams, were greatly relished and admired. The ruins of the oriental cities recently brought to the light of day, as well as those which have ever remained exposed to view, are replete with symbolic forms and images, which once gave play and delight to the fancy. Nothing is more certain, than that the exiled prophets were strongly influenced in their style by the training which their condition necessarily gave them. Hence the great dissimilitude between them and, for example, such a writer as Isaiah. Our æsthetical judgment is strongly biassed in favor of such writers as Isaiah, Nahum, and Habakkuk, perhaps justly. But this cannot prove that the Jews in exile would not have a higher relish for the manner of Ezekiel and Zechariah. It may, indeed, be taken for granted that such was the case; for otherwise we can hardly suppose those prophets would have so far departed from the ancient models. That they possessed talents competent to writing in another style, cannot well be doubted by any one who has studied their works."—P. 393.

"It was characteristic of the Chaldees to use symbolical representations beyond any other nation with which we are acquainted. But it was common also for the Medes and Persians to make an abundant use of the like imagery or pictorial representations. All the monuments of Middle Asia, on the great Mesopotamian plain, those heretofore discovered, and those recently disinterred, are filled with symbols of various kinds, and especially of beasts that are of gigantic and grotesque forms. In no part of the world has the taste for the huge and the grotesque been carried so far. In no part has the attachment to symbol developed itself in so many and such singular ways.

"It is striking to note how much a familiar view of those persons and things which surrounded Ezekiel, Zechariah, and Daniel, impressed itself on their minds, in the way of shaping their taste, and gave a coloring to their style."—P. 451.

"How is it then with the prophet Zechariah who came out of exile? That renowned antiquarian, Bishop Munter, has given his opinion thus: 'The prophet Zechariah has shown in his visions a coloring altogether foreign to the Jews, and which could take its origin only in Chaldea. He speaks of a stone with seven eyes, of a golden lamp with seven branch-lights, symbols of the seven eyes of Jehovah which look through the whole earth; of four chariots, spirits of heaven, which come from the

four quarters of the world, and take their station before the Most High." —P. 452.

"How comes it now that these three writers of the exile-period should resemble each other so strikingly in general taste and manner, and circle of imagery, and in the frequency of it? How comes it that all of them are so manifestly out of the Palestine circle of action or description? One feels himself abroad the moment he begins to read them. They are, indeed, animated by the same spirit, but they are far from wearing the same costume. May not one almost take it for granted, that the images of things seen in a dream or trance-vision are copies in the main of those seen in a waking state, and only formed into new combinations, or placed in new positions? *It would seem now that all these contemporaries of the exile-period had seen the originals of their symbols on the Babylonish walls, and houses, and temples.* The grotesque, the gigantic, everywhere met their eyes. Even their descriptions partake of the usual *hyperbole* of the remoter East."—P. 453.

He thus ascribes their use of symbols as an instrument of prophecy to the *taste* which they had formed by their familiarity with the sculptures and paintings of the Babylonians, and represents them as having taken their symbols from those that were in use among that people. This implies that their visions were contrived by themselves, or were the work of their own minds, instead of being miraculously exhibited to them by the Almighty. If the symbols were presented to them by the great Inspirer, and acted out their several parts in their presence, how can it be said that it was their taste that prompted them to employ them? On the supposition even that they were in harmony with their taste, it was not their taste that occasioned their employing them, any more than it was their taste that was the cause of their beholding the visions, obtaining a supernatural knowledge of the future, or receiving the explanation of their symbols from the angel interpreters. As God was the author of the visions, the fact that the symbols were in harmony with their taste is no more a proof that their taste was the cause that those symbols were employed, than the fact that the beautiful objects of nature are agreeable to the taste of mankind, is a proof that their taste is the cause that those objects are created. In referring the use of symbols therefore to their taste, Professor Stuart contradicts their own representation that God was the author

and exhibiter of them, while they were their mere involuntary and entranced spectators. Such a reference is consistent only with the supposition that their visions are mere fictions of their contrivance. If God was the author of them, it is as absurd to ascribe their symbols to their taste, as it were to refer the forms and hues of flowers, the beauty of the human countenance, the circumference and arch of the sky, the grandeur of the midnight firmament, and other objects of grace and majesty, to the tastes of men, because they are sources to them of pleasure.

But what evidence is there that the use of symbols, and of such symbols as are instruments of revelation, was in harmony with their taste? The supposition that it was suggested by, or in concurrence with their ideas of beauty or fitness, implies that the same symbols were employed in the same relations, or as representatives of the same agents, by the Babylonians also, from whom he assumes that they adopted them. Otherwise they could not have derived from them a taste for using them in the prophetic office. Their taste for them must, of course, have been a taste for them in the relation in which they had been accustomed to see them used:—not a taste for them in the abstract, without a reference to their office. How could their sense of the appropriateness and beauty of a gypsum winged-lion, as a symbol of a god, involve a sense of the fitness and beauty of a living winged-lion as a symbol of a line of men who were the conquerors and oppressors of their nation? A taste for statues, draped or half-draped according to the fashion of the ancients, is not a taste for living human beings in similar dress and attitudes, and appropriated to wholly different offices. Unless the Babylonians were accustomed to employ the same figures as symbols, and as symbols in the same relations, the supposition of such a taste for them is solecistical and absurd. But what proof is there that that people employed a winged-lion as a symbol of their dynasty of kings? Not a particle. Instead, there is reason to believe that that figure, if used at all, was an object of religious homage and the representative of a god. In the Assyrian sculptures, at least, the monarchs are represented in their proper figures, and with appropriate emblems. There is not the slightest indication that they were symbolized by the winged-lions and bulls that

were stationed at the entrances of their palace halls. Those shapes seem rather to have filled the office of guardian gods. What evidence is there that the Babylonians used a bear as the symbol of the Medes and Persians, and a four-headed and four-winged panther as an emblem of the Greeks? What indications are there that they used such a monster figure as the fourth beast, as a representative of the Romans, of whom they probably had no knowledge? What proofs that they employed a ram as a symbol of the Medes and Persians, and a one-horned goat of the Greeks? None whatever. The whole fancy that these and the other symbols of the visions were used by them in the relation in which they are employed in the prophecy, or in any symbolic relation whatever, is wholly groundless and absurd. The sculptured slabs with which the halls at Nimroud and Kouyunjik were lined, were undoubtedly commemorative of the past, not prophetic of the future. They were representative of the sieges, battles, hunts, and other achievements and occurrences that distinguished the reigns of the monarchs who erected them; while the winged figures that stood at the portals of their palaces and the entrances to their chief apartments, were emblems of the deities to whom they paid their homage.

But apart from this, what can be more uncritical than to suppose that Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah founded their tastes as theologians and prophets, on the gypsum deities that were stationed in the temples and palaces of Babylon; and the graven figures of monarchs, satraps, warriors, priests, soldiers, slaves, subjects, captives, and animals, with which the walls of their principal structures were adorned? Can a grosser impeachment of their sense and morals be imagined? Can a greater contradiction to their character be conceived? Did Daniel give any indications of a taste for their idols, or a fancy for the fashions of the court, when rather than intermit the worship of Jehovah, he chose to be cast into the den of lions? Did his associates, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, when, rather than worship the great image which Nebuchadnezzar had set up, they preferred to be thrown into the fiery furnace? Daniel resided both at Babylon and at Shushan, and was, doubtless, familiar with their idols and commemorative sculptures; but what ground is there for the supposition that

Ezekiel and Zechariah ever entered a temple or palace of the Babylonians, and beheld any of their golden and marble gods? Not the least. The assumption that they had an opportunity to observe and study them is wholly gratuitous. His view is irreverent to God also, as well as reproachful to them. Is it credible that Jehovah would have employed them as his prophets, had they become enamored of the idols of the Babylonians even as objects of art, and sunk in their religious taste to a level with them? Can anything be more apparent than the utter untenableness of Professor Stuart's theory? Can any fancy be more unworthy of a Christian critic and scholar? How is it that these considerations, which one would think would have instantly presented themselves, seem not to have occurred to him? Is there any other explanation of the inadvertence, than that having become infatuated with the German critics who regard the prophecy as a mere work of art, and attempt to account for its peculiarities as they would for those of any ordinary uninspired composition, he has adopted their absurd theories under the idea that they are the work of genius and learning, without any thought of the contradictions they involve, or the results to which they lead?

Professor Stuart assumes that the employment of symbols and emblematic figures originated with the Assyrians or Babylonians, and that the Hebrews gained their knowledge, and were led to their use of them through them. But what proofs are there that such was the fact? He alleges none whatever; and there certainly is nothing to indicate it in the Scriptures, profane history, nor in the relics of the ancient cities of Mesopotamia that have recently been disinterred. The use of sphinxes and other gigantic forms, as ornaments of temples and palaces, may be traced to a much earlier period in Egypt, with which the Hebrews were familiar, than in Nineveh and Babylon.

But they were themselves accustomed to the use of emblematic figures with wings, and of a gigantic form, in their tabernacle and temple, from the time of their exodus from Egypt, to the period of their exile at Babylon. Such were the cherubim stationed on the mercy seat, and wrought on the veil of the inner tabernacle. Those of the temple were seventeen feet and a half in height, and their wings nearly nine

feet each in length. They were graven also with palm trees on the walls, the posts, and the doors of the inner sanctuary. The brazen sea was supported by brazen oxen, and the bases of the lavers were encased with lions, oxen, and cherubim. With this use of figures in their tabernacle and temple, they were thus familiar long before their captivity in Babylonia. The supposition that they adopted them from the Chaldees or Assyrians is, therefore, wholly inadmissible. Instead, the Assyrians may have drawn their use of their human-headed and winged forms of the lion and bull, from the Egyptians, or the Assyrians and Egyptians both may have founded their conception and use of them on a tradition of the form of the cherubim that were stationed at the gates of Eden, or, perhaps, that were exhibited to ancient prophets, as in the revelation to John, in theophanies which they witnessed. Whether, however, such was the fact or not, there is not any evidence, that the Assyrians and Babylonians originated the use of such symbolic figures, and induced the Hebrew prophets for the first time to employ them at the period of the Babylonian captivity. Indeed, had the Israelites derived their knowledge and use of them from the Syrians, Babylonians, or Assyrians, it would have been at an earlier period than their captivity, as they had long before become familiar with their mythology, apostatized to the worship of their idols, and adopted their corrupt manners. It was in punishment chiefly of those crimes that they were delivered to the dominion of the nations whose customs they imitated.

If we look to the symbols themselves, of Zechariah, Ezekiel, and Daniel, the supposition that they were derived from the Babylonians or Assyrians is manifestly wholly without ground and absurd. The symbolic candlesticks and olive trees beheld by Zechariah, cannot have been adopted from that source. The candlestick was a modification of that of the tabernacle and first temple; while the olive trees were natives of Palestine, and flourished in the courts of the temple itself, and in the valleys and on the hills that surround Jerusalem. The horses, horsemen, and chariots were not drawn from them, as the Israelites were familiar with them at least as early as the time of their conquest of Canaan. The flying roll cannot, for the Hebrews were as well acquainted with letters as the Assyrians

of Babylonians. It is not to be supposed that the epha was derived from them, as they were accustomed to use that measure; nor can the women with wings who bore it to the land of Shinar, as they had an example of the union of wings to a human form in their cherubim. The angelic beings cannot have been suggested by the Babylonians, as the Hebrews were aware of their existence, forms, and ministry. Nor can the stone with seven eyes. If, as is probable, it was graven in the form of a human head, it may have been in the similitude of a cherub. If not, there is no necessity to suppose that it was adopted from another people. Nor is there any evidence whatever that such an emblem was employed by the Babylonians. The fancy that Zechariah's symbols were derived from a foreign source is thus not only altogether without ground, but in contradiction to the most indisputable facts. They are all of them agents or objects, or founded on conceptions with which the Israelites were familiar; while there is no evidence that any one of them was ever employed by the Babylonians as a symbol.

That assumption is equally unauthorized in respect to **Ezekiel**. No one will pretend that the throne of the Almighty borne on a flaming whirlwind, the cherubim with four faces and eyes on every part of their bodies, and the wheels with eyes in their circumferences, were copied from the Babylonian temples or palaces. No such symbols were employed by that people. No corresponding conception of a god and his attendants was ever, so far as we have any knowledge, entertained by them. The symbols of his fourth chapter of the siege of Jerusalem, were all objects with which they were familiar; as were those also of the fifth, ninth, and twelfth chapters—a knife, the hair of the head, balances, fire, a sword, a mark on the forehead, the slaughter of persons, the furniture of a house, the wall of the city. Can anything be more absurd than to suppose that any of these were derived from the fane or palaces of Babylonia? But it were worse than ridiculous to assume that the symbols of the valley of dry bones were adopted from them. There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Babylonians or any other people ever had an idea of a resurrection of the dead of a particular people, or any of the dead, to a corporeal life like that which they had

before lived ; or any symbolic resurrection whatever. And, finally, there can be no pretence that the symbols of the last chapters of his prophecy are taken from Babylonian models, as they are all copies of the ancient temple, or earlier visions of Jehovah.

Nor is his use of the eagle, the lion, the crocodile, the cedar, and other objects of the animal and vegetable world in his allegories, in any measure referable to their employment by Babylonians. They are all objects with which the Hebrews were as well acquainted as the nations that lived on the Euphrates and Tigris ; and, at most, can no more be traced to them than to the Egyptians who used several of them in their hieroglyphics and commemorative paintings. No fancy could be more utterly unsupported than that he drew them from the Chaldeans.

His theory is equally groundless and incredible in respect to Daniel. It is not to be supposed that the great image of Nebuchadnezzar's dream was copied from a statue or delineation in his temples or palaces. There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Babylonians had an image formed of those four metals, with an intermixture of clay in the feet. The supposition is inconsistent with the impression made on the king by the vision. Why, if he was familiar with such an object, should he have been so perplexed by his sight of it in a dream. If he had a sculpture also of its destruction by the descent on it of a stone from a mountain, why should that part of his dream have occasioned any more alarm than the recurrence in his sleep of any other spectacle with which he was conversant ? But admitting that they had framed or delineated such an image, by what considerations can Professor S. render it credible that they had pictured or wrought a representation of its demolition by a stone cut out without hands from a mountain ? Can any smaller critic be imagined than he who can persuade himself that such an assumption is not only legitimate, but essential in order to the just interpretation of the prophet ? Instead of favoring it, the whole narrative indicates that the spectacle was entirely novel to the monarch, and that it was its singularity that gave it its deep impression on him. •

It is equally groundless to suppose that the great tree of his

second dream, and its hewing down, was copied from a symbolic delineation on his palace walls. That trees may have been among the objects sculptured on them, is probable; but what likelihood is there that there was also a representation of a watcher from heaven, commanding that one of them should be cut down:—of the execution of that command, and of the preservation of its stump by a band of iron and brass? Can any probable motive be imagined for sculpturing such a device? If it were a symbol, it must have had some meaning. What could it have been? If Nebuchadnezzar was familiar with the spectacle, and aware of the events it was devised by its authors to indicate, why did he not attach to it its established meaning? Why were not the wise men of his kingdom able, at his command, to explain it? How unfortunate for the monarch that there was no Moses Stuart among his "magicians, astrologers, and 'sorcerers!'" He would then have had no need of a Daniel to relieve his unnecessary perplexity!

Is there any more reason for the fancy that the sea from which the wild beasts emerged, or the winds that strove on it, were copies of Babylonian symbols? Is there the slightest ground for the supposition that they had among their sculptures or delineations, figures that answered to the beasts themselves? Not a trace of such a winged lion, four headed and four winged panther, or beast of ten horns, is found among those that have been disinterred from the ruins of Babylon or Nimroud. The lions are human-headed. There are no four-headed and four-winged, or ten-horned animals among them, nor bears with ribs in their mouths. Nor are there any rams with unequal horns, or goats with but one horn, or with four. There is no ground whatever for Professor S.'s assumption, except the mere fact that they had sculptured figures of human-headed winged beasts, that appear to have been their gods. That they had figures that were symbols, and such figures as those of Daniel's visions, there is not a shadow of evidence. He who can believe that they had a symbolic beast with an eleventh horn, that had eyes in it and a mouth that spake words against the Most High, and wore out the saints of the Most High, will not, we apprehend, be likely to be envied as a critic; nor will he who can persuade himself

that the hosts of heaven cast down by such a horn, the Prince of the host, the throne and form of the Almighty, the judgment of the fourth beast, and the investiture of the Son of Man with the dominion of the nations, were copied from delineations in their temples. Such a theory may, perhaps, appear credible to one who regards the prophecy as a mere human composition. It cannot command the faith of a sober and sound scholar.

The pretence "that all these contemporaries of the exile-period had seen the originals of their symbols on the Babylonish walls, and houses, and temples," is thus wholly groundless and incredible. It is advanced by German interpreters who deny the inspiration of the prophets, and regard their works as the product of their own minds, acting under the influences that usually prompt writers, and is very naturally employed by them to confirm that theory. Rejecting the representation of the prophets that their symbols were exhibited to them by the Almighty, it was requisite, in order to give plausibility to that theory, that they should account for them in some other manner. Had they not disbelieved in miracles and inspiration, they would not have resorted to such a pretext. That one who professes to regard Daniel, Ezekiel, and Zechariah as inspired prophets should adopt it, is certainly singular. There are other indications, however, that Prof. Stuart, in fact, considers Daniel as the real contriver of his visions, and looks at his prophecy as a work of art. He exhibits Daniel as writing it according to a plan of his own:

"The writer's plan or design evidently does not, in any degree, resemble a regular chronological history, or annals, that both preserve the order of time and record all particular events that are worthy of notice. Daniel gives mere outlines, rapid, striking, brief, generic. It is evident that his design is mainly a *religious* one."—P. 174.

And he exhibits him as copying his symbols from the Babylonians in the same manner as he represents John as borrowing his from Daniel. He says of the Apocalypse:—

"A multitude of passages in it are altogether after the manner of Daniel. The kind of imagery employed, the symbols chosen for

representation, the intervention of angel assistants and angel interpreters, and even the designation of times, are all *after the model of Daniel throughout*, although far from a plagiarist's imitation. It is no small testimony to the estimation in which Daniel was held, that *John has thus preferred in general his manner of communication to all others.*"—P. 406.

This implies that it was John who decided that his prophecy should be made through the medium of symbols, and who modelled them after the manner of Daniel; and that he was, therefore, the author of his revelation in the same sense that uninspired writers of fiction and history are the authors of their works. He, in like manner, regards Daniel also as settling the plan of his prophecy, borrowing its symbols, and framing it throughout according to the taste he had formed by his familiarity with the sculptures of the temples and palaces at Babylon. But this is in direct contradiction to Daniel's representation that they were beheld by him in vision, and is, in effect, a denial of his inspiration.

Professor Stuart does not formally state what the principles are on which the prophecy is to be interpreted. He intimates in his preface that they are those "of historico-grammatical exegesis." It is only the meaning of *the text*, however, that is to be determined by them. As *the language* is not the medium of the predictions in the representative parts, but *the symbols*, it is not by the laws of grammatical exegesis that their import is to be unfolded. They are no more to be interpreted by the principles of philology, than the parable of the sower, or Isaiah's allegory of the vineyard. The laws of language are as inadequate to the explication of symbols, as they are to the solution of the problems of geometry. If Prof. S. limits himself to the province of "historico-grammatical exegesis," his work is finished when he has produced an accurate translation and explanation of the text. With the import of the symbols which the text describes, except so far as it is explained in the prophecy itself, he can have no concern. The question what the objects are that are represented by the great sea out of which the four beasts rose, or what the events are that are symbolized by the winds that strove on it, and others of the like nature that are not resolved by the interpreting angel, which

he now attempts to answer, are wholly foreign to his office as interpreter. He thus completely overlooks the distinction between ascertaining the meaning of the language in which the symbols are described, and determining the import of the symbols themselves, and treats them as the same. Had he adhered to this theory, accordingly, he would have exhibited the symbols as representatives simply of themselves, or of agents, acts, and events of their own order; and the four beasts, therefore, as merely foreshowing the appearance on the earth of animals like themselves, and exerting the agency that is ascribed to them; which is in total contradiction both to the import assigned to them by the interpreting angel, and to the construction he has himself placed on them. So serious a misapprehension of the task he was to accomplish, leaves no room for surprise that he has almost invariably fallen into mistakes in his explanations of those of the symbols that are left in any measure to be resolved by the expositor.

But in addition to "the principles of historico-grammatical exegesis," he professes to interpret the prophet by the aids which he himself furnishes. He says, in respect to his construction of some of the most important of the symbols:—

"I feel compelled to depend on reasons drawn almost wholly from the book itself. *A priori* reasoning in this case, the basis of which is an assumption of what we ought to expect from the pen of Daniel, or reasoning borrowed from the Christian fathers, who assumed as a part of their basis, that the *Romish Antichrist* was before the mind of the prophet, we cannot assume without examination, if we would keep our exegetical conscience quiet. *There is no expositor of an author so legitimate and authoritative as himself. And it is by an appeal to Daniel himself that I hope and shall endeavor to explain Daniel.*"—P. 173.

As a large part of the predictions are made through symbols, and a considerable number of them are interpreted in the prophecy itself, it would seem natural that one who wished to interpret Daniel by Daniel himself, should endeavor to ascertain, if practicable, from the interpretations he has given, what the principle is on which the symbols are employed, in order that it may be understood, and those that are left unexplained by the angel be resolved by the same laws. Had

Professor Stuart instituted that inquiry, he might have drawn from the prophecy the most important aids to its solution. Of upwards of fifty of its different symbolic agents, acts, and events, there is an interpretation given either by the attendant angel or the prophet. So large a number of explanations, and embracing symbols of every class, must naturally exemplify the great principles on which they are used. To suppose that they do not, is to assume that they have no uniform and determinable laws. It is manifest, however, from these examples, that instead of being used arbitrarily, they are employed on principles that are natural, obvious, and uniform. Thus they render it clear that agents always represent agents, acts denote acts, and effects foreshow effects ; and that living, bodied agents always denote men. Another of their great features is, that whenever their nature admits it, they are of a different species from that which they are employed to represent. Thus the beasts, which are agents, not only denote agents, but represent men, and of natures and dispositions towards their fellow men, that resemble in a conspicuous degree the dispositions and habits of such beasts towards other animals. The acts, also, and the catastrophes of the beasts symbolize the acts and catastrophes of the men whom they represent. The knowledge of these laws, accordingly, is of the utmost importance to the interpretation of the prophecy. They indicate to the expositor the relation in which the symbols are employed, guard him against incongruities, and enable him to be uniform in the principles of his constructions, and to give an intelligible and satisfactory reason for them.

And could any investigation suggest itself more naturally, or be more scholarly and philosophic ? Yet into this inquiry, which one would think would be the first to present itself, Professor Stuart has not entered. It appears not to have occurred to him. He has not considered what the principles are on which the interpretations that are given of a large part of the symbols, are founded. He has not raised the question whether they furnish a clue to the laws by which the others are to be explained ! What omission was ever more extraordinary ? Instead of availing himself of the palpable and ample aids furnished by the prophet, and interpreting him by himself, he has totally neglected them. Instead of appealing

to him exclusively for his meaning, he, in fact, attempts to interpret him by the Babylonians and Germans!

He, accordingly, remains unaware of the principles on which symbols are employed, and in many of his expositions contradicts their plainest laws. Thus he violates analogy in his construction of the wings of the lion and panther, and instead of treating them as instruments of one kind of motion, that symbolize the means of another, he interprets them as symbolizing velocity, a mere characteristic of motion. "If the wings on the lion indicate *velocity* of movement, as they plainly appear to do, then *two pairs* of wings on the panther indicate an intense degree of velocity. This and nothing more seems to be the import of double pairs of wings," p. 179. But this is in violation of the law that an agent symbolizes an agent; and the several parts of the agent, therefore, the answering parts of the agent that is symbolized. Otherwise, it might only represent a set of abstract qualities or characteristics without any subject in which they adhered. If the wings of the lion only represent velocity, or a characteristic of the motion which they are the means of producing, then the legs and feet may only symbolize strength or fleetness, the jaws power or destructiveness, and the other parts such other qualities as severally distinguish them or the effects of which they are the means; and, instead of a line of conquering kings, the whole that would be foreshown by the lion would be a combination of abstractions without any agent in whom they were embodied. Such is the issue to which his construction conducts him! He not only at once erases from the prophecy the Babylonian dynasty, but the Persian also and Macedonian, and strikes from his hands his own favorite Antiochus Epiphanes, whom he regards as the chief theme of the predictions, and expands to such gigantic dimensions as to fill his whole sphere of vision.

He makes a similar mistake in his interpretation of the heads of the panther. "As four wings are indications of great rapidity, so four heads seem to be the corresponding indications of great or extensive *power*. But it may mean somewhat more; and, if so, it must indicate, so far as I can see, *dominion in all quarters*," p. 180. "The four heads, then, may be regarded as the symbol of dominion in the four different

quarters of the world, i. e. of universal dominion," p. 201. But if the four heads indicate dominion in four directions, then the wings must indicate velocity in four directions, and, of course, at the same time; and the legs and feet four degrees of strength or motion in four directions, and so of all the other parts of the panther; and the result will be that it symbolizes nothing but a complication of qualities and movements, several of which cannot co-exist, without any agent in whom they adhere; and Professor Stuart again has neither the first Macedonian dynasty, nor the four that succeeded it on the division of Alexander's empire.

He falls into an equally palpable error in his explanation of the intermixture in the toes of the great image of iron and clay.

"Verses 41, 42, explain the mixture of the iron and clay, as symbolizing an empire which is both weak and strong; i. e. has some weak points and some strong ones. Evidently the mixture of iron and clay in the feet and toes indicates that the colossal image has but a frail support. Accordingly, when the stone from the mountain strikes the feet, the whole image falls and is crushed to powder. But here the mixture of the iron and clay is represented as symbolizing another remarkable characteristic of the dynasty in question, viz. the intermixture of the party chiefs of the fourth dynasty by marriage, in order to promote their respective designs, and also the failure of these arrangements to accomplish the ends proposed. This circumstance is so peculiar from its nature, that one at first wonders that such a matter should be introduced in order to characterize a dynasty. It implies, of course, that there were several chiefs, who negotiated intermarriages; for the marriage of a single reigning prince with some one, or any one, is such an ordinary circumstance that there would be nothing distinctive or characteristic in a symbol of it."—Pp. 65, 66.

That both the iron and the clay symbolize persons who constitute the combination of rulers, for whom the feet and toes stand, is indisputable, as the one is a part of the image as much as the other. The clay is not an adjunct, but an integral element of the feet and toes; and those whom it represents, are a class of the general body of rulers whom that part of the image denotes. Their intermixture, therefore, cannot symbolize the intermarriage of persons represented by

the iron, who were members of that body of rulers antecedently to the incorporation of the clay. Instead, it denotes the introduction into that body of a new order of persons, who are to the others with whom they are intermixed, what clay is to iron when united with it in such an image. And those persons are not women, as Professor S.'s interpretation implies, though he calls them males—for queens always have a degree of power; but they must be men, and men of another order than those of the iron dynasty; and they are accordingly interpreted as such by the attending angel. "They" who are represented by the iron, "shall intermingle with the seed of men, but they shall not cleave together, even as iron cannot mingle with clay." As the seed of men, then, are of a different order from those denoted by the iron, who had before held the office of rulers, they must be of the class who had until that time been mere subjects of the iron dynasty; and the event, therefore, denoted by the mixture of their symbol with the iron, is their admission to a share in the government—a result that confutes Professor Stuart's reference of the symbol to the times of Antiochus Epiphanes and his immediate predecessors. The government of that king, and of the contemporary dynasty of Egypt, was not a mixed monarchy. The people had no share, by representatives of their election, in the enactment or execution of the laws. Professor Stuart thus totally misses the meaning of the prediction, by his not having made himself acquainted with the principles of symbolization. His interpretation is as obviously against the laws of analogy, as it is against the letter of the text. There is no resemblance between the alliance of different dynasties by marriage, and the mixture of iron and clay. If the event to be foreshown were such an alliance of dynasties, it would have been symbolized by the intermixture, in each of the several toes, of *iron* taken from the others, not by the incorporation of an element denoting persons that before had not belonged to any of the dynasties. We might allege many other instances in which he falls into similar incongruities. The whole course of his commentary, indeed, indicates a singular want of acquaintance with the laws of analogy.

He has run into a still greater error, however, and one that

vitiates almost his whole exposition, in referring the legs and feet of the image, and the monster beast of ten horns, not to the rulers of the Roman empire, but to those of the Macedonian, after its division into four kingdoms, and as standing, therefore, for the same persons as the four-headed panther after the fall of Alexander's line.

"To interpret the fourth beast and the legs and feet of the colossal image as symbolic of the *Roman* empire, seems to be an exegetical impossibility. That the fourth beast was *diverse* from the three others, is explicitly said in vii. 7., 23. The fact that the fourth beast was a monster without a name, i.e. had no parallel in the animal world, indicates the mixed and incongruous condition of the fourth dynasty. The symbol of it in ii. 40, in the mixture of the iron and the clay, is an indication of the same nature. Then it is explicitly declared in viii. 8, that the four notable horns, which came up in the room of the great horn (Alexander), symbolize the four kingdoms towards the four winds of heaven, which kingdoms sprang up as a *succession of the third dynasty*. In viii. 22, it is explicitly stated that these four horns denote four kingdoms, *which stand up out of the nation or people who governed*" [*were governed by*] "*the preceding dynasty*, i. e. from the *Grecian* nation. These *four horns*, denoting the partition of the fourth dynasty, are quite different in their signification from the ten horns in vii. 7, 20, 24."

"The *immediate succession* of the *fourth* empire, which arose out of the ruins of Alexander's; the four great divisions of the fourth great dynasty; the ten kings that sprang up in one of the four divisions; and the *different countries* occupied by the Romans; are unequivocal and unanswerable arguments against applying the fourth dynasty to *Rome*.

"But there is another proof, if possible, still more decisive: this is that all the prophecies of Daniel agree in asserting that Antiochus Epiphanes sprang from the bosom of the fourth dynasty.

"Although the things already stated, seem to decide the question against *Rome* beyond all reasonable doubt, yet there is another circumstance which is, if possible, still more decisive. This is, that the commencement of the fifth, or *Messianic kingdom*, takes place only when these four dynasties are broken up or subverted."—Pp. 188, 189.

The first objection to these representations is, that they

gratuitously assert or assume that which should be proved. It might justly be expected that a construction that so intimately affects the meaning of a most important part of the prophecy, would be sustained by at least some share of plausible evidence. But what is there in what he alleges that yields his interpretation any support? The fact, that "the fourth beast was *diverse* from the three others," certainly does not demonstrate that it symbolizes the same combination of rulers as the third beast, after its four heads succeeded its great horn. Instead, that it was another and a wholly different beast, proves that it is the representative of another set of agents, and who are the rulers of another empire. The fact that "the four notable horns" of the he-goat, "which came up in the place of the great horn—Alexander—symbolize the four kingdoms," or dynasties, "toward the four winds of heaven," does not prove that these kingdoms, "or dynasties, sprang up as a *succession* of the third dynasty," and constituted the fourth. The fall of one horn, and the rise of others in its place, no more proves that the goat with the new horn symbolizes a wholly different dynasty, or the rulers of a different empire, than the fall of three of the horns of the fourth beast, and rise of an eleventh, proves that that symbol, after the rise of the eleventh horn, denotes a different and a fifth dynasty that reigns over a fifth empire. The fact that "among the ten horns of the fourth dynasty springs up the little horn, which plucks up three of the others," does not show that Antiochus Epiphanes is the agent symbolized by that horn. The fact that out of one of the horns of the third dynasty, springs up the little horn which waxes great and assails the temple and people of God, does not constitute any evidence that that king is the person who is represented by that horn. Nor does the fact that the fifth or Messianic kingdom immediately succeeds the fourth dynasty, demonstrate that the Macedonian, in its second form, is that fourth dynasty. It remains to be shown what the period is when that fifth kingdom receives its institution. The considerations he alleges to sustain his construction, have thus no relevancy to it whatever. He asserts or assumes the positions throughout which he should prove. This is a singular method of endeavoring to

"explain Daniel" "by an appeal to Daniel himself." A more palpable example of interpreting a prophecy by a preconceived theory, we have not often seen.

But in the next place the construction is not only unsupported by any evidence, it is, in every respect, irreconcilable with the prophecy. Nothing can be more manifest than that the four metals of the great image, and the four beasts that rose out of the sea, symbolize the same four successive dynasties. This, Mr. S. himself admits. Nothing is more certain than that the fourth beast with ten horns is a wholly different symbol from the four-headed panther which preceded it, and that it symbolizes not only a different body of rulers, but rulers of a different nation and empire. The last, Professor S. denies. But it is clear from the whole representation. There is no more room to suppose that the third and fourth beasts represent dynasties of the same people and empire, than there is that they denote identically the same dynasties. But it is certain that they do not, from the fact that the third beast symbolizes the rulers of the Macedonian empire in all the modifications that they assumed. The panther symbolizes the same body of rulers, and of the same empire, as the he-goat; and its four heads denote undoubtedly the same four dynasties, that, after a brief period, reigned over that empire, that are symbolized by the four horns of the goat that sprang up after the first horn was broken. But the panther and he-goat represent the rulers of the Greek empire in all the modifications which they assumed. There certainly is not a hint to the contrary. There certainly is not a hint, nor does Professor S. offer a pretence that they assumed any other modification than that which is denoted by the four heads of the panther, and the four horns of the goat. But they indisputably symbolize the rulers of the third, not of the fourth empire. The panther represents the whole combination and series of the rulers of the third empire of which Alexander was the first king; and the he-goat also represents the whole body and series of the rulers of the third empire of which Alexander was the first king. But the four heads of the panther are parts of that symbol, as much as its four wings were, or any other portion of the animal; and the four horns of the goat were parts of that symbol, as much as the

first horn was, or any other portion of its body. They certainly, therefore, symbolized the dynasties of the Greek empire, after its division into four kingdoms. This is expressly affirmed, indeed, by the interpreting angel. "And as to the horn that was broken, and there stood up four in the room of it, four royalties, or dynasties, from the nation shall arise," and this, notwithstanding his endeavor to disprove it, is virtually admitted by Professor S. He says, "*The third beast must symbolize the third empire and not the fourth.*" All the rulers, then, that the third beast symbolizes, are rulers of the third empire, not of the fourth; and thence, as that beast symbolizes, by its four heads, the four dynasties that succeeded to that of Alexander, and the he-goat symbolizes also, by its four horns, the four lines of kings that succeeded to that prince, who was represented by the first horn—these four dynasties are dynasties of the third empire, and not of the fourth. The lofty fabric which the Professor has labored, through almost the whole of the argumentative part of his work to erect, is thus overturned by a blow. Is it not singular that he should not have seen the untenableness of his construction? What can be more uncritical and preposterous than to hold that the four dynasties that are indisputably denoted by the symbols of the third empire, are not dynasties of that empire, but instead, of the fourth? What can be more unscriptural and absurd than to assume, that because the symbol of the third empire undergoes, in the course of its career, an important change in its form, it must, in its second form, symbolize the rulers of a different empire from those which it denoted in its first? On that ground, the symbol of the Babylonian empire must also be regarded as representing the dynasties of the Persian and Median empires, as well as the Babylonian, for it passed through far more extraordinary changes than the he-goat. Its wings were plucked, it was lifted up and made to stand on its feet like a man, and a man's heart was given to it. The ram also, the symbol of the Persian dynasty, underwent an important change. Of its two horns, one came up after the other and rose to a greater height.

Thirdly. His construction is in direct contradiction to the language of prophecy. It is expressly said, that as to the

fourth beast, there shall be a fourth dynasty on the earth which shall *differ from all other dynasties*, and shall devour all the earth, and tread upon it and crush it. But how can that combination of rulers differ from all others on the earth, if, as Professor S. represents, it is identically the same with that of the third empire, symbolized by the brass of the great image, and the four-headed panther, through most of their reign, and by the he-goat after the rise of its four horns? If the *kingdom* or territory and subjects of the brazen part of the image, and the panther and goat, are identically the same as those of the fourth beast, and the rulers whom they symbolize, are, with the exception of Alexander and his family, identically the same, it cannot be that the fourth dynasty is diverse from all the others. Instead of a different dynasty, it is the same, with the exception of Alexander and his brother and sons, who were almost immediately assassinated.

Fourthly. His construction is confuted by the difference of the beasts that symbolize the dynasties of the third empire from that which represents the fourth. The four heads of the panther symbolize four lines of supreme rulers, obviously from analogy, and from the interpretation given of the heads of the wild beast of the Apocalypse. The order of rulers whom they denote, are to the whole body of rulers that are symbolized by the panther, what the heads of the panther are to the rest of its body. They are the persons who possess legislative authority, and whose will is the law, which it is the business of those who hold office to carry into effect. They are the same chiefs also as are represented by the four horns of the goat, and are interpreted to be kings. They are therefore a wholly different combination of dynasties from those that are represented by the fourth beast, as that animal had ten horns, and that were, like those of the goat, contemporaneous; for the prophet says expressly "it had ten horns, and I considered attentively the horns, and behold *another little horn* came up *between them*, and three of the former horns were rooted out from before it." They were coexistent, therefore, not successive. In the body of rulers which this ~~beast~~ symbolizes, there accordingly are ten contemporaneous dynasties. It cannot, therefore, be the same as that of the four which are represented by the panther and goat. A com-

bination of rulers, embracing four monarchical dynasties, and no more, reigning over separate kingdoms, cannot be the same as a combination embracing ten kingly dynasties, reigning over ten separate kingdoms.

Fifthly. His construction is embarrassed by other difficulties also, that are insuperable. He holds that the ten kings of whom the ten horns of the fourth beast are symbols, are the kings of the Syrian dynasty; Seleucus Nicator was the first, and Antiochus Epiphanes, as he counts, the eleventh. But, if such be the fact, then the fourth beast must be the symbol of the rulers of that Syrian kingdom alone, not, as he represents, of the four kingdoms into which Alexander's empire was divided. On what ground can he assume that the beast stands for the rulers of the whole of those kingdoms, when he makes the horns representatives solely of the kings of Syria? After having appropriated the only parts of the monster that denote monarchs to the kings of Syria, he cannot legitimately claim that there are other parts that fill the same symbolic office towards the kings of Macedon, Egypt, and Asia. If he advances such a pretence, he is bound by the principles of historico-grammatical exegesis, to designate those parts, and show that the prophecy assigns them that function. To take it for granted, or assert it without evidence, is not "to explain Daniel" "by an appeal to Daniel himself."

But to complete the proof of his error, there were not ten kings of that Syrian dynasty, anterior to Antiochus Epiphanes. He admits that there were not, and attempts to make up the number by counting Demetrius, a nephew of Antiochus Epiphanes, who he acknowledges never ascended the throne, and on the mere ground that had he not been set aside by Antiochus Epiphanes, he would, as the son of a former monarch, have been a candidate for the sceptre. But on that principle he might as easily extend the series to twenty kings as to ten, as there were many others who, on the supposition that the events which determined the succession had not happened, would have been heirs or aspirants to the throne. Nor can he show that those whom he counts as the eighth and ninth of the line ever occupied the throne. Heliodorus, the eighth, who revolted from Seleucus Philopater

the brother of Antiochus Epiphanes, and caused his death, probably, at first, hoped to establish himself in his place ; but if so, he relinquished the design, it would seem, on the appearance of Antiochus Epiphanes, as that prince obtained the throne without opposition. Nor was Ptolemy IV. Philometer, the ninth, an infant prince of the Egyptian line ever, so far as there is any evidence, in possession of the kingdom. It is only known that his mother claimed it on his behalf. That he did not obtain it, is clear from the fact that no resistance was offered by him to its assumption by Antiochus. If, moreover, he was in possession of the kingdom, how could it be, as Professor S. represents, that Heliodorus was divested of it by Antiochus, on his reaching Syria? And, if Heliodorus was in possession of the throne and kingdom at that epoch, how could it be that Ptolemy Philometer was then deprived of them? His attempt to make out a line of ten Syrian kings who preceded Antiochus Epiphanes, three of whom were "rooted out" by that monarch, is thus wholly unsuccessful, and the inconsistency of his construction in so important a respect with history, is an unanswerable proof of its total error.

Sixthly. But it is irreconcilable with the prophecy in other respects. Professor S. maintains that the little horn which makes war with the saints, is the symbol of Antiochus Epiphanes. But it is foretold that the little horn continues to make war with the saints, till the ancient of days comes, when judgment is instituted, and the beast is destroyed. If, therefore, as Professor S. holds, the beast denoted the rulers of the four kingdoms of Alexander's empire, and Antiochus Epiphanes was the agent symbolized by the little horn, then the whole combination of rulers of the four kingdoms should have been destroyed at the period of his fall. Such, however, was not the fact. The Romans conquered Macedonia, one of the four kingdoms, several years before the death of Antiochus Epiphanes. But they did not become masters of Asia Minor, by the bequest of Attalus, till thirty years later. Seventy years elapsed after that before their conquest of Syria, and thirty-four more before the extinction of the Egyptian dynasty at the death of Cleopatra. The throne, indeed, of Antiochus Epiphanes himself continued to be occupied by

his descendants for a long period after his death. Can any fuller demonstration be desired, both that Antiochus Epiphanes was not the personage denoted by the little horn, and that the four kingdoms of Alexander's empire were not the kingdoms over which the rulers denoted by the ten-horned beast reigned ; as otherwise all those rulers would have perished at the same epoch ?

And, finally, it is represented by the prophecy that the dynasty of the fourth kingdom, symbolized by the iron legs and feet of the great image, is to be destroyed by a stone cut out of the mountain without hands, and that its destruction is to be immediately followed by the institution of the fifth dominion and dynasty of the saints, who are thereafter to reign over all people, nations, and languages. It is foreshown, moreover, that it is that fifth dynasty that is symbolized by the stone, and is to break in pieces the power denoted by the image. "And in the days of those kings the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom—royalty—or dynasty—which shall never be destroyed, and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces, and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever." But Antiochus Epiphanes himself was not destroyed by the saints, who are to reign over the fifth kingdom. Their period had not arrived at the time of his fall. He was not destroyed even by the Hebrews, who Professor S. holds are the saints denoted by the passage. They had no instrumentality in his destruction. He did not indeed die a violent, but a natural death. As Professor S. regards the saints who were worn out and destroyed by the little horn as Jewish saints, p. 246, *the pious Jews*, if his construction is correct, *must have been invested, immediately after his death, with the dominion of all nations, and continued to exercise it without interruption to the present time !* But they received no such royalty or power at his death. Instead, they continued in a state of vassalage down to the period of the dissolution of their polity and their dispersion among the nations by the Romans. Nor was the kingdom of Christ in any sense instituted at that epoch. Nearly two hundred years intervened between the death of Antiochus Epiphanes and Christ's commission of his disciples.

His construction of these symbols is thus in every relation incorrect. Instead of following "the principles of historico-grammatical exegesis," or explaining Daniel "by an appeal to Daniel himself," he appears to have given very little attention to either, but to have employed himself throughout the expository part of his work in little else than transferring to his pages the theories of the recent German writers who treat the book as an uninspired composition, and notwithstanding his protestations that he cannot in that agree with them, his ideas of its import, or the events which it indicates, are almost without an exception on a level with theirs.

The endeavors of those who advance false constructions of the word of God, sometimes by their ill success prove the means of subserving the demonstration of the truth. And such may very naturally be the issue of his effort to set aside the meaning of these symbols. The fact which is made indisputable and manifest by his laborious attempt, that the four monarchies of Alexander's empire are not the fourth kingdom of the prophecy, and that Antiochus Epiphanes is not the agent denoted by the little horn of the fourth beast, is an unanswerable demonstration of that which Professor S. endeavors to disprove,—that the Roman is the fourth empire, and that the little horn is the symbol of a line of rulers that are contemporaneous with ten other dynasties in that empire. This follows inevitably by Professor S.'s own concession; he admits that the third empire was that of the Greeks under Alexander. If then, according to the symbolization of the four heads of the panther and the four horns of the goat, the third empire embraced the four kingdoms into which Alexander's was divided, through their whole period till they were conquered by another people, then the fourth empire came after the rise and career of those kingdoms, and is the empire by which they were at length conquered, and that empire was indisputably the Roman. It was that people that rose into power next after the Greeks; and it was they who conquered the kingdoms of Alexander's empire, and reigned over Macedonia, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, for a longer period than that of the Babylonian, Persian, and Greek empires together.

That the Roman rulers are the fourth dynasty, is manifest, also, from the fact that they have exerted the acts, and

assumed the power, that are indicated by the symbols. Their strength, ferocity, and insatiableness answered to that of the fourth wild beast. They slaughtered and oppressed the nations of the earth in a manner like that in which the beast devoured and trampled down its prey. They conquered Judea, destroyed the temple, and put an end to the offering of sacrifices. The original empire, lying west of Greece, was at length divided into ten monarchies, and there sprang up among those monarchies another dynasty answering to that of the eleventh horn of the beast, that made war with the true worshippers of God, and wore them out by persecution and slaughter. That the Romans are the agents denoted by the fourth beast is manifest also from the New Testament, in which they are represented by essentially the same symbols:—first, a dragon of seven heads, denoting the seven orders of their rulers down to the fall of the western division of their empire; and ten horns symbolizing the dynasties that afterwards reigned over that part of the empire; and, next, a seven-headed and ten-horned wild beast, which is exhibited as making war on the saints, and as at length destroyed by the Almighty Redeemer at his second coming, and assumption of the sovereignty of the earth. Is it not singular that Professor S. should see no indications in the palpable correspondence of these two symbols in form, in agency, and in doom, that Daniel's fourth dynasty is that of the Romans?

But, if the fourth dynasty was that of the Romans, it follows with equal certainty that the great events denoted by the destruction of the image by the stone from the mountain, the slaughter of the ten-horned beast, the investiture of Christ with the dominion of the earth, and the institution of the kingdom of the saints, are yet future. The destruction of the dynasty of Rome, most certainly, did not take place at the institution of the Christian church. That empire had not then reached its full power, and it maintained its dominion over Judea itself, and the East generally, through the six following centuries, and is symbolized in the Apocalypse, as well as in Daniel, as to continue to the time of Christ's second coming. The kingdom of the saints which is to be established on the fall of the fourth empire, and continue for ever, most certainly was not instituted at the organization of the

Christian church. The saints, or pious members of the church, did not then receive, nor have they at any subsequent period, obtained the kingdom and dominion and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven. They have neither had any empire over the earth at large, nor any dominion whatever. No fancy can be more absurd. Christ announced to his disciples that, instead of reigning immediately after his ascension, they were to go forth as lambs among wolves, suffer hatred and persecution for his name's sake, and be put to death; and after churches were planted by them in the principal provinces and cities of the empire, he revealed to Paul, Peter, and John, that a great apostasy was to take place, a false religion prevail, and the true worshippers be oppressed, tortured, and slaughtered through a long series of ages, ere his second coming, and the institution of his kingdom in its triumphant form. Nothing can be more certain and palpable than that such an apostate and persecuting power, as is symbolized by the little horn of the beast, has arisen in the Roman empire and assumed the prerogatives and exerted the agency ascribed to that agent; and that it still subsists. Nor can anything be more indisputable than that no such events have yet taken place, as answer to the destruction of the wild beast, the investiture of the Son of Man with the sovereignty of the earth, or transference to him of the kingdoms held by the wild beast, false prophet, and dragon, and the institution of the empire of the saints who are to take the kingdom on the fall of the fourth beast, and possess it for ever and ever; Daniel vii. 13, 14, 18, 22, 27; Rev. xi. 15. The Son of Man has not come in the clouds of heaven, followed by the armies of the risen saints, who are to attend him at the battle of the great day of God Almighty, when the apostate powers are to be destroyed: the saints, symbolized by the stone cut from the mountains, have not dashed the dynasties denoted by the image, and filled the whole earth with their kingdom.

All these great acts and catastrophes are future; and they are to be as real, as literal, and as conspicuous, as any of the others that are foreshown by the prophecy. As those who were symbolized by the image and beasts were real rulers, who exerted a real dominion, and conquered, slaughtered,

and reigned over their fellow men in the manner indicated by their symbols, so their destruction in their last form is to be a real, literal, and public destruction, and by the agents,—Christ and the saints,—to whom it is ascribed, and who are thereafter to possess the dominion of the earth. As their destruction is to be a literal and public one, as truly as their living, reigning, and making war on the saints are; so the advent of Christ and his saints at their destruction is to be a real and visible advent. As the powers denoted by the image and beast are real, not figurative men, and their dominion a real, not tropical dominion; so the dominion which Christ and the saints are to exercise over the nations is to be a real and personal, not a figurative dominion. It is as contradictory to the symbols and language of the prophecy to treat Christ's coming and reign and the reign of his saints as merely tropical, as it were to ascribe such a meaning to the symbols of the four empires. There is no medium between the admission of this, and the denial to the prophecy of any clear meaning. If the advent and reign of Christ are only to be a figurative advent and reign, and the kingdom of the saints only a figurative kingdom, then, on the same principles of interpretation, the destruction of the apostate and persecuting powers denoted by the fourth beast is only to be a figurative, not a real destruction, and they in fact are, for aught that appears, still to subsist and perpetuate their reign through all coming ages. On the ground on which Professor S. himself explains the preceding symbols of the prophecy, Christ's coming, the miraculous destruction of the civil and ecclesiastical rulers of the Roman empire, and the reign of the risen saints, are to be as personal, as real, and as visible, as the agents and their acts and catastrophes were denoted by the winged lion, the bear, the four-headed panther, and the ram and he-goat. It were completely to reverse the principle on which he treats these symbols, not to assign a similar reality to the agents and events of the fifth monarchy. Such is the issue of his attempt to wrest the prophecy from its true meaning. Instead of verifying the construction he aims to fasten on it, he has only shown that it is totally untenable. In place of confuting the reference of the prophecy to the rulers of the Roman empire, he has only made

it indisputable that that is its true construction, and that the personal advent of Christ, and literal resurrection and reign of the saints, are to take place at the overthrow of the fourth and institution of the fifth kingdom.

His mistakes, however, are not confined to the interpretation of the symbols. Much of his commentary on the other portions of the prophecy is equally exceptionable. We may perhaps, on a future occasion, notice the views especially which he presents of the ninth and twelfth chapters.

The work is, on the whole, of less interest and value than we had hoped to find it. A very large share of its pages is occupied with mere grammatical details that are appropriate only to a recitation room. He says, "I have kept in my eye everywhere *the wants of a beginner* in the study of Hebrew and, especially, of the Chaldee. For the Chaldee part the book is, as I trust, a complete *Chrestomathy*, i. e. it gives the solution of every difficulty respecting the forms and the syntax of words. The reader may depend on its being a sufficient introduction to the grammatical study of the Chaldee language." He proceeds everywhere on the supposition that his reader is literally a beginner, and unable even with the aid of grammars and dictionaries to determine the simplest question respecting the language. Much of it, accordingly, is as entirely out of place in a commentary as a paradigm of verbs would be, or a table of affixes. It has the merit, however, of being tolerably harmless; and may be excused, perhaps, as it is in fact the only department in which his opinions are of much authority. He has not the critical judgment nor the experimental knowledge that are requisite to a useful commentator; his prejudices and tastes confine his inquiries to a narrow class of writers, and those of the neological school; and, instead of independent and thorough investigation, he adopts with little reserve, and repeats their crude and anti-scriptural theories. The theological influence of his work accordingly, so far as it exerts any, will be unfavorable. Drawn chiefly from those who reject the inspiration of the Scriptures, and imbued with their spirit, it will naturally lead those who take it as a guide, to low ideas both of the authority of the word of God, and the significance of its teachings.

ART. II.—A DESIGNATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE FIGURES
OF ISAIAH. CHAPTER X.

THE prophet, at the close of the preceding chapter, exhibits Judah and the ten tribes as devoured by God's avenging judgments, and reduced to such want and desperation as to prey on one another, and eat the flesh every one of his own arm. He here presents the rulers as legalizing their injustice and cruelty by framing decrees for the purpose of plundering the helpless of their property. "Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and write" mandates for "the oppression they have prescribed," v. 1. They formed schemes of seizing the possessions of certain of their subjects, or exacting their property under the name of taxes or contributions to the public treasury, and then enacted laws to authorize it.

1. Hypocatastasis. "To turn aside the weak from judgment, and to take away the right of the poor of my people, that widows may be their prey, and they may rob the fatherless," v. 2. To turn persons aside, is to force them from the line on which they are advancing, in another direction, so that they miss the object or point to which they were proceeding. It is here put for intercepting the weak and poor from a legal indemnification for the injustice which they suffered. Decrees were issued to legalize it, in order to prevent a remedy by other statutes that provided for the subject, protection against such arbitrary oppression. The right assured to the poor by equitable laws they took away by the enactment of others that authorized the most unjust exactions.

2, 3. Metaphors in denominating widows prey, and the use of rob for unjust exaction, though sanctioned by a special decree. In unreasonableness and cruelty they resembled making spoil of them and robbery.

4. Apostrophe. The prophet now directly addresses those who were perpetrating this enormous wrong, and reminds them how helpless they were themselves to be, when God should interpose to judge and punish them. "And what will ye do in the day of visitation, and in the desolation, that—the authors of which—shall come from far? To whom will ye flee for help, and where will you leave your glory?"

5. Metaphor, in the denomination of their wealth acquired by such cruel exaction, their glory. These interrogatories are equivalent to a prediction that a day of retribution was approaching, when they would be overwhelmed with ruin, and have none to whom they could fly for help, or with whom they could deposit the unjustly acquired treasures that were the chief objects of their desire and ambition. If any escaped it would be owing wholly to God's interposition. "Without me every one shall bow among the bound, and they shall fall among the slain," v. 4.

6. Metaphor, in the expression, "not turned away." It is applied to anger, to denote that it was not discontinued; or that the inflictions by which it was manifested, were not intermitted. "For all this his anger is not turned away," v. 4.

7. Hypocatastasis, in the exhibition of God as extending his hand in an attitude to strike still, to denote that his providence was so administered as to continue their punishment. "But his hand is stretched out still," v. 4.

God now indicates that the Assyrians were to be the instruments by whom he was to inflict those evils, and he denounces a woe on them, also, in punishment of their pride and merciless ambition.

8. Metaphor, in denominating the Assyrian a rod. "Woe to the Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand, is" the instrument "of my indignation," v. 5. Though powerful, self-relying, and acting without any reference to God, they were to be the mere executioners of his will, and the evils they were to inflict, the expression of his anger.

9. Hypocatastasis, in the exhibition of the Assyrian as sent, and with an express charge to plunder and trample down the Israelites. "I will send him against a hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath I will give him charge to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to trample them down like the mire of the streets," v. 6. Sending and charging, are put for acts of his providence by which the Assyrian was to be called to execute his will as exactly as though he were specifically directed to do it. He, however, instead of regarding himself as executing the purpose of God, was to be prompted wholly by a desire to gratify his love of slaughter and power.

10. Metaphor, in the use of cut off, for slaughter. "But

he will not intend so, nor will his heart think so; for to destroy is in his heart, and to cut off nations not a few," v. 7.

11. Metaphor, in the use of the preposition *in*, by which the heart is exhibited as a place. "It is in his heart to cut off nations." It is by that figure that thoughts are said to be in the intellect, and desires in the heart; to rise in them—to enter them—to go forth from them, and other expressions used, which literally denote a motion, or station in space. There is an analogy between those mental processes, and the natural relations and movements that are employed to express them.

12, 13, 14. Comparisons. "For he will say, Are not my princes altogether kings? Is not Calno like Carchemish? Is not Hamath like Arpad? Is not Samaria like Damascus?" v. 8, 9. These cities, of which Calno was on the east bank of the Tigris, Carchemish on an island in the Euphrates, and Hamath and Arpad in Syria, north of Damascus, had already been conquered by him.

15. Synecdoche, in the substitution of his hand for himself. "As my hand hath found the kingdoms of idols," v. 10.

16. Hypocatastasis, in the substitution of found—an act of one kind—for seized, or conquered, which is altogether another. He speaks of them as though they were so small and weak, compared to his power, that he had but to ascertain where they were, to grasp them as he would an object which he could bear in his hand.

17. Comparison of what he was to do to Jerusalem, with what he had done to them. "As my hand hath found the kingdoms of idols, whose images excelled those of Jerusalem and Samaria, shall I not as I have done to Samaria and to her idols, so do to Jerusalem and her idols?" v. 10, 11. Instead of understanding that he was to be but the executioner of Jehovah's anger on the Israelites, he supposed that he had but to contend with idol gods, whose power was inferior to that of the sculptured deities of Syria, whom he had already vanquished with ease.

The prophet now announces that the Assyrian himself also was to be destroyed, on his having inflicted on the Israelites the evils of which he was to be the instrument.

18, 19, 20. Metaphors, in denominating the thoughts or

desires of the mind, its fruits, and ascribing greatness to the heart, to denote its pride or self-confidence, and loftiness to the eyes, to indicate the assurance which they express. "But it shall be, that when the Lord shall have finished his whole work on Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem, I will punish the fruit of the greatness of heart of the king of Assyria, and the ostentation of his loftiness of eyes," v. 12. God was thus to confute the false self-reliance of the Assyrian, and manifest that his being employed as his instrument of vengeance, was not because he was approved by him.

21. Hypocatastasis. "For he saith, By the strength of my hand I have done," what I have accomplished, "and by my wisdom, for I am wise; and I remove the bounds of the nations, and rob their treasures, and like a mighty man, bring down the inhabitants," v. 13. Bringing down from a high to a low place, is put for reducing to subordination, or humbling.

22. Comparison of the mode in which he reduced nations to subjection, to that in which a man of great strength overpowers one with whom he contends: "I bring down inhabitants,"—a whole people—"as a mighty man" brings down an antagonist.

23 Synecdoche, in the substitution of his hand for himself. "My hand has found the wealth of the nations," v. 14.

24. Hypocatastasis, in using the act of finding for conquering or seizing. The verb is not employed metaphorically. To ascertain the locality in which their wealth was deposited, was not impossible. The act of finding is substituted for conquering, to indicate the ease with which he obtained their wealth.

25, 26. Comparisons. "My hand has found, as a nest, the wealth of the nations, and like the gathering of eggs that are left, so have I gathered from the whole earth," v. 14.

27. Hypocatastasis, in the substitution of birds in the place of the victims of his power, and his using their absence, or silence and inaction, to represent the absence of all effective opposition to his conquest of the treasures of the nations. "Like gathering eggs that have been left," by birds, "so I have gathered the wealth of the nations, and there was none that moved the wing, or opened the mouth, or chirped," v. 14. What an impressive image of his resistless power, or the

utter helplessness of those whom he had plundered! Their wealth had been as easily seized by him as though it had been abandoned by its owners, and he had been allowed to take it without opposition or objection.

God now rebukes his boast by asking whether the instruments which men use, affect a similar independence of them.

28, 29. Metaphors, in ascribing to the axe and saw, boasting and magnifying, which are acts that are peculiar to intelligent beings. "Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith? Shall the saw magnify itself against him that moveth it? as if a rod should wield those who lift it up; as if a staff should lift up—not wood" which is insensible—but the conscious and voluntary being who uses it, v. 15. What a touching exhibition of the subordination of the Assyrian to God! He was as incapable, not only of thwarting the Almighty, but of acting without being upheld and directed by him, as an axe or a saw is of claiming a superiority to the artisans who use it; and as a rod is of directing the person who wields it, or a staff of taking the place of the person who carries it, and lifting him up, as though he were its walking-stick, instead of being itself lifted by him.

30, 31. Comparisons of the supposed act of the axe and saw, with an equally unnatural and impossible act of a rod and staff.

32. Metaphor, in the use of send, in place of inflict. "Therefore the Lord, the Lord of Hosts, shall send upon his fat ones, leanness, and under his glory shall burn a burning like the burning of fire," v. 16.

33. Hypocatastasis, in the substitution of fat ones for men of wealth, and leanness for destitution of property. He was to be retributed by calamities of the same kind as he had inflicted on the nations he had conquered; as he had robbed their wealthy men of their treasures, so his rich men were to be reduced to poverty—a change resembling that which the robust and fleshy undergo when reduced by disease or famine to leanness.

34. Metonymy, in the substitution of glory for that which was the means of his glory and magnificence as a monarch, by which some suppose is meant his army, which is called his glory, in the first prediction of his invasion of Palestine, chap. viii. 7; and that the burning or heat, was not literally burning,

but *like* the ardor or burning of fire ; and a pestilence, like that with which Sennacherib's army was smitten. The means of his glory were more probably, however, his capital, his palaces, and his temples, in which his goods and treasures were placed, which were to him, what their wealth was to his rich subjects.

35. Comparison of the burning of his glory to a burning by fire.

36. Hypocatastasis, in the substitution of burning or a fire, for the various causes by which the objects of his pride, and instruments of his glory, were to be consumed. They were to be wrested from his hands by conquest, and marred and demolished by being besieged and sacked, as effectually as though a fire were kindled under them, and reduced them to ruin.

37. Elliptical metaphors, in denominating God, the Light of Israel, without an express affirmation that it is he who is denoted by the name. "And the Light of Israel shall be for a fire, and his Holy One for a flame," v. 17. Jehovah, who, when he revealed himself to the Israelites, invested himself with dazzling light, shall be for a fire and flame to the Assyrians.

38. Hypocatastasis. "And it shall burn and devour his thorns and briers in one day ; and he will consume the glory of his forest and his fruitful field, from soul to body, and it shall be like the wasting of one who is sick. And the remnant of the trees of his forest shall be few, and a child shall write them," v. 17-19. Thorns, briers, forests, and fruits of the field, the natural growth of his territory, are put for his subjects, and the burning and consuming of the one substituted for the destruction of the other. It is probably because those species of the vegetable world are used as representatives of men, that the expression, from soul to body, is employed to denote the absoluteness of their destruction.

39. Comparison. "And it shall be like the wasting away of one who is sick," v. 18. The destroying judgments with which God was to visit him, were to be to his palaces, cities, armies, and subjects, what a fire would be to the forests and fields of his kingdom, that swept over them, and blackened and burnt not only the trees and the crops, but even the briers and thorns with which they were covered, and what a blighting and exhausting disease is to the body.

40. Hypocatastasis. "And it shall be in that day that the remnant of Israel, and the escaped of the house of Jacob, shall no longer lean upon him that smote them, but shall lean upon Jehovah, the Holy One of Israel, in truth," v. 20. Leaning, an attitude of the body, is put for trusting or confiding, an analogous act of the mind.

41. Metonymy, in the substitution of house for the family or people of Jacob.

42. Hypocatastasis. "A remnant shall return, a remnant of Jacob to God Almighty. For though thy people, O Israel, shall be like the sand of the sea, a remnant of them shall return," v. 21, 22. Returning as from exile, or captivity, an act of the body, is put for repentance or becoming obedient to the Almighty, an analogous act of the mind. That the return foreshown is to be a spiritual, not a corporeal return, is seen also from the quotation of the passage in the New Testament as denoting the sanctification and salvation of the Israelites, "Though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall be saved." Rom. x. 27.

43. Apostrophe, directly announcing to the Israelites that, notwithstanding the greatness of the multitude that was to spring from them, a remnant only was to return to God by repentance. "For though thy people, O Israel, shall be like the sand of the sea, a remnant of them shall return," v. 22.

44. Comparison of the children of Israel in number to the sand of the sea. This indicates that a vast period was to pass during which they were to continue in alienation and perish; as otherwise the comparison would seem hyperbolic in the extreme. The prophet now announces in confirmation of the prediction that few only were to be saved, that God had in righteousness decreed a destruction that should overwhelm them like a deluge. "A consumption is decreed, overflowing in righteousness. For the consumption decreed the Lord Jehovah of Hosts will make in all the earth," v. 22, 23. It was righteousness that dictated that decree. Such an exemplification as that abandonment of the Israelites to destruction presents of his truth, and their error, folly, and injustice in forsaking him, and putting trust in idols, was essential to his vindication. It is a practical confutation of

all their false pretences, and a verification of all the prerogatives he has asserted in reference to them and the purposes he has made known. Had he continued to prosper them, and given them to enjoy the good which they sought and expected from their graven deities, it would have seemed a proof of the reality of their gods, and would have confirmed the Israelites in their apostasy. It would also have been to allow his perfections and his rights to go unvindicated, and sin to enjoy the reward that is appropriate only to righteousness.

45. Apostrophe. "Therefore thus saith the Lord God of Hosts, O my people inhabiting Zion, be not afraid of the Assyrian," v. 24. How much is the significance and graciousness of this command and the announcement that follows enhanced by being thus directly addressed to the Israelites under the appellation of his people! It is like a direct interposition, instead of sending a message by another to cheer and support them.

46, 47. Hypocatastases. "Be not afraid of the Assyrian. He shall smite thee with the rod, and shall lift up his staff upon thee in the way of Egypt," v. 24. Smiting with the rod, and lifting up the staff upon them, which are modes in which the cruel vent their passions on their dependents, are put for oppression, tyranny, pillage, and other forms of injury that were usually inflicted by the Assyrians on those whom they reduced to vassalage. The way of Egypt is put for the manner of the Egyptians. The Assyrians were to oppress the Israelites as the Egyptian taskmasters oppressed them.

48. Metonymy, in the substitution of Egypt for the people of that country.

This domination, however, was soon to cease. "For yet a very little, and wrath is at an end; and my anger to their destruction," v. 25. Yet it depended not on the will of the Assyrians, but on God. It was because his wrath towards the Israelites was to end, and he was to inflict vengeance on the Assyrians.

49, 50. Hypocatastases. "And Jehovah of Hosts shall raise up against him a scourge, like the smiting of Midian at the rock Oreb, and his rod over the sea; and he shall lift it

up as he did in Egypt," v. 26. A scourge, which is an instrument with which men chastise one another, is put for the analogous means with which God was to punish and destroy the Assyrians; and his raising and lifting it up, is put for the measures of his providence by which he was to bring those instruments to act on them. What a striking exhibition of his power over them! He could excite pestilence, array against them the Babylonian armies, or employ any other means of defeat and destruction, with as absolute ease as he could lift up a scourge, or wield a thong.

51, 52, 53. Comparisons of his raising and lifting that scourge against them with the mode in which he caused the Midianites to be smitten at Oreb, in which he extended his rod over the sea when he caused the waters to divide, and in which he lifted it up in destruction of the Egyptians. In those instances the enemies of the Israelites were destroyed by extraordinary means. In the first, a stratagem which the Midianites, had they understood it, would have despised, was the means of striking them with a panic, and causing them in a measure to destroy one another. In the second, the miraculous division of the Red Sea, by which the Israelites were saved, was made the means of destruction to the Egyptians who pursued them. In the last, common natural agents, insects, reptiles, darkness, tempests, pestilence, were employed in extraordinary forms and on an unexampled scale, to harass and destroy them.

54, 55. Hypocatastases. "And it shall be in that day, that his burden shall depart from thy shoulder, and his yoke from thy neck, and the yoke shall be destroyed, because of fatness," v. 27. Burden and yoke are put for oppression and vassalage, and the removal of those put for the termination of these.

The meaning of the last clause is not obvious. It is by many supposed to denote that the Israelites at the period of their deliverance are to be in strength and resolution, compared to their enemies, what a fat and high spirited animal is in respect to a yoke or burden,—restive and uncontrollable,—and that they are therefore to be able to extricate themselves from the power of those who have held them in subjection. The verification of this prediction of deliverance, and the

conversion of the remnant of Israel, are doubtless still future. The ten tribes who were carried captive by the Assyrians, have never returned from dispersion, nor been converted.

This prophecy of their final deliverance by interpositions in their behalf by Jehovah, as extraordinary as were those by which he signalized their release from bondage to the Egyptians and march into Canaan, is followed by a prediction of the invasion of Judea by the Assyrian monarch, and probably Sennacherib, and the destruction of his army. "He is come to Aiath; he is passed to Migron; to Michmash he intrusts his baggage. They have passed the strait; they have taken their lodging at Geba," v. 28, 29. These places lie to the north of Jerusalem in the territory of Benjamin, and on the route by which an army desiring to take the capital by surprise would naturally advance.

56, 57. Metonymies, in the use of Ramah and Gibeah for their inhabitants: "Ramah trembles, Gibeah of Saul flees."

58, 59, 60. Apostrophes. "Cry aloud, daughter of Gallim; Hearken, Laish; O poor Anathoth," v. 70.

61. Elliptical metaphor, in denominating the population of Gallim its daughter. The meaning is the same as though the expression had been, Cry aloud, people of Gallim, its daughter, or who are its daughter:

62. Metonymy, in the use of Madmenah for its inhabitants. "Madmenah wanders," v. 31.

63. Elliptical metaphor. "The inhabitants of Gebim flee; yet this day he is to stand in Nob. He shall shake his hand against the mountain of the daughter of Zion, the hill of Jerusalem," v. 31, 32. The inhabitants of Zion are exhibited as its daughter. The meaning is the same as though the language had been, He shall shake his hand against the mount of the inhabitants of Zion, who are its daughter. What a graphic picture of the rapid advance of the invader, and of the alarm it was to excite! He had already crossed the Jordan, and reached the city of Ai, not far from Jericho, on the first knowledge of his approach. He halts at night at Geba, nearly half way to Jerusalem. Ramah, which is off from the line to the city, on the right, trembles with apprehension that he may diverge from the direct route, and attack her. From Gibeah of Saul, which was probably immediately on his way,

the inhabitants fled. The prophet then apostrophizes the people of the remaining towns he was to pass to reach Jerusalem. The cry of the people of Gallim was to be one, not of despair probably—but of alarm, to rouse one another to an instant flight. The people of Laish were to listen to it as a signal at which they were to flee. The condition of Anathoth was to be still more calamitous, either through their irresolution or an inability to escape.

64. Hypocatastasis, in the substitution of the forests of Lebanon for the Assyrian army, and the act of God in leveling the lofty trees and thickets by a mighty stroke, for his act in destroying the Assyrians by a pestilence. "Behold the Lord Jehovah of Hosts lops the branch with terror, and the high of stature is felled, and the lofty one brought low, and he shall cut down the thickets of the forest with iron, and this Lebanon with a mighty stroke," v. 33, 34. Such a prostration of the trees of that mountain would be to them what the destruction in one night of one hundred and eighty-five thousand by pestilence was to the Assyrian army. This is one of the greatest and most impressive of the figures of the Scriptures, and is unapproached by the loftiest and most imposing employed by the orators and poets. What a vast and splendid representative of a numerous host! What an impressive exhibition of resistless power! What an image of God's absolute sway, and the helplessness of man in his hands!

1. The most powerful and victorious monarchs of the earth are in perfect subordination to God, and the instruments of his will even in those of their conquests and successes that seem to be a triumph over him. The king of Assyria, when assailing his chosen people and wasting their country, and under the persuasion that he was defeating the deity in whom they trusted, was but a rod in the hand of Jehovah, with which he chastised them for their revolt from him to the idols to whom their conquerors ascribed their success. He proceeded no further, and in no other direction, in his incursions and the devastation of their territory, than God permitted. The subordination of his people, also, is equally absolute in the offices they are called to fill. The efficacy of the means they employ to accomplish the ends which

he enjoins, and the success that attends them, are owing wholly to him. Whatever may be the sphere in which they act, they are but instruments. Not the slightest good is achieved, no evil is in any measure lessened or mitigated, any further than he accomplishes it by his Spirit and providence. This great truth needs to be seen and felt in order that labor in his service may be conducted in a proper spirit. A realization of it is both a preparative for success and a token that it will be obtained.

2. God's employing evil persons and nations to accomplish his will in the punishment of others, does not imply any approval of their principles or conduct. The views on which they proceed are wholly unlike his. They are prompted by selfish and cruel passions, and act in ignorance or disregard of him. He allows them to indulge their depraved passions in the very acts in which they accomplish his vengeance on his enemies. They aim not to do his will, but to aggrandize themselves, by increasing the multitude of their subjects, accumulating fresh wealth, and acquiring fame and glory.

3. When God has used them as instruments of his justice on others, he turns and judges them, and shows by their destruction that they are not objects of his approval. The awful strokes with which he overwhelmed the Assyrians formed a terrible demonstration at once of his displeasure, of the impotence of the sculptured deities to whom they ascribed the glory of their greatness, and of his power to bestow on the Israelites, however depressed they were for the time, all the great blessings he had promised to them of deliverance ultimately from their enemies, a restoration to righteousness, and an adoption for ever as his peculiar people!

ART. III.—THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF FUTURE PUNISHMENT; An Argument in Two Parts. By H. H. Dobney, Baptist Minister. Third American from the Second London Edition. New York: Published by an Association of Gentlemen, 1850.

MR. DOBNEY is a very sincere and resolute advocate of the

doctrine that those of the race who are not saved, instead of continuing in existence and suffering for ever, are to be annihilated; and the mode in which he treats the subject, his ingenuousness, his hearty recognition of the great doctrines of the gospel on other subjects, and the success with which he combats several palpable errors which he assails, are adapted in a high degree to conciliate the confidence of his readers, and inspire them at least with doubt what the real doctrine of the Scriptures on the subject is, if not to win them to acquiesce in his views. Many of his pages, indeed, are far more specious than solid, and addressed rather to the prepossessions and passions of his readers than to their reason; and much of the seeming force and plausibility of his work arises from his assuming that several of the erroneous speculations which he confutes, respecting the nature of the soul, the principles of the divine government, and the ends that are to be answered by punishment, are elements of their doctrine whom he opposes, though they are not at all involved in it, and his reasonings against the one are no arguments against the other. The supposition, for example, that the soul is to exist for ever by virtue of its nature, is not, as he assumes, an element of the doctrine of their endless being who die in impenitence; nor is such a constitutional imperishableness a dogma of the orthodox. There may be individuals who entertain it, but we should be surprised to learn that it is taught in any theological school in this country or England. To suppose that the soul is imperishable or indestructible, by virtue of its nature or the constitution it has received, is to suppose that it is endowed with a self-existing nature, which is a solecism. No created being can have the ground of its existence in itself. To imagine the soul to be now self-existent, were to imagine that its nature forms an indisputable proof that it never owed its existence to a creation. For, if it now has its being independently of a creator, how can it be shown that it had not at any former period? Or what ground can its nature now present for the inference that it originally owed its being to an exterior cause? The doctrine of the Scriptures accordingly is, that in God "we live, and move, and have our being," and that he "upholds all things by the word of his

power," and that is the dictate also of reason. The fact, however, that the soul is not by its nature, or constitutionally, indestructible, is no proof whatever that it is not to exist for ever; its continuing to exist depends on God's continuing to uphold it; and the question whether it is to exist for ever or not, is the question whether or not he designs to uphold it for ever.

Mr. Dobney's discussion of this subject at great length is, in fact, therefore, though we doubt not undesignedly, unfavorable to an unbiassed judgment by his readers; as in treating a constitutional indestructibility of the soul as an essential constituent of the doctrine of endless punishment, he betrays those of them who are not familiar with the subject, into the error of supposing that his confutation of that groundless doctrine is a proof that there is no such punishment. Thus his publishers seem to suppose that, in overturning that theory virtually of the soul's self-existence, he accomplishes all at which he aims. They say, "If the doctrines herein stated are true, it follows that the *inherent immortality* of man is a stupendous fiction, unsupported by the analogy of nature, or a particle of evidence from the Scriptures of truth. If these things be so, it is time for the world to know it." He has not, however, shed any new light on the subject, and will not find any, we presume, in this country or Great Britain, entitled to be regarded as theologians, who do not entertain essentially the views which he advances respecting it.

But he owes still more of the impression which his volume is suited to make in favor of his doctrine, to an unauthorized and injurious assumption, that if the Most High continues the wicked in being and punishment, his sole object in it must be to torture them. He represents that those who regard the Scriptures as teaching the immortality of the wicked must show,

"That when the God of truth threatens the sinner with *destruction*, in many mutually consistent passages, the terms employed cannot be understood literally, but must be understood metaphorically; which must be either because man is necessarily indestructible, or because the Judge will not exert the power he possesses to destroy, or will exert his

power to prevent the sinner naturally dying out of existence, and will by an act of omnipotence keep him alive for ever and ever *in order to torment him*; and in reference to this last idea the remark may be suffered: That the sinner is either necessarily immortal, which scarcely be affirmed,—or else he is immortal only by the will and conservation of God. So that the above awful inference is just,—and truth can rejoice in undisguised phraseology,—that God will, of his own free act, uphold in life for ever and ever the unhappy sinner, *for no other purpose than to punish him.* . . .

“But while we scruple not to use any language which the Most High has employed in his revelation of mercy, and ascribe to him all the titles that he claims,—Father,—Lawgiver,—Judge,—we nowhere find him set forth as *purposely prolonging the existence of his WRETCHED VICTIMS, drawing it out, of his own free will, age after age, to all eternity, IN ORDER THAT HE MAY FILL AND SATURATE IT WITH MOST EXQUISITE AND UNUTTERABLE AND UNCEASING MISERY.*

“We say that a theory like this, which presents the righteous God under such a terrific aspect,—which secures the never ending existence of sin and suffering in a universe presided over by wisdom, and justice, and love, and mercy,—which, if really credited by any of us in the present state at all events, might well make reason more than totter on her throne, and convert all Christendom into one mighty maniac cell, where, in the grasp of the demon of terror, the most benevolent would be the most hopelessly affrighted,—we say that such an appalling theory, pregnant with horrors which no created being can by any means represent to his mind—had need to be sustained by evidence proportionally strong.”—Pp. 86, 87.

He has many passages in which he thus assumes that the sole object of upholding the lost in existence, must be *to torment them*, and gratify thus a wanton and insatiable malignity; and accordingly represents the doctrine of endless punishment, held by “the orthodox,” as implying that “*the sinner is to be sustained in being through eternal ages, in order to be permeated at every pore with as intensely exquisite anguish as he can possibly endure,*” p. 244. We regret that one who makes so many professions of a desire to avoid exaggerations, and unwarrantable appeals to the passions, and exhibits so many indications of fair-mindedness, should resort to such a stupendous misrepresentation, not only of the doctrine he opposes, but of the object for which the Most High

inflicts punishment on the wicked. Can it be his design to exacerbate the prejudices of his readers, and inspire them with an irreconcilable aversion to the doctrine of future punishment? Is he unaware that his representation is unjust in the utmost degree to those whom he exhibits as holding that doctrine? Has it escaped his notice that if the assumption on which he proceeds is legitimate, the horrid imputations of malice to the Almighty, which he ascribes to the doctrine of endless punishment, are equally chargeable to his own? If, as he assumes, the sole aim of the Almighty in upholding the wicked for ever, must be **TO TORTURE THEM**—to subject them to the greatest sum of excruciating misery that his power enables him to inflict, and their nature permits them to bear—must it not be supposed that the gratification of such a malignity is equally his object in the punishments to which he actually subjects his creatures? If Mr. Dobney can prove that God cannot uphold and punish his revolting creatures at any one period of the future, unless it be from a mere wanton delight in inflicting misery, he can prove with as much ease and certainty that he cannot at any other. The ground on which he proceeds is, in fact, therefore, equivalent to the assumption that the Most High cannot punish his offending subjects, unless it be from a mere malignant and cruel delight in their suffering; not in order to the manifestation of his rectitude, the maintenance of his rights, and the support of his government over his other subjects. A large share of Mr. Dobney's volume, and that part of it which is most adapted to excite the passions of his readers, is thus founded on the dreadful imputation to the Almighty which he ascribes to those whom he opposes, and if legitimate, confutes his own doctrine as effectually as it can theirs. That, with his sharpness in detecting the objections with which the views of those whom he assails may be urged, he failed to perceive this fatal defect of his own, is singular.

If, however, he truly supposes that such must necessarily be the object of an endless punishment of the wicked, where is his authority for the representation that that view is entertained by those who regard the Scriptures as teaching that the impenitent are to exist and be miserable for ever? Where does he find such a representation made by them of the rea-

sons of their endless punishment? What writer of authority can he designate who has been guilty of so dreadful an impeachment of the Most High? He mentions none, nor, we venture to say, can he. It is not the faith of those who believe in the perpetuity of future punishments. "The orthodox" would shrink from such an accusation of God, as a stupendous blasphemy. The dogma against which Mr. Dobney directs his most impassioned and effective rhetoric is thus a monster of his own creation, and the earnest and determined blows with which he smites it, fall with equal force on his own doctrine.

He thus takes it for granted, without any attempt at its proof—both that those whom he assails entertain the doctrine which he ascribes to them, and that if God punishes the guilty for ever, their views of the motive by which he is prompted—a mere delight in inflicting misery—are correct. Is it not extraordinary that he should have founded his whole work on such a foregone conclusion, and passed, without consideration, the points that are most fundamental in the discussion? Before venturing on such an assumption, he should have instituted the inquiry, whether God is capable of a retributive administration over sinners through eternal ages, that shall be marked by such rectitude and wisdom as to reflect no discredit on his excellence, and present no ground to them or others for just objection. If Mr. Dobney cannot prove that he is not, then he has no room for the assumption that the everlasting punishment of the impenitent must necessarily spring from a malignant motive. But it cannot be proved nor presumed that God is not able to exert such an administration over the incorrigible. The supposition that he cannot, is solecistical in the extreme, and absurd. It is a supposition that he cannot exercise his infinite perfections in treating the evil according to their character; that to conform his sway over them to his rights and their deserts, were to be infinitely malicious! But that cannot be, unless it is malicious to inflict evil on them in any degree or form, because of their sins; or, in other words, that it is malevolent to treat them with strict justice, which is a contradiction, and would overturn Mr. Dobney's views of God's providence as directly as theirs whom he controverts. It were, in fact, to deny altogether the righteousness of God's

law; the legitimacy of his government, and the guilt of offenders in transgressing—for what else could possibly make God unjust in inflicting a punishment in precise accordance with their offences? That he can sustain them for ever, then—withhold from them his favor, and assign them a lot in accordance with their character in the exercise of his perfections, and honorably to himself, no one will understandingly question. Mr. Dobney has no alternative but to admit it, or deny altogether the rightfulness of God's government, and treat it as a tyranny. But he will not deny that God has a right to reign for ever, and he cannot, therefore, that he can exercise that right for ever without malevolence.

If, then, it is thus indisputable that God is able, with infinite ease, to exercise a retributive government of righteousness and wisdom over those who are in revolt, Mr. Dobney should next have inquired whether it is not possible and probable that his perfections may even require it. And how can he prove that they do not? Inasmuch as it is practicable to him to exercise such a government, it cannot be incompatible with his wisdom, or benevolence, unless he can pursue a different administration that will involve a higher display of those perfections and secure a greater degree of good. But how is Mr. D. to prove that any other administration would be wiser and more benevolent to his kingdom at large? He cannot assume that it would be worthier of his perfections to redeem those whom he punishes, rather than to uphold them to sin and suffer; for he admits that he has just and wise reasons for not saving them. He must prove therefore, in order to maintain his doctrine, that though God may with perfect righteousness and wisdom uphold and punish them for ever, yet he would display still greater wisdom and goodness in their annihilation. But how is he to prove that? It is plainly impossible. He cannot even show that there would be any righteousness or wisdom whatever in their annihilation. He cannot demonstrate, indeed, that it would not be altogether unwise, and occasion immeasurably greater evils than their everlasting conservation and punishment involves. It is apparent that their extinction might give rise to the most fatal consequences to the rest of the universe. For why should God strike them from exist-

ence, unless it is impossible to uphold and rule them for ever in revolt, in a manner worthy of his perfections, and compatibly with the safety of his government over his other subjects? But an inability to reign over them in such a manner would be an imperfection, and to annihilate a vast crowd of creatures because of such an inability would be a public acknowledgment and demonstration of that imperfection. It would form an indisputable proof that he was unequal to his station; that he had called beings into existence whom he was unable to uphold and rule conformably to their character, in such a manner as not to defeat the ends for which he created them. But that would be to show that he is not entitled to the homage he claims as perfect in his attributes, adequate to the government of his kingdom in righteousness and wisdom, and exerting an administration that is in all respects glorious to his perfections, and worthy of the confidence, submission, and approval of his subjects. It would be, therefore, to weaken his sway over the holy, and render it impossible to them unreservedly to adore and trust him. It would be to furnish Satan, also, with an excuse for his rebellion, and enable him to boast that he had triumphed over the Almighty, by putting him under the necessity of showing that he is incapable of governing rebellious subjects in a way that is worthy of a perfectly wise and good being, and of demonstrating thereby that he is not entitled to the homage he claims; that his law, therefore, is infinitely unjust, and the penalty with which he enforces it unrighteous; and thence that instead of being supremely holy, just, and good, he is immeasurably unholy and malevolent; and consequently that all his subjects are absolved from allegiance to him. It is apparent thus that the perfections of the Most High imperatively forbid the annihilation of his rebellious creatures, and require him to verify his infinite power, wisdom, justice, and goodness, in their eternal conservation and government, in accordance with their character.

The great leader of the revolted hosts undoubtedly sees what the consequence would be of such a demonstrated incapacity of the Supreme to rule the rebellious in a manner worthy of a being of perfect wisdom; and it is probable that the hope with which he is animated in his contest with Jeho-

vah, is that he may baffle him in his attempts to glorify himself in the government of fallen men, and show thereby that he is not worthy of homage as all-perfect. Could he defeat God in his designs, he would prove him to be unequal to the task he has undertaken, and not a match even for one of his creatures. Could he demonstrate that, he would gain a justifiable reason for not yielding him the homage he demands; and in gaining that for himself and his associates, he would gain it for all others, and at once overturn the divine government, and place the Most High under a necessity of rescinding his present and enacting another code of laws. That would be the greatest victory to which the prince of evil could possibly aspire. And the annihilation of the wicked, because of an inability to uphold and govern them without an exhibition of imperfection, would yield him such a victory in the most decisive form. For it would enable him to say, I have compelled the Almighty himself to acknowledge and demonstrate, by one of the greatest and most momentous acts he has ever exerted, the truth of what I have always claimed as a justification of my rebellion; that he is not competent to govern the kingdom he has called into being in a manner suitable to perfect wisdom and goodness. He, indeed, keeps up a specious show of unexceptionable rectitude and benevolence, as long as his subjects continue to yield an unquestioning obedience to his commands, and render him the confidence and adoration he requires; but the instant they hesitate, the moment they put his attributes to the test by revolting, and place him under the necessity of verifying his perfections by reigning over them in that relation, that moment the delusion vanishes, and he is found to be totally unequal to the exigence; and he has demonstrated it now on a stupendous scale by striking from existence a vast crowd of the fallen, whom he first undertook to restore to virtue and happiness by the mediation of his Son, and being baffled in that, he has swept them back to their original nothingness, because to uphold them any longer would be to uphold a monument of his incompetence and defeat!

The Most High will be withheld, therefore, by his perfections and the well-being of his kingdom, from a course that would involve such a train of consequences. He will be

required by his rectitude, wisdom, and goodness, to uphold and maintain his rights over his revolted creatures for ever; show that it is not in their power to convict him of imperfection; and demonstrate that he is able to reign gloriously to himself over fallen as well as over obedient subjects.

But apart from this there are several considerations that may justly lead us to conclude that wisdom and goodness require that he should uphold the rebellious, and exercise a government over them for ever, in accordance with their character.

It seems apparent that when his creatures rebel, it is the part of wisdom and goodness towards his other subjects, and requisite to his own vindication, that he should allow a full exhibition to take place of the natural and necessary consequences of sin. If he interfered immediately to prevent it, how would either the holy or the sinning see what the true results of rebellion are? If he interposed to prevent any part of its natural effects on the revolting; either immediate or remote, it would seem that it must, in that degree, intercept the universe from a just view of the consequences of revolt, and lead them thereby, in a corresponding measure, to misjudge of the nature of redemption. In order to a full apprehension of what God does in saving those whom he saves—a full manifestation must be presented of what they would have been, had they been left to perish; and the conservation of the wicked for ever, will be requisite in order to that. The possibilities of exemplifying the great facts of their character, and God's rights and power, will not be exhausted in a limited period. The developments and process will go on through eternal ages. Thus it will be seen by such a practical experiment, that they are truly such enemies as God represents them. It will be seen that no measures of punishment are adequate to reform them; but, that in the certain prospect of interminable misery, they go on deliberately and incorrigibly in alienation and rebellion. It will be demonstrated on the other hand, that God is able to baffle all their attempts to obstruct and defeat him, and display his infinite justice, goodness, and truth, in his sway over them. And, finally, it will be seen that the restoration of those who are saved to holiness and happiness, is wrought by divine grace,

and enable the redeemed themselves, and the whole obedient universe, to appreciate Christ's work, and give to him the glory that is due to his name. And the display of these great truths, and realization of them by the universe, will be essential, undoubtedly, to their just understanding of God's ways, and sense of his infinite claims to their submission and trust. It is thus apparent that the everlasting conservation and sway of those who continue in revolt, will be essential to God's perfection and the maintenance of his government.

Had Mr. Dobney, then, instituted these inquiries, and pursued them to their proper results, he would have seen, not only that there is no ground for assuming that if God upholds and punishes the rebellious for ever, it must be for the mere purpose of gratifying a malignant delight in their misery ; but that there are ample reasons for the belief that their conservation and punishment through an endless existence, are essential to his rectitude, and indispensable to the well-being of his obedient kingdom.

We pass now from these general views, which overturn the main ground of Mr. Dobney's volumes, to a consideration of the passages of the Scriptures which he adduces in support of his doctrine, and shall find in them also equal evidence of its error.

His first argument in favor of his theory, he founds on the representation in the gospels, that Christ is the Life, and brought life and immortality to light ; that he promises life to those who believe on him, and exhibits them as entering on the completion of their redemption, into life, and life eternal ; while, on the other hand, those who do not believe, are represented as not seeing life, and threatened with destruction and perdition. He infers from this, that the peculiar gift bestowed on those who are saved is an everlasting existence, and the evil inflicted on those who are not saved an excision from existence. To this we reply, that the life promised, and to be bestowed on the saved, is not a bare unending existence, but an endless life in *the body* in such a relationship to God, acceptance and bliss, as Adam would have enjoyed had he continued in allegiance and obtained justification. It is a perfect deliverance from the curse brought on himself and his posterity by his rebellion, and gift of a life in an immortal

body, such as was to have been the reward of his obedience. This is clear from the fact that the death that was inflicted on him as the penalty of his fall, was a death of the body. It was not an extinction of his soul, as that would have been an annihilation of his being, and made a subsequent existence and resurrection impossible. Had he been annihilated *he* could not be recalled into existence. The production of another precisely like him would be a creation, not a resurrection; and such a mere copy would necessarily be a different, not identically the same being. In order to the possibility of a resurrection, therefore, the soul must survive, and death accordingly be confined to the body. As all mankind, then, who die, are to be raised to another life, the death universally that is brought on them by the fall of the first parent, is a death merely of the body. The life, consequently, which is the counterpart of that death, is a life in an immortal body. It is not a mere spiritual life, or renovation of the mind; for those who enter it must believe in order to it. It is a life that is future to the living as well as to the dead; not that is now enjoyed, for it is to be conferred at Christ's second coming. A corporeal death is not absolutely requisite to it; as the multitude of the saints living in the natural body at Christ's advent, are to be changed to immortal, without undergoing the infliction of death. And it is because it is to involve a full repeal of the penalty of sin, and is the beautiful, blissful, and glorious mode of existence which God originally appointed as the reward of obedience, that it is proposed by Christ in such a manner to believers, and treated as the great result and consummation of redemption.

On the other hand, not to see life, is not to be annihilated any more than the death of the body was annihilation. Instead, it is not to see *that life* of immortality which is the reward of obedience, but to continue under the curse of sin. This is seen from a single passage. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." As he must continue to subsist in order to its abiding on him, his not seeing life cannot be his annihilation, but his still being debarred from the blessing of obedience and subjected to the penalty of sin.

This is apparent also from the passage he next alleges, 2 Tim. i. 9, 10. "Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began, but is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, *who hath abolished death and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel.*" But what death is it that Christ has abolished? Not a spiritual death. That would imply that the life which is its antithesis is a mere spiritual life. That which Christ brought to light was not the fact that the children of God are restored to holiness. The great doctrine of their renovation and sanctification was fully revealed through the Old Testament prophets, as is seen in the Psalms and the predictions in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and others, of the gift of the Spirit to God's people; the inscription of the law on their hearts, and their preservation from apostasy. The death which he abolished is, therefore, the death of the body. He abolishes that death which was brought on the race by Adam, and that was the death of the body. "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." But that death which all suffer by Adam is the death of the body. It is the death that was threatened to him, which was a corporeal death; it is a death, that is distinguished from apostasy itself, as it was by sin that it entered the world, and it has passed on all because all have sinned. It is not a moral death, therefore, or alienation of the heart from God; but is the penal consequence of such an alienation. From that death accordingly we are expressly taught all are to be released by Christ. All that die by the sin of Adam are to be made alive by Christ. "The hour is coming when all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of Man, and shall come forth, they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." And it is that corporeal death accordingly, that is after the last resurrection to be destroyed. The death that was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone after the judgment of the wicked, symbolized Rev. xx. 11-15, represented the death that is associated with the grave, and the death, therefore, of which the body is the subject; and that is the death which it is promised the

redeemed, with whom God dwells on the descent of the risen saints denoted by the New Jerusalem, shall no more suffer, Rev. xxi. 4.

The life and immortality accordingly, which Christ brought to light by the gospel, is not a life and perpetual existence of the soul as Mr. Dobney imagines, but a life and immortality of the body, the antithesis of that death to which the race was subjected by Adam. This is confirmed by the change which is wrought in both the dead and the living saints at Christ's coming. In the resurrection of the dead their corruptible is to put on incorruption, and in the change of the living, their mortal is to put on immortality. But their bodies alone are mortal,—i. e. liable to death,—by which they return to the dust from which they were taken ; and the immortality with which the raised are to be endowed is, of course, to be an immortality of their bodies. Immortality in truth, which is the antithesis of mortality, or a liableness and a sentence to death, is literally predicable only of the body, and is in the Scriptures affirmed only of that, never of the mind. The term in the passage in question *αθάνατον*, translated immortality, in fact denotes incorruptibleness simply,—not *αθανασία*, immortality, or deathlessness, which is its literal meaning.

This life and immortality were brought to light by Christ by the gospel, or good news proclaimed by him of the redemption he was to accomplish. He first openly taught the great doctrine of the resurrection of all the dead, and the change of the bodies of the righteous living at his coming to immortality ; and this is the only life that he brought to light, for he announces no other.

Mr. Dobney thus entirely misses *the subject and nature* of the immortality which the gospel reveals, supposing it to be a predicate of the soul instead of the body, and to denote everlasting existence, instead of deathlessness, which is its true import. Can he desire a more ample confutation of his argument from these passages, and of his theory respecting the subject and nature of immortal life ?

He next alleges Mark ix. 43–48. “ And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off : it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched, where their worm dieth not, and the

fire is not quenched. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Mr. Dobney regards the unquenchableness of the fire, as showing that those who are to suffer the punishment of which it is to be the instrument, are to be annihilated, as a body is destroyed, that is cast into a devouring fire. The reverse, however, is the fact. That the passage is altogether figurative, is obvious from the consideration that it is not in reality the eye, hand, or foot, that offends or tempts to sin; nor is the plucking out the eye, or the excision of the hand or foot, a means of protecting oneself from temptation. A person with but one eye, one hand, or one foot, is as likely to be tempted to sin, as though he had two. Instead of being literal, therefore, those organs of the body are used by hypocatastasis, or substitution, for the passions or affections of the mind which betray to sin; and their excision or eradication put for the restraint or suppression of those tempting affections; and being cast into unquenchable fire, substituted for the punishments that are to be inflicted on those who do not restrain and subdue their evil desires. In other words, certain organs of the body, and a removal of those organs, are substituted for certain affections of the mind, and a suppression of those affections; and being cast, when raised from death, into unquenchable fire, is put for the punishments that are to follow the evil indulgence of those affections. The figure does not imply, therefore, that the being who is to suffer that punishment is literally to be cast into unquenchable fire, any more than it implies that those who would escape such a fire, must literally pluck out an eye, and cut off a hand or foot. Being cast into a lake of fire, is the symbol of the punishment the impenitent are to suffer after their resurrection; and as they are to be raised immortal, the unquenchableness of the fire, and the deathlessness of their worm, indicate that their punishment is never to end;—not that they are to be reduced to nothing-

ness, or struck from being. This is taught directly in several other passages. Thus Dives, who lifted up his eyes in Had ~~es~~, represented himself as tormented by the flame, not as likely to be annihilated by it; asked for water to mitigate his thirst, not to extinguish the fire; and desired his brethren to be warned against that world, not as one of annihilation, but of misery. In like manner, the punishment in fire and brimstone of those who worship the beast and its image, is to continue without intermission for ever. Rev. xiv. 9—11. The passage in question confutes Mr. Dobney's theory, therefore, instead of supporting it; as the immortality of the worm, and the inextinguishableness of the fire, show the endlessness of the existence and punishment of the wicked, in place of indicating, as he assumes, their annihilation. His construction exhibits the perpetuity of the instruments of punishment as needless and absurd. Why should a fire be sustained for ever, and a worm upheld through endless ages, when the beings on whom they are to exert their power are, after a few moments, to be swept from existence!

The passage which he next employs to support his views is equally against it. "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Matt. x. 28. Mr. Dobney holds that death is an annihilation of the whole being, and makes that theory the ground of an inference that the second death is an extinction of being also.

"We find ourselves imperatively compelled to believe that the sentence pronounced in case of transgression considered in itself, and as it must have been understood by Adam, and as it was expounded by the Judge himself, conveyed the sole idea of cessation of existence—a return to that blank nothingness out of which he was brought—and that unless a remedial system had mercifully intervened, when Adam died, there would have been an utter and everlasting extinction of his conscious being."

"We have seen reason to believe that the death threatened to Adam was the death of the *entire man*, the cessation of all conscious existence, which would therefore have been his doom, had it not been for the mediatorial work of the second Adam."—Pp. 134, 135.

He holds accordingly that a resurrection is to be a resto-

ration to *existence*, and thence regards the second death as another annihilation.

"If immortality be a prerogative conferred on the pious through the Mediator, it must follow that sinners were not *ab initio* endowed therewith, and also that none who reject Christ and his great salvation will live for ever; and so, consequently, the threatening to them of destruction, of perishing, of second death, must be literally understood" as denoting a total extinction of being.—P. 201.

He accordingly alleges all those expressions as proofs of his doctrine. The passage, however, under consideration, shows that the death of the body is not the death or destruction of the soul, and therefore confutes his assumption. The command is,—Fear not them which kill *the body*, but are not able, ἀποκτείνειν, to kill *the soul*, that is to take away its life by violence. Here it is shown that to take away the life of the body by violence is not to take away the life of the soul; nor ability for the one, ability for the other. The one is completely within the reach of men, the other is wholly beyond their power. The death of the body, then, is not the extinction of the soul. It survives; and consequently Mr. Dobney's argument from this passage is built on a false assumption, and is overthrown.

The other passages which he alleges, in like manner confute both his doctrine and the assumption on which it rests, that death is the annihilation of the whole being. The first is Matt. xxv. 46. "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment, and the righteous into life eternal." They who are thus to go into punishment and life, are the living nations whom Christ is to judge at his second coming, and are therefore to be in the natural body. If death, then, be, as Mr. Dobney holds, annihilation, and the punishment to which they are doomed be death, as they then will be swept from existence, they cannot be raised again to life. A reproduction of such beings would not be a resurrection, but only a new creation of others like them. That which has absolutely ceased to be can never by any possibility exist again, and be identically the same as it was before annihilation. The supposition is a self-contradiction. But we are expressly shown that all the wicked who have died, are to be raised to life

again at the judgment which is to follow the release of Satan and the revolt of the nations after the close of the thousand years. The supposition, therefore, that the punishment to which the enemies of Christ mentioned in this passage, are to be subjected at the commencement of the thousand years, is annihilation, cannot possibly be true. This is shown, also, by the interminableness of their punishment. They are to go *εις κολασιν αιωνιον*, to everlasting punishment. Their existence and consciousness are to be without end, therefore, as otherwise the penal inflictions they are to suffer, could not be eternal. Mr. Dobney endeavors, indeed, to show that they may be everlasting, because what he regards as their consequence—annihilation—would be eternal. But that is a solecism. A being cannot be the subject of good or evil any longer than he exists. Nothing but nothingness itself can be predicated of him after he has ceased to be. If, then, annihilation were his punishment, it would end when that annihilation was accomplished. Viewed in either relation, therefore, the passage presents an unanswerable confutation of Mr. Dobney's doctrine. Their punishment cannot be annihilation, because they are to exist at a future period: it cannot be an extinction of their being, because it is to continue and be predicable of them for ever.

The passage he next offers, relates in like manner to the destruction of the wicked who are living at Christ's coming, and confutes instead of confirming his theory. "And to you who are troubled, rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power," 2 Thess. i. 7-9. But the living only who are in open war with Christ, Rom. xix. 19-21, and those who have united with them in persecuting his disciples, Matt. xxv. 42-46, are to be destroyed at his coming. The dead, whose names are not written in the book of life, are not to be raised and judged until the vast period has passed that is denoted by the thousand years that are to follow that judgment of the living. The fact, therefore, that those who are of the antichristian party are to be destroyed ante-

rior to the millennium, demonstrates that that destruction is not to be an annihilation, inasmuch as they are to be raised to life again at the final judgment of the dead, after the close of the thousand years, which would plainly be altogether impossible if they had no intermediate existence. A resurrection is not a creation. It is a change of a subject that already exists from one state of being to another. If, then, the wicked do not then exist, they cannot be the subjects of a resurrection. His construction of this passage, therefore, as teaching the annihilation of those on whom vengeance is to be taken by Christ, at his coming, is unauthorized and inconsistent with the fact which we are taught in other passages, that they are to live at a later period.

The passage he next alleges presents an express revelation of the everlasting punishment of a class of offenders, Rev. xiv. 9-11. "And the third angel followed them, saying with a loud voice: If any man worship the beast and his image, and receive his mark in his forehead, or in his hand, the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation, and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb, and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever, and they have no rest day nor night, who worship the beast and his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name." This visionary spectacle, beheld by the prophet, is representative of events that are still future. The angel announcing the punishment is a symbol of men who after the agents represented by the two other angels,—one proclaiming the everlasting gospel, and the other announcing the fall of Babylon,—have entered on their ministry,—are to rise in the ten kingdoms in which the beast reigns, and warn the nations of the punishment with which they are to be smitten, who yield it their homage. The beast and the image are symbols of political and ecclesiastical rulers; the mark is a symbol of an analogous peculiarity that distinguishes the subjects and vassals of those rulers. The wine of wrath is a symbol of a resembling evil which God is to assign the worshippers of the beast and image. The fire and brimstone symbolize analogous causes of suffering; and the pains produced by the

wine, the brimstone, and the fire, represent analogous miseries that are produced by those causes. Now these symbolical tortures, it is expressly declared, are to continue without intermission for ever. There is to be no limit to their duration. They are never to be even temporarily suspended. The instruments of their tortures are to send up their smoke for ever and ever; and it is to be at every period of its ascent the smoke of their torment. The punishment is therefore to continue, and thence the subjects of that punishment are to exist for ever in order to suffer it. There is no evading this construction; and the truth which it reveals is presented with far greater strength through the medium of the symbols than it would have been through the mere medium of language. Mr. Dobney does indeed endeavor to escape it, but by expedients that are wholly inadmissible, and that would, if allowed, set aside every other revelation that is made in the Apocalypse, or the other symbolical prophecies: First, that "it is contrary to one of the soundest and most obvious rules of interpretation to derive a momentously important doctrine from a book so full of symbol, and the most elevated poetry, as the Apocalypse is on all hands allowed to be," p. 224. But to this we answer, there is no such rule of interpretation. The supposition is not only groundless, but it is virtually a denial of the authority of the Apocalypse, and impeachment of the wisdom of God in making a revelation through such a means; for it assumes that he has chosen an instrument of representation that is so equivocal and uncertain as to render it wholly unsafe to receive that which is foreshown by it as indisputably that which is revealed. Can a more unwarrantable device be chosen than such an imputation, to escape the disclosures which God has made through that prophecy? The fact that it is "full of symbol" is no reason that it should be of an uncertain meaning and without authority. Mr. Dobney might as well object to the teachings universally of the Bible, on the ground that it is so full of words. The symbols are used conformably to a law; the principle on which they are to be interpreted is shown in the Apocalypse itself and the other symbolical prophecies; and God revealed it for the purpose of making known to his servants what was to come to

pass. But how could it represent to them the vast series of events which it foreshows, if the instrument through which it indicates them is so equivocal as to be unworthy of any reliance? Mr. Dobney could not have resorted to a pretext more inconsistent with the character and design of the book. He adds as a further reason against its testimony, that "it is allowed on all hands to be" a book "of the most elevated poetry." This is equally mistaken. Eichhorn and a number of other German writers, and a few followers in Great Britain and this country, have exhibited it as a poem; but it is only by a total misappropriation of the term. Had they taken the precaution to ascertain what poetry is, they would have been withheld from so absurd a blunder. There is not a book in the Scriptures more utterly devoid of all claims to be regarded as a poem.

His next pretext for setting aside the testimony of the passage, "that the vengeance denounced" by it "is inflicted here on earth, and during the time-state," p. 225—is equally singular and unjustifiable. He infers that this world is to be the scene of the vengeance, and the present life, the time, on the ground that other events that are foreshown in visions that precede and follow this, have their accomplishment here. But in the first place, were it granted that this world is to be the scene of the punishment here foreshown, it would not thence follow that it is not to continue for ever. If the place denoted by the lake of fire and brimstone is either on the surface, or in the depths of the earth, the punishment which is symbolized as to take place in it, is none the less to be without end. But in the next place, the ground on which he infers that this world is the scene of the vengeance, and the life the period, is absurd. His argument is, that as other events symbolized in the prophecy that precede the resurrection and judgment of the wicked, take place on the earth and in this life; therefore, the earth is to be the scene also of the event that is foreshown in this vision, and this life the time. But what connexion is there between his premise and conclusion? He might as well assume that because the judgments that are inflicted on the wicked in this life are inflicted on them in the natural body, therefore, the punishments that are to be

inflicted on them after their resurrection, will be inflicted on them in that body also. His argument implies that if God foreshows a class of events that are to take place in this life, it must be taken for granted that all the other events which he reveals, are to take place in this life also ; which is equivalent to the assumption that he cannot, or cannot be supposed to foreshow an event that is to follow the resurrection of the wicked, unless all the other events symbolized in the prophecy are also to follow that resurrection. The principle of his argument may therefore be used with equal propriety to prove that all the events revealed in the Apocalypse are to take place after the resurrection and judgment of the wicked. For the punishment foreshown in this passage most certainly is to follow that resurrection and judgment. It is indisputably the last punishment that is to be inflicted on those who are its subjects ; for it is to continue for ever. But all the wicked that have died before the resurrection of the wicked will then be raised, and subjected to precisely this kind of punishment. If, therefore, the worshippers of the beast and image denoted in this passage, die before that resurrection, they will then be subjected to this punishment, and not before ; for their bodies, in which they are to be punished, are to continue in the grave till that epoch. As all will be punished in this form then, and none before, it is clear that the punishment foreshown in this passage will not take place till then. This is seen from the description of the last resurrection and judgment. "And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God ; and the books were opened, and another book was opened, which is the book of life ; and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead which were in it ; and death and hell delivered up the dead that were in them ; and they were judged every man according to his works. And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire," Rev. xx. 12-15. As all the dead are then to be raised, and all who are not written in the book of life are then to be cast into the lake of fire, it is certain that the worshippers of the beast and image

will be among them ; and that that is the epoch, therefore, when the punishment threatened them in the passage in question is to be inflicted.

Mr. Dobney's arguments, on all these grounds, being thus refuted, he has nothing left for the support of his doctrine, except the words, destroy, destruction, and others of the like import, used in describing the punishment of the wicked, which he holds are synonymous with annihilation. The terms, however, are not of the same, nor even of a resembling import. To annihilate is to strike from existence. But to destroy is only to change the mode or condition of existence in such a manner as to disqualify, disable, or prevent that which is destroyed, from the condition or end for which it was designed. When, for example, a city is said to be destroyed by a siege or an earthquake, the meaning is not that the substances of which it is built are annihilated, but that they are so changed in condition and relationship, that they are no longer applicable to the uses for which they were erected. There may be vast remains of walls, temples, fortresses, palaces, theatres, and other structures, that may continue to stand for ages almost without dilapidation. Yet the city is said to be destroyed, because it is so marred and demolished as to prevent it from being used for the purpose for which it was designed—and such is its meaning generally. Thus it is applied literally only to such purely material things as are organized—as vegetables, animal bodies, and minerals, or works in which matter is artificially arranged by man—and destroying them is disorganizing, or disarraying, and disarranging them, so that they are no longer adequate to the ends and uses for which their organization or arrangement fitted them. A work of art, for example, as a city, an edifice, a ship, an engine, is said to be destroyed when it is broken up, disarranged, or so marred as to disable and unfit it for the purpose for which it was formed. This is the etymological meaning also of the corresponding Hebrew, Greek, and Latin verbs. Thus *destruo*, from which destroy is derived, signifies to pull down, separate into parts, or reduce to disorder and ruin. When applied to corporeal beings individually, it denotes their being marred, mutilated, or disorganized, so as to unfit them for their proper functions as living beings, and usually their being

killed, or the separation of the two great constituents of their being, the body and the $\psi\chi\eta$, life-principle, or conscious nature. When applied to great combinations of human beings, as to armies or nations, it signifies only such a disorganization of them by death, or other causes, as to incapacitate them for their functions as armies, communities, or nations. When applied to incorporeal beings, and to the wicked after their resurrection and judgment, it denotes an analogous disability for the ends, or debarment from the good, for which they were originally formed, or to which they aspired, and subjection to a condition analogous to the disarray of an organized being, or form, by which it is disabled for its proper functions. Thus Christ is said to have assumed our nature that he might through death *καταργησῇ τὸν διάβολον*, destroy the devil who has the power of death; that is, might render him inadequate to his aim—disable him—divest him of his power. In like manner, to destroy the wisdom of the wise, is to baffle, confound, and thwart it. So also the wicked are to be destroyed by being disabled by the condition in which they will be placed, and cut off from the end at which they have aimed—which is happiness in sin, and alienation from God—and from the end for which they were fitted by their nature, which is a holy and blessed life in the favor and presence of God. Their bodies will be sources of suffering instead of enjoyment, and of ignominy in place of glory; and their alienation from God, instead of a means of ease and independence, will be fatal to their well-being. Their situation will be, in respect to the object at which they have aspired, and the proper end of their existence, what the condition of an organized body is when it is disarranged and defaced so as to unfit it for its proper office. It does not imply, therefore, that they are to be annihilated, nor does the language admit of such a meaning. Its import is as remote and diverse from it as disorganization or demolition applied to an organized body is from annihilation. Their everlasting existence is, in truth, an indispensable condition of their everlasting destruction. The last ground on which Mr. Dobney attempts to sustain his doctrine, is thus swept from beneath him.

But his doctrine is not only not supported by any proofs: it is embarrassed and confuted by the most formidable incon-

sistencies and contradictions; and contradictions which he has made no effort to obviate. He has not neglected any opportunity to object to the view which he opposes, but has urged with all the art of which he is master, every plea by which he could perplex it, or render it odious to his readers. On the other hand, he has alleged all the considerations in favor of the doctrine of annihilation that could recommend it to the prejudices or selfish wishes of men; while a share at least of the difficulties that embarrass it and show it to be untenable, he has passed in silence.

Thus, while he urges, in the most unhesitating manner, that the doctrine of the endless punishment of human beings is inconsistent with God's benevolence and rectitude, he admits that it is expressly taught, Rev. xx. 9, 10, that the devil is to be "tormented day and night for ever and ever;" and in that admission, accordingly, gives up the main ground of his argument for the annihilation of the incorrigible of mankind,—that their everlasting punishment could only spring from a delight in inflicting misery; and is incompatible, therefore, with God's perfections. For, if it is compatible with his justice and goodness to punish the devil and his angels for ever, why is it not equally compatible with those perfections to inflict a similar punishment on his enemies of the human race? By his own concession then, the whole of his reasoning and rhetoric, on that ground, is altogether mistaken and delusive. It either is not inconsistent with infinite rectitude and benevolence, to punish evil beings for ever; and, therefore, men may be subjected to such a punishment, consistently with those perfections; or, if incompatible with justice and goodness, still God, in fact, will punish one order of beings everlastingly, and, therefore, he may, without any contradiction to his character, inflict such a punishment on another. Mr. D. objects, indeed, to such a punishment of men as is indicated by their being cast into a lake of fire and brimstone, that it implies that the same amount of suffering will be inflicted on all; which is inconsistent with their diversity of desert. But he forgets that the lake of fire and brimstone is only a symbol, and that the suffering is not, as he assumes, in reality to be by such an agency. Nor would a difference of degrees be impossible were a sulphuric fire the instrument of the infliction. But

whatever may be the nature of the punishment, we are expressly shown that it is to correspond in degree to the guilt of the punished. Every one is to receive according to the deeds done in the body. Mr. Dobney's own theory, however, is obnoxious in the utmost degree to this objection; as he makes the punishment of all identically the same—a deprivation of being. If the great penalty of sin is, as he holds, a forfeiture of existence, and that is the penalty which is to be inflicted on the wicked, then, most undoubtedly, however diverse their demerits are, their punishment is to be identically the same. This difficulty he admits; and attempts to escape it by the supposition that the period of annihilation may differ with different individuals; and that the inflictions that precede it may vary in such a manner as to correspond to the different degrees of demerit. But, in the first place, he has no evidence whatever of the truth of that supposition; and next, in assuming that there are to be penal inflictions, and, perhaps, for very long periods, that are to precede annihilation and form a wholly different punishment, he exposes his system again to the charge which he makes the main ground of his argument against interminable punishment;—that it is inconsistent with God's justice and goodness. For if, as he holds, God cannot punish beings through endless ages, unless it be from a mere delight in inflicting misery: then it is apparent that he cannot punish them through any part of interminable ages, unless it be from that motive. Any consideration that can prove that he may, consistently with justice and goodness, punish them for one, a hundred, or a thousand ages, will prove with equal certainty, that he may for ages without end.

He offers nothing to relieve his doctrine from the difficulties with which it is embarrassed by the supposition, on which he proceeds, that the dead are wholly without consciousness during the period that intervenes between death and their resurrection. The Scriptures show, in many passages, that the departed, both good and evil, are conscious during the period intermediate between death and the resurrection. Thus Christ exhibits Lazarus as entering a condition of enjoyment immediately after his death; and Dives as immediately subjected to punishment, for Dives desired a messenger to be sent to warn his brethren, who were still living, lest they also should

come into that place of torment ; and Abraham replied to him, that Lazarus was then comforted, or in a condition of enjoyment, whilst Dives, who had his good things in this life, was tormented. He assured the penitent thief also, "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise," a garden of life, beauty, and bliss. In the Apocalypse, the souls of those who had been put to death for the testimony of Jesus, are exhibited as appearing in the presence of God, and asking, How long, O Lord ! dost thou not avenge our blood on the inhabitants of the earth ? And as clothed in white robes, which indicate life and activity, and entering a state of rest, till their brethren also, who were to be slain, should be put to death ; which is not to take place till near the period of Christ's second advent, and the resurrection of the holy dead. They are conscious, active, and happy, therefore, through the whole of their intermediate existence. But Christ taught expressly in his argument with the Sadducees, Matt. xxii. 31, 32, that there is a conscious life between death and the resurrection. "But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob ! God is not the God of dead ones, but of living." Mr. Dobney attempts, indeed, to show that this merely proves a future, not an intermediate existence. But what could be more mistaken ? The language of God is, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and not, I shall be in a future age ; and Christ's declaration is, God is not the God of dead ones, but of those who have life. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob had life, therefore, at the period when God made that announcement : otherwise, he could not then have been their God. Had they been divested of existence, they would have been of a class of whom Christ declares he is not the God. Mr. D. alleges, however, that if the passage teaches directly only their intermediate existence, it could not be considered as furnishing any proof of a resurrection. He misapprehends, however, the nature of the proof that was requisite to confute the Sadducees. The ground on which they denied the resurrection was, that death being, as they held, annihilation, a restoration to life was impossible. The reproduction of beings like those who had died, would not be a resurrection, but a

creation ; and the beings created would not be the same, but different. The only consideration, therefore, that was necessary to set aside that objection, was a proof of the continued existence and consciousness of those who had died ; and that was furnished in the fact, that God, who is not the God of beings that have ceased to be, was the God, ages after their decease, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

But this intermediate life Mr. Dobney denies ; and holds not only that there is no conscious existence between death and the resurrection, but that there is no existence whatever ; death being, as he represents, an absolute extinction ; and it is on that theory, in a large degree, that he builds his doctrine that the final punishment of the wicked is annihilation ; and this fatal opposition to the teachings of the Scriptures he leaves unobviated.

And, finally, his theory of death, resurrection, and annihilation is obnoxious to the charge alleged by him against the doctrine of endless punishment,—of exhibiting God as inflicting evils that are incompatible with benevolence. If death, as he holds, is annihilation ; then identically the same beings cannot be reproduced by a resurrection. There cannot be a resurrection of that which has ceased to have a being. A reproduction would be a new creation ; and the beings new created would be absolutely different from those who had died. They would, at most, only be exact copies ; if supposed to have a precisely similar consciousness, that could not constitute them the same, it would only be a stupendous and cruel delusion. If God then were to create and punish such beings on the ground that they had existed before and exerted a sinful agency, it would be on a wholly false ground, and infinitely unjust ; and would, therefore, form the highest evidence that could be conceived, that he was prompted by a delight in the wanton infliction of evil. Such is the issue in which Mr. Dobney's doctrine terminates ! He has only succeeded in framing a theory which, if true, verifies the awful imputation on the Almighty, which he falsely charges on the doctrine he assails !

Mr. Dobney's volume, while specious and presenting a show of candor and of forcible argumentation, is thus one of the most mistaken and delusive with which we have ever

met. He proceeds throughout on a total misapprehension of the doctrine which he opposes. He entirely omits the questions that are most essential to a just understanding of the subject. He takes for granted the main parts of his own theory. He alleges nothing positive from the Scriptures to support it. He presents no proof that the passages which seem directly to teach the endlessness of the punishment of the wicked, do not in fact teach that doctrine; and finally, were all that he claims admitted, instead of answering his purpose, it would only exhibit the Almighty as indisputably obnoxious to the charge of malevolence in the punishment of the impenitent, which he unjustly ascribes to the doctrine of the orthodox.

Mr. Dobney presents a striking exemplification of the manner in which ardent, speculative, and self-relying minds are often betrayed into great errors, and become the means of leading a crowd into the most dangerous and fatal mistakes. Assuming that endless punishment, if inflicted, must be inflicted from a malevolent motive, and recoiling with horror from a doctrine that presents such an impeachment of God, in his eagerness to get rid of it, he resorts to expedients that overturn with equal directness other doctrines of revelation which he still professes to maintain. His speculations are likely to be even more mischievous to others than they seem to have been to himself. Those who adopt his results will not be likely to pause at the point where he halts, but will pursue his principles to the issue in which they naturally terminate. We have already seen how his doctrine, that death is annihilation, cuts off the possibility of a resurrection. But if the beings who are to be the subjects of the last judgment, are to be new created for that occasion, how is it conceivable that any of them can be immediately annihilated, and under a pretext that they had had an existence before and had sinned? Can an act more revolting to truth, justice, and benevolence be imagined? If, moreover, the beings who are finally to be judged, are to be created for that trial and the awards that are then to be assigned, who can believe that Christ died for their expiation, and that those of them who are to be accepted, will be accepted because of his death on their behalf? Can any greater impossibility be conceived? The disciples of Mr. Dobney have thus only to follow his principles to their

legitimate results, and they will end in the rejection of the whole Christian system. We would warn our readers against his work, therefore, as at once one of the most mistaken, and one of the most dangerous.

- ART. IV.—1. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ANIMALS. By L. Agassiz. An article in the *Christian Examiner* for March, 1850.
2. THE DIVERSITY OF ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN RACES. By L. Agassiz. An article in the *Christian Examiner* for July, 1850.
3. THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN: Comprising Inquiries into the Modifying Influence of Physical and Moral Agencies on the Different Tribes of the Human Family. By James C. Prichard, M.D., F.R.S. London: H. Baillière. 1843.
4. THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACES proved to be the Doctrine of Scripture, Reason, and Science, with a Review of the present position of Professor Agassiz. By the Rev. Thomas Smyth, D.D. New York: G. P. Putnam. 1850.

It is a conspicuous feature of the age that all facts and theories, whatever may be their nature, that can subserve the cause of the sceptical, are plied by them with the utmost diligence to undermine the authority of the Sacred Scriptures as a revelation from God, and lead men to distrust them as a history of man. One class of speculatists endeavor to set them aside by a theory of human nature that denies all existences exterior to the mind, and exhibits a revelation, therefore, from a deity as impossible. Another assume that reason is competent to determine independently of any communication from God, what his nature, dispositions, and laws and aims must be, and reject his word because its teachings are at variance with their preconceptions. A third endeavor to convict its narratives, doctrines, and predictions of defects and errors, and on that account represent it as a mere fabrication or complication of myths, designed to embody the vague beliefs,

dreams, or wishes, of a dark and credulous age. A fourth attempt to confront it by facts in the natural world, and found on the structure of the globe, the relics of ancient generations of animals, or the condition of the human race, speculations under the specious name of science, that contradict it, and brand it as mistaken and unreliable. And great numbers of the educated, and especially of the young, are betrayed by these means into scepticism and infidelity. If their authors are not prompted mainly by a desire to overturn Christianity, but aim to conduct their inquiries independently of religion, the views they advance that are adverse to its truth, are immediately seized by its enemies and employed to controvert its teachings, and impair its credit. The plausibleness, and show of demonstration with which they are sustained, and the extreme facility with which many are led to adopt them, and become their advocates and propagators, render it peculiarly the duty of the friends of the Bible to interpose for its vindication, and point out the fallacy of the facts and reasonings which are supposed to confute it. Of that character is the theory adopted and advocated by Professor Agassiz, that the human race, though forming but one species, instead of having descended from a single pair, are the offspring of many pairs, or communities, that were created independently of each other, and were distinguished at their origin by the peculiarities that now discriminate them. He disclaims, indeed, very earnestly, any desire to controvert the Scriptures. He represents himself as conducting his investigation of the subject as a mere naturalist, and deducing his conclusion from precisely such facts as are the basis of a similar deduction in respect to other organized beings. He claims even that he sees nothing in the Mosaic record, or other parts of the Sacred Volume, that contradicts his theory. It is, however, in fact, in open antagonism with the Scriptures, and if admitted to be true, must naturally lead to a disbelief of their inspiration and veracity. We believe it, however, to be as mistaken as it is anti-scriptural; and our object in noticing it is to point out, first, the inadequacy of the grounds on which it rests; and next the inevitableness with which those who embrace it must be led, if consistent, to the rejection of Christianity.

1. He concedes that the human family, notwithstanding the variety of its races, consists of a single species.

"There are two distinct questions involved in the subject,—the Unity of Mankind, and the Diversity of the Origin of the Human Races. . . . We recognise the fact of the unity of mankind." . . .

"Are men, even if the diversity of their origin is established, to be considered as all belonging to one species, or are we to conclude that there are several different species among them? The writer has been in this respect strangely misrepresented. Because he has at one time said that mankind constitutes one species, and at another time has said that man did not originate from one common stock, he has been represented as contradicting himself, as stating at one time one thing, and at another time another. He would, therefore, insist upon this distinction, that the unity of species does not involve a unity of origin, and that a diversity of origin does not involve a plurality of species."—*Christian Examiner*, July, 1850, pp. 110–113.

But to admit thus that the race, notwithstanding its varieties, is yet of the same species, is in our judgment to concede that there is no adequate ground for the belief that they are not all of one origin. It is to concede that there is no absolute proof *in their nature* that they are not all of the same parentage; nor that the diversities that subsist between them are not the consequence of exterior incidental causes. A difference of species is an absolute proof of a diversity of origin, inasmuch as species only perpetuate themselves; they never generate others; and there is no other perfect proof of such a diversity of origin. A variety in a species is no absolute proof that all that belong to it are not of the same origin; for inasmuch as varieties as great confessedly exist in races that are known to have descended from the same stock as exist between the different races of the human family, there can be no absolute certainty from such varieties that they are not the product of causes that lie out of the constitution itself, and have come into existence notwithstanding those who are subjects of them are of the same stock as those who are not. Since causes are known to exist and produce effects of the kind on a vast scale, such as changes of complexion, form, temperament, energy, habit, it is impossible to demonstrate that any of the varieties of those

kinds that exist are not the result of those causes. From the nature of the case, the utmost that Professor Agassiz can do is to present a bare possibility or probability of the contrary. An absolute demonstration, or a high probability, is impossible. When a cause of one species that is competent to produce a given effect is known to exist and act, there can be no absolute proof from the nature of that effect, that it is not the product of that cause, but of another, which is not from any other source known to be producing that effect, but only to be adequate to its production. On his own principles, then, he must relinquish the ground of a scientific deduction of the different origin of the several races from the varieties which subsist among them, and content himself at the utmost with the claim that, contemplated apart from the Scriptures, it might be considered possible or probable.

II. But the main ground on which he founds his theory is wholly inadequate and irrelevant. It is the principal object of his first article to show that animals and plants did not originate from a common centre, but were created independently of one another in the several scenes which are now their natural localities; and he closes it with the remark, that the fact that the principal races of man in their natural distribution, cover the same extent of ground as the great zoological provinces, would go far to show that the differences which we notice between them are also primitive. *Ch. Examiner*, March, p. 204. And the analogy of the animal world is the chief basis of his deduction that the several races of men had an independent origin. The supposition, however, that animals of the several species were not created in single pairs, but in numbers, and in the several localities which they were to inhabit, is no obstacle to the belief that out one of each sex of the human race was created; for the scriptural history of the creation expressly represents that fish, birds, beasts, and insects, were created in great numbers. The language of the narrative is, "And God said, let the waters bring forth *abundantly* the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven. And God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth *abundantly* after their kind, and every winged

fowl after his kind." The waters, thus, without any consideration whether they were rivers, lakes, or seas, or where they were situated, were peopled abundantly with the animals of which they are the element; and the air with the winged creatures of which it is the peculiar sphere. There must of necessity, therefore, have been many of the same species, not only in the different localities for which they were fitted, but doubtless also in the same scene. The atmosphere of a continent or large island, could not be said to have abounded with winged forms, had only a single pair or a single swarm of each species existed in it. The same representation is given of the creation of the inhabitants of the land. "And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so." They were created, therefore, in great numbers, and in all the different localities that were fitted to be their habitation. According to the Scriptures, then, the fact that animals were called into existence in great numbers of each species, and in many localities, is no ground for the inference that the same method was pursued in giving being to the human race. God has shown us in his word that in their creation he took the opposite course. And the same reason that rendered such a procedure in the creation of animals expedient, perhaps rendered it equally wise in the reproduction of their races after the flood, by which all inhabiting the atmosphere and land, except those preserved in the ark, were destroyed. If their inability to migrate from a single centre to the different zones, continents, and islands, and of many of them even to exist, except in the climates for which they are fitted, rendered it necessary originally that they should be created in the several localities they were to occupy, that necessity existed, probably, for their reproduction there, whenever those regions were to be repopled by them.

And there was a reason for that course in regard to them that did not exist in respect to men. They are generally indisposed, and a great portion of them incapable of migrating to distant regions. Seas, rivers, mountains, and climates, are to most of them insuperable barriers. But no such reason existed for the creation of man in all the continents,

lands, and climes, he was to inhabit. He has a natural disposition to explore and occupy new regions. His curiosity, and his desire of enlarging his possessions and gaining new means of supplying his wants and new sources of pleasure, lead him to pass from place to place, and fix his residence wherever he can best suit his tastes: and his faculties fit him to overcome all the obstacles to his occupation of the whole earth. He has power to employ natural, and invent artificial auxiliaries, by which he can cross rivers and mountains, pass plains and deserts, and navigate seas and oceans. Many of the animals themselves are made the means of his traversing vast regions which would be wholly impracticable to them without his guidance and care. The forests with which the earth is overspread, the snows that often cover vast tracts of its surface, the waters and winds, instead of barriers to his progress, are made the instruments of his passage from place to place with far greater rapidity than he could move without their aid. And it is in the discovery and use of these means of transporting himself and the products of the earth and of his labor from place to place, that he finds one of the most needful and useful theatres for the development and exercise of his powers, to have debarred him from which, would have been to limit unnecessarily his opportunities and inducements to self-cultivation, and therefore was inconsistent with the creator's wisdom and goodness, which requires that he should be placed in a condition suited to the culture and display of his peculiar faculties.

There was another moral reason of still higher significance for the creation of a single human pair as the sole parents of the race, which Prof. Agassiz has overlooked: viz. its necessity in order that the whole might be placed under the same moral government. As the ends sought in the creation of intelligent beings must be founded on their intelligent nature, and respect therefore their character, they must be secured by their conduct in reference to a law. A part of the creator's agency, therefore, towards them will infallibly be to place them under a law, and subject them to a trial of their allegiance; and his providence over them will be conformed to their conduct in that trial. If they obey, he will approve them, and place them in a condition expressive of his favor; if they revolt, he

will withdraw from them many of the gifts they have forfeited, and exercise over them a government that is adapted to them as rebels. But the earth is not suited to be the theatre of more than one such moral government at the same time. If it is the scene of a government over obedient beings, it must extend to all its continents and climes. One division of the globe cannot be under an administration like that which would have been exerted over our first parents, had they not fallen; and the other under a curse of thorns and briers, barrenness and blight, pestilence and death. The great natural laws of the earth and air must necessarily prevail in all its parts. This necessity then of instituting a moral government over all the intelligent inhabitants of the earth, and one that is appropriate to them all, whatever may be the character they assume, was an imperative reason for the creation of but a single pair of such beings, whose agency under the trial to which they were to be subjected, should determine the condition in which the whole race should be placed, and the nature of the government that should be exercised over them; and this consideration should enter as a fundamental element in a speculation in respect to the course God would pursue in giving existence to such a race. It is as unphilosophical to overlook, in such an inquiry, what is essential to his perfections, what must of necessity be the great scheme of his procedure, as it is to disregard what is necessary, or proper to man. As his main aim in giving existence to intelligent beings is indisputably a moral one, it can no more be assumed that he will pursue the same course with them as he pursues with mere animals in a relation that intimately affects that aim, than it can that he will treat them in his administration generally, as though they were mere unintelligent creatures. This great fact, however, Professor Agassiz has overlooked, and has argued from the course which he supposes the Most High pursued in giving being to the various orders of irrational creatures, precisely as though there was no reason whatever in their moral nature, and his office and aim as a moral governor; why he should not have pursued the same method in giving existence to man. His deduction is therefore wholly inconsequential, and built on an inadequate and inappropriate ground.

He offers another argument to show that men, though of the same species, are not of the same origin, that is equally inconsequential and inappropriate.

"The beasts of prey all agree in the peculiar form of their teeth and claws, which are adapted to seize upon their prey; their alimentary canal is so constructed as to fit it best for digesting animal food; their dispositions are savage, unsocial; and so universal are these characteristics, both in their physical constitution and in their natural dispositions, as clearly to show that they constitute a natural unity in the creation, entirely disconnected both in structure and natural dispositions with any other division of the animal kingdom, such as the monkeys, the ruminants, or the rodents. But because they agree so closely in all these prominent features, has any one ever thought that the wolf, tiger, and bear, originated from a common stock, and that their resemblance was owing to this common origin? Have we not here, on the contrary, the plainest evidence, that with the most distinct origin, without even the possibility of a mixture among such races, they exhibit a clearer resemblance and disposition, more alike than the different races of men? We may go further to show that a common character by no means proves common descent or parentage in the least degree, by comparing the different species of that so large genus, the cats, in which the wild-cat, the panther, the leopard, tiger, lion, and all the numerous species of this group having such similar habits, such similar natural dispositions, with the same structure, were yet constituted as so many distinct species unconnected in their genealogy.

"The same evidence might be drawn from thousands of natural groups, both in the animal and vegetable kingdom. We need only compare the different species of deer, moose, and elk, in the different parts of the world, or the buffalo with the wild bulls of the old world, to know that this law of unity among larger and smaller groups, when there is the most complete independence of origin, prevails throughout nature. Who does not recognise *prima facie* that the canoe-birch, white-birch, sweet-birch, and yellow-birch, are trees of the same stamp, though they do not pass one into the other, do not mingle, producing, nevertheless, similar fruit? Is this not true also of all the oaks, of all the pines, and is the unity stamped upon them all less obvious, less important, less conspicuous, because none of these plants, none of the animals mentioned above, can be referred to a common stock? These examples will be sufficient to show that the closest unity, the most intimate unity, may exist without a common origin, without a common descent, without that relationship which is often denoted by the expres-

sion 'ties of blood.' And on the other hand, that these ties of blood may exist without necessarily calling forth the higher connexions which may be found between individuals of the same type, is, alas ! too plainly shown by the history of mankind. * The immediate conclusion from these facts, however, is the distinction we have made above that to acknowledge a unity in mankind, to show that such a unity exists, is not to admit that men have a common origin, nor to grant that such a conclusion may be justly derived from such premises. We maintain, therefore, that the unity of mankind does not imply a community of origin for men ; we believe, on the contrary, that a higher view of this unity of mankind can be taken, than that which is derived from a mere sensual connexion—that we need not search for the highest bond of humanity in a mere animal function, whereby we are most closely related to the brutes."—Ch. Examiner, July, pp. 117–119.

But this is, in the first place, founded on an imagined analogy between the vegetable and animal world and man, and an assumption that God must naturally pursue the same course in giving being to the one as to the other, which, as we have already shown, is unauthorized and inconsistent with his perfections and purposes. Professor Agassiz himself admits in the sentence last quoted, that the intellectual nature of man is entitled to far higher consideration in the inquiry in respect to the origin and unity of the race, than that which is common to him with animals. Yet he founds his argument altogether on the corporeal part of man's constitution.

But, in the next place, aside from that, the cases which he compares, instead of parallels, are wholly dissimilar, and his argument from them altogether nugatory. His allegation is, that as the resemblances that subsist between different species of the same genus are no proof that they have a common origin, inasmuch as it is against their nature, and physically impossible ; therefore, the resemblances that exist between individuals and families of the *same* species are no proof that they have a common parentage, although it is consistent with their nature and physically possible. Or, in other words, that a resemblance that does not prove an impossible event, cannot prove a possible one ! Professor Agassiz, we presume, will, on a reconsideration, scarcely think this entitled to the rank of a scientific deduction ! But how is it that a race of animals is proved to be of the same species ? Not certainly by the

resemblances which they bear to one another in form, color, size, and other particulars that are obvious to the senses. For those resemblances are never absolute; but are limited and varied indefinitely by dissimilarities and specialities of individuals. The only *absolute* proof that they are of the same species is, that they propagate and perpetuate their own kind, and no other. In that particular they never differ. All their other characteristics admit of diversities. But it is known and admitted that mankind universally, no matter how the races are paired, propagate and perpetuate their own kind, and no other. It is indisputable, therefore, that they not only present the fullest evidence that they are of the same species, but, also, that they exhibit the highest which their corporeal nature admits, that they are of the same parentage. As their identity of species is the only evidence we can have from their mere bodily nature, that they are all the offspring of the same parents, we have in their identity of species all the proof we can have from that part of their nature, of their identity of origin. The Professor's argument, accordingly, in this relation is, that inasmuch as a characteristic that is consistent with a diversity of origin does not prove a unity of origin, therefore, a characteristic that is consistent with a sameness of origin does not prove that there is a diversity of origin! But how is this, except on the ground that the resemblances which he alleges, have nothing whatever to do in determining the question, whether the origin is diverse or the same? That they are neutral qualities that may belong alike to beings of the same, and of a different parentage? In this part of his discussion, then, the Professor manifestly has made no progress. His deduction is from a premise with which it has no connexion.

Professor Agassiz attempts to determine the question altogether as a naturalist, and on the ground of the analogies that are presented by the animal and vegetable world. There are other sources of evidence, however, that are entitled to consideration. Such are the affinities that subsist between the languages of the different races. Recent investigations have led to the conclusion that the whole of the dialects of the world are reducible to a few primitive stocks, and that the languages of the three great divisions of the race, the descend-

ants of Japhet, Shem, and Ham, in their first forms, consisted in such a measure of the same elements, as to indicate that they had a common parentage. A close affinity is known also to subsist between the vernacular languages of white and black nations or races; and there are white and black races, likewise, that are known to have descended from the same stock. These facts indicate very strongly that all the nations of the earth have descended from the same parentage.

He omits, also, a consideration of what the Scriptures teach on the subject, and claims that he is entitled to determine the question as a naturalist, irrespective of what they relate of the creation of the race.

"But we know so little respecting the origin of that first human pair to which the white race is distinctly referred, that even if it were possible to show that all men originated from that one pair, the naturalist would still be required to exert himself to throw more light upon the process by which they were created, in the same manner as geologists have done respecting the formations and changes in the physical condition of our globe.

"Such an investigation into the ways of nature, into the ways of the Creator, and into the circumstances under which organized beings were created, is a question wholly disconnected with religion, belonging entirely to the department of natural history."—*Christian Examiner*, July, p. 111.

But in investigating into the ways of the Creator, and into the circumstances in which he has brought organized beings into existence, it is incumbent on him, if he would reach the truth, to examine all the sources of information, and especially if God himself has assumed the office of teacher, to learn and receive what he communicates on the subject. The question cannot be decided irrespective of religion; for revealed religion contemplates the race as the descendants of one pair, and all the great measures of God's government are founded on it as an essential fact. Professor Agassiz cannot assume that they had a diversity of origin, without in effect assuming that the teachings of the Scriptures on the subject are erroneous.

He in like manner omits to notice the objection to his theory, that it is at variance with the sacred oracles, and

even denies that it presents any contradiction to their statements.

"We deny that in the views which we have taken of these questions there is anything contradicting the words in Genesis. Whatever is said there, can be best explained by referring it to the historical races. We have no statement relating to the origin of the inhabitants now found in those parts of the world which were unknown to the ancients.

"Do we find in any part of the Scriptures any reference to the inhabitants of the arctic zone, of Japan, of China, of New Holland, or of America? Now, as philosophers, we ask, whence did these nations come? And if we should find as an answer, that they were not related to Adam and Eve, and that they had an independent origin, and if this should be substantiated by physical evidence, would there be anything to conflict with the statements in Genesis? We have no narrative of the manner in which those parts of the world were peopled. We say, therefore, that as far as the investigation will cover that ground, it has nothing to do with Genesis. We meet all objections at once, we dare to look them in the face; for there is no impropriety in considering all the possible meanings of the Scriptures, and nobody can object to such a course except those whose religion consists in a blind adoration of their own construction of the Bible."—*Christian Examiner*, July, pp. 111, 112.

This is very singular language for a scientific investigator. Professor Agassiz appears to have forgotten that there are other branches of knowledge besides zoology; that language is one; and that when a question is raised in respect to the import of a narrative like that of the creation in Genesis, it is to be determined by its own peculiar and proper laws, not by the mere assertion of one who chooses to disregard its testimony. If the question whether Genesis and the Scriptures throughout represent Adam and Eve as the parents of the whole human family is to be decided by the laws of language, there is no room for debate that it is Professor Agassiz who is the victim of prejudice, not those whom he thinks proper to denounce in so discourteous and unscholarly a manner. He seems to proceed on the extraordinary assumption that because there is no express mention in Genesis of the arctic zone, Japan, China, New Holland, and America, it cannot clearly and indisputably represent that their inhabitants are

descendants of Adam and Eve;—that there are no specific and all comprehensive terms that supersede the necessity of particularizing continents, islands, and races. But if that were so, he could not declare and teach that all the animals of the earth have their origin in this world, and come into existence in the modes that are peculiar to their several natures, unless he enumerated all the localities,—zones, climes, continents, islands, and seas, which they occupy. The phrase all mankind, could only mean a single branch of the human family, unless it were expressly defined as comprehending all, by an enumeration of all the scenes that are inhabited by the race! He will see the expediency, we trust, of guarding against the repetition of such unfortunate absurdities. The language of Genesis is as specific, as unequivocal, and as comprehensive for the purpose of exhibiting Adam and Eve as the only human beings that were created to inhabit the earth, and as the parents of all others of their kind, as any that could have been selected. It professes to give an account of God's whole work in creating the earth itself, and its inhabitants, vegetables, animals, and mankind. "And God created every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind. And God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and everything that creepeth upon the earth after his kind. And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over *the fish of the sea*, and over *the fowl of the air*, and over *the cattle*, and over *all the earth*, and over *every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth*. And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them. And God blessed them; and God said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over *every living thing that moveth upon the earth*. And God said, Behold I have given you *every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of all the earth*, and *every tree in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed*; to you it shall be for meat. And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the

earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat." Can anything be more certain than that this enumeration embraces all the living creatures that God created to inhabit the earth, air, and water? Can anything be more clear than the representation that he created but one human pair? Can anything be more indisputably affirmed, than that he commanded that pair to fill the earth with their offspring, and that he gave them dominion over all the vegetable and animal tribes "upon the face of all the earth," which implies that they and their offspring were to be its sole human occupants? Can language possibly be more unequivocal or comprehensive? Can a more rude and unwarrantable contradiction to it be conceived, than the assumption that they were only one of a great number of human pairs, created independently of them, who received a similar charge to people the world with their offspring, and were invested with a similar absolute dominion over all its vegetable and animated tribes? Professor Agassiz, surely, cannot have duly considered this language, or he could not have fallen into so extraordinary a mistake as to imagine that it admits of a construction compatible with the theory that Adam and Eve were the parents of only a single branch of the human family; that there were numerous other creations of pairs like them, either before, contemporaneously, or subsequently, who were the progenitors, also, of other branches of the human race. He denies, indeed, that men originated at all from patriarchal pairs; and holds that they were created in nations, and peopled the world at once as they now do.

"We maintain that, like all other organized beings, mankind cannot have originated in single individuals, but must have been created in that numeric harmony which is characteristic of each species. Men must have originated in nations as the bees have originated in swarms, and as the different social plants have at first covered the extensive tracts over which they naturally spread. The manner in which the different races of men are united when they border upon each other, shows this plainly; and we have many analogous facts in the varieties we observe among well known animals."—*Ch. Examiner*, July, p. 128.

Can Professor Agassiz devise a theory of their creation, more absolutely antagonistic than this to the narrative of

Genesis? The pretext, then, that "to suppose that all men originated from Adam and Eve, is to give the Mosaic record a meaning that it was never intended to have," and that it is not incompatible with it to suppose not only that many other parent pairs were created, but that whole tribes and nations were called at once into existence by the Almighty fiat, is altogether unjustifiable, and adapted to discredit rather than confirm his theory, and impair than strengthen his authority as a philosopher.

Such are the considerations which he alleges in support of his views. He places it on a single ground that is irrelevant, and yields no premise for the deduction he founds on it. He yields that ground in his concession that all men are of the same species; and he leaves his scheme unprotected from the objections with which it is embarrassed by its inconsistencies with many important facts, and with the teachings of the Scriptures.

It is not our design, however, to enter into a minute refutation of his system. It is enough to have shown that he has done nothing towards its verification; that he has missed the most vital parts of the question, and has offered only an argument that is a fallacy throughout. Those who may desire a fuller view of the subject, will find a very ample discussion of it in its various relations, in Mr. Prichard's *Natural History of Man*, and Dr. Smyth's *Unity of the Human Races*.

The theory, however, though founded on a narrow and superficial view of the subject—placed on untenable grounds, and conflicting with the teachings of the Scriptures—will doubtless meet disciples, and not improbably find believers and advocates among those who profess to receive the Bible as a revelation from God. A more than ordinary disposition is manifested at the present time by crowds to receive and welcome objections to Christianity, and to exalt the authority of the sciences, as the mere speculations of philosophers and naturalists are often falsely called, above the word of God. There are many in the church, and some in the sacred office even, who question or reject the inspiration of the Scriptures, and endeavor to reduce the miracles they record to mere natural events, and modify or expunge their

teachings ; and infidelity itself has, in some instances, become bold and ostentatious in the avowal and inculcation of its doctrines from the pulpit. The young, therefore, who are unsettled in their theological views and prone to scepticism, are peculiarly liable to be betrayed by these examples, and the applause which they meet, into the assumption that an assent to this and other similar theories, though they conflict with the teachings of the Scriptures, is not incompatible with a profession of the Christian faith. Our object in the remainder of this article will be to expose that delusion, and show that those who adopt the theory that the whole human family are not descended from Adam and Eve, but that the principal nations and races had each a separate and independent origin, must, if consistent with themselves, wholly reject Christianity.


In the first place, they must reject the inspiration of the Scriptures ; as they unequivocally attest that Adam and Eve were the only human pair whom God created, and exhibit them as the parents of the whole race. That is taught not only in the history of the creation which we have already quoted, but with equal explicitness in the history of the flood and the repopulation of the earth by the descendants of Noah, and other passages of the sacred oracles, and is implied in every part of them, and proceeded on as a fact in all the great measures of the divine administration. Thus it is declared that by the flood, "all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth, and every man, all in whose nostrils was the breath of life, of all that was on the dry land died ; and every living substance that was upon the ground, both man and cattle, and the creeping things and the fowl of the heaven, and they were destroyed from the earth ; and Noah only remained and they that were with him in the ark," Genesis vii. 21-23. There can be no more specific and emphatic representation than this, that not an individual of the human race outlived that catastrophe, except Noah and his family, who were preserved in the ark. No room is left for the supposition that whole races of identically the same nature, and bearing like them the name of man, though descended from other parents,

occupied portions of the globe that were not submerged by that deluge, and survived it unmolested, and have continued from generation to generation to the present time. On the subsidence of the flood accordingly, God commanded Noah and his sons to repopulate the earth, and gave them dominion over all other organized creatures; which implies again that they were the sole human inhabitants of the earth. Had a large part of the globe been already swarmed with populous nations who had remained untouched by the deluge, it would have been a solecism to have delivered the whole animal and vegetable worlds into the hands of Noah and his sons, and enjoined them to replenish the earth with their offspring. And finally it is declared of the three sons of Noah that "of them was *the whole earth* overspread," Genesis viii. 18, 19. In harmony with this, we are taught also in the New Testament that "God made of *one blood* all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth;" that the death of all is the consequence of Adam's sin; and that the redemption by Christ contemplates all of them as his posterity. The whole fabric of God's government over the race as exhibited in the Scriptures is founded on that as a fact.

There is no possibility, therefore, of denying it, without,—if any self-consistency is to be maintained,—a disbelief of that representation of the Scriptures, and consequently a rejection of them altogether as a communication from God; for the unity of the origin and descent of the race is so openly assumed by them throughout and contemplated in all the divine laws which they record, that their veracity must altogether fall with its fall on that subject. If they misrepresent on a point so fundamental, as to render the whole of God's providence and moral administration a complication of false representations and solecisms, they surely can have no title whatever to credence. They therefore who reject them in that respect must inevitably cease to regard them as an inspired and authoritative record of the works and will of God, or the acts of men. Such has been the fact universally, we believe, hitherto. Not an individual can be designated, we presume, who has regarded the history of the creation in Genesis as a myth or allegory, who has not discredited the inspiration of the Scriptures. It has been denied by the German specu-

latists who have entertained that view. It was denied by Coleridge, and treated with ridicule and scorn; and is, we doubt not, however they may affect to disguise it, by all who understandingly adopt his principles.

In the next place, they will find themselves unable to believe that such a moral government is exercised over men as the Scriptures represent, or to frame any theory of an administration that shall consist with their system and man's condition. All God's dealings with men as lawgiver and the ruler of the material world, contemplate them as offspring of the same parents—as having the same moral character—as obnoxious to the same penalties, and as needing the same redemption. He claims the same rights over them, exhibits them as standing naturally in the same relation to him, imposes on them the same laws, visits them with the same punishments, and makes the same provision for their deliverance from moral and physical evils. The whole system of his measures assumes that they are not only in the same moral condition, but that they were brought into that condition by the same cause, and that that cause was the fall of Adam and Eve. The evils suffered by the whole race are precisely those which were announced as the consequence of their revolt—a thorny and sterile earth, toil, sorrow, subjection, suffering, and death; and they are represented as having their origin in their offence. To those, then, who do not believe that Adam and Eve were the parents and representatives of the whole race and brought on them these evils by their fall, it must be impossible to believe that they had such an origin in the conduct of ancestors, or that the providence under which they take place is founded on any such reasons. They can have no evidence whatever that other parent pairs, whom they may suppose to have been created contemporaneously with Adam and Eve, or at a different epoch, were put on trial in the same manner as they were, and fell and brought their offspring into a similar condition. They can have no probable ground for believing or supposing it, except the fact that all the races are in the same physical and moral condition; and if they do not admit that explanation of it furnished by the Scriptures, they cannot rationally admit a similar explanation by a supposed fall of many similar pairs.



They must, of necessity, disbelieve that a moral and providential administration is exercised by God over the race on any such ground, and account for the condition of the earth, and the sinfulness, debasement, sufferings, sorrows, and mortality of men, in some wholly different manner. And, if consistent, they will of course reason in regard to them as they do in respect to the diversity of the races, altogether from the analogy of the animal and vegetable worlds; and treat the imperfections of man's constitution and his subjection to want, toil, suffering, disease, and death, as altogether natural, in the same manner as decline, disease, and death, are to animals. They will no more admit a moral reason of the one than of the other, nor regard the one any more than the other as a consequence in any relation of the conduct of progenitors. But in disbelieving that it is because man has sinned that he is subjected to physical evils, and suffers, declines, and dies, they must of necessity either believe that God exercises no government over him, or has no reference in the allotment of these evils to his moral character; or else, at least, that the reasons of his appointing them are of a wholly different nature from those to which his word refers them. Mankind come into life mortal and under a sentence to death; and multitudes of them die immediately after birth. If, then, the reason that they are brought into existence in such a condition, and die, does not lie in the conduct of their progenitors, as it cannot lie in their own conduct, it cannot be considered as having any moral ground whatever, and must necessarily, therefore, be regarded as wholly irrespective of a moral reason, in the same manner as the mortality and death of animals are, that are not subjects of law. But what moral government can be supposed to exist compatibly with such a theory? If death is not the consequence of sin; if the sorrows and sufferings of life are not penal evils, and expressions of the displeasure of the moral Governor, what evidence is there in his providence over the race that he holds them responsible for their conduct, and regards them as offenders?

It will perhaps be thought that as it is admitted that mankind are of a single species, and fitted therefore to be subjects of the same government, it may be supposed that if descended from many created pairs instead of one, their progenitors

may have been put to a trial like Adam and Eve, and by their fall brought on their several races the same evils as those that were devolved by Adam and Eve on their offspring; and thence that God may, consistently with the theory of a plurality of created pairs, be supposed to exercise such a government over the race as is ascribed to him in the Scriptures, and to found its peculiar measures on the same grounds.

We answer, no one, we presume, who entertains the theory of a multifold origin of the race, will be disposed to indulge the supposition of such a complication of trials and falls. It were to augment the difficulties immeasurably of accounting for the condition of the race, instead of diminishing them. It is, in truth, inconsistent with the ground on which Professor Agassiz founds his views—the analogy of the animal and vegetable worlds—to suppose that had God created numerous pairs, or groups of human beings, as progenitors of races, he would have formed them all of the same species. It is the great characteristic of the animal world that there are several, and often many species of the same genus. Had he followed that law, and created many groups of men, he would have created them of different species, and instead of one order of human beings capable of propagating none but their own kind, there would have been many and perhaps hundreds. The unity of the race therefore in species is, on his principles, a confutation of his theory of its diversity of origin.

But, apart from this, it is altogether incredible that, in a single world like ours, many, perhaps hundreds and thousands of pairs or groups, should be put to a trial as Adam and Eve were, each of them fall in the same manner, and devolve the same complication of evil consequences on their posterity. A single world is not suited to be the theatre of numerous trials of representative pairs. If many pairs or groups are supposed to be put to trial, it may also be supposed that some of them may maintain their allegiance, and secure the virtue and bliss of their posterity, instead of involving them in the evils that revolt draws in its train. But a different issue of the different trials would render a wholly different providential and moral administration necessary over the two classes; and for that, a single world like this is plainly not at all

adapted. It is not supposable that fifty or a hundred, and, perhaps, several hundred localities distributed over the globe, occupied by different races, should be paradises wholly exempt from the curse of sin ; and as many others blighted by that curse, and the scene of want, toil, sorrow, suffering, and death. It is not consonant with the methods God pursues in the management of the world, to suppose that he should proceed with man on a plan of that nature. The theory of a plurality of independent races is wholly incompatible, therefore, with the supposition of a moral government like that which God is exercising, or any government whatever which contemplates men as offenders, and sorrow, suffering, and death, as penalties of the violation of a divine law ; and those who embrace the one must of necessity reject the other.

In the third place, they cannot, therefore, in any consistency with themselves, believe in the redemption of men from these evils by the mediation of Christ, but must necessarily reject Christianity as a mere invention or myth of a dark and fanatical age. For his redemptive work contemplates all mankind as the descendants of Adam and Eve, and as involved in their present condition by their fall ; and its object is to unfold the way for their extrication from this condition, and restoration to a state essentially like that in which they would have existed, had the first pair maintained their allegiance. The evils for which he furnishes a remedy, are the evils that were brought on the race by Adam's apostasy, and result from their personal rebellion ; and the gifts he bestows, are the renewing and sanctifying influences of the Spirit, forgiveness, adoption, restoration from death to all who suffer that infliction, exemption from death to all believers in him who are living at his second coming, and at length, a total deliverance of the race from sin, sorrow, suffering, and death, and existence in a condition that will assure their life for ever in virtue, peace, and blessedness. " As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." " As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, judgment shall come upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." No one then can believe in his interposition to

deliver them from these evils, who does not believe that any such connexion subsists between their character and condition and Adam's offence ;—who holds that their imperfections, miseries, and mortality, instead of originating in the moral agency of an ancestor, are altogether natural, and need no such remedy as Christ proposes. How can they suppose Christ's interposition is real, if they regard the ground on which it is founded as altogether mistaken and supposititious? How can they suppose such a redemption as he undertook is necessary, if men are not in the condition which that redemption contemplates? How can they suppose that death is to be repealed by his sacrifice, when it is a part of their creed that death is not a punishment, nor a consequence in any relation of a violation of law? How can they look for pardon and justification through his blood, when they deny the necessity of a gracious forgiveness and acceptance? How can they ascribe wisdom, truth, and goodness, to such a measure, which their scheme exhibits as a complication of contradictions and absurdities? It must be as impossible, as it were to believe that the animals themselves are the subjects of such a redemption. They must of necessity reject the Christian system; and hold that if men need any redemption, it must be founded on wholly different grounds, and be accomplished by altogether different means.

Let those then who are disposed to accede to the theory advanced by Professor Agassiz, maturely weigh these considerations, and see what the issue is to which it must naturally carry them; and if they reject the grounds on which the Christian system rests, and deny the reality, or form a different view of the evils it is designed to remedy, let them not delusively persuade themselves, that they may still, without a fatal inconsistency, retain a belief and profession of that system.

ART. V.—THE ADVERB.*

THE *adverb* (Lat. *adverbium*, as if “joined to the verb”) is a part of speech joined to the verb in order to modify or limit the force of the same.

As the adverb modifies the verb or predicate, so it modifies an adjective or participle, which is a verb or predicate without the predication.

The adverb does not, like a verb, substantive, or adjective, express a peculiar form of an idea merely; as “he went from *home* ;” nor like the numeral or preposition, a peculiar relation of ideas; as “to go *down* the hill;” but it denotes an objective factor in full as a member of the syntactical combination; as “he went *home* ;” “the sun went *down*.”

The adverb modifies the predicate by expressing an incidental or supplementary object. In this it differs from the necessary or complementary object. It involves a substance or essence, and the direction or tendency towards the same.

Although the limit of the adverb is well defined by the etymology of its name, and by the use to which it is applied, yet it embraces words considerably different from each other as to their nature, owing to their origination and different mode of formation.

1. The simplest form of the adverb is that which is derived from the substantive, which expresses a substance, or something conceived of as a substance. Thus

Home, “to the house,” an accusative case, used adverbially.

Needs, “from necessity,” an ancient genitive, used adverbially.

Always, “at all times,” the accusative of time.

Noways, “in no manner,” an ancient genitive, used adverbially.

Nightly, “by night,” with adverbial suffix *ly*.

* This article is from a gentleman who has given great attention to the structure of language, and who will furnish us, we trust, with a series of philological contributions.

Beside, "moreover," compounded of *by* and *side*.

Away, "at a distance," compounded of *a* for *on* and *way*.

To-day, "on this day," compounded of *to* and *day*.*

These are principally adverbs of place and time; also of cause, as *needs*; and of manner, as *noways*.

2. Another class of adverbs is derived from the adjective, which in this case is used as an abstract substantive. Thus,

Unawares, "with suddenness," an ancient genitive, used adverbially.

Once, "at one time," an ancient genitive used adverbially. So *twice*, *thrice*.

Wisely, "with wisdom," with adverbial suffix *ly*. So from most adjectives of qualities.

Right, "with rightness," with loss of ancient adverbial suffix. So many others.†

In vain, "with vanity," compounded of *in* and *vain*. So *in secret*, *in public*, *in particular*, *in general*. These are adverbial phrases.

These are principally adverbs of manner.

3. A third class is derived from pronouns, in which the substantive idea, as place, time, cause, manner, &c., is involved in the form of the word. Thus,

There, "in that place." So *here*, *where*?

Thither, "to that place." So *hither*, *whither*?

Thence, "from that time." So *hence*, *whence*?

Then, "at that time." So *when*?

So, "after that manner." So *as*, *how*?

Therein, *thereof*, &c. So *herein*, *hereof*, &c. *wherein*? *whereof*?

Adverbs derived from pronouns are either in an oblique case, or else have peculiar adverbial suffixes.

These adverbs derived from pronouns differ widely from the preceding. They denote impermanent relations, or relations to the speaker merely.

4. A fourth class of adverbs are those which are closely related to prepositions. The substantive idea is definite space as related to the speaker himself. Thus

* See Fowler's Eng. Grammar, § 317.

† See Ibid. § 319.

In, compounded, emphatic form *within*.

Out, compounded, emphatic form *without*.

Up, compounded, emphatic form *above*.

Down, compounded, emphatic *beneath* and *below*.

Fore, compounded, emphatic form *before*.

Back, compounded, emphatic form *behind*.

Also *off*, *on*, *by*, *with*, *to*; *about*.*

Thus "he went down" = "he went to space which was lower in regard to the speaker."

5. Another class of adverbs is formed by trajection; they are called adverbs of *modality*. These modify the predication or affirmation, and not the predicate itself. They express all degrees of certainty or uncertainty. Thus "my brother will *not* come;" "*perhaps* he will come;" "*possibly* he may come;" "he will *probably* come;" "he will *certainly* come;" "the sun had *scarcely* set."

These sentences may be resolved thus: "he will *certainly* come," = "it is certain that he will come."

This class of adverbs deserves attention.

The object of the preceding remarks has been to classify adverbs anew, and to clear up a difficult point in the new or Beckerian philology respecting the objective relation.

ART. VI.—MISCELLANIES.

I.

PROFESSOR LEWIS'S DISCOURSE ON NATURALISM.

PROFESSOR LEWIS has published, since his removal to Schenectady, an address delivered by him at Union College in 1849, in which with great keenness, brilliance, and effect, he confutes and rebukes the infidelity and atheism that under the garb of learning and taste are rapidly infecting the scientific

* See Fowler's Eng. Grammar, § 324.

discussions, the literature, and, in a measure, the theology of the day. "The literal and philosophical and even religious world"—he represents—"is becoming parched and inflated" with an "atheistic naturalism" and "idealism," that, however veiled under specious names, and disguised by imposing professions, totally rejects the Jehovah of the Scriptures, the self-existing creator, upholder, and ruler of the universe, disowns his word as a revelation, and discards the redemption which it proclaims. Some make God and the universe of matter and mind, identical, and deny thereby the possibility of a divine lawgiver or revelation to individuals; as none can on that theory be more divine than each individual himself; and thence the possibility of sin against a lawgiver, and consequently the necessity and possibility of a redemption. Others substitute the laws of the physical world in the place of the creator and upholder, treat them as a species of self-subsisting and controlling powers, and ascribe to them the offices and dignify them with the names of the deity. A still more numerous class deny the existence both of an outer world and a creating and upholding God, and exhibiting all the objects of thought and sense as identical with thought and sensation themselves or their mere forms, make each individual to himself the only existence, and what seems to him an external universe, fellow-beings, and God, only the phenomena of his own consciousness. This is the doctrine of the modern German metaphysics, and the basis of most of the scepticism that prevails in Europe; and it is a fundamental element in the speculations of Coleridge, Schleiermacher, Neander, and other neologists, whose philosophy and theology have obtained a currency in this country; and those who have adopted their theories of man, God, and Christianity,—however unconscious they may be of it,—if it is supposable that they do not understand themselves, have admitted into their system a principle of atheism more effective than any other, and that will naturally work its way to that result, through all the restraints that education, reason, and conscience may oppose to it. This tendency has already been strongly exemplified. The Coleridge, Kant, and Schleiermacher party in Great Britain and this country no longer stand on the ground they occupied twenty years ago; their

leaders are now much more ready openly to deny the miracles of the Scriptures, reject their inspiration, and disown their most indisputable and essential doctrines. They treat inspiration and revelation as mere natural processes, install reason or the heart as a divine teacher in the place of the Holy Spirit, and exhibit inspired men themselves and the Son of God as but mere ideas. It is a cardinal doctrine with them, accordingly, that each one's consciousness is his only source of theology; that it is the especial prerogative of the heart to frame a system of doctrines to suit its own taste; and that such a system is the only means by which it can excite itself to piety. The Jehovah of the Bible and the universe is thus absolutely shut out of their theology, and man made at once the creator and the created, lawgiver and subject, the judge and the judged. There is none to whom he is responsible but himself, and no standard of right but his own passions and fancy. Twenty years more of progress as rapid as has been made the last twenty years, and there seems no reason to doubt that that school will, as a body, be as undisguised and rampant in their infidelity and atheism, as Strauss and his associates are in Germany.

Professor Lewis is under no mistake then in exhibiting this system, whatever may be the garb under which its features are for a time partially concealed, as atheistic, and sure ultimately to work itself free from its disguises, and disclaim all pretence to an affinity with the Christian religion. "Between the simple and sublime doctrines of the Scripture and the idealizing naturalism there is an irreconcilable war; the church and this philosophy may for a while mingle together, but they must soon separate. When the soul of any man has become thoroughly imbued with the latter, all true and hearty and reverent faith in the Scriptures must more and more decay, until it goes finally out in the utter wreck and ruin of all true moral ideas," p. 26. Is it not singular that any should fail to see this? Is it not strange that any who are the friends of truth should regard these principles as innocent, presume that their abettors are still orthodox, and contemplate their inculcation in the seats of learning, and diffusion through the community with indifference? The extent to which they have already spread, the numerous

channels through which they are diffused, the thoughtlessness with which they are often commended by persons who are pleased with the glitter of specious words with which they are set off, and the silence and unconcern with which their propagation is witnessed by many of those who are set for the defence of the faith, are among the most portentous indications of the time.

Among the absurdities of these speculatists ridiculed by Professor Lewis is the ascription of personality and activity to ideas. Beginning with a denial of the reality of God, man, and the universe, and exhibition of all that is exterior to the mind, as merely ideal, they end by transforming certain favorite ideas into personal agents, and investing them with a controlling influence over mankind ; and as they are ideas of which those who are represented as under their sway are wholly unconscious, they must of necessity, if they have a real being, be independent and self-subsisting existences. He exemplifies this in a very effective manner in reference to the battle of Tours in which Karl Martel defeated the Saracens.

"The battle itself was the fact for narration. The strife, the blows, the flowing blood, the deaths, the eventful changes of that long agonizing struggle, the seeming turns of chance, the final rout, the merciless slaughter,—these furnish the more *outward* picture. Another view rises higher. Transcending the mere chronicle, and even the more graphic heroical or epical legend, it brings in the moral and physical states of the parties, and their moral and physical relations. These form the more *inward* or real event of which the outward strife is but the exponent. This moral state again is compounded of various elements—the degree of civilization, the predominance of certain passions, the power of certain forms of religious belief. All these united form that collection of events, or rather that combined event, of which it is the duty of the chronicler accurately to inform us, and on which it is the higher historian's province to philosophize.

"So far all is sober and rational. But the most modern philosophy of history is not content with such materials. The merely human elements are too common, too easily resolved into those ordinary facts of human nature, which, however outwardly varying, are nearly the same in their essential character for all ages. The recognition of divine agencies on the other hand, especially in the ordinary way, is too

unphilosophical. It too easily cuts the Gordian knot, and introduces its *deus ex machina* with too little regard to the great dramatic proprieties of ideal causation.

"Beyond and above all this, there must be brought in the wondrous and transcendent power of *ideas*. These wild men of Tours, these ferocious Franks, these fanatical Saracens, were fighting for *ideas* and under the invisible power of ideas. In other words the ideas themselves were fighting through them; just as in times nearer our own it has been said of the men of Berlin, of Vienna, and the faubourgs of Paris, *great ideas were fighting through them*. Of all this, however, the actors were utterly unconscious, at least as individuals, whatever may have been transcendently going on in the sphere of their generic humanity. In other words *the ideas cannot be resolved into motives and thoughts then present to any individual minds*, and thus affecting collective masses. . . . An idea then is not motive, it is not simply past experience, or present fear, or future hope. It is not passion or emotion, high or low. It is not intelligence. No—it is something rising above all this. It would seem to have ascribed to it a sort of semi-animate *personality*. It sways the mind, not as a thought, or a collection of thoughts, or as any combined influences of past and present impressions, but rather as a sort of possession or instinct. The souls of men are unconsciously possessed by it, as by a good or evil spirit."—Pp. 13-16.

As all ideas are in fact objects of a distinct consciousness, *transcendental* ideas like these, that lie wholly out of the sphere of consciousness, must, if real, have an existence altogether independent of the minds on which they exert their power, and instead of perceptions, apprehensions, or intuitions, therefore, be positive entities, and have a power of acting on existences that are exterior and diverse from themselves. These philosophers accordingly, in attempting to solve the phenomena of the universe as purely ideal, quit their own theory and introduce a set of agents that are altogether unideal as the causes of those phenomena; and this is a fair specimen of the depth and consistency that characterize their speculations. Professor Lewis, in exposing their false principles and mischievous influence, has fulfilled a duty for which he deserves the thanks of the friends of revelation. It is time that the adherents to the truth made an effort for its defence against this atheistic system. Those who would avoid the overthrow of their own faith, must preserve them.

selves from its contamination ; and those who would prevent others from being betrayed by it to destruction, must divest it of its mask, and expose to them its impiousness and absurdity ; and proper exertions for the purpose by even a small body of those who direct in a measure the judgment and taste of the public, would soon arrest its career, and consign it to the contempt and detestation which it deserves.

II.

THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848.

THE great changes that took place in the condition of the nations of Europe nearly three years since, made a profound impression at the time on the thoughtful, and excited the apprehension that the despotic governments and the hierarchies of the ten kingdoms were soon to meet a final overthrow. The failure consequently of the people to secure their objects, and speedy resubjection to tyrannies more violent and hopeless than those under which they were crushed before, has occasioned as general surprise and disappointment. That, however, is precisely the issue in which it is foretold, the effusion of the fifth vial on the throne of the beast, that undoubtedly had its accomplishment in a measure in that event, is to result. The kingdom of the beast " was filled with darkness, and they, the people, gnawed their tongues for pain, and blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their sores, and repented not of their deeds." What other description so appropriate and graphic could be given in so brief a compass of the issue of those catastrophes ! The people of France, Rome, Naples, Sicily, Piedmont, Tuscany, Venice, Austria, Hungary, Bavaria, Saxony, Prussia, on seizing the supreme power, seemed instantly to become bewildered, like persons involved in impenetrable darkness, and uncertain which course to pursue ; and occupied with false shows, ere they were aware, lost the opportunity of securing what they had flattered themselves they had attained, and were forced back into a more hopeless thralldom than that from which they had escaped. Poverty instead of wealth, want instead of plenty, helplessness and woe instead of power, misery instead of happiness, was

the issue to millions who had been most inflated with confident and exaggerated hopes. Astonishment, rage, and despair, accordingly seized them as they became sensible of their defeat, and they shrank back from the power to which they found themselves again enthralled, to brood over their miseries and disgrace in rancored self-reproach and exasperation.

The calm that now reigns in the several kingdoms is not the consequence of an extinction of the passions that agitated and impelled the multitude during the brief period of their triumph; they exist still in all their strength and exacerbation; they are only repressed by the resistless force with which the rulers now exert their recovered power, and the terror which the dungeon and the gibbet inspire. This is certainly a surprising issue of such a movement, and such as no one, judging from the indications in its first stages, could have deemed probable. That the people of France, Italy, and Germany, had no adequate preparation for a proper exercise of the elective franchise which they assumed or forced their rulers to concede to them, and were likely to be badly governed by the man of their own choice, was apparent; but that they should in a brief period lose to such an extent their whole power, and not even make a trial of their capacity for self-government, could not have been anticipated, and seemed in the utmost degree improbable. The condition, however, into which they have sunk in every kingdom on the continent, is such as is foreshadowed in the prophecy; and their defeat is very probably to become still more absolute, and their mortification still more exacerbated; and such will be the result doubtless for a considerable period of other outbreaks and revolutions, should they occur. The shape which these great movements have assumed, confirms therefore this application of the prophecy; and should attract to it more strongly the attention of God's people, and prompt them to study with greater care the signals he has given in his word, of the still more momentous events that are approaching, and watch with higher interest the preparations that seem in progress for other and greater revolutions.

The changes that are silently working in the religious world are very remarkable also, and present striking proofs

that the prediction under the sixth vial is meeting its fulfilment in the alienation of the people from the nationalized churches. Waters are explained in the prophecy as the symbol of peoples and nations; and Babylon is undoubtedly the representative of the nationalized hierarchies. The people and nations of the ten kingdoms are to their hierarchies, therefore, what the river Euphrates was to Babylon. The drying up of those waters accordingly must signify the discontinuance by the people of their connexion with the legalized ecclesiastics or established churches. And that is taking place on a great scale, especially in the Catholic communities. It is resulting partly from the greater religious liberty that was given by the constitutions of 1848; and in a still greater degree from the union of the priests generally with the monarchical party in their endeavor to divest the people of their newly acquired power, and establish the old tyrannies. The priests of France at first affected to concur in the subversion of the throne, and establishment of a democratic government; but the moment the reaction commenced, and the new rulers began to oppose the popular will, recall the rights that had been conceded, and endeavor again to build up an independent and arbitrary government, the bishops and priests and Jesuits joined with them so openly, and gave them so zealous a support, as to reveal the insincerity of their democratic professions, and show that they are still swayed by the intolerant, ambitious, and tyrannical spirit, that has animated them at every other period of their power. The consequence is, that the people are led to regard them as the implacable enemies of liberty, and the conviction is becoming general that the overthrow of their power is indispensable in order to the enjoyment of civil and religious freedom. Many, accordingly, instead of silently submitting to their pretensions, or regarding them with indifference as before, are disowning their authority and assuming a hostile attitude towards them. And this movement seems likely to continue, and antagonism to the church become perhaps a popular sentiment. If the present government proceeds in its attempts to restrict the liberty of the press, and abolish the political rights guaranteed to the citizens by the new constitution, and is prompted to that policy by the priesthood, the people will

naturally become more thoroughly aware of their character, and regard them with deeper dislike ; and should a new revolution take place, whether in favor of democracy or monarchy, it will almost necessarily give a fresh impulse to that feeling. Should a despotic government again be established, it will make the priests who give it their support, and use it as their instrument, the objects of a stronger distrust and hatred. And should the people again obtain the supremacy, they will probably go far greater lengths than at the last revolution, in abridging the prerogatives and influence of the national church.

The alienation of the people from the Papacy has taken place, and is advancing on a far greater scale in the Roman states. The proposal of the present pontiff soon after his accession to the see, to give to his subjects a civil constitution and a representative government, rendered him highly popular with them, and excited extravagant expectations of an amelioration of their condition. But the opposition of the clergy generally to those measures, the pope's refusal to verify his promises, his attempt to return to a despotic policy, his flight from his dominions, his denunciation of the free government that was established in his absence, and his resumption of a merciless and destructive tyranny on his restoration to power, rendered him and the whole body of subordinate ecclesiastics the objects of deep and universal resentment and hatred. There the priests are their political as well as their ecclesiastical oppressors ; and it is seen and felt with an energy far greater than in France, that there can be no civil or religious freedom, no safety for persons or property, no public or private happiness, until the Catholic hierarchy is divested altogether of its political power, and placed like other bodies of men under the dominion of the civil law. The question of civil and religious freedom with them is the question of the overthrow of the Papacy as a political power. The consequence is a desertion of the churches in a great degree by the people, especially of Rome, and deep and rancorous hatred of the priests, and a desire and determination to throw off their dominion at the earliest moment possible ; and these feelings must naturally gain strength, and become more general. Every fresh outrage of

their rights will give them a keener sense of the hypocrisy and impiousness of their oppressors. Every new stage that they are pushed by them down the steep of degradation and misery, will inflame them with a fiercer resentment, and inspire them with a sterner resolution, when a favorable juncture arrives, to wrench from their own limbs the manacles with which they are loaded, and fasten them on their torturers.

In Piedmont a similar alienation from the ecclesiastics has been occasioned by the refusal of the Archbishop of Turin to allow a priest to attend one of the civil ministers in his last hours, or yield him the rites of burial, because he had been instrumental in promoting the passage of a law rendering ecclesiastics amenable to the civil tribunals for civil offences. That instance of malice and intolerance, which delayed the burial and came near preventing it with the rites of the church, inflamed the populace with indignation at the ecclesiastics, and rendered the interposition of the civil government necessary to protect them from being mobbed, and driven from the city; while the Archbishop's persistence, against the remonstrances of the court, in prohibiting his clergy from officiating at the burial, and his subsequent condemnation by the civil court, and final deposition from office, have served to generate a deep and undisguised feeling throughout the kingdom, that the priests are implacable enemies of their civil liberties, and must be divested of their power, in order to the possibility of a just and free government. A similar contest between the civil powers and the Archbishop of Cagliari, Sardinia, has issued in like manner, in his deposition, and rendered the whole body of the Catholic officials the objects of popular dislike. And these alien and hostile feelings will naturally diffuse themselves, grow in strength, and obtain a freer expression.

A similar process is going forward in the other states of Italy, and in Austria, Bavaria, and Prussia. Everywhere the Catholic priests are the enemies of liberty, and the favorers of despotic power; and the people who desire a larger measure of freedom, a more general diffusion of knowledge, and a check on the arbitrary will of their oppressors, are naturally led to regard them as their worst enemies, and to wish and sigh for extrication from their sway.

The principal measures, indeed, of the Pope and the Catholic clergy generally, of the last few years, have been peculiarly disastrous, and indicate that their overthrow is to be the consequence in a measure of their own infatuation. The attempt of Pius Ninth to relieve the Papacy from the unpopularity with its subjects, which its cruel and debasing oppressions had drawn on it, and revive its decayed power by the admission into the administration of what seemed to be a representative and popular branch, led almost immediately to a revolution, in which he lost the supreme control, and found himself compelled either to surrender his most essential prerogatives, or desert his throne for a period, and rely on his allies to conquer his kingdom for him, and enable him to resume it as its absolute master. The experiment by which he hoped to regenerate the Papacy, and invest it with a fresh halo of glory, thus proved more disastrous than any other measure it had ever adopted, and gave it a greater shock than it had received from any of its external foes: for it revealed its weakness and insusceptibility of such a renovation as would either promote or admit the release of its subjects from oppression and debasement, and admission to even an humble share of the blessings of freedom and prosperity. It drew aside the veil which a blind faith and veneration had permitted to hang over its features, and disclosed to the popular gaze its monster form in all its hideousness, as the deadly foe of liberty, safety, and happiness, accustomed to nourish itself on the miseries of its subjects as its choicest aliment, and incapable of being divested of its ferocious nature, and transformed to justice and benignity.

It thus disenchanted its victims, instead of confirming and heightening their delusion. It showed them that the power which they had revered and worshipped is a merciless torturer instead of a father, a demon instead of God; and that discovery flashed on their eyes in a dazzling light, and verified by the oppressions, outrages, and bloody resentments of which thousands of individuals and families have been the victims since the restoration of the Pontiff, will never fade from their conviction, but remain a fixed element in their judgment of the Papacy. The course pursued by the Catholic clergy of France, Piedmont, Sardinia, and Ireland, has served, in like manner, by demonstrating their unaltered intolerance, hostility

to the diffusion of knowledge, and unfriendliness to free governments, to weaken their influence on the people, and force them to alienation and antagonism. In Germany, the prevalence of rationalism has reduced the influence of the clergy, Reformed as well as Catholic, to so low a point, that were the order struck from existence, it would scarcely excite a regret, there is reason to believe, in a large part of the population. In Great Britain, too, dissatisfaction with the established church is extending and advancing in strength. Strenuous efforts are made by the dissenters to render it the object of popular dislike, by pointing out its defects and exposing its mischievous influences, while a large body of those who have heretofore been its most ardent supporters, have lately become, in a measure, alienated and hostile, in consequence of the defeat, by the government, of the Bishop of Exeter, in his contest in respect to baptism. A variety of causes are thus at work throughout southern and western Europe, in lessening the popularity and power of the nationalized clergy; making them the objects of suspicion and hostility, and inducing those who have heretofore acquiesced in their sway, and yielded them support, to withdraw from their communion. And it is a new, a peculiar, and a most important feature of the period, and indicates very significantly that the great movement foreshown by the drying of the Euphrates has begun, that is to issue in the overthrow of the legalized hierarchies, as the diversion of the waters of the river from its channel, by the Persians, led to the fall of ancient Babylon.

This revolution, which is thus silently and steadily advancing, should attract the earnest attention of the people of God who watch the relations of his providence to the predictions of his word. It indicates very clearly the point to which the great series of events foreshown in the Apocalypse has advanced in its fulfilment, and that a preparation is taking place for the sealing of the servants of God—which is probably to be an equally singular and important event, closely connected with this, and, in a measure, perhaps its consequence. For the characteristics by which the sealed are to be distinguished are, we are told, that they have not been defiled with women—which is the symbol of homage or voluntary submission to the usurping hierarchies denoted by great Babylon;

that in their mouths there is no guile—no professions of allegiance to Christ that are not sincere ; and that they are without fault before God, or are not chargeable with having substituted creatures in his place, as objects of submission and homage, but have ascribed to him alone the rights, and rendered to him the worship that are exclusively his. The agency on them denoted by the sealing, is accordingly to cause them to manifest these characteristics. Their public conduct is to make it as apparent and indubitable that they are the servants of God, in contradistinction from the servants of usurping ecclesiastics, as though the name of God were stamped on their brows by an angel from heaven. And the way seems preparing for the rise of a body of persons in the several nations of Europe, who shall make such a full renunciation of the unjustifiable claims of the legalized hierarchies to authority over the faith and worship of their people, and give to Christ alone the honor of lawgiver and king of the church. And such views as the sealed are to manifest of God's prerogatives, and the guilt of yielding to the claims of creatures who usurp his place, have hitherto been almost unknown. The Protestants, at the Reformation, approved and sustained the assumption of dominion over the doctrines and worship of the church by kings and ecclesiastics, as fully as the Catholics themselves. Every Protestant state nationalized its church, and legislated against dissenters ; and that usurpation of God's prerogatives is continued with slight modifications to the present day. The ground on which it is resisted generally by dissenters, is rather that the power is exercised in a particular mode, than that it is altogether usurped and an infringement on the divine rights. A public and earnest denunciation of it in this relation, assertion and vindication of God's exclusive right to legislate over them in respect to his worship, and the method and conditions of salvation, will therefore distinguish the sealed in a new and peculiar manner as his servants, in contrast with the vassals of the hierarchies. And that it is to be a work of great significance, is indicated by the dignity and splendor of the symbols by which it is represented, and by the extraordinary distinctions to which the sealed are to be exalted in consequence of their fidelity. They are to be the first that

are to be redeemed by Christ from the earth at his coming, and presented to the Father. They are to stand with him on Mount Zion and sing a new song in the presence of the saints, denoted by the living creatures and elders, and are thereafter to be his attendants wherever he goes. The office they are to fill is undoubtedly, therefore, to be highly peculiar, and the work they are to accomplish, eminently acceptable and glorious to God. Who can contemplate it without a profound impression that it is to be a work of immeasurable significance and dignity ; of the utmost importance to God's vindication, and a true manifestation of the principles and character of his usurping foes ; and that it is to exert a powerful influence on both the true and false worshippers who are to witness it ? Peculiar as their office is to be, there are powerful agencies now exerting that it would seem may naturally cause the rise of such a body of men, and prompt them to such a work.

The distribution of the Scriptures and religious books, and the labors of evangelical ministers and missionaries in France, and Switzerland especially, and in a measure in Italy and Germany, have been the means, by the divine blessing, of bringing a large number to the knowledge of the truth ; and a body of worshippers is forming who can utter, when called to the work, such a testimony for God ; and it is noticeable that the peculiar obstructions with which they meet, and persecutions to which they are subjected, directly spring from this interference of usurping creatures with God's prerogatives, and force it immediately on their notice. It has accordingly already been largely discussed by the Protestants of France and Switzerland, and in a measure in Great Britain ; and is continually obtruded on the thoughts of the evangelical by the bigotry, intolerance, and tyranny, of the legalized ecclesiastics and civil rulers ; and as it is more fully investigated, the error and enormity of the assumptions on which the anti-christian party proceed, will be unfolded more and more fully, until at length the truth is revealed in all its greatness and sanctity, that God alone has the right of religious lawgiver, and, consequently, that men who attempt to dictate the faith and worship of their fellow-men are guilty of usurping his place.

The posture of political and religious affairs in Europe, is thus of peculiar interest. There was never a period when the indications were more significant. There was never a juncture when it was more incumbent on the disciples of Christ to notice with care the movements of his providence, and study with earnestness the teachings of his word.

ART. VII.—CRITICS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

I. .

THE PECULIARITY OF CHRIST'S REIGN AND MAN'S CONDITION DURING THE MILLENNIUM AND THE AGES THAT ARE TO FOLLOW.

A CORRESPONDENT who has given much attention to the prophecies, and regards them as indicating that the work of redemption is to cease at the close of the period denoted by the thousand years, asks us to state the reasons of our belief that instead, the race is to inhabit the earth and multiply, and Christ's mediatorial work continue without end.

In the first place, then, there is no direct or indirect intimation in the Scriptures that its multiplication is ever to cease. It is assumed by those who suppose it is to terminate at Christ's coming, or at the close of the millennium, without adequate authority. A position, however, that affects on so vast a scale the salvation which Christ is to accomplish, ought not to be adopted without the most ample reasons. Yet we are not aware of a single valid consideration that can be alleged by them in support of that view.

On the other hand, there is no dearth of indications that mankind are to occupy the earth in an endless series of generations, and the work of redemption continue for ever. Had the first pair not fallen, the race would doubtless have continued in an interminable succession. It is inferable from their nature. No reason can be conceived why God should debar any generation which he would then have called into existence, from the parental office, for which their consti-

tutions would be fitted. It would be to give them that part of their nature in vain. No adequate reason can be imagined why he should then arrest them in their multiplication, and put a limit to their numbers. No want of power to uphold, supply, and govern them through a perpetual round of ages, could render such a measure necessary. Nothing can be seen or conceived indicating that the possibility of subserving the ends for which they were created, would have diminished by the progress of their numbers, and be any less at the thousandth, the ten thousandth, or the millionth generation, than at the tenth or hundredth. Why would it not have been as benevolent, as wise, and as glorious to God, to continue to create them, in any one age of the universe, as in any other? Had it been his purpose to strike his works from existence, at some future epoch, or to pause in the display of his perfections, and the administration of his kingdom, it would then be seen that the race of man, though holy, was to reach a limit. But as he was then, as he is now, to uphold his works and continue to display himself, and carry on his empire in an eternal progress, it would be in harmony with his attributes and designs, that he should give perpetuity to this order of his subjects, and cause them, in accordance with the constitution with which he has endowed them, to multiply in an interminable series. If such, then, was the scheme which he would have pursued towards them, had they not fallen, why is it not the scheme, also, he is now to pursue?

What reason is there to suppose that he has made a total change in his purpose? The object of Christ's interposition is to counteract and defeat the plot of Satan, and rescue the race from the consequences of the apostasy. And we are assured that he is to achieve that end; and that the curse brought by Adam on his posterity is at length to be repealed. There is to be a time when men shall no more die, nor be mortal, nor suffer sickness, pain, sorrow, or any other of the evils that result from the fall. They will be replaced, therefore, in that respect, in such a condition as they would have occupied had they not sinned; and the same scheme of government resumed, doubtless, as to their continuance and multiplication, that was instituted at first, and would have been pursued had they persevered in allegiance.

In the third place, there are positive evidences of the perpetuity of the race here. The dominion with which Christ is to be invested at his second coming, is to be an everlasting dominion, "and a dominion that shall not pass away," by being changed to a different form, or becoming merely nominal; and the kingdom over which he is to exercise it is one that "shall not be destroyed." But that dominion is to be over "peoples, nations, and languages," and that kingdom a kingdom of men, existing in communities and in the natural body. His subjects are to be men speaking different languages, and embracing all the races and nations that inhabit the earth. As his dominion then is not to pass away, nor his kingdom cease to be what it is at its institution, his subjects also are for ever to continue and be of the same order as at first. It is implied also in the proclamation at the sound of the seventh trumpet: "The sovereignty of the world has become our Lord's and his Messiah's," and βασιλεύσει, he shall rule as king for ever. The sovereignty he is to exercise as king for ever is the sovereignty τοῦ κόσμου, of the globe, of this world, and of course a sovereignty over men in their corporeal nature, for which the world is fitted and designed. It is expressly taught also in the announcement of Christ's birth and the description of his government by Isaiah, that he is to exercise his everlasting rule on the throne of David, as the king of Israel, therefore, and thence over them and the Gentiles in the natural body. "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace. Of the increase of the government and of the peace there shall be no end upon the throne of David and in his kingdom to establish it, and to confirm it in justice and in righteousness from henceforth and for ever," ix. 6, 7. His ruling as king on the throne of David and in his kingdom for ever, implies that the Israelites are for ever to continue as a nation and in the natural body. Otherwise the kingdom in which he reigns cannot be David's kingdom, which was that of Israelites, not of any other order of beings; and of Israelites in the body, not of disembodied Israelites, or Israelites raised from the grave in a glorified form. The eternal increase of

This government indicates that there is to be an eternal augmentation of the number over whom he is to reign. There is no other relation in which it can be supposed to increase. It cannot advance for ever in wisdom, benignity, or power over its subjects, as it will be perfect in all those respects at its institution. But it will go on for ever in its greatness and grandeur, if the myriads for ever multiply who are its happy subjects.

The perpetuity of the kingdom of the glorified saints indicates also that men are for ever to exist in the natural body, and thence are for ever to multiply. The kingdom which the saints of the Most High are to take at the destruction of the fourth empire, they are to possess for ever and ever; and it is to be the kingdom and dominion and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven; and is to continue for ever under the sceptre of the Redeemer, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and whom all dominions are to serve and obey. As they are thus to reign for ever, and men are for ever to continue in the body as their subjects, and as numerous dominions are everlastingly to serve and obey the Messiah during their reign, there are for ever to be separate nations and kingdoms. Men then are for ever to exist as communities and nations, and thence in the natural body, and therefore are for ever to multiply. To suppose that they are not to multiply is to contradict their nature, and exhibit their existence as an infinite absurdity; for it is to suppose that the marriage institution is to be discontinued, and the world occupied by countless millions of immortal celibates, debarred from the principal offices, duties, and joys, for which their constitution fits them. No man in his senses can persuade himself that such a society of isolated beings is the beau ideal of a renovated world; that that is the great climax in which the redemption of the race from the curse is to terminate. The most important function of our nature is that of bringing similar beings into existence, and the parental and filial relations are the chief sphere of the duties, virtues, and enjoyments of life. To suppose that they are to be debarred from those virtues and joys, is to assume that they are to be denied the possibility of the highest and most delightful forms

of virtuous affection, and reduced to the necessity of a comparatively useless and joyless existence.

But how then, our correspondent asks, is the condition of the race after the millennium to differ from its condition during that period? If Christ's kingdom in such a form is to continue here for ever, what is meant by his delivering it up to the Father?

The great peculiarity that is to distinguish the condition of the race, after the close of the thousand years, is, we suppose, an entire exemption from the curse of mortality, sorrow, suffering, and the loss of spiritual blessings that were consequent on the fall, and restoration to a state essentially like that in which the posterity of Adam and Eve would have come into existence, had they persevered in allegiance, and secured the everlasting virtue and bliss of their offspring. That such a redemption is to be accomplished we have ample assurance. At the resurrection and judgment of the dead at the termination of the thousand years, death is to be abolished, and the curse in all its forms discontinued. Men then are not only not to suffer and die, they are not to be liable to suffering and death. The sentence to mortality is to be repealed, and its cause removed, and succeeded by a sentence to life, and its natural causes. And that is not universally to be their lot till after the millennium. The race in the natural body are during that period to consist of two classes: 1. The saints who are to be changed from mortal to immortal, and fully released from the curse of sin. That is the gift which they who are living at Christ's coming are to receive. They are not, as is generally supposed, to be transfigured to a glory like that of the risen saints that are to be *αλλασσεσθαι*, changed—so that their *το θνητον*, mortal—*ενδυσθαι αθανασιαν*, shall put on immortality, or deathlessness. They are still, however, to continue in the natural, in contradistinction from the spiritual body, as is apparent from the description given of their life. It is said of those who go victorious out of the great tribulation at Christ's coming, and enter into his kingdom, "they shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun light on them, nor any heat; for the Lamb shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes;" which indicates that they are still to be in the natural body, as otherwise the promise would be inappropriate.

It would be inapt and mislead, to foreshow that beings would not suffer certain forms of evil, of which they had by a change of nature become wholly unsusceptible; and would, on the other hand, be distinguished by certain enjoyments of which they had become by that change wholly incapable. The same delineation is given of their life after the descent of the New Jerusalem. "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying; neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away." They are to be *οι ανθρωποι*, *men*, with whom God is thus to dwell, and *οι λαοι*, people, and therefore mankind in the natural, not in the spiritual body; and the peculiarity of their life is to be, that they are not to die, nor weep, nor grieve, nor suffer corporeal pain of any kind; or any of the evils that are elements of the curse of transgression, such as desertion by God; but God is to dwell with them, and be their God, and enrich them with the safety and bliss of his accepted and assured children. Exempted from the penalty of sin in every form, and made immortal, their condition and life will undoubtedly be essentially the same as Adam's, Eve's, and their offspring's would have been, had they not transgressed.

2. Others, however, and probably the great body of the race, especially at the beginning of the thousand years, are to be mortal, as is indicated by the announcement that the leaves of the tree of life in the New Jerusalem, are for the healing of the nations, which implies that they are to be susceptible of disease and death; and by the fact, that after the nations in the remote parts of the earth have revolted under the renewed influence of Satan, they are in vast numbers to be destroyed. Those who come into life, therefore, during the thousand years, will doubtless enter it as mortal, or under a liability to death; and those who are exempt from it will owe their exemption, first to their sanctification, and subsequently to a change to immortality, like that which the saints living at Christ's advent are to experience. While the nations as a body are to be sanctified, and all who are sanctified are to be freed from the curse in all its forms and made immortal, there are indications that there are to be individuals, at least at the commencement of the millennium, and probably for a

considerable period, and possibly throughout its duration, who will continue in alienation and perish. We are told that they are blessed who do his commandments, inasmuch as they have the right to the tree of life, and to the gates entering the city—the New Jerusalem; while without are dogs, and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie. This implies that there will be persons of extreme depravity who will not come under the jurisdiction of the risen saints, of whom the city is the symbol. It may be that it is to be only at the commencement of their reign, and that these transgressors are among the wicked whom they are to judge and break in pieces with an iron sceptre, Rev. ii. 27. It is foretold, also, in Isaiah, that at the epoch when Jerusalem is to be created a rejoicing, the child shall die a hundred years old, and the sinner being a hundred years old shall be accursed, lxv. 20: and that may also be in the first age of the millennium. It is not necessary to suppose that the judgment of the nations, destruction of the incorrigibly wicked, and conversion of those who survive, are to take place simultaneously or immediately after the advent of Christ and the investiture of the risen saints with their kingship. That they are to rule the nations with an iron sceptre, and dash them in pieces as a potter's vessel, shows that they are at least to enter on their reign before the full judgment and conversion of the nations; and these great events may not improbably occupy a considerable period. The change also from mortal to immortal of those who are sanctified of successive generations, may take place at such a distance from their conversion, that they will have given full proof of their allegiance, and gained a right, or meetness, to partake of the tree of life—to eat of whose fruit is to be a pledge of immortality.

Christ's delivery, then, of the kingdom to the Father, that God may be all in all, is not to be a surrender to him of his peculiar sovereignty of the earth, and discontinuance of his reign over it; as his kingdom and reign here are to be eternal. It is only to be a redelivery to him of the sceptre of the universe, which Christ holds during his reign in heaven antecedently to his second coming, and is to hold throughout his millennial rule on earth; and his exercise, thereafter, of his

dominion over men in subordination to the Father. It is to involve, therefore, no discontinuance of his mediatorial work, and no termination or interruption of the work of redemption in the form it is to assume on the final abolition of the curse, and elevation of the race then in the natural body, to the condition in which the offspring of the first pair would have existed had they not fallen. Thus vast is the scheme of Christ's government! Thus perfect and glorious the redemption of the race he is to achieve! Thus absolute the defeat of Satan's aims and hopes in his betrayal of men into rebellion! Thus sublime the prospects he unfolds to the faith of his people!

II.

THE CHURCH REVIEW ON THE SECOND ADVENT.

It is peculiarly unfortunate for an Editor who wishes his critical judgments to be received as upright, learned, and liberal, to commit the faults of manner which he unjustly ascribes to others; and betray the rashness he imputes to them of pronouncing dogmatically on subjects with which he has but an imperfect acquaintance. The Editor of the Church Review and Ecclesiastical Register has fallen, we apprehend, into this error, in a notice in his October number of the Theological and Literary Journal. After stating that "*the Editor appears to maintain in common with others who style themselves 'Millenarians,' that the visible advent of Christ is to precede the restoration and conversion of the Jews, the resurrection of the saints, the conversion of the Gentiles, the establishment of his kingdom, and the period of the millennium,*" he adds:—

"The editor exhibits all the oracular authority, dogged obstinacy, and bitter vituperation of *modern theorists on the subject*. The tone in which *these men write*, obliges us to say, that we have not a particle of confidence in their theory, and that the past history of all such attempts to fathom the mysterious depths of prophecy, might with propriety suggest less confidence, and more modesty."

A beautiful exemplification, truly, of the humility, moderation, and courtesy, which should in his judgment characterize

discussions on such a theme! What genial mildness and suavity! He charges that "modern theorists, on this subject," are, as a body, characterized by the exhibition of "oracular authority," "dogged obstinacy," and "bitter vituperation," and write in a "*tone*" that obliges him to disclaim all belief in their theory, and rebuke them for want of caution and modesty. We, it seems, are not peculiarly guilty of those faults. We only exhibit them in the measure that is common to all modern theorists on the subject. What an intimate acquaintance it bespeaks with those who have, in the present age, formed opinions and written on the theme! What a candid appreciation of their spirit! And how delicate and respectful towards those of them who are of his own denomination! Can this gentleman be aware who they are against whom he directs this volley of extraordinary epithets? Is he so little acquainted with his own church in this country, as not to know that not only a large number of the presbyters, but several of the bishops, are Millenarians, and accustomed to theorize, write, and preach on the subject? Is he so little familiar with the habits of others, as to imagine that none but Millenarians express or entertain opinions respecting it? Has he had the singular misfortune not to hear that a large body also of the clergy of different ranks of the Episcopal church of Great Britain, look for the advent of Christ anterior to the millennium; and that a far greater number who do not, nevertheless theorize on the subject, and fall, therefore, within the sweep of his denunciation; and that they are, as a body, at least, as distinguished for talent, learning, candor, and courtesy, as any other class of equal numbers? Is he unaware who the writers are whom he thus stigmatizes? Has he never heard of Mr. Faber, Mr. Cuninghame, Mr. Brooks, Mr. Bickersteth, Mr. Maitland, Mr. Todd, Mr. Begg, Mr. Cox, Dean Woodhouse, Mr. Wordsworth, Mr. Croly, Mr. Elliott, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Lyall, Mr. Davidson, and the scores of others who have written and published on the theme? Has he yet to learn, that among these modern theorists there are anti-millenarians as well as pre-millennialists, and that it is at least as unjust to charge the latter as the former, with assuming an authoritative air, maintaining their opinions with obstinacy, and indulging in vituperation? How admirably quali-

ned for the office of censor he has assumed! How genuine and profound must be the dislike he expresses of writers who affect the oracle, and indulge in wanton abuse of those who presume to dissent from their opinions! Is not the writer also on his own pages, to whom he refers, one of the "modern theorists" on the subject, as much as those on whom he animadverts, and comprehended as truly as they in his denunciation? Is he not himself, likewise, among those "theorists;" and the subject, therefore, of his derogatory and scurrilous imputations, in common with all others who entertain opinions in respect to Christ's advent? A more unlucky attempt at oracular criticism has seldom, we apprehend, been made; or a more unfortunate specimen exhibited of ill-judged assumption, obstinacy in prejudice, or insolent and splenetic vituperation. We take the liberty to suggest to this Editor, that "less confidence and more modesty" would become him in pronouncing opinions on authors with whom he happens to be so sadly unacquainted; and to hint that if he wishes to be heeded in his denunciations of others, he must take care that the doggedness and vituperation which he injuriously imputes to them, are not so palpably his own characteristics.

How is it that he has been betrayed into this unfortunate exhibition of himself? Does he disapprove of the study of the prophetic Scriptures? Does he deem it presumptuous to attempt to ascertain the import of the revelation God has made for our instruction, and commanded us to receive and observe? Or is he so sure that he is infallibly right, as to feel justified in treating those who presume to disbelieve and confute his favorite theory, as guilty of "dogged obstinacy" and "bitter vituperation?" Let us remind him that others have the liberty of interpretation as well as himself; that Millenarians have as ample a right as their antagonists to state their views of the purposes God has disclosed in his word, and to urge the proofs by which they are demonstrated with earnestness; and that the privilege and duty also—if misjudged and traduced—are as indubitably theirs, to vindicate themselves, and refute and rebuke those who misrepresent and abuse them.

But we have already bestowed too much attention on this ebullition of folly. We are induced to notice the Review, chiefly because of the article to which the Editor refers as

furnishing proofs of the justice of his denunciation. After stating that "the tone in which these men write obliges us to say that we have not a particle of confidence in their theory, and that the past history of all such attempts to fathom the mysterious depths of prophecy, might, with propriety, suggest less confidence and more modesty," he adds, "We refer the reader to the article in the April number of the Church Review, on the 'Theories of the Second Advent,' by one of the most profound scholars in this country." The reader would naturally infer from this, that there are proofs in that article, that those who have written on the Second Advent are characterized, as the Editor asserts, by the exhibition of "arrogance, obstinacy, and vituperation." That, however, is not the fact. It is not the writer's aim to establish such a charge. In place of that, his object is to show that "the subjects which the title" of Professor Crosby's book embraces—"The second coming of Christ, the end of the world, the resurrection of the dead, and the general judgment"—*have excited attention* in almost every period of the church," and that, "in almost every period *unauthorized and extravagant views have prevailed, to a considerable extent.*" He accordingly aims to give a sketch of the views that have been held on the subject, and the excitements they have occasioned from the apostolic age to the present time, and notices among modern writers some who are not Millenarians, as well as some who are; and the conclusion to which he wishes to lead his readers seems to be, simply, that they all have run into errors and extravagances, and are thence unworthy to be taken as guides; not that they affect the oracle, or are doggedly obstinate and vituperative. His being one of the most profound scholars in this country does not contribute anything, therefore, to verify the Editor's accusation. He does not display his learning for that purpose, nor does he sanction, by his example, the Editor's offensive language.

But, though his article is thus unlike what the Editor's reference implies, we are glad that "one of the most profound scholars in this country" is disposed to treat the subject, and endeavor to correct the "unauthorized and extravagant views" that to a considerable extent prevail; and as he has stated opinions, and given reasons for judgments on one or two topics,

in which we are not able to acquiesce, we are desirous of his assistance in removing our difficulties; and we venture to assure the Editor that we are not the victims of such a dogged obstinacy, but that we shall with the utmost readiness and thankfulness adopt a solution of them that is worthy of "one of the most profound scholars in this country," though it should place us under a necessity of modifying our opinions. The first subject, in respect to which we solicit information, is the principle or law of figurative language by which he spiritualizes the predictions of the restoration of the Israelites, the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the temple, the re-celebration of the feast of tabernacles, and other events of which it is foretold that people are to be the subjects, and makes them refer exclusively to the Christian church. He says:—

"Men of considerable talent, of much piety and worth, both in England and in this country, seem to have become infatuated on the subject of our Lord's second and visible coming, and of his subsequent reign in the visible Jerusalem. It would seem that something very like a re-establishment of the old Jewish system is contemplated by some, although expressly disclaimed by others, with this exception, that all nations are to unite with the ancient holy people in divine worship at the old national altar. The locality of Solomon's temple is to be gloriously distinguished, and perhaps physically elevated; a splendid temple is to be built there, the material of which is to be brought from Mount Lebanon, as formerly by arrangements between Solomon and Hiram; the feast of tabernacles is to be celebrated there every year, and those who refuse to attend are threatened with condign punishment. The most terrific extirpation of those who are supposed to be hostile to the Messiah, is to be perpetrated by the saints of the Most High who are to possess the kingdom; and in this extermination of the ungodly they are to follow the example of the divinely directed and aided conqueror of the Canaanites. Thus is the second advent to be established, and thus is the divine Redeemer to reign gloriously in Mount Zion."

"And to satisfy his readers that these positions are not gratuitous assertions, thrown out at random," he quotes a passage from the late Mr. Irving, on Isaiah ii. 1, and after animadverting on it, adds:—

"It is not surprising that a writer who is so confident should dog-

matically decide that 'the man whose understanding of God's word is *so vitiated*, as that he cannot see in these superabundant promises the fact of a *national restoration to Israel at all*, is not in a case to understand any part of Scripture, and will interpret it according to his own prejudices and fancies, or those of the generation he lives in, and the men he esteems.' It is quite unnecessary to quote any more from a book teeming with extravagant interpretations, and wholly destitute of that calm deliberate judgment which alone can give weight to any decisions on subjects of such solemnity and importance."

He next offers a passage from another modern author:

"From this writer let us turn to another—a man of high character as a philologist, a traveller, a theologian, and a pious Christian. The able and learned Dr. Henderson, in his late work on Isaiah, has laid down some very extravagant positions on the subject under review. Strange to tell, he sometimes loses sight of the sublime and beautifully poetic *imagery* of his author, and dwells on the *meagre, prosaic, LITERAL meaning* of the burning words and *seraphic figures* of that lofty genius and divinely inspired prophet. After the splendid and glorious *imagery* by which the man of God *represents* the future *spiritual* condition of the holy people, the true Israel of converted Jews and Gentiles, under the great king Messiah—when light shall have poured into them—when everything hostile shall have united in closest affection, or been completely subjugated; when whatever is valuable shall have become their own; when *all nature* shall have contributed *its beauteous and bountiful productions* to adorn God's holy house, *his spiritual temple*; when complete peace shall be enjoyed, expressed by the figure of open gates, to lead in the eternally conquered enemy, and to show that no hostile entrance is at all apprehended; Oh! how chilling is the bathos which brings down this most celestial delineation to the matter of fact business of cutting wood on Mount Lebanon, and transporting it to Jerusalem to build a new temple with—of keeping the gates open, that people in general, and travellers, may not be hindered from going in and out, even at night! We could not make such a demand on the *credulity* of our readers, as to expect them to take such a speculation on any authority short of the learned writer's own statements."

After introducing a passage from Dr. Henderson's volume on Isaiah, he adds, in further expression of the views he entertains of the predictions of the prophets, on that subject:

"In Zech. xiv. 16 it is said that 'the nations which came against

Jerusalem, shall even go up from year to year to worship the King the Lord of Hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles.' *We have always supposed that this is* FIGURATIVE, denoting a general worship of the true God in his true church, the figure being taken from a Hebrew joyous festival, as is the case in 1 Corinth. v. 8.

"Now, if the language must be understood literally of annual journeys to Jerusalem to celebrate the feast of tabernacles, why should not Isaiah be understood literally when he speaks of doing this every new moon and every sabbath! We *opine*, therefore, that Isaiah must have used this language *figuratively*. And *if* so, we want something beyond the *ipse dixit* of the celebrated English divine to satisfy us that the same may not be true of Zechariah's style. And *if* this is figurative, why may we not suppose that many other similar representations are figurative? Consistency would seem to require it; it would be entirely in harmony with the analogy of Scripture, and thus multitudes of difficulties would be avoided."

The mode in which the reviewer evades the construction of these prophecies as foreshowing the restoration of the Israelites, rebuilding of Jerusalem, re-erection of the temple, and celebration again of the feast of tabernacles, thus is, the assumption that they are figurative, and that by their figures they are spiritualized and made referable altogether to the Christian church. The question accordingly, whether he is right or not in his construction, depends on the question whether they are in fact figurative; and whether, if they are so, the figures in which the predictions are couched are of such a nature that they have the meaning which he ascribes to them. If they not only are not figurative but literal, but if, in truth, there are no figures by which they could be invested with the sense he ascribes to them, then it is he that is in error, rather than Messieurs Irving and Henderson, and it is his interpretation, in place of theirs, that should excite our astonishment.

What, then, are the figures by which these prophecies are charged with the meaning he assigns to them? If justified in his assumption, he of course can point them out, and give the law by which they are to be interpreted. If he not only cannot identify them, and state the principle on which he explains them, but cannot even show that there are figures of such a nature as is requisite to give the passages the import

he attributes to them, he cannot justify his construction. The reason he gives for spiritualizing them will then be no reason whatever. His denominating them figurative will only signify that they are unintelligible, or that the principle on which he assigns their meaning is unknown; and his avowal that he interprets them as figurative, therefore, be equivalent to a confession that his interpretation is founded on ignorance; which, to our apprehension, is scarcely worthy of one of the most profound scholars in this country!

We ask the reviewer, therefore, to state and define the figures by which these predictions of the return of the Israelites, the rebuilding of Jerusalem, the re-erection of the temple, and the celebration again of the feast of tabernacles, are divested of their reference to the Israelites, Jerusalem, the temple, and that feast, and made to respect the Christian church. It certainly cannot be the metaphor; as in that figure, the agent or object to which it is applied, is always the subject of that which it expresses. As for example, when it is said, the fields *smile*, the metaphor is in the verb; the fields are used literally, and are the subject of that which the verb denotes, as much as they would be if the expression were, the fields seem to smile, or look cheerful and gay. If the metaphor, however, were such as the reviewer's assumption requires, the figure would lie in the noun, instead of the verb, or at least would embrace the subject of the affirmation as well as the affirmation itself, and in place of the fields, some wholly different object would be the real subject of the process or condition denoted by smiling. Thus in the prediction concerning Judah and Jerusalem: "And it shall come to pass in the last days that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills, and all nations shall flow unto it; and many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for out of Zion shall go forth the law and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem;"—the reviewer holds not only that that which is *affirmed* of the mountain of the Lord's house, Jerusalem, Zion, and Judah, is figurative; but that the mountain of the Lord's house, Jerusalem, and Judah, are them-

selves, likewise, used by the figure, and denote places, structures or bodies, and persons that are wholly different. The figure, therefore, which he ascribes to the passage cannot possibly be the metaphor.

This is further evident, also, from the consideration that not only must a term be employed in the affirmative part of a sentence in order to its being used metaphorically, but it must also be applied to something of which that which it literally denotes is not true. Thus, the verb smile, to be used metaphorically, must be applied to some agent or object that cannot actually smile, as to a field, a landscape, or the heavens. In order, therefore, that Jerusalem may be used by a metaphor to signify the Christian church, the Christian church must be, directly or indirectly, declared to be Jerusalem. In respect to the passage, for example, quoted from Zechariah, "the nations which came against Jerusalem shall even go up from year to year to worship the King the Lord of Hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles," in order that Jerusalem might, as the reviewer holds, denote "the true church," an express affirmation would be necessary that the true church is Jerusalem. Such an affirmation would be necessary, also, in order that the prediction, "they shall go up" to Jerusalem, might be a prediction that they shall go to the true church. But there are no such affirmations in the passage; nor is there anything predicted of the Israelites, or Jerusalem, that is not compatible with their nature. It is absolutely certain, therefore, that the church is not the subject of the passage. To alter this and other predictions of the kind, so as to charge them by that figure with the sense which the reviewer imputes to them, would require an interpolation so arbitrary and monstrous as grammatically to change both the subjects of the prediction and the things themselves that are foreshown of them! No scholar, we presume, will advocate such a violation of the prophecy.

Nor can it be by the hypocatastasis or substitution that they acquire the sense he imputes to them; as in that figure as well as the metaphor, the agent or object which it is employed to illustrate, is always the agent or subject of that which it expresses. Thus in the passage—"The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light"—in which walk-

ing in darkness is put for being without the knowledge of God, or under the dominion of false views of his designs ; and seeing a great light, for the reception of a new revelation, or fresh instruction respecting his will ; it is the people of Galilee of whom the affirmations are made, who were and are to be the subjects of that which they foreshow. In the prediction, " And he will lift up an ensign to the nations from far, and will hiss unto them from the ends of the earth," it is Jehovah who it is said shall exert these acts, that is to exert those for which they are substituted ; and it is the Gentiles to whom it is said they are to be directed, to whom those which they represent are actually to be addressed. In the sublime passage, also, Isaiah x. 33, 34, in which the forests of Lebanon are used as a substitute for the invaders of Judea—though there is no express mention in the figure itself, who it is for whom they are substituted, yet it is clear that it is for the Assyrian monarch and army, from the fact that they are the subject of the prophecy in which the figure occurs, and are expressly mentioned in the verses that precede it ; and that is invariably the law of the figure. But there is no mention whatever of the Christian church as the subject of the predictions in question, respecting Jerusalem, the temple, and the feast of tabernacles ; and if that which is affirmed of them were supposed to be used by the hypocatastasis as substitutes or representatives of other occurrences, still Jerusalem and the temple would be the subject or scene of those events. They cannot be made the representatives of the Christian church, except by a sheer and monstrous interpolation of that church, that would entirely change the subject and the meaning of the predictions.

Nor could the allegory, were the passages in discussion supposed to be allegorical, be the instrument of making them predictions of the Christian church ; as that figure, also, is always accompanied by an express statement who or what it is that it is employed to represent. Thus the allegory of the vineyard, Isaiah v. 1–7, is closed with the announcement that " The vineyard of the Lord of Hosts is the house of Israel, and the men of Judah his pleasant plant."

But there is no other figure, of which we are aware, by which, even by interpolation, the Christian church could be

made the subject of these predictions. The reviewer indeed speaks of "seraphic figures" as occurring in Isaiah, and in these prophecies; and as the figures which are the vehicle of the meaning he imputes to them. We are not aware, however, of any species that is known by that name. What then is their nature? Let him define them; let him indicate what their peculiarities are; let him state the principle on which they are employed, and show how it is that they make the Christian church the subject of these predictions. This he must be able to do, if he is cognisant of such a species of figures; and it is indispensable to the justification of the construction he places on them. It will be creditable to him, also, in the utmost degree, as "one of the most profound scholars in this country;" for it will be accomplishing what no other writer either here or in Europe has been able to achieve; while, on the other hand, not to do, and not to be able to do it, will be as unfavorable to his credit. No more awkward predicament can be imagined than his will be, if, after having assigned it as the reason of the interpretation he puts on these prophecies, that they are figurative, and that the figures through which they convey the sense he ascribes to them, are "seraphic figures," it turns out that he is not able to show what those figures are, identify them, and state the principle on which they make the passages yield such a meaning. It will demonstrate that the ground on which he places his construction is no ground whatever, but only a delusive word signifying nothing—a mere nonentity. What more unfortunate predicament for a scholar! We earnestly hope, therefore, he will discharge this task. It is time that men of learning and reputation settled this question, and abandoned the pretence that such an element exists in these passages, unless they are able to demonstrate its presence in them, and determine its nature.

The other subject in regard to which we solicit information, is the principle of the interpretation which he places on the predictions of the destruction of the antichristian powers at Christ's second advent. He says:

"Dr. Henderson speaks in comparatively mild language of all the enemies of Israel being swept away. *We make no objection to the*

representation, provided we be allowed to explain the language in a SPIRITUAL SENSE. But another distinguished clergyman has employed phraseology well adapted to excite furious zealots to fanatical passion and cruelty, who, 'knowing not what spirit they are of,' at the same time madly imagine that their wrath is working the righteousness of God."

And quoting a passage from the Rev. H. M'Niel's lectures on the prophecies relating to the Jews, in which he says of the enemies of the chosen nation, who are to attempt to prevent their restoration: "*The day of Jerusalem's recovery is the day of their ruin. In that day it will be a righteous thing in the servants of the Lord to execute unsparing destruction upon his and their enemies;*" and that "then fury shall be poured forth, and vengeance executed both by their own hands, as in the case of Joshua's exterminating conquests, and by a greater hand than theirs stretched out to fight for them, as in the case of Pharaoh's overthrow." He says:

"On this passage we add no comment, except what may be suggested to the thoughtful Christian and peace-loving reader, by our italics. We will only say, that we should require a system to be substantiated by most solid Scriptural evidence, before we could feel ourselves justified in even thinking such an idea, much less promulgating it to others. 'Vengeance is mine saith the Lord.'"

We do not understand the reviewer as denying that there are passages which, taken literally, represent that the enemies of the Israelites at the time of their restoration are to be destroyed, and that the Israelites themselves are, as the executioners of God's vengeance to take a part in destroying them. If he doubts it, he has but to refer to Zechariah xii. 6 and xiv. 14, and other like passages, for the most ample evidence of it. But what he assumes is, that their language is not literal, and that the destruction which they foreshow, is not a corporeal but a spiritual destruction. What then we wish to learn from him is, first, *the nature of the figure* by which the language acquires "a spiritual sense;" and next, *the nature of the spiritual destruction* which it denotes. If he is justified in treating the language as figurative, he must be able to define the figure which it involves, and show how it acquires by it such a

signification. Otherwise his figure is an unknown and indeterminate element, and his construction, consequently, not only devoid of any explicable ground, but against the most potent reasons:—inasmuch as if he cannot demonstrate the existence of a figure in the language that makes it the vehicle of that sense, he has no reason whatever for the assumption that it is figurative, and is unauthorized, therefore, to interpret it as such.

But what—we are equally desirous to learn—can be the spiritual sense which the reviewer ascribes to these passages? What is the spiritual evil which he supposes the destruction of the natural life is used in these predictions to denote? It cannot be apostasy from God; for these antichristian hosts will already have apostatized, and in being marshalled in war against the Israelites as God's people, will be marshalled against him. The contest is accordingly called the battle of the great day of God Almighty. Nor can it be the second death; for that is not to be inflicted on the evil who die anterior to the millennium, until the second resurrection which is to take place *after* that period. Besides it is not the office of the Israelites, nor of men of any order, to inflict the second death; for though they can kill the body, we are expressly told they cannot kill the soul. If then it is neither alienation from God in this life, nor the second death in the next, what is that spiritual evil which the reviewer regards the literal slaughter of the enemies of the Israelites as denoting? If he is justified in assigning it a spiritual meaning, he, of course, is able to tell what the meaning is, and demonstrate the law by which the language is made to yield it. Otherwise his construction is not an interpretation, but only an arbitrary imputation of a sense in violation of the laws of language;—a procedure of which, we presume, no one of “a calm deliberate judgment” will intentionally be guilty. We shall look with no common interest, therefore, for the solution of these difficulties. If he cannot furnish one, and one that is worthy of a writer who is eulogized as among the most profound scholars in the country, his condition will not be very enviable. His expressions of surprise and horror at the errors and presumption of Mr. McNeil and Dr. Henderson will recoil with tenfold energy on himself. For what can transcend in infatuation and lawlessness the denial thus of the true sense of the word

of God, and imputation to it of a meaning of which he can neither give the definition, nor state the law by which it is obtained? and a meaning confessedly, therefore, altogether unknown and altogether indemonstrable!

III.

THE LATE MR. MILLER'S VIEWS OF THE EVENTS THAT ARE TO ATTEND AND FOLLOW CHRIST'S ADVENT.

WE learn that we were in error, in our July number, in representing Mr. Miller as having held that the earth is to be annihilated at Christ's coming, that there is to be but one resurrection, and that Christ and the saints are not to reign on the earth during the millennium; but in a different scene. We were led into the misapprehension by articles in several papers, soon after his death, which professed to exhibit the peculiarities of his belief. We find, on recurring to his "Views of Chronology and Prophecy," that he held that the resurrection of the saints only is to take place at Christ's advent; that they and the living saints who are to be changed, are then to be withdrawn into the air, or space, while the earth is to be cleansed by fire, the elements melted with heat, and the works of men and the living who are unsanctified consumed; that when that purification of the earth is accomplished, Christ and his redeemed are to descend and reside on it during the thousand years: that at the close of that period, the wicked are to be raised from the grave; and that it is they, not men in the natural body, who are then to be deceived by Satan, and led to make war on the saints. He held, accordingly, that the multiplication of the race and the work of redemption are to cease at Christ's coming, and the earth be occupied thereafter by none but the glorified.

IV.

THE CONGREGATIONALIST'S NOTICE OF THE REVIEW OF PROFESSOR PARK'S DISCOURSE.

IN an editorial article in the Boston Congregationalist of the 11th of October, we are charged with "the grossest and most wanton misrepresentation," in exhibiting Professor Park

as teaching, in his Discourse, that there are two distinct and dissimilar theologies. The writer—whom, for convenience, we shall denominate the Editor—says :

"The doctrine ascribed to Professor P. is nowhere stated in the sermon, but is pointedly contradicted everywhere. We do not hesitate to assert that the whole review is made up of a series of the most barefaced and gross sophisms, and astounding misrepresentations, that we have ever met with in the history of controversy. If any one should take a few of Mr. Lord's sentences, in which he sets forth his millenarian doctrines, and then, by FALSE LOGIC, charge him with propounding in them THE OPPOSITE SYSTEM, and then review his arguments for millenarianism, and charge on him irrelevance, self-contradiction, confusion, and nonsense, it would not AT ALL EXCEED IN VIOLENT MISREPRESENTATION WHAT MR. LORD HAS DONE."

If this is so, or even probably so ; if it is not itself a "violent" and "astounding misrepresentation," this writer can, of course, prove it ; and with facility. There can be no necessity for his relying for it on mere asseveration. He only needs to show that the doctrine which Professor Park advances and endeavors to establish and illustrate, is not what we represent, but wholly different and contradictory, and his work is accomplished ; and that can involve no difficulty, if the teachings of the Discourse are so directly the opposite of what we represent. Such sheer dissimilarities, such open and flagrant antagonisms, can easily be distinguished, and the method exposed by which we have confounded them ; and in achieving such a defence, the Editor of the Congregationalist, so far from disobliging, would gratify us. It would be far more agreeable to be assured by unanswerable evidence that the chair of the Abbot professor is occupied by a man of Scriptural views, than to know that it is held by one who employs himself in destroying the faith which it is his business to maintain. It is more satisfactory to entertain a favorable than an unfavorable estimate of a fellow-being ; and especially of one whose station naturally renders his opinions the instrument of great good or evil. Could the Editor of the Congregationalist, therefore, Professor Park himself, or any one else, confute the view we gave of the doctrine of his Discourse, in such a manner as should justly satisfy the candid and upright,

we should not only rejoice, but should wish to be among the first to express our satisfaction, and offer him our congratulations.

On the other hand, if the Editor of the *Congregationalist*—having the aid, not improbably, of Professor Park himself—has not furnished, and cannot, any such proof of the misrepresentation with which he charges us; if he offers nothing for the purpose but his own unsupported assertion; if his statements are in direct contradiction to the doctrine and object of the Discourse; and, finally, if the pretext on which he founds his defence, is not only wholly unwarranted, but would, if allowed, instead of relieving Professor Park, make his position still more embarrassing and discreditable; then our criticism is justified, and, instead of ourselves, it is the Editor of the *Congregationalist* who has been guilty of “the grossest and most wanton misrepresentation.” And such, we apprehend, the reader will find to be the fact.

He commences his defence by a quotation on the difficulty of detecting deceptions in logic.

“Whately well remarks that ‘the difficulty of detecting and exposing a logical fallacy is much greater than that of comprehending and developing a process of sound argument.’ Also, ‘that a *very long discussion* is one of the most effectual veils of fallacy. Sophistry, like poison, is at once detected and nauseated *when presented to us in a concentrated form*; but a fallacy which when *stated barely in a few sentences* would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world *if diluted in a quarto volume*.’ It is on these principles that we account for it that the sagacious editor of the *Presbyterian* has allowed himself to be so deluded by the fallacy of Mr. D. N. Lord’s review of Professor Park’s sermon as to recommend it to his readers as a thorough dissection, analysis, and exposure of its errors, and to sanction the alarm sounded by the reviewer of fatal heresy at Andover, and of the need of a rally of the churches to effective resistance.”

Who would not suppose from this, that the asserted deceptiveness of the review is so exquisitely subtle, and diffused so equably and imperceptibly through the whole body of the discussion, as to render its detection in any one part extremely difficult, except by the keenest and most delicate scrutiny? It turns out, however, that this sagacious remark

of Archbishop Whately, like many of the exemplifications Professor Park affects to give of his two theologies, is altogether irrelevant, and that the alleged fallacy of the review is, by his own account of it, *a solitary one, gross and transparent*, and instead of being spread through its whole body, is concentrated in *a single word* ; for he immediately adds—

“The whole power of the review depends upon *one very gross and TRANSPARENT fallacy*. But as the editor of the Presbyterian has not been able to detect it, we are led to suppose that it may delude others also.”

He is induced, therefore, to point out and expose this “fundamental” deception ; but unfortunately, by his own showing, it is not *a logical* fallacy at all. Logical fallacies, are fallacies in *reasoning*, not in mere didactic statements, or even in premises from which conclusions are drawn, and much less in the mere interpretation or construction of words. “When *the conclusion*”—Whately says—“*does not follow* from the premises, it is manifest that the fault is in the *reasoning*, and in that alone. *These, therefore*, we call *logical fallacies*, as being properly *violations* of those rules of reasoning which it is the province of logic to lay down.” But the error with which we are charged,—if it be one,—is not an error in *a conclusion*, but only,—as the Editor himself exhibits it,—in the statement of the sense in which a term is used in a didactic proposition ! A beautiful specimen, truly, either of the Editor’s critical acumen or candor ! Is it a sheer blunder ; or is it an attempt to practise on the deceptibleness of his readers, in the presumption *that they would inconsiderately take the quotation* from the Archbishop of Dublin, *as applicable*, though it is not, *to the review*, make it the ground of an unfavorable judgment respecting it, and assume that the question at issue, in relation to the Discourse, is a mere question of logic ? He proceeds—

“It consists, then, in changing the sense of a *single term* from the sense in which Professor Park used it to a sense in which he did not use it. The change is simple and easily made—but it *transforms the whole sermon into a mass of gross errors and contradictions* ; whereas,

when its proper sense, as used by Professor Park, is retained, the sermon is true, self-consistent, and important.

"The term upon which such consequences depend, is the common and simple word THEOLOGY. *In its common and familiar sense*, it means the science which teaches the existence, character, and attributes of God, and the nature, principles, and facts of his universal government. *Used in this sense, but one true system of theology is possible.* But for reasons assigned, Professor Park saw fit to use the word in *another and secondary sense*, that is, 'A PARTICULAR MODE OR METHOD OF REPRESENTING THIS ONE SYSTEM.' If the word theology is used in *this sense*, it is plain that there may be *more than one theology*, because there can be more than one mode of representing the one true system.

"The expediency of using the word in this sense is, no doubt, a fair subject of inquiry. But whether expedient or not, it is a fact that Professor Park so uses it. It is a fact, also, that Mr. Lord, in his criticisms, *does change it from this sense* to ITS ORIGINAL AND PRIMITIVE SENSE, and by this simple change makes all the heresy charged on Professor Park. The heresy charged on him is this, that he teaches that the true system of theology revealed by God is not only unsuited to move the heart to holy affections, but is absolutely displeasing to it and repellent, and that the heart develops a false and antagonistic system in order to gratify itself—and that this false system is advocated and defended by Professor Park as the only means of arousing the emotions of the heart. The error of this view is indeed gross and enormous."

Such is the expedient by which he attempts to shield Professor Park from the charge of teaching that there are two dissimilar and opposite theologies. He admits, in the fullest manner, the reader will observe, that the meaning we ascribed to the word Theology, and the sense in which we assumed it was used by Professor Park, is its "*original, common, and familiar sense.*" His definition of it, as "the science which teaches the existence, character, and attributes of God, and the nature, principles, and facts of his universal government," is the same in import, and expressed in much the same terms as ours. He concedes, also, in the most unqualified and emphatic manner, that if that is the sense in which Professor Park used it, then his Discourse is "*a mass of gross errors and contradictions,*" and "its fundamental position" "*a heresy*" as "*enormous and malignant*" as we have ascribed to him. The question now is, whether

he, in fact, used it in that sense, and so obviously and undoubtedly, as to justify us in presuming that that was the meaning he attached to it; or whether he employed it in the sense which the Editor of the *Congregationalist* asserts.

In the first place, then, the Editor produces no evidence whatever that Professor Park employed the term *theology* in the unusual and secondary sense which he affirms he attached to it. He offers nothing to support his pretext but his mere asseveration. He alleges no definition of the term from the Discourse, in which that meaning is ascribed to it; for Professor Park gives none. He quotes nothing from him which indirectly proves that he must have used it in that sense; nor could he, for there is nothing whatever in the Discourse that furnishes such proof. This is a very significant fact! If the Editor finds any specific statement in the sermon that that is the sense in which the word was employed, why did he not produce it? If he is aware of any passage that indirectly even renders it clear or probable that that is the signification he attached to it, why did he not allege it, and put the fact at once beyond debate? Sensible as he is that unless he can establish what he here avers, Professor Park's doctrine must be admitted to be altogether indefensible, and as "enormous and malignant" "a heresy" as we have represented it, how is it that if able unanswerably to establish it, he was so inconsiderate, and faithless to him, as to omit it, and rest his vindication solely on his mere asseveration? That is not the method which a "sagacious" critic would most naturally take to exculpate the innocent from injurious imputations. It is the expedient to which those only resort who have no other means of attaining their object!

But perhaps the reader will think we have overlooked an expression in one of the passages we have transcribed, which the Editor exhibits as copied from Professor Park, and as an explanation of the sense he attached to the term *theology*. After admitting that if the word is used in its "common and familiar sense, but one true system of theology is possible," he adds, "but for reasons *assigned*, Professor Park sees fit to use the word in another and secondary sense, that is—'A PARTICULAR MODE OR METHOD OF REPRESENTING THIS ONE SYSTEM.'" This last expression is marked as though quoted

from the Discourse. It is not, however. There is no such passage in it, nor any embodying the same proposition. Professor Park gives no definition whatever, nor any statement approaching a definition of the meaning with which he uses the term theology. The passage is a sheer fabrication, and the pretence that Professor Park stated or intimated that he employed the word in such a peculiar and extraordinary sense, and "assigned" "reasons" for it, is a bold and unmitigated misrepresentation. This is truly a dark omen! The Editor of the *Congregationalist* must feel that he has undertaken a very impracticable task, when he finds it necessary to resort to such expedients to accomplish it! What an exemplification of the dislike he indicates in his introduction of *the fallacies* by which readers are sometimes deluded! How exquisitely adapted to inspire confidence in his unsupported declarations!

In the next place: The term theology has no such "secondary sense" as the Editor of the *Congregationalist* ascribes to it. It has no meaning but that which is expressed in the definition we gave of it, as "the science that teaches the existence, attributes, and character of God—his laws—the measures of his government—his purposes—the doctrines he has revealed, and the duties he has enjoined." It is never distinguished, except as natural or revealed, moral or speculative, true or false; or of some other species that consists with its treating exclusively of God and his government. As, therefore, Professor Park assigned to it no other sense, and gave no hint that he employed it with an unusual meaning, we were not only justified, but absolutely obliged by truth and candor to presume that he used it in its common and legitimate sense. To have assumed that he employed it with another signification, would have been altogether gratuitous. How, without any evidence whatever, could we presume that he did not use it in its true meaning? How, without the slightest ground for it, could we suppose that he attached to it such a totally novel and unauthorized signification, as the Editor of the *Congregationalist* now assigns to it? He is wholly unjustifiable, therefore, in his assertion that we changed it from this unexpressed, unknown, and unintelligible meaning, "to its original and primitive sense." No change whatever was made in it by us. We took it as we found it. The

secondary sense which the Editor now assigns to it, had not then been invented. It is the offspring undoubtedly of a necessity that was not felt until after the publication of the review. A singular method truly of vindicating Professor Park! The Editor must have been sensible that there was a sad dearth of legitimate means for the purpose, to be induced to contrive and rely on such an expedient. What a series of extraordinary measures to accomplish his object! He begins by asserting that Professor Park used the term in a sense of which he gives no intimation, and that is utterly unknown to usage. He then affirms that he "assigned" "reasons" for employing it in that sense, though no reasons whatever of the kind are given, nor any hint that he attached to it an unusual signification. To convince his readers, however, of the truth of his allegations, the Editor *fabricates* what appears to be a definition of the term, and presents it as a quotation from Professor Park's Discourse! He then affirms that we "change it from this sense"—thus defined and accounted for by "reasons"—"to its original and primitive sense, and by this simple change make all the heresy charged on Professor Park." And, finally, to excite the indignation of his readers against us, he concludes his criticism with the declaration—"We do not hesitate to *assert* that the whole review is made up of a series of the most barefaced and gross sophisms, and astounding misrepresentations that we have ever met with in the history of controversy." What childlike guilelessness! What scrupulous accuracy! What unsophisticated horror at injustice and deception!

The reader is now able to judge in some measure what confidence is to be placed in the Editor's asseverations. He will soon be able to see also what estimate is to be formed of his intellect and judgment.

In the third place: That Professor Park cannot have used the term in the sense which the Editor avers, and that the pretence is a mere afterthought, devised to shield him from the discredit to which his doctrine subjects him, is apparent from the fact that if the Editor's definition of the secondary sense in which he asserts he used it, is substituted for the word *theology*, IT COMPLETELY CHANGES THE SUBJECT OF THE DISCOURSE, makes the argument irrelevant, and converts the

whole discussion into a tissue of incoherent and nonsensical propositions. After giving a definition of theology in its common and familiar sense, he says :—

“ And in *this sense* but one true system of theology is possible. But for reasons assigned, Professor Park sees fit to use the word in another and secondary sense, THAT IS ‘ A PARTICULAR MODE OR METHOD OF REPRESENTING THIS ONE SYSTEM.’ *If the word theology is used in this sense*, it is plain that there may be more than one theology, because there can be more than one method of representing the one true system.”

Let his definition then be substituted for the word theology in the passage in which Professor Park states the theme of the Discourse, and instead of “two forms of theology,” and “the theology of the intellect,” and “the theology of feeling,” it will read thus:—

“ There are two forms of a particular mode or method of representing, of which the two passages in my text are selected as individual specimens; the one declaring that God never repents, the other that he does repent. For want of a better name these two forms may be termed a particular mode or method of representing *the Intellect*, and a particular mode or method of representing *Feeling*. Sometimes indeed both the mind and the heart are suited by the same modes of thought, but often they require dissimilar methods, and the object of the present discourse is to state some of the differences between the particular mode or method of representing *the intellect*, and the particular mode or method of representing *feeling*; and also some of the influences which they exert upon each other!” The title also of the Discourse changed to conform to the Editor’s definition, instead of the Theology of the Intellect and Feeling, becomes, The particular mode or method of representing *the Intellect*, and the particular mode or method of representing *Feeling*! The subject of the Discourse is thus completely expunged by the Editor’s expedient, and another introduced in its place, of which neither the hearers, the readers, nor Professor Park himself ever thought! And consequently all the subsequent propositions and illustrations are made irrelevant and absurd; as not a syllable is employed in exhi-

biting particular modes or methods of representing the *intellect and feeling*. The whole is occupied in stating what the characteristics are, on the one hand, of *the theology* which the intellect adopts and approves; and on the other, what the characteristics are of the theology which the heart devises and employs for the satisfaction of its tastes and dispositions. A more unfortunate expedient, therefore, could not possibly have been devised by the Editor, either for his own reputation or Professor Park's! If admitted, it demonstrates beyond the possibility of doubt his utter incompetence as a writer and thinker. The Editor accuses us of displaying a "misanthropic pleasure in assailing his character as a *scholar*." The faults, however, we have pointed out are of but slight significance compared to the disgraceful exhibition of his understanding and judgment which the Editor thus presents. If his statements are true, Professor Park not only cannot be a strong-minded theologian, an accurate reasoner, or an accomplished rhetorician, but he cannot have even a moderate share of sense. ~~No one~~ not on the very verge of idiocy could be capable of uttering such a combination of incoherent and senseless propositions as the Editor's contrivance makes of his Discourse.

Into what confusion and nonsense it converts it, may be seen from the passage with which he commences his discussion. Transformed by substituting the Editor's definition of theology for the word itself, it will read thus;—"A particular mode or method of representing *the intellect* conforms to the laws, subserves the wants, and secures the approval of our *intuitive and deductive powers*. It—a particular mode or method of representing the intellect—includes the decisions of the judgment, of the perceptive part of conscience and taste, indeed of all the faculties which are essential to the reasoning process. It—a particular mode or method of representing the intellect—is a particular mode or method of representing **SPECULATION!** and, *therefore*, comprehends the truth just as it is, unmodified by excitements of feeling!" What pertinent announcements! What self-evident propositions! How admirably adapted to secure the approval of "*the intuitive and deductive powers!*" He goes on. "It—a particular mode or method of representing the intellect—is

received as accurate not in its spirit only, but in its letter also!" Intuitively and deductively certain, doubtless, though nothing has been said that shows whether that method of representing the intellect is appropriate rather than absurd, true instead of false, or intelligible rather than unintelligible! "*Of course* a particular mode or method of representing the intellect, demands evidence, either internal or extraneous, for all its propositions!" What resistless logic! Who can fail to see the indissoluble connexion of this conclusion with its premise! "These propositions, whether or not they be inferences from antecedent, are well fitted to be premises for subsequent trains of proof!" Should they happen to be false and absurd, it will be no obstacle, it seems, to that result. "This mode or method of representing the intellect, *therefore*, prefers general to individual statements, the abstract to the concrete, the literal to the figurative." To what a sublime height has this great argument already ascended! Because a particular mode or method of representing the intellect is a particular mode or method of representing *speculation*, *therefore* it comprehends the truth just as it is, and is received as accurate not in spirit only, but in letter also; consequently it demands evidence for all its propositions, and all its propositions, whether postulates or conclusions, are fitted to be premises for subsequent trains of proof; and *therefore* it prefers general to individual statements, the abstract to the concrete, the literal to the figurative! Was ever such a complication of false, irrelevant, and preposterous propositions before put together? What a splendid exhibition of the *Editor's intellect*!

The description of the theology of feeling is metamorphosed by his definition into similar nonsense. Thus, "in some respects, but not in all, a particular mode or method of representing feeling differs from a particular mode or method of representing the intellect." What a novel announcement, and how pertinent and full of interest! A particular mode of representing feeling manifests an extraordinary power, however, in the next sentence, by transforming itself into a *belief*; an exploit of which we doubt whether a particular mode of representing the intellect is capable. "It—a particular mode or method of representing feeling—is *the form of belief*

which is suggested by, and adapted to, the wants of the well-trained heart! It—a particular mode or method of representing feeling—is embraced as involving the substance of *truth*, although when literally interpreted *it may or may not be false!*” “It—a particular mode or method of representing feeling—studies not the exact proportions of *doctrine*, but gives especial prominence to those *features* which are and ought to be most grateful to *the sensibilities*. It—a particular mode or method of representing feeling—insists not on dialectical *argument*, but receives whatever the healthy affections crave. It—a particular mode or method of representing feeling—chooses particular rather than general *statements*, and is satisfied with vague, indefinite representations. Instead of measuring the exact dimensions of a *spirit*, a particular mode or method of representing feeling says, ‘I could not discern the form thereof; an image was before mine eyes, there was silence, and I heard a voice!’” Was ever anything heard in Bedlam that transcended this in irrelevance, incoherence, and senselessness? Yet according to the Editor of the *Congregationalist*, these are the real themes of the Discourse, and these preposterous announcements, which none but a lunatic could utter, are the real ideas which Professor Park employs to illustrate those themes!

It works a similar change in the exemplifications he attempts to give of the influence which his theologies exert on one another. His first, “the theology of the intellect illustrates and vivifies itself by that of feeling,” is converted into the following elegant announcement:—“The particular mode or method of representing the intellect illustrates and vivifies itself by the particular mode or method of representing feeling.” And the first proof he gives of it is the following pertinent dictum:—“As man is compounded of soul and body, and his inward sensibilities are expressed by his outward features; so his faith combines ideas logically accurate with conceptions merely illustrative and impressive.” What a demonstration of his proposition! Would a jury called to decide whether an individual was mad, hesitate for a moment, were he to utter a long harangue made up of such senseless inaptitudes and incoherences! He converts the whole Discourse in like manner into a jargon of

disjointed, absurd, and false propositions. There is not a paragraph that is not metamorphosed into the most crude and drivelling nonsense.

No more decisive demonstration can be required of the utter error of his pretence that that is the meaning with which Professor Park used the term theology. And what judgment now are we to form from it of the Editor's perspicacity? Is it to be taken as an index to his "intuitive and deductive powers?" Is he unable to see the merciless havoc it makes with the Discourse, and with Professor Park's "character as a scholar?" Did ever an advocate more pitifully betray the party he attempted to defend, or make a more discreditable exhibition of inconsiderateness and incompetence? This wretched subterfuge then must be abandoned, or Professor Park's "character as a scholar" and theologian is far more ridiculous and pitiable than we had supposed.

In the fourth place: As it is indisputable that Professor Park employed the term theology in the sense we ascribed to it, as the science that treats of God and his government: so it is equally clear that he represents the two theologies of the intellect and feeling, as essentially dissimilar and antagonistic to each other—the one being true, the other false. This is rendered apparent by the introduction to the Discourse. He commences it by the following recital and statement:—

"I have heard of a father who endeavored to teach his children a system of astronomy in precise philosophical language, and *although he uttered nothing but the truth*, they learned from him *nothing but falsehood*. I have also heard of a mother, who, with a woman's tact, so exhibited the general features of astronomical science that *although her statements were technically erroneous*, they still made upon her children a better impression, and one more nearly right THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE by a more accurate style. For the same reason, many a punctilious divine, PREACHING THE EXACT TRUTH in its scientific method, has actually imparted to the understanding of his hearers, either NO IDEA AT ALL, or A WRONG ONE; while many a pulpit orator, using words which tire the patience of a scholastic theologian and which IN THEIR LITERAL IMPORT ARE FALSE, has yet lodged in the hearts of his people the substance of truth."

These accordingly are "THE TWO FORMS OF THEOLOGY," or modes of treating the subjects of the Bible, which he announces as the theme of his Discourse, and proceeds to describe, contrast with each other, and exemplify; and he here represents them as direct opposites—the one as uttering "nothing but truth," and yet as conveying "nothing but falsehood"—the other, as consisting of statements that are technically erroneous, but, nevertheless, making an impression more nearly right than would be produced by "a more accurate style." "Preaching the exact truth in its scientific method," he declares, imparts to the hearers, "either *no idea at all*, or *a wrong one*;" while "using words" which in their literal import *are false*, "lodges in the heart the main substance of *truth*." No bolder contrast of the two theologies could possibly have been drawn than this; and no more unqualified and emphatic representation made, that that which he condemns he condemns as true, and because of its truth; and that that which he commends, he commends as false, and because of its falsehood. We were, therefore, not only naturally led to regard him as assigning to them that opposite character, but were absolutely obliged to it. No room was left for any other view of his meaning. To have attributed to him any other, would have been not merely altogether gratuitous, but against the clear and indisputable import of his language.

This, however, the Editor of the Congregationalist denies, and affirms that "the doctrine ascribed to Professor Park is nowhere stated in the sermon, but is pointedly contradicted everywhere." He claims that "it lies upon the face of the whole sermon, that the aim of Professor Park is to consider some of the differences between *two modes of representing the one system of theology*;" "one caused by deep emotion, the other by unimpassioned, logical, and abstract mental habits;" and, as a proof of it, alleges the expression which Professor Park employs in the inquiry with which he commences his discussion;—"What then are some of the differences between *these two kinds of representation*?" But what are *the two kinds of representation* here meant? The Editor himself admits that they are what Professor Park had denominated "*two forms of theology*." What then are those "two forms of theology?" They are indisputably *two modes*

of representing THEOLOGY, using the term in its legitimate and only sense—as ~~the~~ the science that treats of God and his government; and those two modes are *the mode which he had described in his introduction; and they are* THE TRUE AND THE FALSE; for they are the kinds, and the only kinds he had depicted, and it is to them and them only, that his language can refer. This is accordingly demonstrated beyond the possibility of doubt, by the fact that “the differences between these two kinds of representation,” which he proceeds to state and exemplify, *are the differences between* TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD and not any other. Thus he describes “the theology of the intellect as conforming to the laws, subserving the wants, and securing the approval of our intuitive and deductive powers,” as “the theology of speculation, and therefore comprehending THE TRUTH *just as it is*, unmodified by excitements of feeling;” as demanding “evidence for all its propositions;” as insisting “on the nice proportions of doctrine, and on preciseness both of thought and style;” and as employing “words so exactly defined, and adjustments so accurate, that no caviller can detect one ambiguous, mystical, or incoherent sentence.” *These are the only characteristics, moreover, that he ascribes to it*, and it is on the ground of these that he asserts that though “adapted to the soul in her inquisitive moods, it fails to satisfy her craving for excitement;” “seems tame to the mass of men,” and is not suited to “eloquent appeals.”

On the other hand, he represents the theology of feeling as differing from that of the intellect, and the peculiar characteristics which he ascribes to it are, equivocalness, vagueness, inaccuracy, self-contradiction, and falsehood. Although “embraced as involving the substance of truth, *when literally interpreted, it may or may not be* FALSE.” “It studies not the exact proportions of doctrine.” “It is satisfied with vague, indefinite representations.” “It is often more forceful because of *its looseness of style, herein being the hiding of its power.*” Preciseness of style would make its falsehood so manifest that its power of deceiving would be lost! “*Of course*, the theology of feeling aims to be impressive, *whether it be or not minutely accurate.*” When, therefore, a false representation will answer its purpose better than the truth, it “of course” employs it. “Often it bursts

away from *dogmatic restraints*, forces its passage through or over *rules of logic* ;” that is, resorts to *the fallacies* and deceptions in argument of which the Editor of the Congregationalist affects such a horror ; “and presses forward to expend itself, first and foremost, in affecting the sensibilities ;” and “*for this end . . . assumes as great a variety of shapes as the wants of the heart are various.*” As “the heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked,” the shapes that theology assumes are, of course, in an equal measure, false and “wicked.” He, accordingly, says, that when employed by “Martin Luther” and “the church fathers, who used it often,” “anything, everything, can be proved from them ; for they were inditing sentences *congenial with an excited heart*, but FALSE as *expressions of deliberate opinion.*” And adds, in order to save it from the disgrace of thoughtless and reckless falsehood :—“By no means can it be termed *mere poetry*, in the sense of a *playful fiction*. It is no *play*, but solemn earnestness. It is no *mere fiction*, but an outpouring of sentiments too deep, or too mellow, or too impetuous, to be suited with *the stiff language of the intellect.*” The reason that it is not suited with that language, of course, is, that the sentiments it utters are false ; and he, accordingly, adds, that “it avails itself of a *poetic license* and indulges in a style of remark, which, for *sober prose*, would be *unbecoming*, or even *when associated in certain ways, irreverent.*” The whole description he gives of it, thus exhibits it as perpetually deviating from the *truth* into *inaccuracy, equivocalness, extravagance, FICTION, FALSEHOOD!* And it is its inaccuracy, equivocalness, and falsehood, that he exhibits as the source of its power.

The differences between his “two kinds of representation” are, therefore, beyond all rational disputation, the differences of TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD. That which is represented by the one, is the TRUTH *just as it is*. That which is represented by the other, though put forth *as truth*, yet when properly interpreted, is or may be *as false as the deceitful and malicious passions of the heart may desire!* The Editor of the Congregationalist has thus as completely failed in this, as in his other attempt to vindicate him and convict us of misrepresenta-

tion.* If it were even admitted, as he claims, that Professor Park uses the term theology in the unknown and impossible sense he asserts, as "a particular mode or method of representing" a system of theology, and that his two forms of theology are two modes of representing theology, it would not relieve him from the objections we urged against his doctrine; for the question would still remain, *what are "those two kinds of representation"* or modes of exhibition which he describes, and one of which he disparages as unsuited to excite the heart to holy affections, and the other commends and eulogizes as adapted to please the heart and move it to obedience? And the answer would still be as now;—they are *true and false* modes of representation, and that mode of representation which he disparages presents the theology that comprehends *the truth just as it is*; and that mode of representation which he approves and recommends, presents a theology that is *false*. Was there ever a case more entirely indisputable? Were ever the artful pretexts and loud asseverations of a writer more amply confuted?

But to complete the proofs of the Editor's utter error, he, in fact, however unconsciously, proceeds in this part of his article *on the assumption that the term theology is employed by Professor Park in the sense we ascribed to it*, and not with the unknown and impracticable meaning he asserts, and makes the ground of his defence; otherwise his whole argument is a jargon of nonsensical assertions and assumptions.

Thus, quoting a passage in which "Professor Park states some of the principles of the subject," he says:—

"Here, then, we have two modes of presentation, one caused by deep emotion, the other by unimpassioned, logical, and abstract mental habits. These he then calls '*two forms of theology*.' . . .

* It is seen, from this, that they are in equal error also, who suppose that Prof. Park's object, in the Discourse, is simply to show that there is a difference between literal and figurative language; and attempt to justify or excuse him on that ground. That construction is as untenable and absurd as the other. Professor Park assigns to the theology of feeling all passages that are employed in expressing emotion and affection, and many, indeed, that are not, without any consideration whether their language is literal or tropical.

"Still as, perhaps, some one might carelessly suppose that he referred to two theological systems, and not to two modes of presenting one and the same system, he thus re-states the great point to be considered in the whole discourse. 'What then are some of the differences between THESE TWO KINDS OF REPRESENTATION?' Nothing can be more definite, nothing more guarded than this statement of the fundamental question of the sermon. It is a consideration of the two kinds of representation of the one system of theology, which men employ, as they are deeply excited and full of emotion, and, of course, imaginative and passionate; or as they are cool, intellectual, scientific, and logical. Hence, whenever the phrases 'theology of the intellect,' 'intellectual theology,' &c., occur, we are to regard them as meaning that representation of *theology* which arises from and suits the intellectual and logical powers, uninfluenced by excited feelings. So the phrases 'theology of feeling,' 'emotive theology,' mean that representation of *theology* which arises from and suits the ardent feelings and excited emotions of the mind. But as these modes of expression would be cumbrous, he uses the shorter ones, 'theology of the intellect' and 'theology of the feelings,' *after having explicitly defined THEIR SENSE so as to preclude all mistake.*"

Here the Editor, beyond all disputation, uses the word *theology*, in every instance of its occurrence, in its legitimate sense, as denoting the science that treats of God and his government; and he represents Professor Park as employing the expression "TWO FORMS of *theology*, and THESE TWO KINDS OF REPRESENTATION" to denote "TWO FORMS," "TWO KINDS," or "TWO MODES of representing *one and the same SYSTEM*" OF THEOLOGY; and affirms that he used the phrase "the theology of the intellect," to denote one of these modes of representing *theology*, and "the theology of feeling," to signify the other mode of representing it. By his own concession and plea, therefore, Professor Park used the term *theology*, in the phrases—"the theology of the intellect," and "the theology of feeling"—*in its usual and legitimate sense*; and he gives the expression, "that representation of *theology* which arises from, and suits the intellectual and logical powers," *as the definition of the theology of the intellect*; and the expression, "that representation which arises from, and suits the ardent feelings and excited emotions of the mind," *as the definition of the theology of feeling*. "As these modes of expression," he says, "would be cumbrous, he uses the shorter ones, 'the-

ology of the intellect,' and 'theology of the feelings,' *after having explicitly defined their sense* so as to preclude all mistake."

The Editor thus directly retracts and contradicts the pretence with which he commences his article, and makes the basis of his whole defence that the term *theology* is not used by Professor Park in its legitimate sense to denote *theology*, but is employed to signify merely "a particular *mode or method of representing one!*" *There* it was the word *theology* which he asserted Professor Park had *defined as a mode of representation*. *Here* it is the words, "Two Forms," and THESE TWO KINDS OF REPRESENTATION, which he exhibits him as defining as *two forms or modes of representing THEOLOGY!* If, therefore, his assertion *there* was correct, then his statement *here* is wholly mistaken. If his statement *here* is correct, then his assertion *there* is an error, and the whole fabric of his defence falls to the ground. But that he is mistaken *there* is indisputable, as we have already shown, and now show again. For, if in the phrase, "Two Forms of THEOLOGY," the term *theology* is not used to denote *theology*, but a particular mode or method of *representation*, it will make nonsense of the expression, as it will render it equivalent to the phrase—"Two forms of a particular mode or method of representing"—what? not *theology*, for the Editor avers that that is not the subject of the proposition; but only that which he asserts Professor Park used it to signify—namely "a particular mode or method of representing." "Two forms of theology" must therefore denote two forms of a particular mode or method of representing;—a particular mode or method of representing;—a particular mode or method of representing—and so on without end; for the term *theology*, in its genuine sense, can never be added as denoting *the subject of the representation!* The Editor, however, in fact, here adds it in that sense, and retracts and abandons, therefore, the false sense he at first ascribed to it, and made the basis of his attempted vindication of Professor Park. Had he adhered to that definition, he would never have exhibited *theology* as he here does, as the subject of the representation: but instead, would, as we have already shown, have made "the intellect and feeling" its subject, as is indicated in the

phrases, "the theology of the intellect," and "the theology of feeling," which, interpreted conformably to his definition, are equivalent to the phrases, "A particular mode or method of representing the intellect," and "a particular mode or method of representing feeling!" The Editor thus completely deserts and contradicts the pretence on which he builds his attempted exculpation of the Discourse, and proceeds in his argument on the assumption that Professor Park uses the term theology in the sense we ascribed to it! It is indisputable, therefore, by his own showing, that the doctrines of the Sermon are what we assumed them to be; and the hallucination and recklessness of mind which it displays, such as we represented; for he acknowledges and avers that if the term theology is used in the sense we assumed, and he himself here ascribes to it, "*it transforms the whole Sermon into a mass of gross errors and contradictions, "nonsense, and confusion."* Did ever a critic succeed more effectually in confusing himself, and verifying the facts and representations which he attempts to invalidate!

He offers several other considerations to persuade his readers that the doctrines of the Discourse cannot be what we represent them, that demand a brief notice.

The first is, that "it was heard by an audience representing the highest intellectual, theological, and religious attainments of the evangelical party in New England; yet they were utterly unaware of the presence of any heresy in the Discourse; much less did they dream that its fundamental position was a heresy so enormous and malignant as the one just alleged."

On the supposition, however, that that is a fact, it does not prove that "its fundamental position" is not "a heresy" as "enormous and malignant" as we have alleged. The Discourse is to be judged by its language and teachings, not by the audience that heard it. Yet it would not indicate, we think, very high "intellectual, theological, and religious attainments," to be *wholly unaware* of the presence of any heresy in the Discourse, when it is introduced by the representation that "preaching the exact truth in its scientific method," "actually imparts to the understanding of the hearers, either no idea at all, or a wrong one;" "while using

words, which in their literal import are false, lodges in the hearts of the people the main substance of truth!" The hearer that discerned nothing erroneous, self-contradictory, and enormous in that, must, we think, have been somewhat inattentive, dull of perception, or else deficient in "theological and religious attainments." What would have been thought of it had it been uttered by a Theodore Parker, a Ralph Waldo Emerson, or a D. F. Strauss? Where, in the whole domain of disguised or open infidelity, can the Editor of the *Congregationalist* find a more unblushing and malignant attack on the truths of God's word? Far worse than a denial, it is a direct detraction and blasphemy of them.

But how has the Editor ascertained that "the audience were wholly unaware of the presence of any heresy in the Discourse?" Did they unanimously indicate that they thought it unexceptionable? Were resolutions passed by the Convention expressive of their perfect approbation? That many were interested, and that some were highly pleased, and expressed their approval and admiration in extravagant terms, is well known: but there were some, it is also known, who formed a wholly different estimate of it; and had not the maze of its antithetic and contradictory propositions, the glitter of its specious words, and the glow and rapidity of its utterance, prevented their fully comprehending it, we doubt not that the audience generally would have been fully aware of the presence in it of a heresy, as enormous and offensive as we have alleged.

But if the audience were so "utterly unaware of the presence of any heresy in the Discourse," how happened it that Professor Park, in publishing it, acknowledges that he had indulged in "trains of remark that were adverse to the doctrinal views" of a party or school that belong to the Convention? He says, in a notice prefixed to the Sermon:—

"When the author began to prepare the ensuing Discourse, he intended to avoid all trains of remark adverse to the doctrinal views of any party or school belonging to the Convention. But contrary to his anticipations, he was led into a course of thought which he is aware that some clergymen of Massachusetts would not adopt as their own,

and for the utterance of which he was obliged to rely on their liberal and generous feeling. Although it is in bad taste for a preacher, on such an occasion, to take any undue advantage of the kindness of his hearers, yet perhaps it is not dishonorable in him, confiding in their proverbial charity, to venture on the free expression of thoughts which he cannot repress, without an injurious restraint upon himself."

Professor Park himself was thus fully aware that the views he employed himself in advancing would not be adopted by a certain class of the clergymen of Massachusetts, and he appealed to their *liberality* and *charity* on the one hand to excuse him for uttering them on such an occasion; and alleges on the other, for his justification, that he was prompted to it by his conscience! What class of the Convention, then, were they who he was aware must disapprove of his doctrine? Not the Unitarians; for he knew undoubtedly, at the time of its publication, that they were especially pleased; and had they not commended his Discourse, he would not have thought it necessary to apologize to them for teaching its doctrine, inasmuch as it does not formally touch their peculiarities of belief. Who then were they whom he knew his Discourse must offend? The evangelical party indisputably, whose faith he so directly assails; and who have in fact denounced his doctrine as most grossly and mischievously false. Yet in the face of this fact, inscribed by Professor Park on the front of his Discourse, the Editor of the Congregationalist has the boldness to assert "that the audience were utterly unaware of the presence of any heresy in the Discourse," and to claim that it is altogether unobnoxious to doctrinal objection!

But the audience did not consist altogether of "the evangelical party of New England;" a considerable portion of the Convention were Unitarians, and many others of the hearers were doubtless of that denomination, and it is well known that they were generally pleased with the Discourse, though, had they fully discerned its character, they too would undoubtedly have rejected and denounced its doctrine; as it is as utterly contradictory to the method which they pursue in the maintenance of their peculiar views, as it is to that of the evangelical party. If Professor Park's theory of the

mode in which "the main substance" of truth is to be most effectually "lodged by a preacher in the hearts of his people" is assented to by the Unitarians, they should preach the evangelical doctrine of the trinity, Christ's deity and expiation, and justification by faith, in order to propagate their own antagonistic system! If the approbation of the audience, then, is to be taken as a test of the character of the Discourse, the applause it drew from the non-evangelical party is a proof that it was thought, if not to favor their peculiar views, at least to be decidedly adverse to the orthodox. The issue of the Editor's appeal to the audience is to the discredit of the Discourse, therefore, not to its vindication.

The next "probability" he alleges that his "view of the case is correct," is found in the very grossness and enormity of the error ascribed to Professor Park. "It is an error so gross that it would be almost impossible to produce evidence enough to prove that *unless he is utterly insane, he either does or can hold it.*" This is certainly an extraordinary argument. It proceeds on the assumption that the certainty that Professor Park teaches the doctrine we ascribe to him, does not correspond at all to the evidence that it is taught in his Discourse; but that instead, no matter what that evidence is, the certainty and probability diminish just in proportion to the error of the doctrine; and if its error is gross and enormous, it is almost impossible by any amount of evidence to prove that he holds it! No greater solecism, however, was ever embodied in language. The certainty that he teaches the doctrine we impute to him, is not affected at all by the grossness and enormity of the error. It depends altogether on the evidence furnished by his language and reasoning; and as that evidence is clear and ample, the certainty that he teaches it is as absolute as it would be if it were not a gross and enormous error. Considered irrespective of evidence, the enormity of a crime may seem to form a probability against its having been perpetrated; but after the evidence of it has been examined and found to be ample, the greatness of the crime detracts nothing from the certainty that it has been committed. As high a certainty that a person committed a murder would be presented by the testimony of ten men who

witnessed it, as would be presented by their testimony that he merely struck the injured party on the cheek, if that were the act which they ascribed to him. On the ground, however, on which the Editor proceeds, no matter what the measure of evidence is, the possibility of proving a crime diminishes proportionally with its enormity, and sinks to the verge of extinction when the outrage is atrocious. If it be so, Professor Park may undoubtedly embarrass his antagonists in their attempts to convict him of gross error; but what a ground of vindication!

That, however, the doctrine we ascribed to him is what it is, is no indication, we take it, that it is not held by Professor Park. So far from it, it is in harmony with the metaphysical system entertained by the school to which he belongs, and its natural result. It is the doctrine of Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Morell, that the mind itself is the sole source of its theology; that inspiration is nothing more than a stimulation of its powers by ordinary causes; and that its natural sensibilities, tastes, and affections, are, therefore, as authoritative guides in respect to it as the intellect. Professor Park has only embodied that theory in his doctrine, and exemplified one of the shapes which it naturally assumes. Instead of contradicting the fundamental principles of his neological system, he has framed his Discourse in accordance with them.*

* The following views are given of this system by Rev. Mr. McCosh in his volume, noticed on another page, on the Divine Government, Physical and Moral :—

" This age is as unwilling to do homage to the word, as that which has passed away. Instead of the RATIONALIST, we have now what is called the INTUITIONAL THEOLOGIST. It is not now the understanding, but intuitions of thought and feeling, which are placed above the word; and to them, with the word as a mere servant or assistant, is allotted the task of constructing a religion. The religion thus devised, if not so consistent as that formed by the understanding, is vastly more showy and gorgeous, and suits itself to a great many of the impulses of human nature. Just as in natural religion, the blank scepticism of former times has been obliged in the present day to clothe itself in the dress of pantheism to keep mankind from utterly abhorring it; so in revealed religion, the rationalism which was felt to be insufficient for any one practical purpose whatsoever, either in the restraining of sin or the gendering of holiness, has become a more pretending intuitionism. Persons who believe in the Scriptures in no higher sense than they

"Another presumption is found in the fact that this alleged error he never states in Professor Park's language, for the plain reason that there is no language in the sermon in which it can be stated. On the other hand, the error is forced on Professor Park by what profess to be mere logical inferences from his words." That this charge is altogether groundless, the reader has in this article abundant evidence. The language we have quoted from Professor Park expresses

believe in Homer do yet decorate their pages with constant references to faith, to spiritual life, and the religious consciousness.

"It would carry us too far to trace the history of this system; nor do we think it needful carefully to allot to each supporter his share of the heterogeneous materials which have been collected to build the fabric. Certain principles laid down by Kant, principles which we regard as false in themselves, were being followed out in Germany to their legitimate consequences, and producing a very pretending form of universal scepticism, when Jacobi rushed in to protect philosophy, by setting up FEELING as a counterpart principle to the understanding. Schleiermacher carried a similar principle into religion, and *sought to construct a religion [THEOLOGY] out of FEELING or intuition*. This scheme has been adopted by De Wette, and even, we regret to say, to some extent by Neander and other eminent divines, who have of late years been defending their system against another supported by the followers of Hegel, which professes to be more rational and logical; and they defend their system as earnestly as if they were defending Christianity. As the practical result of the whole, the scepticism which began with the clergy, has now gone down to the common people, and has assumed a form sufficiently vulgar and offensive; and the followers of Schleiermacher find that they have no power to allay the spirit which they have called up; for the dreamy intuitions of the divines are felt to be as incapable of being grasped by the practical understanding of the common people, as they are acknowledged to be incapable of being apprehended by the logical understanding of the philosophers. Yet this is the system which is being imported into our country by certain clergymen of the Anglican Establishment and Independent ministers in England. In particular Mr. Morell, after mixing with it a further medley from the eclectic philosophy of Cousin, is seeking to recommend it to the British public."—Pp. 500, 501.

"This placing of the intuitions above the word, is in some respects more perilous than the setting the reason above the word; for where natural reason thus presumes to act as the arbiter of revealed truth, we can meet it on its own grounds. Its dogmas, if unsound, are at least clear and intelligible, and so can be met and refuted. But *this intuitional theology* carries us into a region where *every man's own spirit creates for him a scheme which cannot be so much as examined*, because it cannot be developed in a clear system, or put in such a shape as to admit of its refutation. In these circumstances we do not regret to find that God seems to have sent among the builders of this heaven-defying tower, such a spirit of confusion and variance, that no two of them can speak the same language."—P. 506.

the error we impute to him, as clearly and indubitably as the language in which we have stated it ; and so likewise does that which we transcribed from him in the Review. We did not confine ourselves to single words, or mere isolated expressions, but alleged whole paragraphs and long passages, in which the doctrine is embodied in the most unequivocal and ample terms. That after giving the reader adequate evidence that the construction we placed on his language is correct, we then stated his doctrine in our own terms, was not only allowable, but essential, in order to precision, clearness, and brevity. The Editor of the *Congregationalist* has exercised the same right, and to a far greater extent, proportionally to the length of his article, in his statement of what he alleges is the doctrine of his Discourse ; and he is entirely justifiable in it. He could not by any other course have shown as perspicuously what the views are which he holds Professor Park presents. The mere fact that he states the doctrine he ascribes to Professor P. in his own language, is no proof that Professor Park did not teach that doctrine. And in like manner, the mere fact that we often stated the error we impute to Professor P. in our own terms, is no proof that he does not teach that error, nor that "there is no language in the sermon in which it can be stated."

But the "enormity" of this allegation is made sufficiently apparent, by the Editor himself, in the admission that if the term *theology* is used by Professor Park in the sense we ascribe to it, it is indisputable that "the whole sermon is a mass of gross errors and contradictions," and that "the whole power of the review depends upon one very gross and transparent fallacy," which "consists in changing the sense of a single term," "*theology*" "from the sense in which Professor Park used it, to a sense in which he did not use it ;" and that yet, after all, the Editor proceeds in his main argument to vindicate the Discourse, on the assumption *that that term is used in it, in the identical sense which we ascribe to it !* By his own showing, therefore, the language of the Discourse expresses the error we impute to it, and our not stating it always in Professor Park's language did not arise at all from there not being any "language in the sermon in which it can

be stated." The Editor thus weakens, instead of aiding his cause, by resorting to such false and preposterous pleas!

And, finally, he alleges it as a proof that we have misrepresented the doctrine of the Discourse, that we exhibit Professor Park as having run into gross irrelevances, contradictions, and absurdities, in his attempts to exemplify the influences which his two theologies exert on one another. The fact, however, that he is confused, irrelevant, absurd, and self-contradictory in that part of his Discourse, is no proof surely that he has not fallen into an error in the other! Instead, it is in harmony with it that he has there run into "a heresy" of equally "great grossness and enormity," and contributes to make the imputation of it to him credible. And such is the impression, we have learned, that has been produced by that part of the review. The evidence there pointed out of the inapplicableness of his ideas, the incoherence of his reasoning, the childishness and folly of his thoughts, and his self-contradiction and charlatanry, have induced an overwhelming conviction that his qualities of mind are precisely such as might be expected in one who can hold and propound the monstrous doctrine he advances in the opening of his Discourse. Does the Editor of the *Congregationalist* suppose that the greater the incompetence, confusion, and self-confutation of a writer, the higher the likelihood is that he is orthodox? A beautiful climax, truly, to his argument!

Such is the issue of his attempt to vindicate the Discourse. What a tissue of thin artifices, preposterous blunders, discreditable self-confutations! What a tragic misadventure! Instead of relieving Professor Park from his difficulties, he has added greatly to his embarrassment. In place of confuting the charges we alleged against him, he has shown, by the untenableness of the pretext on which he relies for the purpose, and by his concessions, that they cannot be refuted.

Why now is it that so ill-judged and fatal a course has been taken by him?—a point we deem it of the utmost consequence the reader should consider, in order to a just appreciation of his defence. It is certainly natural to suppose that he knows what Professor Park's real sentiments are, what the positions are which he advances in his Discourse, and why he acknowledged in a note prefixed to it that he was

aware that they are rejected by a part of the clergymen of Massachusetts,—by whom he undoubtedly meant the evangelical,—and appealed to their proverbial “liberality” and “charity” to excuse his promulgating them on such an occasion, on the ground that he was prompted to it by a sense of duty. But if such is the fact, to what an unfavorable conclusion it forces us respecting the Editor’s principles: for what else can his defence then be regarded, than a desperate attempt, by a denial of the truth, to shield Professor Park and his party from the reprobation which their doctrines, when understood, must naturally draw on them? The propagators of gross errors not unfrequently resort to that expedient to mask their false doctrines, and keep up a show of orthodoxy that they may better delude the unwary, and accomplish their ambitious designs; and unfortunately, that is precisely what might be expected from him, if he adheres to the Discourse, the very doctrine of which is that theological teachers are to use falsehood instead of truth, in order to gain the object at which they aim. Instead, however, of such a judgment, let us presume that he truly believes the doctrine of the Discourse to be what he avers it is, and—notwithstanding Professor Park’s consciousness and acknowledgment to the contrary, and the fact that many have openly and emphatically expressed their disapprobation of it—persuades himself that it is altogether unobjectionable to the evangelical party in New England. If it be so indeed, it is certainly sufficiently singular. Let it, however, be supposed; and what are the conclusions to which it must lead in regard to his qualifications for the task he has undertaken; of his ability to grasp a simple subject; his capacity to see the relations of his different propositions to one another; his power to discern the results to which his assumptions lead; and his adequacy to distinguish the confutation of himself from the confutation of his antagonist? It is not easy to imagine a more hopeless condition than Professor Park’s, if his vindication depends on the unsupported assertions, the transparent blunders, and the suicidal misrepresentations of such extreme simplicity!

But, perhaps, instead of either of these suppositions, it is still more probable that he was prompted to this defence by

Professor Park himself, with whom it is natural to presume he at least communicated in respect to it, and that the plea on which he rests his vindication of the Discourse is that on which the Professor places its justification. 'If such then is the fact, how happened it that the Editor did not detect its untenableness, and see the confusion into which it converts the Sermon? Did no doubt of its truth and availableness suggest itself to him? Did he adopt it without examination, and resolve, if it proved unsatisfactory, to transfer the task of defending it to Professor Park? And what, on this supposition, are we to think of Professor P.'s perspicacity? Is he still so little master of the subject, as to persuade himself that such a shallow expedient could answer his ends? Did he wholly fail to see what the results are to which it leads? Was he unaware of the total change which it works in the subject of his Discourse, and the manner in which it turns his bold announcements, his specious reasonings, his sparkling illustrations, his pointed contrasts, into labored incoherence and studied nonsense? How admirably qualified he must then be for the difficult duties of his office! Whatever the explanation of the Editor's defence is, it bespeaks the utter hopelessness of Professor Park's cause at the tribunal of truth.

What, however, are his prospects at the bar of the churches? Is he to pass uncensured? Is he to be sustained, approved, eulogized, and encouraged to go on in his endeavor to imbue the minds of the young who are preparing for the sacred office with his doctrine, and spread it as widely as practicable through the community? This is a question of the utmost moment. The course he proposes to pursue and recommends, transcends in enormity any that was ever before avowed, and will make, if adopted, a more unscrupulous ministry—not excepting even the Jesuits—than the world has yet seen. To estimate it aright, it must be contemplated practically. Let us then look at the results to which it must lead. As the doctrine that the "pulpit orator," in order to avoid certain defeat, and most effectually gain his object, must teach falsehood to his people instead of truth, requires him to present erroneous views of all the facts and doctrines of religion which he attempts to treat, it will lead not only to uni-

versal misrepresentation, but to the most stupendous and shocking heresies and blasphemies! When, for example, the existence of God is the subject of his discourse, it will require him either to deny that he exists, or that there are any evidences of his being; assert that his existence is merely ideal; or propound some other doctrine that is the opposite of the truth. In other words, in order to prevent his hearers from being atheists, he must exhaust all the resources of his ingenuity to persuade and drive them directly into atheism! When he treats of God's nature, in order to lead them to a just belief in him, as an infinite, self-existing, and all-perfect Spirit, he must confound him with his works; exhibit him as like his corporeal creatures in constitution and passions; assert that he is himself but a creature; or detract in some other form from his nature and perfections! When he discourses of God's rights as a lawgiver, to give his hearers just and effective apprehensions of his claims to their subjection, and the authority of his laws, he must deny that he has any title to institute a government over his creatures; exhibit his prerogatives as those simply of an adviser or counsellor; or teach that the obligation of his commands depends on his creatures' consenting to receive him as their ruler; or some other similar error! When he attempts to lead his people to regard Christ as divine, he must teach that he is but a creature! When he would impart to them just apprehensions of his death as an expiation, he must deny that he died as a sacrifice, represent it as incompatible with God's justice and goodness to inflict evil on an innocent being in order to the forgiveness of the guilty, and maintain that Christ died as ordinary men die, gave his life in mere confirmation of the truth of his teachings, or propound other equivalent errors! And these are, in fact, identically the doctrines respecting God's being and rights, and Christ's nature and death, that are put forth by the German neologists from whom Professor Park drew his theology; and several of them are the same as are advanced by his co-believer and co-laborer, Dr. Bushnell. When he treats of justification by faith in Christ, he may also teach, as Dr. Bushnell does, that that justification is self-justification or approval, not pardon and acceptance by God; and that the faith to which it is annexed, is faith in self, not faith

in Christ! When he would teach the doctrine of the trinity, he must preach unitarianism. When he would lead his people to believe in the future punishment of the impenitent, he must proclaim universalism, and fortify it with such reasons as lend it a color of truth. When he would teach Calvinism, he must preach Arminianism. If he believes and would teach Arminianism, he must preach Calvinism! And so of other facts and doctrines. In like manner in respect to practical duties; if he would induce men to worship God only, his method will be to exhort them to pay their homage to creatures and idols; and if he would lead them to observe the sabbath, to deny that it is a duty, or counsel them to desecrate it. If he would inspire them with a dread of profaneness, he will justify or recommend swearing or blasphemy; if he would excite them to temperance, he will vindicate or favor intoxication; and to awaken a proper horror of licentiousness, will treat it as innocent, or assign it the rank of a virtue! And, finally, to justify and give authority to that method of teaching, *he must maintain that it is the method which God himself has pursued in the instructions, commands, and exhortations of the Scriptures!* How, if he holds that that is the proper and only efficacious way of leading men to the truth, can he hesitate to hold and teach that it is the method which the Most High employs? Such openly, or with but a thin disguise, is the course which they must pursue who give their approval to Professor Park's doctrine, and make it their guide. Was it ever before equalled in profligacy! Is there anything approaching it in enormity in the writings of D. F. Strauss? Is there anything in the works of Paine or Voltaire more shockingly blasphemous or immoral? Nothing! They would have been withheld from advancing such a doctrine—if for no other reason—by the disgrace it would have reflected on their intellects.

Is this doctrine, then, which thus proposes a universal substitution of falsehood for truth, and sin for obedience, to pass unrebuked, and meet a general sanction in the churches? Is it to prove no obstacle to Professor Park's influence? That he has very zealous supporters we know. That they may be unscrupulous as well as zealous, the principles of the Discourse would lead us to apprehend, and the attempts that

have been made to vindicate him sufficiently show. It were absurd to look for truth and modesty in the advocates or apologists of such a creed. That some who do not assent to his doctrine will wish to avoid an open expression of their disapprobation; that others who aspire to direct the public mind, may endeavor to prevent any decisive action in respect to him, conceal the character of his Discourse as far as may be, and allow him to go on in the silent diffusion of his principles,—is not impossible. No efforts, however, can prevent his doctrine from being generally understood. It is already known from Maine to Mississippi, is the subject of conversation to thousands and tens of thousands, and is denounced without reserve, so far as we know—by men of all parties, with the exception of Professor Park's neological school; and the various reviews and notices of it will be yet more extensively read, and generate a still more emphatic concurrence of judgment in respect to it among the intelligent and upright. No combination, however influential in other relations the parties who enter them may be; no studied silence of editors; no arts, however crafty, and assiduous, can shield its objectionableness from notoriety. What, then, is to be the issue? Can it be that when it has been thus generally examined and become thoroughly understood, it will meet the sanction of "the evangelical party in New England;"—that no authoritative protests will be heard against it;—that no expression of dissent and disapprobation will be uttered;—and the friends of truth and integrity throughout the country be left to the conclusion that its doctrines are sanctioned, not only by those who are responsible for the views taught at Andover, but by those, also, having the direction of other institutions that are intimately associated with it, and sustained in a large degree by the same community, and directed by the same individuals? If so, it will indicate an apostasy far more extensive than we had suspected; and bespeak an inconsiderateness of the interests of truth, and an indecision and insensibility in those who have not abandoned it, that is not to be reconciled with fidelity to Christ. There certainly was never an occasion where duty to God and his people more imperiously required them to interpose and protect religion from a gross and shameful misrepresentation, and the

church, from a corruption of doctrine and morals. There never was an instance in which less courage was requisite to denounce a palpable and mischievous error, or when silence and concurrence could be more impolitic and discreditable. There never was a crisis when an earnest and emphatic expression of their judgment by even a moderate number of the faithful disciples of Christ, would more effectually check the spread of a false and pernicious doctrine, and unite the churches generally in the acknowledgment and maintenance of the truth. Let the evangelical discharge their duty, and the evil will be arrested. May God inspire them with fidelity and wisdom, and direct them to measures which he will make the means at once of vindicating his truth, and protecting his church from the mischiefs to which this error exposes it!

ART. VIII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. CHRISTIANITY REVIVED IN THE EAST; or, a Narrative of the Work of God among the Armenians of Turkey. By H. G. O. Dwight, Missionary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1850.

THIS history of one of the most important and most successful missions that have been instituted from this country, is fitted to attract more than a common share of attention, from the great interest of the events which it narrates, and the significant indications it unfolds of the future purposes of the Most High in respect to the ancient churches of Western Asia. It recites the principal incidents that have marked the course of the missionaries from their establishment at Constantinople, near twenty years since, to the present time; the means they have employed to communicate the gospel to the unlearned, superstitious, and, in a measure, idolatrous people among whom they have labored; the difficulties with which they have met; the gradual success of their ministry; the persecution by the hierarchy of those who have received their doctrine; the interposition of the Turkish government for their protection; and, at length, the organization of several separate Protestant or Evangelical churches under the sanction of the court, with a right to worship,

teach, circulate books, and institute other churches wherever they choose, among that people. The experiment of a long succession of centuries seems to have shown decisively that no vivifying principle survives in the old religious systems of that quarter of the world. If the light of life is to be rekindled among them, it is to be brought to them from without. The great truths of the Scriptures which they still nominally hold, are left almost totally unnoticed, and their worship and piety are resolved into a mere round of superstitious and idolatrous ceremonies. The Spirit does not make such a false gospel the instrument of sanctification, but leaves its devotees to the formalism, blindness, and lifelessness, that naturally result from their errors. No such scheme, which man devises to satisfy his alien and debased affections, ever receives God's sanction. It is the truth only, as it is in Jesus, that he owns and makes efficacious to salvation. How signally is his wisdom and sovereignty shown in this instance, in the employment—not of their own native teachers—but of men of remote and almost unknown lands, for the re-introduction of the gospel there; that it might be seen that their new life is not the effect of the old, but of another system, and owes its existence to the wonderworking power of God, not to the skill of man. The doctrines taught by the missionaries to those fallen churches, which have met the divine blessing, are those which are most fundamental in Christianity;—Christ's expiation, renovation by the Spirit, and justification by faith. The converts appear to have given eminent evidence of the genuineness of their discipleship, in the patience and steadfastness with which they have endured the persecutions their reception of the truth has drawn on them; and the Armenian patriarchs and priests made an undisguised display of the intolerance and tyranny with which they are animated in the fierce and malignant abuse with which they pursued and harassed them, as long as they were allowed by the civil powers. From the important points at which the missionaries have already established themselves, the civil rights they now enjoy, and the favorable dispositions with which their instructions are received by the people, there is reason to expect that, by the blessing of God, the truth will, hereafter, be much more rapidly diffused, and ere long, a large body of pure, zealous, and active churches established in Asia Minor, Syria, and Armenia. The commencement of this process on a scale as considerable even as is detailed in this volume, deserves to be regarded as one of the great events of the age. It will be contemplated by the student of prophecy especially, with more than ordinary interest. That part of the world is, as well as Europe, to be the theatre, ere long, there is reason to believe, both of great conflicts, and great triumphs to the true worshippers. God seems to be unfolding the way, indeed, through almost the

whole circuit of the Christianized and civilized world, for the preparation of a people to bear witness to his word in the great tribulation that is approaching, and to go from it victorious into the rest which he is to give to his disciples at his coming. All who can be pleased with a simple and unostentatious narrative of a series of extraordinary and important events; all who contemplate with interest the great movements of God's providence, and observe the corroboration they yield to the predictions of his word, will find, in the perusal of this volume, more than an ordinary share of gratification.

2. *RESPONSES FROM THE SACRED ORACLES, or the Past in the Present.* By Richard W. Dickinson, D.D., author of *Religion Teaching by Example, or Scenes from Sacred History*. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1851.

THIS volume consists of a series of articles on important acts and incidents recorded in the Scriptures, that were the means or occasions of decisive displays of good or evil character; and treated by the author in reference especially to the views and passions, or other causes, from which they sprang, the conduct to which they led, the consequences by which they were followed, and the similar types of character that are now seen in the church and world.

Topics of this class subject the faculties of the writer to a severer test than the ordinary sermon or essay, in which some simple doctrinal truth is treated didactically, some sentiment illustrated, or some duty explained and enforced. They demand a clearer perception, a deeper knowledge of our nature, and a wider observation of life. To treat them with truth, ease, and effect, the writer must have studied himself and others with care; witnessed the exhibition of the heart in the conditions in which its affections are most strongly displayed; and gained just conceptions of God's moral and providential government. As like a painter, he must work out his delineations for himself, unless his views of man are correct and comprehensive, and his apprehensions of God and his administration in harmony with his word, he will not only fall below the truth, but of necessity deviate into error.

Dr. Dickinson has cultivated this species of writing with special care and success, and again produced a volume of unusual interest and merit. His themes present a fine opportunity for the delineation of the affections and passions, the evolution of the motives by which men are prompted in the great acts of life, and exhibition of the happiness or misery with which they are followed; and he has treated them with excellent discrimination and taste. Works of this kind in which the

Scriptures are contemplated as indeed the word of God, given by inspiration, and designed to instruct us in doctrine and duty, are peculiarly needed at the present time, when so many are disposed to regard them, not as intelligible oracles, but as a mere record of unmeaning voices for which the interpreter himself is to devise whatever sense best suits his tastes and wishes. According to them it is the rationalistic expositor who is inspired, not the prophet; and man that contrives and utters the oracle, not God. Dr. Dickinson treats them as the word of Jehovah, and sees the marks of his truth and wisdom stamped on all their recitals and announcements; and thus contemplated, the study of the great personages whose characters are drawn in them, is at once one of the finest exercises of the intellect, and brings home the great realities of religion with the strongest impression to the heart. No more affecting exhibitions are seen than they present of man, in conditions of high enjoyment, extreme suffering, and powerful inducements to evil; no more appalling exemplifications are witnessed of the crimes of which he is capable when deserted of God, and left to the sway of his unrestrained passions; nor are there, on the other hand, any sublimer manifestations of God's condescension and love to his people, or more awful examples of the retributions which he assigns to his enemies!

Dr. Dickinson is particularly happy in defending the Scriptures from the objections of the sceptical, and pointing out the lessons that are to be drawn from the permissions and appointments of providence. He vindicates God's justice, truth, and wisdom with fidelity and skill; assigns men their proper place as his subjects; and asserts and enforces the duty of submission and trust under those allotments, the reasons of which we are not now able fully to comprehend. The pictures he draws of the forms in which the good and evil principles and passions of other ages are seen at the present time, are truthful and effective. His delineations especially of Cain and Jacob, of Absalom and Ahithophel, of Joash and Jehoida, of Gehazi and Amaziah, exhibit striking parallels, and present many beautiful examples of graphic description, acute deduction, and graceful and eloquent thought. Readers of all classes will find themselves richly repaid for the perusal and study of the work, and it will obtain, we trust, as it merits, a wide circulation.

3. ANALYSIS OF SACRED CHRONOLOGY, with the Elements of Chronology and the Numbers of the Hebrew Text Vindicated. By S. Bliss. Boston: J. V. Himes. 1840.

THIS brief epitome of the Chronology of the Scriptures furnishes a large amount of useful information in respect to the times of the per-

sons and occurrences that are mentioned in the Bible. After explaining the terms, and stating the principles of Chronology, the author gives in a series the dates of the patriarchs, judges, kings, prophets, and other important personages whose names occur in the Scriptures, and the chief events with which they were concerned. While in the main he follows Dr. Hales, he has availed himself of the aid of other principal writers.

4. *SERMONS OF THE REV. JOHN KING LORD*, late Pastor of the First Orthodox Congregational Church in Cincinnati, Ohio, with an Introductory Notice. By Nathan Lord, President of Dartmouth College. Boston : Perkins & Whipple. 1850.

THIS volume is introduced by a brief portraiture of the author's intellectual and theological character that is very beautiful, both for the qualities which it ascribes to him, and the delicacy and dignity with which it is drawn. He had a vigorous understanding, a quick sensibility, an inquisitive and meditative disposition, a deep realization of the great things of religion, a full assurance of the rectitude and wisdom of the ways of God, and large views of his government ; and in his speculations—instead of aiming to harmonize the teachings of revelation with the conjectures or deductions of science, as the false and fanciful systems of men are often called—adjusted his views of nature, of man, and of the course of the world, to the word of God. He labored accordingly in the ministry with unusual judgment, faith, cheerfulness, zeal, and success. It is much to the honor of Dr. Lord, that he instructed his son in the nature of the infidel and rationalistic philosophies that now prevail, and are a more dangerous snare to the young than any other to which they are exposed, and taught him how to confute them. How few have fulfilled that office to their children, or taken any effective measures to guard them against the subtle and deceptive doctrines introduced into the literature, and much of the theology of the age, that subvert the foundation of religion and morals ! It is to the credit of the son that he clearly saw the error of those systems, intelligently rejected them, and held the truths with a firm grasp which they aim to supersede. "He looked with extreme jealousy and anxiety at the attempts which are made to separate religion from science ; to interpret the Bible in subjection to nature ; to introduce into the churches rationalistic theories in morals and theology ; and to regulate the life of the world by new methods of philosophy." He regarded the necessity of the influences of the Holy Spirit and a just understanding of the word of God in order to a true knowledge of divine things, as a fact as indu-

bitable as any other of our condition, and accordingly took the Scriptures as his guide, and looked to the Spirit to enlighten him in their meaning; and in studying them, was led, not only to the reception of the doctrines of redemption, but to a discovery of the great purposes of God in respect to the administration of the world, and the salvation of the nations which they reveal, that have passed in a large degree from the faith of the Church. Instead of the elevation of the race to virtue and happiness by the advancement of the arts, the reformation of governments, and the knowledge of the gospel, as is generally expected, he saw that the true worshippers are to be obstructed and trodden down; that the apostate church and persecuting civil rulers, in place of fading away or gradually amending under the influence of truth, are to be swept from the earth by the hand of Christ himself; and that it is not till he in person assumes the sovereignty of the world, that its kingdoms are to become his, and all people, nations, and languages, submit to his sceptre.

From the notice of the course and issue of his son's studies, Dr. Lord proceeds to the inquiry whether such are the teachings of the sacred oracles respecting the future government of the world.

"The question as to what God says he will do, is a question between the literal and rationalistic interpreters of the Bible. It is not whether there will be a reign of righteousness upon the earth, for nearly all, even the infidels, profess to believe in a coming golden age, a perfected state of man; but whether that reign will be introduced and carried on by visible interpositions of Jesus Christ, and corresponding pentecostal influences of the Holy Spirit; or in a related progress and perfection of civilization and religion, according to the *natural*, that is, the present *stated* development of society. The question is not whether Jesus Christ will again appear personally on this earth; for that by all except infidels and atheists, and a small class of Platonic believers, is admitted; but whether that personal and actual appearing will precede and attend, or only follow the millennial age? It is whether Jesus Christ will come actually to subvert and then restore all things; or come only *in a figure* to restore, and then *actually* to subvert the existing economies of church and state in a general destruction of the world? In brief, it is whether the Scriptures affirm or deny another and a more glorious age of the gospel in connexion with Christ's second appearing, before the fulfilling of God's purposes in redemption and the final judgment of death and hell?

"I put the question in these various forms because I would justify the views taken of it by the author of these sermons. . . . His mind was made up after severe thought and study to the literal inter-

pretation of the Scriptures in this respect. That is, it was his judgment that the Bible equally in its direct, figurative, and symbolical language, teaches, consistently and unequivocally, the second and literal coming of Jesus Christ before the Millennial age. It became evident to him that the second coming of Christ would be in visible glory and majesty to change the physical condition of the earth; to subvert all corrupt ecclesiastical governments, the man of sin, the anti-christ and Babylon of the New Testament; to discriminate between the Christian and anti-christian portions of mankind; to restore the people of the ancient covenants now judicially cast off for their unbelief to the rights of primogeniture; to centralize an identified church and state power at Jerusalem; to reign with his risen saints over this illustrious scene during the times of restitution, and out of Zion the perfection of beauty to radiate the lights of knowledge and piety among all the residual nations to the ends of the earth, according to the remarkable testimony of James, Acts xv. 13-17."—Pp. 28-29.

He proceeds to verify these conclusions in a series of terse and powerful arguments from the faith of the church in the first ages, the laws of language, and analogies of the divine government; from their harmony with the theology of the best periods of the church; from their consistency with the general scheme of God's providence; and, finally, from the prophecy of Noah respecting his posterity: and displays in the discussion, a force and independence of intellect, a truth and comprehensiveness of views, a soundness of judgment in respect to the movements of the present age and the aims of Divine providence, and a sense of the wisdom and grandeur of God's ways, not often seen, and that present a striking contrast to the feebleness, superficiality, and error, that mark the publications in which the opposite doctrines are advanced. If the hues are dark with which he paints the misapprehensions, prejudices, and delusions that prevail at the present time, they are not of a deeper tinge than truth requires. That so many good men persuade themselves that the world is on the verge of conversion, arises, in a great measure, there is reason to believe, from their limiting their view almost wholly to the good that is achieving, and overlooking the far more general and powerful agencies that are corrupting the church, and demoralizing society. If they extended their observation to the whole scene presented by the Christianized and Pagan world, they would see that the augmentation of evil is in at least as great a ratio as of good; and that some of the fountains themselves, from which good is supposed by many to proceed, have become corrupt, and are directly aiding the depravation of principles and manners, which it is their business to correct.

We wish this essay may be read by those in the sacred office, and serious Christians generally, and meditated with the attention to which it is entitled. It can scarcely fail, in a measure at least, to arrest and interest the indifferent, if any large, striking, and comprehensive views, sustained by a powerful array of reasons, can arouse them to consideration. It is adapted to conciliate the respect of the doubting and disbelieving, impress the thoughtful, win the candid, and confirm those who concur with the writer in their views, in the certainty of the great events that are revealed in the sacred word as at hand, but that are so generally contemplated with unbelief and aversion. The author merits the thanks of all impartial students of the Sacred Word, that he has put forth so timely and effective a plea for the most momentous and sublime of its misunderstood and rejected teachings.

The sermons are simple, clear, argumentative, evangelical, and earnest, and indicate a mind of superior powers, independence, and originality. They treat of interesting and important subjects, and present a happy exemplification of the salutary influence of just views of the prophetic Scriptures, on the spirit and labors of the preacher. Several of them especially, are remarkable compositions, exhibit the great truths of the gospel in their genuine reality and majesty, and urge the duties of the Christian life with energy and fervor.

Had the author lived to mature age, he would undoubtedly have held a high rank as a thinker and writer, and exerted a wide and beneficial influence. But he was suddenly summoned to another scene, and a preparation for a loftier and more glorious ministry in Christ's everlasting kingdom.

5. **INDIA AND THE HINDOOS :** Being a Popular View of the Geography, History, Government, Manners, Customs, Literature, and Religion of that Ancient People, with an Account of Christian Missions among them. By F. De W. Ward, Late Missionary at Madras and Member of the American Oriental Society. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1850.

THE author of this work resided several years in India as a Missionary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, visited many of the principal districts and cities, especially of the southern part of the peninsula, and qualified himself by intercourse with the people, observation of their manners, and study of their institutions, to treat them with accuracy and interest; and he has embodied in his volume a great variety of entertaining and important information respecting the geographical peculiarities of the country, its natural productions, the

different classes of its inhabitants, and their history, dress, customs, arts, literature, and religion. He closes with a review of the present condition of the English, Dutch, and American Missions; the means they employ for the evangelization of the natives; the obstacles with which they have to contend, and the success they have enjoyed, that is of great interest. It is a remarkable fact that they have apparently been the means of as great, perhaps greater good proportionally to the European residents, than to the natives. Many of them have become exemplary Christians, and zealous and effective co-operators with the missionaries. The number of native converts is supposed to be about 10,000; the number of nominal disciples, probably 50,000; and the impression has become common among the intelligent and thoughtful Hindoos, that their system cannot survive the contact of Christianity, and is destined to a speedy fall. The work is written with ease and sprightliness, enlivened with many interesting descriptions and incidents, and will yield the reader more than a common share of useful and entertaining knowledge.

6. *THE METHOD OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT, PHYSICAL AND MORAL.*
By Rev. James McCosh. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.
1851.

THE wide diffusion and popularity of works on the philosophy of man, providence, and religion, by Coleridge, Cousin, and others of the German school, that are idealistic, and exhibit Christianity as but a factitious and dreamy naturalism, render the appearance of a volume like the present, that is devoted to the exhibition and vindication of the truths of natural and revealed religion, peculiarly welcome. Mr. McCosh proceeds on the great fact to the conviction of which we are constrained by our nature, that ourselves and the exterior world have a real existence, and demonstrate the being and sway of the Creator; and his object is to show what the real facts and indications are which they present of the relations and agency of the Supreme towards man, and of man towards him. He first considers those that are presented by the physical world as administered by providence, in respect to the character of man; and shows on the one hand, that they bespeak, in the sufferings to which the race is subjected, the restraints that are imposed on them, the distance at which they are separated from him, and their self-contradiction and self-condemnation, that they are in an unnatural and fallen condition; and on the other, that they abound with proofs that, nevertheless, he is benevolent and regardful of their well-being.

He next contemplates the elements and laws of the material world,

and points out the infinite proofs they exhibit of his agency, power, wisdom, and goodness, and indications that they are formed to be the means of far greater benefits to the race than have hitherto been realized.

From the physical world he proceeds to consider the powers of the mind through which God governs the race,—reason, consciousness, the will, the affections, and the principle of good and evil actions, and finally concludes with noticing the consistency of natural with revealed religion, and the signs that man is to be restored from the ruins of the fall, and the world made the scene of a perfect life and bliss.

The subjects which he discusses are thus very numerous, and of the highest interest and importance, and they are treated with learning, good sense, and candor. He has powers of a high order, and has qualified himself for his task not only by the study of natural theology and metaphysics, but of the physical sciences, history, and the speculations of the chief authors. He asserts and maintains the truth with directness and fearlessness, and states and resolves objections with acuteness and impartiality. The only exceptionable views advanced by him of much importance that we have noticed, occur in his chapter on the will, in which, inconsistently with his main view, he has fallen into the error of exhibiting that faculty as imparting to motives the power by which they move it to its volitions. His mode of discussion, though diffuse for scientific inquirers, will not prove objectionable to other readers, and it is vivified and adorned in an uncommon measure by appropriate and elegant illustrations from the physical and moral world. It is a work of unusual interest and merit, and excellently suited to counteract the sceptical errors of the times.

7. *THE PSALMS TRANSLATED AND EXPLAINED.* By J. A. Alexander, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Vol. ii. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1850.

THIS volume, commencing with the fifty-first, and closing with the hundredth Psalm, presents the same characteristics as the former; an exhibition of the idioms and striking peculiarities of expression of the original; a reference to the principal passages in which the same terms and thoughts occur; a clear evolution in the translation and exposition of the meaning, and neatness and brevity. The Hebrew is a very scanty and inadequate language, compared to ours and other modern European tongues, and the Latin and Greek; yet the Psalms and other poetical portions of the Old Testament, in which not as many hundreds of words are used, as there are thousands in the English vocabulary—

exhibit every species of feeling and passion, every shade of sensibility of which the human heart is the subject, and uttered with as much distinctness and energy as they are expressed in our own copious tongue. Job, in fact, the Psalms, Proverbs, the Song of Solomon, Ecclesiastes, and Lamentations, present a greater number and variety of expressions of sentiment probably, than the whole body of the Greek and Latin poetry together, and more delicately defined and discriminated from each other. That is the great office, especially of the Psalms. They are a vast delineation of the experience, and embodiment of the views and affections that are peculiar to the pious, and deserve on that account to be habitually studied and meditated by all who would learn what their characteristics are, and cultivate them. Dr. Alexander's work will prove an important help to a minute knowledge of them, and will be read and highly valued, in proportion as it becomes known by the people of God.

8. **ENGLISH GRAMMAR.** *The English Language in its Elements and Forms, with a History of its Origin and Development, designed for the use of Colleges and Schools.* By William C. Fowler, late Professor of Rhetoric in Amherst College. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1850.

THIS comprehensive title scarcely indicates the great variety of topics of which this work treats, and amount of important and interesting knowledge it presents. Instead of a mere grammar in the usual sense, and sketch of the origin and history of the language, it embodies all the information respecting its derivation, structure, and laws, contained in the recent, most philosophic, and erudite treatises on the subject, that is to be desired in a text book designed for the higher order of schools, academies, and colleges, excellently arranged and expressed with judgment and taste. The author treats in the first part of the origin, diversity, and classification of the languages of the world; of the historical elements of the English;—the Celtic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon, Danish, Norman, and others,—of its dialects and provincialisms. In the second part he exhibits its phonology; and in the third its orthographical forms. The fourth, occupying one third of the volume, on its etymological forms, or its different classes of words, the changes or inflections by which they express the different relations of agents, acts, and the objects to which they are directed, and their origin, primary signification, and transition to new uses, treats those subjects in an admirable manner. Under the last division a great variety of facts and explanations are presented that are highly curious and interesting. We give a few examples from the chapter on illusory etymologies:

"The *frontispiece* of a book is usually conceived of as a *piece or picture in front of a book*; whereas it denotes literally a *front view*, from Low Latin, *frontispicium*, the forefront of a house.

"A *font*, or *fount* of types, is in our conceptions confounded with *font*, or *fount*, from Latin *fons*, a fountain; whereas it denotes literally a casting, from Latin *fundo*, to found, or cast.

"*Preface* appears to be compounded of *face*; whereas it is derived from Latin *præfatio*, a speaking before.

"*Wiseacre*, as if compounded of *acre*, is a corruption of German *weissager*, a diviner, a pretender to wisdom.

"*Surname*, sometimes written *sirname*, as if the name of one's sire; whereas it is derived from French *surnom*, an additional name.

"*Lieutenant*. This word has from the earliest times been written or pronounced *leftenant*, supported without doubt by the idea that the second in command holds the *left*, while the first holds the right. The true derivation is from the French *lieutenant*, which signifies one holding or supplying the place of another.

"*Mussulman*. The plural of this word, in respectable writers, is often written *Mussulmen*, as if the English word *man* entered into its composition. The true root, however, is *salam*, an Arabic word.

"Latin *baccalaureus*, a bachelor, as if *bacca laurea donatus*, crowned with the bay-berry. The true derivation is from French *bachelier*, for *bas chevalier*, an inferior knight."

The section on English family and local names indicates the derivation of a large share of those that had their origin in Saxon.

The fifth part on logical forms presents a definition of all the terms and exemplifications of the processes of logic. The sixth, on syntactical forms, contains in the definitions, rules, and exercises everything that can be desired on the order and government of words. The seventh and eighth, on rhetorical and poetical forms, are ample and elegant treatises on the characteristics and laws of oratory and poetry.

The origin, history, structure, and usages of our language deserve a far larger attention in a course of academical education, than they have hitherto received. The number even of the cultivated, who speak and write with the accuracy, force, and elegance they might easily attain, is not large. This volume yields the aids that are needed in a far higher measure than any other, and deserves to be adopted as a text book in schools and colleges, and have a place in every library.

9. **THE FATHERS OF THE DESERT**, or an Account of the Origin and Practice of Monkery among Heathen Nations, its passage into the Church, and some wonderful stories of the Fathers, concerning the primitive Monks and Hermits. By Henry Ruffner, late President of Washington College, Virginia. Two Volumes. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1850.

THE subject, of which these volumes present a very ample and interesting account, though remote from the usual track of readers, is well entitled to their consideration. No one, without a knowledge of the unnatural self-restraints and cruel tortures by which vast numbers have, from age to age, endeavored to extricate themselves from the thralldom of evil, can form a just estimate of our nature, the deep consciousness of ruin with which it is pervaded, and the errors and delusions of which it is the prey. What more monstrous solecism can be conceived than that presented by the ascetics, who, for thirty centuries, have been endeavoring to exterminate from themselves the root of sin, by voluntarily and artificially subjecting themselves to its curse, in the forms of corporeal restraint, suffering, and debasement! No other chapter of the annals of man exhibits a more astounding spectacle of contradictory reason, perverted principle, and heroic folly.

Dr. Ruffner traces its origin to the Hindoo doctrine that the soul becomes defiled with sin by being imprisoned in a material body. Its object is partly to diminish that pollution by counteracting and limiting the influence of the appetites, and partly to expiate it by voluntary self-denial and suffering. It was instituted by the priests of that people in an age long anterior to the conquest of the East by the Greeks, and in the forms it has borne at all subsequent periods,—fasting, celibacy, withdrawal from society, and self-torture; and was associated, as it is in the Catholic church, with the belief of a purgatory, the offering of prayers and oblations for the dead, and the hope ultimately of complete purification and redemption from evil. Their monastic system especially, bore a strong resemblance to that of the Romanists, and prevailed, and still prevails, not only throughout India, but in the countries to the east and north—Burmah, Cochin China, China, Japan, and wherever Boodhism spread.

“In the cold mountains of Thibet, the religion of Boodh has assumed the form of Lamaism; the peculiarity of which is, that there is an order of priests called Lamas, whose supreme head is the Grand Lama, worshipped as an incarnation of the supreme God, and who has several provincial subordinates, worshipped likewise as incarnations of secondary Gods.

"Nowhere in the world does monachism prevail as in that poor wintry region of mountains and lakes. Monasteries are found occupying choice situations in all the inhabited parts of the country. They are filled with hale hearty fellows, who show by their looks that they are well fed, and live much at their ease. Thrice a day they assemble for prayer. They have their fasts and their festivals, their instrumental music, and their hymns.

"In Thibet the Boodhist priests constitute a complete and regular hierarchy. Besides the common monk priests, they have Lamas of different ranks, human and divine, and the head of all is the Grand Lama, who is the pope of northern Boodhism, and of higher dignity than even the pope of Rome.

"When the Jesuit missionaries entered Thibet for the purpose of converting the people to Romanism, they were amazed to find a religion established there, which they could scarcely distinguish from their own. There was a hierarchy of priests corresponding to their own, and a complete system of monachism, with monasteries, nunneries, and hermitages, and monks by thousands and tens of thousands, under the same vows as the Roman Catholics, and subject to the same government and discipline; and all up to the Grand Lama himself, with shaven heads, like their own priesthood, and clothed in similar showy sacerdotal robes and caps.

"There was a chief holy city like Rome, with its pope, and inferior holy cities with their grand dignitaries, like the metropolitan archbishops and patriarchs of Christendom,—all, but especially the holiest of all, full of priests, temples, monasteries, ceremonies, festivals, processions, and pilgrims from distant lands.

"In the temples, they saw a showy ceremonial worship like their own; an altar for sacrifice, and a mass of bread and wine offered upon it; images of saint gods, before which the worshippers bowed; holy water, with which they are sprinkled; prayers in a dead language, and rosaries, or strings of beads, on which to count them.

"There too they found sins confessed to priests, and penitents fasting, repeating prayers with the rosary, and whipping themselves; and there the doctrine of purgatory, prayers for the dead, and extreme unction for the dying."—Vol. i. pp. 78, 79.

The ascetic method of obtaining sanctification was adopted from the Hindoos by the Greeks at a very early period, was a conspicuous element of their philosophy at the commencement of the Christian era, and was in the second century introduced from them into the church. Dr. Ruffner, in detailing its rise and diffusion through the East and West, presents a view of the theological doctrines of the Hindoos in which it

had its origin, and the religious philosophy of Pythagoras, Plato, and their disciples who embraced it. After narrating its introduction into the church, and history to the fifth century, he presents in translations from Athanasius, Jerome, and the Greek ecclesiastical historians, the lives of a number of the principal ascetics of the fourth and fifth centuries. The work is written with learning, judgment, and vivacity, abounds with striking and amusing details, and furnishes a large amount of novel and useful information.

10. *THE PANTHEISM OF GERMANY.* A Sermon delivered before the Synod of Albany, October 9th, 1850. By Ebenezer Halley, D.D., Pastor of the Second Street Presbyterian Church, Troy. Published by request of the Synod. Albany: Gray & Sprague. 1850.

DR. HALLEY could not have selected a more appropriate theme for discussion on such an occasion. The disguised infidelity of the Germans introduced among the educated, has been too long allowed to propagate itself with little obstruction from the friends of truth. It becomes those who keep the faith once delivered to the saints to exert themselves to arrest it, ere it gains a powerful party among the clergy, and diffuses itself through the churches. After noticing the material pantheism of the ancients, and Spinoza and his disciples among the moderns, Dr. H. gives an outline of the idealistic system of Kant and his followers, points out, in a clear and effective manner, its groundlessness and contradiction to our nature, and shows the atheistic results to which it leads in respect to Christianity;—denying the personality of the Supreme being, disowning his providence, annihilating moral obligation, and blotting out a future existence; and thence rejecting the Scriptures as a revelation, denying the possibility of prophecy and inspiration, and exhibiting religion as a mere dreamy and absurd naturalism. He justly denominates the disciples of this wretched system infidels, though veiled under the name of Christian theologians and doctors, and presents a true portraiture of their hypocrisy and hostility to the gospel. We wish others who are called to address ecclesiastical bodies may imitate his example, and by a faithful delineation of its character, put the church on its guard against this atheistic system.

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ART. I.—CHRIST'S SECOND COMING: WILL IT BE PRE-MILLENNIAL? By the Rev. David Brown, A.M., St. James's Free Church, Glasgow. Second Edition, carefully revised and corrected, with large additions. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter, 1849.

MR. BROWN gives a negative response to the question propounded in his title, and makes it the object of his volume to overturn the views entertained by millenarians of that and other events that are revealed in connexion with it,—the resurrection of the holy dead before the millennium, the personal reign of Christ and the risen saints on the earth during that period, the continuance of men in unglorified and natural bodies after his coming, and the resurrection and judgment of the unholy at the termination of the thousand years; and it has been received with much favor by antimillenarians, both in Great Britain and in this country, and commended as an unanswerable confutation of pre-millennialism. So high is the estimate in which it is held by some here, and so strong the desire felt by them that it should become widely known, that a republication of it has been induced; efforts are made to give it a large circulation, and it is relied on in a measure, we understand, as a counteractive of the Theological and Literary Journal. Mr. Brown an-

nounces indeed, in his preface, that "the communications received from England, Ireland, and America, as well as from different parts of Scotland, leave no room to doubt that it has found its way to the parties for whom it was chiefly designed, and accomplished to a considerable extent the objects for which it was undertaken;" and he indicates throughout his volume the utmost assurance of his success, and exults and triumphs in the embarrassment and defeat with which he flatters himself he has overwhelmed his adversaries. Neither his assurance, however, nor the commendations of his friends, can be safely taken as proofs of the truth of his views, or the force of his arguments. That his work is in a high degree adapted to the object for which it was undertaken—if its design were, not so much calmly and impartially to ascertain what the teachings of the Scriptures are on the subject, as to confound and disgrace millenarianism by misrepresentation, sophistry, and ridicule,—is indisputable. It is, from its lofty pretensions and positiveness, more imposing than any other we have seen that is devoted to the advocacy of the same views, more likely to mislead the unwary by deceptive statements and fallacious reasonings, and adapted in a higher measure to inspire its readers with contempt and scorn of those whom it opposes. To the praise, however, of a candid, learned, and demonstrative discussion of the subject it has no claim. It is indeed in some respects very much such a work as Mr. Dobney's on future punishment, reviewed in the *Journal* of January. Like that, it omits the question on which the discussion mainly turns, proceeds on gratuitous and unauthorized assumptions, and owes its effectiveness to the false issues it creates, and the adroit appeals to prejudice and passion with which it abounds. To those who have given any attention to the subject, it must be apparent that the question respecting the meaning of the predictions of Christ's coming and reign, the resurrection and judgment of the dead, the condition of the race during the millennium, and their ultimate destiny, turns altogether on the laws by which the media through which those predictions are made, are to be interpreted. The proper method accordingly of determining their meaning, is first to ascertain what those laws are, and next what the results are which they evolve when applied to

those media. Of this Mr. Brown himself, it would seem, is not unaware, for he represents it as a conspicuous characteristic of pre-millennialism, that it is founded on false principles of interpretation. He says, in his Introduction, "Pre-millennialism is no barren speculation—useless, though true, and innocuous, though false. *It is a school of Scriptural interpretation*; it impinges upon, and affects some of the most commanding points of the Christian faith, and when suffered to work its unimpeded way, it stops not till it has pervaded with its own genius the entire system of one's theology, and the whole tone of his spiritual character, constructing I had almost said a world of its own."—P. 6. He indicates it also in the conclusion of his work; "I have shown, I think, under a number of heads, that the pre-millennial scheme is at variance with the word of God;" and, "that it *proceeds on crude and arbitrary principles of interpretation*, while it shrinks from carrying out even these to their legitimate results."—P. 487. This implies that their imputed error is the result of false views of the laws of language and symbols, and that it is to be corrected by the establishment and application of their true laws. Any other mode must be altogether ineffective and inappropriate. It would be like an attempt to solve a problem in geometry by declamation, or a game at battledoor. The same views are expressed also by the author of the article in the *Eclectic Review*, on Mr. Brown's work, in which his defamatory representations are repeated, and urged with greater vehemence. He says:—

"In arguing with a modern millenarian, we are liable to constant perplexity from being at issue with him on the very *first principles of interpretation*, and on the application of his *professed principles*. To any one who does not come to the study of the Bible strongly predisposed towards a theory, it would appear a glaring absurdity to take what certainly seems the most highly figurative language as the literal expression of the ultimate form and destiny of the kingdom of Christ; and to construct such a theory as that of the millennium from a single symbolical passage in the most symbolical book in the Bible. *You feel this preliminary question forced upon you. By what test can it be ascertained when the word of God speaks as poetry, and when as plain prose? When and where are you to say;—this is a scenical representation of a spiritual truth, or the metaphorical expression of a spiritual*

fact ; and this is an abstract statement purely literal, to be received as an exact unadorned account of Christian doctrine. Is it all literal ! and if not, by what rule can you discriminate the literal from the figurative ? Are there any rules ? or is every individual at liberty to choose out of the visions, prophecies, and dramatic representations of Scripture, that portion which it may suit his system to render literally."

This implies with the utmost distinctness, that the whole question at issue, is the question, what are the marks that distinguish literal from figurative expressions ? What are the true laws of literal and figurative language and symbols ? And how are they to be applied ? And that nothing can be accomplished towards the settlement of the controversy, except by the determination and application of those laws.

Mr. Brown, however, wholly omits this first and most essential step. He enters into no inquiry whatever respecting the peculiarities of figurative language, and the laws by which it is to be interpreted ; nor the principles on which symbols are employed. He gives no rules for their construction, nor does he found on them in any measure, either his criticisms or his reasonings. Instead, he conducts his discussion throughout in as complete independence and disregard of them, as he could, had he been treating a question in agriculture, or a theory in geology. Beyond its omission, moreover, he exhibits the most ample proofs that he is altogether unacquainted with the subject. He manifestly has not studied it, at least with any success ; as he perpetually falls into mistakes and absurdities, which no one would commit who had become in any tolerable degree familiar with it. He has no conception, for example, of the first great law of symbols, that representative agents denote *agents*, not qualities, acts, or conditions ; and that acts represent *acts*, and effects *effects*. Nor has he any suspicion that expressions, in order to be figurative, must involve a figure of a specific kind that can be identified and defined ; and that the nominative of a figurative expression, or the subject to which it is applied, is always used in its literal sense. These and the other fundamental laws of interpretation, lie as completely out of the sweep of his vision as the truths and principles of any other branch of knowledge to which he has never given any attention. This fact is alone sufficient to show that his work is not of any critical value.

His pretence that he has confuted pre-millennialism is a sheer absurdity. He might as well affect to confute a proposition in Euclid, without a knowledge of the laws of geometry. If pre-millennialism is false, the principles by which it is to be refuted must be wholly different from those on which he proceeds. How can he refute a doctrine when totally ignorant of the criteria by which its character is to be determined? His book is, accordingly, what a work would be on astronomy, written in ignorance of gravitation, and the laws of the planetary movements, and professing, on the theory that facts accord with appearances, to demonstrate that the earth is at the centre of the universe, and stationary, and the seeming motion of the heavens, real, and their revolution round the earth the cause of the succession of day and night.

Proceeding as he thus does, in entire disregard of the proper means of determining the question, it results of necessity that he resorts to methods that are inappropriate and deceptive. His principal expedient is by assumption, speculation in regard to what befits the Almighty, and deduction from passages of Scripture that relate chiefly to other subjects, to establish a theory of the divine administration that contravenes the doctrine of Christ's pre-millennial advent; and then by the use of that theory as a law of construction, to set aside the prophecies that directly treat of Christ's coming, the resurrection and reign of the saints, and the other subjects in question. Nearly two thirds of his volume are devoted to that task. The method he pursues accordingly, instead of being legitimate, is like that of Universalists, the deniers of the resurrection of the body, the rejecters of God's foreknowledge, and the asserters of the independence of the will, who first gratuitously assume some proposition involving their doctrine, or deduce it by a process of false logic, and then use it to wrench plain and emphatic passages that contradict it, from their true meaning, and force them into harmony with their pre-established scheme.

The means, also, which he employs to demonstrate his theory, are as exceptionable and untrustworthy as the general plan of his discussion. His chief expedient is the employment of testimonies to sustain his propositions, that yield them no support whatever. No characteristic of his

work is more indubitable and conspicuous, than the deceptibleness and sophistry of its reasonings. He states his propositions with sufficient clearness, and goes through the form of demonstrating them ; but the passages which he alleges as proofs, usually present no ground whatever for the results he deduces from them, and answer no other end than to enable him gratuitously to assume them with an air of demonstration. Thus to prove that all who die, are to be raised *at the same time*, he quotes passages that simply teach that all are to be raised ; and to demonstrate that all are to be judged *at the same epoch*, offers texts that merely show that all are to be judged. This is so usual, that no reliance whatever is to be placed on his mere assertion, or logic. Antecedently to examination, the probabilities may generally be safely assumed to be ten to one against his accuracy. The means, also, which he customarily employs to convince his readers of the truth of his conclusions, are as deceptive and preposterous as his logic. It is the mere assumption or bold and positive assertion that the meaning of the passages which he quotes, is what he claims it to be ; not a critical evolution of their import, and demonstration by their proper laws, that they teach that which he employs them to sustain. There is scarce an example throughout the whole course of his discussion of the use of anything else than mere dogmatical asseveration, to demonstrate the truth of the constructions he places on his proof texts. He acts the oracle on all occasions, and settles questions of all sorts by mere authority.

Unfortunately, however, these are not his only faults. Not content with endeavoring to confute pre-millennialists, he attempts also, by unworthy arts, to render them the objects of suspicion, prejudice, and contempt to his readers. One of his favorite expedients for the purpose, is the exhibition of the different constructions they have placed on prophetic passages, and display in the most piquant form of the errors and extravagances into which they have run ; and treatment of those faults, as proofs that their whole views are altogether erroneous ; or that they are so deficient in knowledge, judgment, or taste, as to be entitled only to ridicule and contempt. We shall not apologize for their errors or absurdities ; they are unquestionably very numerous. But numerous and great as

they are, it is to speak with moderation to say that they are not greater, either in number or importance, than those of their antagonists on the same subjects, nor than may be culled on other themes from the writings of men highly respectable for their talents, learning, and piety. There is not a doctrine or fact of Scripture that may not be run down and disgraced with equal effect, by such raillery and banter as Mr. Brown employs in nearly every chapter, to render those whom he assails the objects of laughter and scorn.

Another favorite artifice to which he resorts to inflame his readers with disgust at their doctrines and detestation of their character, is the gratuitous and calumnious imputation to them of infamous dispositions and principles, and representation of their system as leading to false and mischievous results, to which it not only has no tendency, but is irreconcilably hostile. Sensuousness, Judaism, a denial of the efficacy of the gospel, a disparagement of the influences of the Spirit, a hostility to missions, a subversion of the great doctrines of grace, a tendency to universalism, are among the accusations with which he thus attempts to brand and disgrace them. This is not simply unjust towards them, it is discreditable also to him; as having himself once been a pre-millennialist, and of an ultra school, it is equivalent to an acknowledgment and profession that he was himself tinged with those antichristian doctrines, and felt those fatal tendencies while he was under the dominion of the system. How, unless he was himself conscious of them, can he, without a particle of ground for it, except what he affects to find in the system, treat them as indisputably obnoxious to those infamous imputations? It could only be in utter recklessness and malice. If sincere, therefore, they are to be taken, for aught we see, as confessions, virtually, of what he himself then believed and felt, and should consign him to the discredit of which he aims by them to make others the objects.*

* "Mr. Brown calls the pre-millennial, a 'giddy theory.' We think he should have paused before he applied such a term to a view which has been held by such men as Twiss, Mede, Thos. Goodwin, Gill, Toplady, Milton, Hailes, Newton, Horsley, and Cowper,—not to mention others now living, of whose names the Free Church of Scotland, at least, has no need to be ashamed. But giddy or

Such is the work of this champion of anti-millenarianism, which is regarded by his party as a triumphant defence of their system, and confutation of those who look for Christ's coming and the resurrection of the saints at the commencement of the thousand years. That we have not misjudged its character, or overdrawn its faults, the reader will have the most ample proofs in the examination to which we are to subject it. Several replies have been published in Great Britain, but we have only that already quoted at hand, and shall not think it necessary to refer to them. Our object is not to vindicate the writers whom he assails, nor to show that no views held by millenarians are obnoxious to objection; but simply to try the great questions treated by him by the indisputable laws of language and symbols, unfold and demonstrate the truth, and show the inappropriateness and deceptiveness of the means by which he attempts to confound and overwhelm it. We shall not deem it necessary to refute all his misrepresentations, or notice all his mistakes. It will be enough to show that all the great elements of his system are false.

After explaining in his introduction, the object of his work, pointing out the importance of the question, and stating his views of the theory entertained by millenarians, he proceeds

not, we understand that Mr. Brown was himself at one time a staunch advocate of these very principles. We are inclined to think, from the articles now before us, that having at that period gone the whole length of the more intemperate views which have been promulgated on this subject, and having discovered that these were untenable, he has rejected the whole doctrine with as little consideration as he adopted it at first. He seems not to understand how any one can entertain more sober principles on this subject than he himself did at one time; and this may account for the constant reference he makes to the more crude theories which have been put forth."—*An affirmative answer to Mr. Brown's question, Will the Second Advent of our Lord be Pre-millennial? by the Rev. Walter Wood, Minister at Elie, Fife, Edinburgh, 1846.* Pp. 32, 33.

This indicates the reason, probably, that he takes no notice of the errors of the late Mr. Irving. On perceiving that a main object of his volume is to disgrace millenarians, we expected to see the absurd extravagances and lamentable delusions of that gifted being presented in their full dimensions. Not a solitary allusion, however, is made to him in the work! Were Mr. Brown of a temperament that could be instructed, he would naturally, after so humiliating an experience, have become in some measure distrustful of himself. He is still, however, as unbounded as he can then have been in his self-confidence, and as heated in his zeal. He has only changed his object.

to allege what he denominates "the Scripture evidence against it," in a series of propositions, of which the following is the first :—

"Proposition first.—The church will be absolutely complete at Christ's coming.

"If this can be established, the whole system falls to the ground. If all that are to be saved will be brought in before Christ comes, of course there can be none to come in after his advent. . . .

"The difficulty here is not to find proof of the point, but anything like evidence to the contrary. No plain reader of the Bible ever doubts that the church will be completed ere Christ comes ; not a few even of the pre-millennialists themselves have been constrained to admit it—with what effect upon the sobriety of their own views we shall by and by see ; and even those who deny it, give evidence of the extreme weakness of their ground, and virtually concede the point by admitting that '*the Bride*' of Christ *will* be complete, though they contend that the whole number of *the saved*, whom they distinguish from '*the Bride*,' will not." —Pp. 53, 54.

This is certainly boldly asserted. What now are the considerations by which he attempts to demonstrate it ? It will indicate but little skill, if, with such an amplitude of proof, and nothing "like evidence to the contrary," he neither sustains nor even alleges anything that has a bearing on it. Of a series of passages which he quotes, and pronounces quite decisive, the following is the first :—

"1 Cor. xv. 23. But each party—*ἑαυτοὶ δὲ*—in his own order, Christ the first fruit ; afterwards, *they that are Christ's at his coming*.

"Any one who even glances at this sublime chapter, will see that the burden of it is the resurrection of BELIEVERS *in general*—of '*them that are Christ's*,' considered as the second Adam. As their death is deduced from their federal relation to the first Adam, so their resurrection is argued from their federal connexion with the second. '*As in Adam (they) all die, even so in Christ shall (they) all be made alive.*' And it is immediately after this that the apostle says, '*But each (party) in his own order*'—that is the federal head, and those federally related to him—'*Christ's the first fruits ; afterwards they that are Christ's*'—(the full harvest of them) at his coming.

"Can anything be more decisive than this ? What commentator

explains it otherwise? What unbiassed reader ever understood it otherwise? Is it not then a very bold liberty with the word of God, to say that only a fractional part of them that are Christ's are here spoken of?" —Pp. 54, 55.

His construction, however, is altogether untenable. In the first place, he is mistaken in assuming that the argument from which it is quoted refers solely to the resurrection of the holy. He may, indeed, find respectable commentators who regard it as treating only of that class of the dead; but it is inconsistent both with the question in discussion by the apostle, and the import of his terms. The subject in debate between him and the false teachers whom he was opposing, is the resurrection of the dead without consideration whether they are holy or unholy. The doctrine taught by them was, "*ἐν ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἐστί*", that there is not a resurrection of the dead; not simply that there is not a resurrection of the unholy. The apostle accordingly meets their denial of a resurrection, by showing that it is a denial that Christ himself had risen, and is equivalent, therefore, to a denial and overthrow of his whole work of redemption. "Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is *not* a resurrection of the dead? But if there be *not* a resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen; and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is vain," Cor. xv. 12-14. His inference respecting Christ thus depends entirely for its truth on their doctrine being a denial absolutely of a resurrection; for if it were only a denial that they that are Christ's are to rise, it would not be equivalent to an assertion that Christ had not risen, nor involve any ground for such an inference. If they merely held that a certain class of human beings are not to rise, it would not follow from it necessarily that Christ who is divine as well as human, had not risen. He argues in the same manner also in the verses that follow, to show that their denial implied that the apostles were false witnesses, and that their hope of a future life was a delusion. "We have testified of God that he raised up Christ; whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not: for if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised," v. 15, 16. This follows conclusively on the supposi-

tion that their denial was a denial absolutely of a resurrection; but does not result at all, if the question at issue were, not whether there is a resurrection, but simply whether there is to be a resurrection of a particular class of men. It is clear, therefore, that the theme of the apostle's discussion is the resurrection of the dead, without reference to any one class rather than another; and not, as Mr. Brown assumes, the resurrection simply of believers in Christ.

This is again placed by the apostle beyond question in the representation that all who die by Adam are to be made alive by Christ; and that since death is through man, through man also is the resurrection of the dead. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept. For since death is by man, by man also is the resurrection of the dead. For as by Adam all die, even so by Christ shall all be made alive," v. 20-22. No terms can be more comprehensive and absolute than these. They represent the resurrection to be wrought by Christ, as to be co-extensive with the death produced by Adam. All who die by Adam, are to be made alive by Christ. But all who die, whatever their character is, die by Adam; all who die, therefore, whatever may be their character, are to be made alive by Christ. The resurrection is to be by man, in the same manner as death is. But the death of all who die is by man; a resurrection, therefore, of all who die is to be by man. As it is no peculiarity of the righteous that they die by Adam, so it is no peculiarity of theirs that they are to be raised by Christ. This is the philological and logical meaning of the passage, and the only construction it will bear; inasmuch as all who die by Adam will not be made alive by Christ, unless all who die, evil as well as good, are made alive by him. Why then should it be disputed? It offers no new announcement. It involves no contradiction to other passages. The same facts are taught in other parts of the New Testament. That all die by Adam is expressly asserted, Rom. v. 12-14, 17-19. That all are to be raised by Christ, is taught John v. 28, 29. There not only is no exegetical or logical reason, therefore, in the passage itself, for putting on it a different construction, but it is not requisite to harmonize it with other passages that treat of the subject. Nor is there any doctrinal ground for it whatever.

Every critical consideration requires that it should be taken as affirming that the dead universally are to be raised, without reference to their character.

This is confirmed, moreover, by the distribution in the next verse of the whole of those who die, into three classes, and announcement that their resurrection is to be at different epochs. "As by Adam all die, so by Christ shall all be made alive; *ἕκαστος δὲ ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι*, but every one in his own band. The first fruits, Christ; then they that are Christ's at his coming; afterwards *τὸ τέλος*, the last band, when he is to deliver the kingdom to God the Father."—V. 22–24. This is undoubtedly the meaning of *τὸ τέλος*. It was customarily used by the Greeks to denote a division, and the last division of an army. Thus Homer says:—

Αἴψα δ' ἐπὶ Θρηκῶν ἀνδρῶν τέλος ἴξον ἰόντες.

Statimque ad Thracum virorum ordines pervenerunt euntes.

And soon, advancing, to the extreme band,

The men of Thrace they came.—*Iliad* x. 470.

They are described in a previous line as, *ἔσχατοι ἄλλων*, the remotest from the centre of the Trojan encampment, the outside, or last body of troops passed by Dolon as he proceeded towards the Grecian lines—

Θρηῖκες οἱδ' ἀπάνευθε νέηλυδες ἔσχατοι ἄλλων.

Thraci hi seorsum sunt novi-advenæ extremi omnium.

The Thracians, by themselves, new come, of all

The host, the last.—*Iliad* x. 434.

It is used by Herodotus to denote bodies of troops, *οἱ περὶ τὸ προσεβαλλὼν κατὰ τελεα*—the cavalry attacked in squadrons or divisions.—*Lib. ix. c. 20.* Band, cohort, army, are accordingly given by lexicographers as among its established meanings. Bretschneider, in his lexicon of the New Testament, defines it in this passage, as denoting, *ultimi, reliqui homines*, the last or rest of mankind—and this is shown to be its meaning by the distribution of the whole body of the dead into their several bands. As he affirms the resurrection of all who die, and declares that every one shall rise in his own band, one of the bands must of necessity consist of those who are

not Christ's. But no such band is designated, except it be in this expression. Christ being first, and a pledge of the resurrection of all the others, and the next they that are Christ's at his coming, τὸ τέλος must be taken as the last band, if the other class is indicated. And thus interpreted, the expression is natural, the sense such as the point the apostle was explaining requires, and the whole passage made harmonious and complete ; while the other construction exhibits the point he was establishing as left unfinished, and the expression as inapt. This is also made certain by the announcement that, at the period denoted by εἶτα, when the last band is to be raised, death, the last enemy, is to be destroyed. "Afterwards the last band, when he shall deliver the sovereignty to God even the Father, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power ; For he must reign till he has put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death."—V. 24–26. But the destruction of death, we learn from Rev. xx. 11–14, is to take place immediately after the resurrection and judgment of the unholy. The fact that their resurrection is thus immediately to precede the destruction of death, and necessarily, as it is to be the conquest of death, and release of all its victims from its power, renders it clear that the great event denoted in this passage by τὸ τέλος, is also the resurrection of the unholy, which is necessary in order to the conquest of death here foreshown, and must precede its destruction.

The passage is thus wholly misinterpreted and misapplied by Mr. Brown. It utters no such announcement as that which he ascribes to it. It presents no ground whatever for the support of his proposition : it affirms nothing indeed in relation to it. That which the apostle teaches in the verses we have quoted is, first, that there is to be a resurrection of the dead ; which having proved from the resurrection of Christ, he then proceeds to show that it is to be co-extensive with death, and to be procured by Christ, as death was caused by Adam ; and finally, that every one is to be raised in his own band—Christ, who is the conqueror of death, first—next, they who are his at his coming ; and afterwards, the last division, who are not his. Not a syllable is uttered by him that affirms or implies that the second band embraces all, as

Mr. B. asserts, who belong, and are to belong, to the redeemed church, and partake of salvation. His attempt, accordingly, to prove by it that "all that are to be saved will be brought in before Christ comes," is wholly unwarrantable and absurd. It no more follows from the fact that all *the dead* that are Christ's will be raised at his coming, that no others either then or at a subsequent period are to be his, than it follows from the fact that all the Israelites were led out of Egypt by Moses, that there never were any other Israelites; or from the fact that all the Israelites, with the exception of Caleb and Joshua, who on leaving Egypt were more than twenty years old, died in the wilderness, that all the Israelites of every age died there also.

But in the next place: apart from the irrelevance of the passage to his proposition, his assumption that *the dead* in Christ, at his coming, are to embrace all that are ever to be saved by him, is in open contradiction to the revelation made in many passages, that all believers in Christ are not to have died at his appearing. The passage quoted by Mr. Brown relates exclusively to *the dead* in Christ; and he assumes and asserts that they are to comprise the whole number that are to be saved. But both Christ and Paul and John teach that a vast number of his disciples are to be living at his coming, and to remain and be changed from mortal to immortal. Thus Christ announces that when he comes in the clouds of heaven, he shall send his angels, and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other; and that some will be taken from the field, and some from the bed, and some from the mill—indicating that they will be living; and that when he sits on the throne of his glory, *all nations*, by whom are meant the living, not the dead, shall be gathered before him, and those of them whom he accepts shall go into everlasting life. Paul, also, expressly says respecting the resurrection: "Behold, I show you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed; for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality."—V. 51–53. So, also, 1 Thessal. iv. 15–17: "For this

we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that *we which are alive, and remain unto the coming of the Lord*, shall not precede them that are asleep; for the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel and with the trump of God; and *the dead in Christ* shall rise first. *Afterwards we who are living and remain* shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, and so shall we ever be with the Lord." The numerous directions, also, and exhortations to believers to look and wait for the coming of Christ, imply that believers are to be living at his advent. Such commands would be incongruous and absurd, if the whole of his people are to be swept from the earth before his appearing. They would be commands to look for that, which, by the arrangements of Providence, believers never can behold. In the Apocalypse, also, a great multitude, which no man could number, of all nations and peoples and tongues, are exhibited as going out of the great tribulation in the body: for it is predicted that they shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more, for the Lamb shall feed them, and lead them to the fountains of the waters of life; which implies that they are still to be unglorified. Otherwise the announcement of such an exemption, as a great characteristic of their new condition, would be unsuitable to their nature. They are doubtless representatives of the living saints who are at Christ's advent to be changed from mortal to immortal, and thence continue in the body. Such an exemption will accord with their altered nature, and be an indispensable element of their happiness. We have thus the most emphatic certainty that the dead in Christ at his coming are not to comprise all his redeemed, even at that epoch; and thence that Mr. Brown's assumption is not only without any ground in the passage he alleges to sustain it, but is in direct contradiction to one of the plainest and most important teachings of the sacred word. Such is the error and extravagance of the first argument by which he attempts to support his proposition. A multitude which no man can number of living saints, at Christ's coming, are excluded by Mr. B. from salvation, in order that *the dead in Christ* may constitute the whole number of the redeemed!

His other argument—for he offers but one more—involves an equally palpable misapplication of the word of God.

“The next passage I have to adduce in proof of the completeness of the church at Christ's coming, is—

“Eph. v. 25-27. Christ also loved the church and gave himself for it; that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word; that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish.

“It is impossible to doubt what ‘church’ is here meant, for it is defined by three bright, unmistakable marks within the bosom of the passage itself. It is the church which Christ loved from everlasting; it is the church which he is now sanctifying and cleansing by the word, as with the washing of water; it is this church, even the whole loved, ransomed, and purified company, which Christ will present to himself a glorious church. *When? Clearly at his coming.* But should any hesitate about this, I will put it beyond doubt by comparing it with two or three passages in which the same delightful truth is expressed, and nearly in the same terms.”—P. 57.

But the passage is wholly irrelevant to his proposition. That which he attempts to prove by it is, that the church will, at Christ's coming, be absolutely complete *in number*, or embrace all that are ever to be saved; but that which it affirms is simply that Christ loved the church and gave himself for it, that he might make it complete *in character—holy and without blemish!*—propositions that are absolutely unlike, and no more involve each other, than any others that can be conceived. Yet Mr. Brown treats them as *identical*, and builds his argument altogether on that assumption. A more palpable error we have seldom known a controversialist to commit. His argument, expressed in the form of a syllogism, is the following, the major being a gratuitous assumption.

A completeness of the character of a body of human beings is identical with, or at least involves a completeness of their *number*.

But the church of Christ is to be complete in character at his coming.

Therefore, it is then to be complete also in its number.

The assumption from which he reasons, if true, must be as

applicable to other portions of mankind, as to the church. What are the conclusions, then, to which it leads? If a completeness of the character of a company of human beings is identical with a completeness of their number, then, as Adam and Eve were complete in their sinful character, on their apostasy, they were the only beings of the human family that were ever to exist; and accordingly Mr. Brown must be in error in what he says in his exposition of Corinth. xv. 22, 23, in respect to Adam as the federal head of the present race of men, as his posterity! Which will he relinquish—his argument there, or his assumption here? It leads to an equally brilliant result in respect to the race at the period immediately before the flood. "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually; and it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth," Gen. vi. 5, 6. The character of the race, at that time, was indisputably complete in wickedness; no language could affirm it more absolutely, or depict it in stronger colors. If then completeness in character is identical with completeness in number, it follows that the race had at that epoch become complete in its number, and consequently that no human beings have come into existence since! It may be applied with equal appropriateness also to men at the period in which it was affirmed by the Psalmist, "There is none righteous, no not one; there is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God; they are all gone out of the way; they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no not one," Ps. xiv. 2, 3; and again, when the same character was ascribed to the race by Paul, Rom. iii. 10-18, and at numerous other periods. Such are the consequences in which his assumption involves him. If it be true, there not only are not to be any living saints on the earth at Christ's coming, but there are not to be any living human beings whatever. There are not even now, and have not been for ages! On the other hand, there are many passages from which a similar completeness of the number of the church, ages ago, may be proved with equal conclusiveness. There is not a hint in the exposition which he quotes respecting the time when Christ is to purify the whole church and

present it to himself, holy and without blemish. There is nothing that implies that he is to present to himself all whom he is to redeem at one time. Mr. Brown takes for granted that element of his argument, as well as the identity of their completeness of character and number. But he can no more assume that Christ is to present the whole of the redeemed to himself at one time, than he can assume that they are all created, regenerated, and sanctified at one time; nor can he without any authority in the passage, assume that that time is the time of his coming any more than that it is at a score of other periods. Indeed, if his method of arguing from a mere word, falsely interpreted, were admissible, there are many passages that would fix the date of the completion and presentation of the church at a wholly different epoch. His argument expressed in a syllogism, is the following:

All whom Christ is to present to himself, will be presented at the same time.

But he is to present the whole church to himself.

Therefore, he is to present the whole church to himself at the same time.

But Paul represents the spirits of just men as in the presence of God, and made perfect at a much earlier period, Heb. xii. 22-24: "Ye are come unto mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem and to an innumerable company of angels, *to the church of the first born which are written in heaven*, and to God the judge of all, *and to the spirits of just men made perfect*, and to Jesus, the mediator of the new covenant." Here the spirits of the just are represented as already made perfect in character, and the Hebrews are declared by the apostle to have already come unto the church of the first-born, and unto God the mediator. If, then, as Mr. Brown asserts and reasons, completeness of character is identical with or involves completeness in number, the spirits of the just having then been perfected in character, must also have become complete in number; and no others, not even of those whom the apostle addressed, have been, or ever will be added to them. Moreover, as the general assembly and church of the first born were then in existence, in the presence of the Mediator, and had been perfected in character; and therefore had been presented by him to him-

self as holy and unblamable; if, as Mr. Brown asserts and reasons, all who are presented to him are presented at the same time, then all who are ever to be presented to him, had been presented at that epoch, and no others of that or any subsequent age are to share in that blessing. Such are the shocking falsities and self contradictions in which his arbitrary and preposterous assumption involves the word of God.

He affects, nevertheless, to allege direct proofs that the presentation, and sole presentation of the church, is to take place at Christ's coming. It is but the repetition, however, of the artifice of his previous argument;—the assumption of the point he is to prove. He asks, "When" will Christ present to himself his glorious church? and answers:

"Clearly at his coming. But should any hesitate about this, I will put it beyond doubt by comparing it with two or three passages in which the same delightful truth is expressed; and in nearly the same terms.

"2. Thess. i. 10: He shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe—in that day."—P. 58.

But this passage has no pertinence to his object. It utters nothing in respect to the presentation of the church to Christ at that epoch. If it is in reality then to be presented and accepted by him, it is to be learned altogether from other passages, not from this. All that is here announced is, that at the coming of Christ, which is described in the preceding verses, he is to be glorified by his saints, and admired by all them that believe. Mr. Brown accordingly, in attempting to prove from it that the whole church is then to be presented to Christ, assumes that he cannot be glorified by his saints, and admired by all them that believe, unless the whole number who are ever to be redeemed, are then presented to him. Reduced to form, his argument is the following:—

Christ cannot be glorified by his saints, and admired by all them who believe at his coming, unless he then presents to himself the whole of those who are to be redeemed by him. But he is, in fact, then to be glorified by his saints, and admired by all who believe. Therefore, all who are ever to believe and be his saints, are then to be presented to him.

What more groundless and monstrous assumption, however, was ever made, than that Christ cannot then be glorified by his saints, and be regarded with love and adoration by all who believe, unless he limits the blessings of his grace to those who have already become partakers of it, and closes the work of redemption ;—that were he to go on in renewing and saving men, and extend his mercy to myriads and millions of successive generations, it would make it impossible that what he had already done in ransoming the lost, should glorify him and excite their wonder and admiration ? A cause must be in truly a hopeful condition when an assumption so derogatory both to Christ and his saints is found necessary to give it a color of truth. He quotes several other passages that are equally irrelevant, and assumes and asserts in like manner the points he professes to prove by them.

Jude 24: " Now unto him that is able to keep you from falling, and to present you faultless before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy."

" Here the thing to be done, and beyond all doubt the time of doing it, are the same as in the two former passages."—P. 59.

But the two former passages present no specification of the time ; and there is no indication of it whatever in this. That which God is here exhibited as able to do, is to preserve them *from falling*, as well as to present them faultless before the presence of his glory ; and Mr. Brown can no more show that the last was not to be accomplished till the coming of Christ, than that the other was not. There is nothing in the passage inconsistent with the supposition that they, like the spirits of other just men, were to be made perfect and admitted to the divine presence, immediately after death. He adds two other quotations of the same character :—

" And you, that were sometimes alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled by the body of his flesh through death, to present you holy and unblamable, and unreprouvable in his sight."—Col. i. 22.

But there is no specification here of the time when this presentation was to take place. It is perfectly compatible with the language to suppose that it was at their transference to the other world, and admission to the divine presence. It

was in holiness and unblamableness, moreover, that they were to be presented, not completeness in number.

"To the end he may establish your hearts unblamable in holiness before God, even our Father, at the coming of our Lord with all his saints."—1 Thess. iii. 13.

Here there is nothing in relation even to their presentation to Christ. It is *the establishment of their hearts in holiness*, or the perfection of their sanctification, of which the passage treats, not the completion of their number, or their presentation to the Redeemer.

Such is the argument by which he affects to demonstrate his first proposition. Not a solitary syllable has he produced that yields it any support ; not a single passage that has even any relation to it. The whole process is one of mere assumption and asseveration. He begs in each instance that which he is to prove ; the passages he employs to sustain his assumptions are in each instance altogether irrelevant ; and his inferences from his proofs are in each case made only by mere affirmation. Several of the assumptions, moreover, on which his reasonings rest, are mistaken and monstrous in the extreme, and contradict the most essential and palpable truths. Yet he expresses at the conclusion of his argument, the utmost assurance of its accuracy, and exults at the defeat of his antagonists.

"And I think it impossible to resist the combined force of these passages. One broad magnificent conception pervades them all. The absolute completeness of the church at Christ's coming."—P. 60.

"Thus have I established the completeness of the church at Christ's coming. I have limited myself to a few passages on the import of which all commentators ancient and modern are agreed ; but it is written as with a sunbeam on the pages of the New Testament ; and those who call it in question, are driven to seek support from highly figurative portions of Old Testament prophecy, and from the corresponding book of the New Testament, the Apocalypse."—P. 61.

These sweeping assertions are fit associates of such an argument ; and his depreciation of the prophetic Scriptures in which figures and symbols are employed as utterly unreliable on the very questions of which they treat, is worthy of one who forces on the word of God in so bold a manner, what-

ever meaning he pleases, and claims with unhesitating assurance the sanction of its authority for his crude theories and presumptuous misconstructions. He proceeds indeed to reject the prophetic Scriptures altogether, as a ground of doctrine in respect to the realities of the future.

"Now it is an old maxim in divinity, that doctrines are not to be built upon PROPHETIC OR SYMBOLICAL SCRIPTURE. *The principle is one of undoubted soundness, and of indispensable necessity as a bulwark against the abuse of figurative language.* PRE-MILLENNIALISM, however, IS ONE ENTIRE PRODUCT OF THE REVERSE OF THIS PRINCIPLE; and in the case before us can produce nothing in proof of the incompleteness of the church at Christ's coming, but what is studded all over with figures."—P. 60.

This is truly a bold assault on the word of God. By doctrines, he of course means the great realities, agencies, dispensations, events, which God has revealed as future; such as Christ's coming; the destruction of the antichristian powers; the resurrection and judgment of the dead; the reign of Christ and the saints during the thousand years; the conversion of the nations, the blessedness of the righteous, and the punishment of the wicked; for these are called doctrines, and are the very subjects which he has himself been discussing, and continues to discuss in the remainder of his volume. And they are subjects of *prophecy*, and are made known to us *only by prediction*. In like manner, antecedently to Christ's first coming, his birth, ministry, death, resurrection, reign, and the redemption of men by his death, were all subjects of prophecy, and were known only as predicted futurities. Yet in the face of these facts, Mr. Brown has the unparalleled rashness to allege it as "a maxim in divinity, that doctrines are not to be built upon prophetic or symbolical Scripture," and to aver that "the principle is one of undoubted soundness, and of indispensable necessity as a bulwark against the abuse of figurative language." But if it be so, then as the great futurities in debate,—the coming and reign of Christ, the completion and presentation of the church, the resurrection of the holy and unholy dead, the priority or subsequence of the advent to the millennium, can

only be known through the prophetic Scriptures, they of course cannot be determined by the Scriptures at all ; and consequently, if any settled views of them are advanced, they must be founded, like Mr. B.'s first proposition, solely on assumption, and supported merely by assertion ! A fit profession truly with which to close the bold violation of the word of God which he has perpetrated through the whole course of his argument ! But a singular fatality attends Mr. Brown. He is not only mistaken and absurd in his assumptions, sophistical in his logic, and rash and untrustworthy in the extreme in his assertions ; but he cannot translate, it would seem, a simple Latin expression, without indulging his disposition to exaggerate and misrepresent. The maxim *Theologia prophetica non est argumentativa*, which he professes to exhibit in English, does not denote at all that the great doctrines, of Christ's coming, the resurrection and judgment of the holy and unholy dead, and others of which he treats in his volume, are not founded on *prophecy* ; no one aware of what he was affirming would utter such a statement, as they can be known only by prophecy. The exact equivalent of that axiom in English is, "Prophetic theology is not argumentative ;" the meaning of which is, that the truths or futurities taught by prophecy, are not deductions from a different set of truths or facts previously known through some other medium ; as some of the truths of natural theology, for example, are, such as the being and perfections of God ; but instead, are taught directly in express and specific announcements ;—a maxim that instead of enjoining, as he assumes, that the prophetic Scriptures should be set aside, and that which they reveal absolutely rejected,—requires us to take that alone as their import, which they directly and explicitly teach, and not attempt by reasoning to deduce from it a different revelation, or force it into harmony with a preconceived system. What splendid proofs he exhibits of his high qualifications for the task he has undertaken ! With what signal grace the jeers and banter at the ignorance and presumption of millenarians, in which he perpetually indulges, come from him ! Such is the issue of his attempt to support his first proposition. The annals of heartless trifling with the word of God, and crude and lawless specula-

tion, present few chapters, we apprehend, that surpass it in extravagance and folly.

After this fancied triumph, he employs a long series of pages in exhibiting the views which millenarians have advanced, respecting the completeness or incompleteness of the number of the redeemed at Christ's coming, the condition of the race during the millennium, and other topics on which he has touched, pointing out their diversities of opinion, and endeavoring to show that they have nothing but figurative and symbolic prophecy, which he unblushingly rejects, with which they can disprove his proposition; as though to disprove it by prophecy was not to demonstrate its falsehood, not merely by appropriate, but by the most effective means. As, however, we shall have occasion to treat of those themes in the notice of other parts of his volume, we shall not now follow him in that discussion, but proceed to the consideration of his next proposition.

"We have seen that the whole elect and ransomed church is complete when Christ comes. If this be correct, we may expect to find *the ordained means* for the gathering and perfecting of the church, disappearing from the stage—the standing *agencies* and *instrumentalities*, the whole economy and machinery of a visible church-state taken out of the way. *Here then is a test—the fairest and most satisfactory that can be imagined*—by which to try the truth of our doctrine. Pre-millennialists maintain that the saving of souls is to go on upon earth after the Redeemer's second appearing. If this be true, we shall find the means of grace surviving the advent. Whereas, if grace has ceased at Christ's coming to flow from the fountain, we shall find that the channels for its conveyance have disappeared too—if the building of mercy has been completed, we may expect to find the scaffolding cleared away."—P. 100.

This gigantic undertaking, none but a rash and sacrilegious hand would attempt, unless in possession of the most indubitable means of accomplishing it. The question he proposes to decide, is one of the greatest ever treated by a controversialist, and most momentous in its bearings on the divine administration. It is, on the one hand, the question whether the work of redemption is to be limited to a short period, and those who are saved to a very small number, at least of adults,

compared to those who perish ; for if Mr. Brown's first proposition is true,—as Christ's advent, notwithstanding his denial, is, as we shall hereafter show, to precede the millennium,—the time and the number are already nearly completed ;—or, on the other hand, whether the redemptive influence of Christ's death is to continue through endless ages, and the race for ever perpetuating and multiplying itself, to be partakers of its blessings. To establish, therefore, such a momentous proposition as he advances, he should produce the most demonstrative evidence. Mere assumption or assertion ; a false inference of it from the simple fact that great changes will take place in the administration of the world at Christ's coming, without any proof that they are to involve that change ; or a deduction of it from groundless and arbitrary postulates respecting the condition in which men must exist, and the relations in which they must contemplate the Redeemer, in order to the possibility of their sanctification and redemption, will neither demonstrate it, nor save it from the guilt of a most unwarrantable attempt to draw a revelation from the word of God which it does not contain, and under the guise of its authority to place a limit to the number of the redeemed, which it not only does not sanction, but most emphatically contradicts. To verify his proposition, he should either allege an unequivocal passage that specifically affirms it, or passages from which it follows as a direct and legitimate inference. If he cannot support it by such means, he must at least show that—even on the supposition that men continue to come into being—it is absolutely impossible either from their nature, Christ's attributes, or the process itself of renovation, sanctification, and justification, that men can be saved after his advent. Not a shadow, however, of anything of that nature is offered by him. The considerations on which he builds his inference, have not the remotest relation to the subject. He says—

“ Beginning then with the *Means*—If it can be shown that both the written *Word* and the sealing *Ordinances* by which God *ordinarily* gathers and perfects the church—*having their whole ends and objects exhausted at Christ's coming*—shall then absolutely cease as means of grace and salvation to mankind, I think it will be clear that all saving of

souls is then at an end. What then is the testimony of Scripture on this subject? The answer to this question forms

"Proposition second—Christ's second coming will exhaust the object of the Scriptures.

"His coming is the goal of all revelation, *its furthest horizon*, its last terminus, its sabbath and haven. Thither are directed all the anxieties which divine truth awakens. Every hope which it enkindles, and every fear which it excites, instinctively points to that awful event, its concomitants and its issues, as the needle to the pole."—Pp. 100, 101.

This is a specimen of the extreme extravagance and recklessness of asseveration in which he is accustomed to indulge in the support of the most groundless and monstrous propositions, "His coming is the goal of *all revelation, its furthest horizon, its last terminus.*" It presents no information, then, of an immortal life of the redeemed after his advent, an everlasting kingdom in which he is to reign, nor an endless existence and punishment of those who are lost! Divine truth occasions no "anxieties" to the hopeless in respect to the interminable retributions that are to follow his coming! It kindles no hope or fear, but what points to that event, its concomitants and issues—"as the needle to the pole," which points to that, and to that alone, by the force of its nature; not to anything beyond, or that is consequential on it! But Mr. Brown is not restrained by these enormous implications of his statements. Intent on making out his arbitrary scheme, he does not pause to consider what contradictions he offers to the most indisputable and fundamental elements of that which is revealed. What now are the means by which he attempts to demonstrate what he affirms to be so certain? Anything that asserts it? Anything that directly implies it? Anything from which it follows by a clear necessity? Nothing of the kind; nothing having the remotest connexion with it; nothing but what forms a ground for an inference that confutes his whole system. All that he alleges is the fact that the Scriptures command and exhort men, both good and evil, to look for Christ's coming, and exhibit it as a great and momentous event to those who precede or are contemporary with it.

"To prepare men for it as an event *future to all whom it addresses,*

is what the Bible proposes, and positively *all that it undertakes* and is *fitted to do*. The whole force of every reference to Christ's coming in Scripture, as a motive to action, absolutely depends on its being a future event.

"1. Look at the case of *saints*,—at all the incentives to patience and hope, to watchfulness and fidelity, to promptitude and cheerfulness in the discharge of duty drawn from the prospect of Christ's coming, and see if they would not be stript of all their power and all their point, on the supposition of its being a *past* event, and as addressed to saints living after it. Take an example or two almost at random. 'Occupy *till I come*.' 'Ye do well to take heed to the sure word of prophecy as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, *until* the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts.' 'Be patient, therefore, brethren, *unto* the coming of the Lord.' 'Gird up the loins of your mind, be sober, and hope to the end for the grace that is to be brought unto you *at* the revelation of Jesus Christ.' 'The Lord, the righteous judge, shall give the crown of righteousness at that day to all them that love his appearing.' 'Our conversation is in heaven, from whence we look for the Saviour.'

"It is impossible to deny that the attitude of *expectancy* and preparedness for a future appearing of Christ, is the whole burden of one and all these passages. Just think how they would sound in the ears of saints living *after* the advent. 'Behold, I come quickly' is the exhilarating announcement of Jesus, to those whose eyes long to behold him, 'and my reward is with me to give to every man according as his work shall be.' But from what lips shall that delightful response go forth *after* his coming, 'Amen, even so come Lord Jesus.' Beyond that end we never get in God's word."—Pp. 101, 102.

Here surely is no affirmation of the proposition, that "Christ's second coming will exhaust the object of the Scriptures," "and is the goal of all revelation, its furthest horizon, its last terminus;" nor is there anything in the remotest degree implying it. Instead, there are mere exhortations to occupy, be patient and sober, and hope till that day,—and announcements that Christ will then give a crown to those who love his appearing, and that believers accordingly were actually looking for his coming. How then does the fact that these injunctions and announcements are addressed to those who are to precede Christ's advent and obligatory only on them, prove that none of the other revelations, statements, promises, or teachings of the Scriptures, are adapted to and designed

for men after Christ's coming; and that none of the race are to be saved after that epoch? It does not, and cannot, unless the fact that any command or injunction of the sacred word is designed only for persons of one period, and obligatory only on them, proves that all the other teachings and truths of the Scriptures are also limited to persons of that period; and that none are after that period to be saved. Mr. Brown's argument is accordingly built on that extraordinary assumption. If he admits that commands and duties may be limited to certain periods, while others have no such limitation; and that the limitation of a peculiar duty, like that of looking for a future event, to a specific period, is no proof that none can be saved after that period, he then cannot claim that the exclusive adaptation of the injunction to look for Christ's coming, to those who precede his advent, is any evidence that other injunctions will not after that be obligatory, and men continue to be saved. His argument is, accordingly, built on that foundation, and reduced to a syllogism, is the following:

If any command, exhortation, or announcement of the Sacred Volume is adapted exclusively to persons of a specific period, and obligatory only on them, all its other commands, directions, and announcements must be limited also, in design and influence, to that period, and the work of salvation itself, therefore, close with it.

But the commands and exhortations to look for the coming of Christ and live in preparation for it, are exclusively adapted to persons who live antecedently to his coming, and binding only on them.

All the other commands, exhortations, promises, and announcements of the Scriptures, are limited, therefore, in their adaptedness and obligation to the time that precedes his coming.

The whole work of salvation, consequently, is to terminate at that time.

This, if valid, is a very summary way of settling the question. Let its efficiency be tested by applying it to other commands and duties that were obligatory only at specific periods. The prohibition imposed on the first pair,—“But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat; for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die,”

was adapted exclusively to them, antecedently to their fall, and limited to that period. On Mr. Brown's assumption, therefore, all other commands and duties with which it was associated, expired, and all provision for their well-being came to an end at the same period. The race must, therefore, according to Mr. B.'s argument, have terminated with them. Instead of that result, however, the Scriptures inform us that that law, made unsuitable by their altered condition, was immediately superseded by another, adapted to their new relations to God, contemplating the continuance and multiplication of the race, and providing for them a method of redemption. His argument may be tested in like manner by the command to Noah to prepare an ark for the saving of his house. If Mr. Brown's reasoning were correct, no other law which God had before imposed on Noah would have been obligatory after that command had ceased to be binding; and none of the race been, after that, made partakers of salvation. A still more emphatic exemplification of its monstrous erroneousness is furnished by the non-obligatoriness and discontinuance of the Mosaic institution, after the death of Christ. According to Mr. Brown's argument, the whole of the other laws, and the whole of the promises, the whole of the predictions, and the whole of the teachings of the Old Testament must also have utterly lost their use and obligatoriness, with the expiration and discontinuance of the Mosaic ritual; and the work of salvation for ever stopped. Not a consideration can be offered by him to justify his application of the principle on which he reasons to the second coming of Christ, that is not applicable also to his first coming. This were truly getting rid of pre-millennialism, Christ's reign, the first resurrection, and the perpetuity of the race and the work of redemption, in a summary manner. Instead of that catastrophe, however, the Mosaic dispensation was set aside by the institution of another; a new revelation was given, suited to the new measures of the Divine government, and the altered condition of men; their redemption, instead of ceasing, was continued on a far greater scale; and all the laws of the Old Testament, with the exception of those of the Mosaic ritual, and all its predictions and teachings, except those that related to Christ's first coming, retained their

adaptedness to the moral necessities of mankind, and were used as before in their illumination and sanctification.

We might allege a great number of injunctions that are obligatory only for a period, at least on many of those to whom they are addressed; such as commands to children, parents, husbands, wives, servants, masters, that cease to be binding whenever they cease to sustain the relations to which the duties enjoined belong; but the untenableness of his assumption is sufficiently apparent.

His argument from the other class of passages which he quotes, is founded on the same monstrous pre-supposition.

"2. Similar remarks may be made upon all those passages in which the second advent is brought to bear upon the sinners in Zion, despisers of gospel grace, such as the following :—

"The Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power, in that day.—2 Thess. i. 7–10. The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night.—2 Peter iii. 10."—P. 103.

He adds Luke xii. 39, 40 and xviii. 26, 27–30, which indicate that Christ will come in an hour when he is not expected by the unbelieving; and inquires—

"Is it necessary to ask whether such warnings would be at all applicable to sinners living *after* that event, so full of terror to the wicked *now*, shall have been numbered amongst the things of the past?"—P. 104.

But the fact that these predictions will, after their accomplishment, cease to be predictions and forewarnings to those who are then living, and become mere records of the past, is no proof that all the other truths, narratives, promises, and prophecies of the Scriptures will also lose their adaptation to them, become obsolete, and render the continuance of the work of redemption impossible. There is no ground from which he can logically deduce it, but the arbitrary assumption on which he builds his argument from the other class of texts,

that any event that renders any one of the commands, predictions, or warnings of the sacred word, inapplicable to mankind, must necessarily work the same effect also in regard to all the others, and involve therefore the total cessation of the work of redemption. But no more false or monstrous supposition was ever advanced. He might as well, from the fact that the predictions and warnings addressed by Christ to his disciples and the people of Jerusalem respecting the siege and destruction of that city, lost their peculiar applicability to those who lived after its fall, infer that all the other teachings, doctrines, warnings, promises, and predictions of the Scriptures lost their applicability and force after that event, and the work of redemption came to a close ! What must be the blindness and infatuation of a man who can coolly advance such a monstrous principle of argumentation, and attempt by it to construe the word of God in contradiction to its plainest teachings, and to the subversion of its most essential truths ! This is one of the laws of interpretation which Mr. B. employs in preference to "the crude and arbitrary principles" on which he alleges millenarians "proceed !"

Not content, however, with this enormous violation of the word of God, he next attempts to give efficacy to his argument, by representing that these two classes of texts comprise the *whole of the Scriptures*, and asserting, on that ground, that when they are superseded, the whole will, as a means of grace, be set aside.

"Thus *one half of the Scriptures* would be inapplicable to *saints*, and *the other half* to *sinners*, living after Christ's coming ; in other words, *the Scriptures, as a means of grace, will be put out of date by the second advent*. It is a light shining in a dark place UNTIL the day dawn—NOTHING MORE."—P. 104.

There is no history, then, it seems, in the sacred volume, as of the birth, ministry, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ ; no record of his teachings ; no announcements of the method of salvation, of the mode of justification, of the necessity of repentance and faith ; no specifications of the duties of believers ; no commands ; no promises ; no narratives of the ministry of the apostles ; no revelations of the future ; nothing whatever, except what is comprised in *the passages*

quoted by Mr. Brown and others of the same class ! What extravagance could the utmost audacity of misrepresentation invent beyond this ? Passages of this character, which abound in Mr. Brown's volume, seem to indicate a mind driven by "feverish excitement" into the shadows of incipient delirium, where the line that separates truth from falsehood, and fact from imagination, has faded into indistinctness. They surely are not the offspring of a calm, clear-headed, and veracious reasoner. Nothing but a delusion bordering on insanity can apologize for such a wholesale abuse of the word of God.

Such is the issue of his attempt to verify his second proposition. He not only offers nothing that directly demonstrates it ; he alleges nothing that has the remotest reference to it. He might as well have attempted to deduce it from the speech of Balaam's ass, which had no applicability except to him, and none to him except on the occasion when it was uttered ; or from the promise of the spies to Rahab, which had no applicability except to her, and on the occasion of the capture of Jericho ; or from Samson's firebrands and foxes, which had no pertinence except to the Philistine corn fields of that season. His argument owes its whole pretence of conclusiveness to assertions and assumptions that are altogether groundless and in open antagonism to the fundamental truths and facts affirmed in the word of God. Had he, instead of this unwarrantable course, reasoned legitimately from the fact that many commands and predictions of the Scriptures are suited only to the period that precedes Christ's coming, and that great changes in the condition of the race and the measures of the divine administration are then to take place, he would have inferred that new revelations will then be made, and new instructions furnished, adapted to the peculiar necessities of men, and the objects of Christ's reign ; and had he, instead of attempting to determine the question by dogmatism and sophistry, chosen to inquire whether the Scriptures do not foreshow that new communications will then be made, and new laws instituted, he would have found not only ample indications, but express announcements of it in the prophecies of that period. But he makes not the slightest reference to the passages that treat of the subject. It does not suit his

object to show what God has revealed respecting it. He can accomplish his aim only by substituting his arbitrary dicta in the place of the words of inspiration.

The expedient by which he endeavors to demonstrate his next position is of the same character.

"Proposition Third.—The Sealing Ordinances of the New Testament will disappear at Christ's second coming.

"The very terms of their institution are singularly decisive on this point."—P. 105.

And he quotes Christ's command to the disciples, "Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them, and teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and lo! I am with you always, even unto the end of the age;" and alleges as the ground of it—

"That the whole work of the ministry, both in its missionary and pastoral departments, embracing the making, baptizing, and training of disciples, together with Christ's mediatorial power and presence for the discharge of it, are to terminate at his second coming. The bare reading of the words make this as clear as any comment on them could possibly do."—P. 107.

Yet, positive as his asseverations are, there is not a syllable in the passage to that effect. The command relates exclusively to their duties, and the promise exclusively to his presence, antecedent to his coming. Not a hint is uttered in respect to the period after his advent. If we would learn what his purposes are after that epoch, we must look to other passages, that expressly relate to the dispensation he is to exercise during his reign on the earth. For aught that is announced here, men may continue to live in the body, and be converted during his millennial sway; an order of men may then fill the office of teachers, and baptism be the rite by which they will be admitted into the company of Christ's disciples. Mr. Brown's construction is not merely not proved. There is no ground on which it can be made the means of supporting his proposition, except the assumption that the limitation of one command and promise to a specific period, carries with it necessarily the limitation

to it of all others, and of the work of redemption itself; which we have already shown to be arbitrary and false.

His inference from the institution of the Lord's supper is equally groundless and monstrous :

"As to the Lord's supper, what can be more conclusive than, 1 Corinth. xi. 26 : For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye do show the Lord's death *till he come.*"—P. 108.

He regards this as teaching that the rite is to cease at Christ's coming. The passage, however, affirms nothing to that effect. It merely declares that they would proclaim Christ's death as often as they should eat the bread and drink the wine, which are its memorials, *till he come.* But admitting that it implies the cessation of the rite at that epoch, that does not infer the cessation of all the other means of grace, and completion of the work of redemption ; nor is there any medium by which he can make it the instrument of proving his proposition, except the assumption on which he proceeds in his argument respecting baptism, that the limitation of any rite or duty to a specific period necessarily involves the limitation of all other laws, ordinances, and means of instruction and justification, also, to that period, and termination, consequently, of the salvation of men ; the absurdity and falsehood of which we have already shown.

Mr. Brown, however, is not satisfied with this lawless deduction from the passage of an inference which it does not authorize ; he proceeds to pronounce the Lord's supper a symbol of Christ's coming, instead of a memorial of his death ; and to employ that astounding misrepresentation as a proof of its discontinuance, and the discontinuance of the whole system of means for the salvation of men at his advent.

"The Lord's supper will cease to be celebrated after Christ's coming, not because the Lord of the church has so willed it, but because after that it would be meaningless—because the state of things, and the attitude of the believing soul, with reference to *the two comings of Christ—of which the Lord's supper is THE ORDAINED AND BEAUTIFUL SYMBOL,* shall then have no place."—P. 109.

Of this sudden transformation of facts and propositions

from their proper nature, to another of a wholly different kind, examples unfortunately very frequently occur in Mr. Brown's discussions. No wizard's wand ever wrought a quicker change of the object which it touched. The most indubitable facts, the most palpable certainties, lose their original qualities under his hand, and assume whatever shape he pleases. Having thus converted the Lord's supper from a memorial of his death into a symbol of his coming, so that the inference that it is then to be discontinued, may appear to be legitimate, and asserted that it is to be abolished independently of God's willing it, he then proceeds in his usual confident style to announce his conclusion as demonstrated.

"What then have we in respect to these ordained means of grace? Why, that the second advent, come when it may, will put them all out of date. The passages which teach this make no distinction between *the means and the end*; they so implicate the *grace* conveyed with the *means* of conveying it, that both are seen disappearing at Christ's coming. If then, there is to be a millennium *after that*, it cannot be *an era of Christianity*; for the whole *Christian furniture*, and with it all the *Christianity that has hitherto obtained*, has been withdrawn from the earth."—P. 109.

Can this be deemed the work of a sane mind? Does it not rather indicate an intellect that, having been thrown from its equilibrium by some over excitement, or fallen under the power of a delusive idea, transforms all objects into the shape and color that suits its morbid condition? The work of Christ, it seems, in becoming incarnate, offering himself as a sacrifice, making expiation for sin, rising from the grave, and ascending to heaven, is no part of Christianity! The great doctrines of redemption by his blood, regeneration by the Spirit, justification by faith; the commands, the promises, the predictions of his word, are no parts of "the Christianity that has hitherto obtained." Though they should survive the coming of Christ, no trace of the Christian system will remain: for Christianity consists of nothing but predictions of Christ's advent, exhortations to look for his coming, warnings that he will punish his enemies, and baptism and the Lord's supper! Such are the insane extravagances to which his morbid eagerness to overturn the doctrine of Christ's advent before

the millennium carries him ! Christianity itself is resolved into its rites, and finally struck from existence to accomplish his object. Not a shred of evidence does he furnish of the truth of his extraordinary propositions ; they rest on his mere asseveration. Not an effort is made to obviate the contradictions which his theory offers to the great facts and teachings of the sacred word. His dicta, though they overthrow the whole Christian system, settle the question as effectually as they could, if they had the most explicit sanction of the divine word. The principles on which he proceeds, prove indeed as absolutely that Christianity has never had an existence, as that it will not exist after Christ's coming. For they assume and imply that God could not possibly institute a series of dispensations, in each of which the same great truths should be embodied, and the work of redemption be carried on ; as the cessation of any one element of an administrative system, he assumes, of necessity involves the cessation and abrogation of all the rest. The work of redemption must therefore have terminated at the close of the patriarchal age ; and again most indisputably at the cessation of the Mosaic dispensation ; and Christianity therefore has never gained an existence. On the other hand, he annihilates with equal certainty, all that will have been accomplished in the salvation of men. Christianity is the religion of Christ, the system of facts, truths, laws, promises, and agencies which constitute his religion, and are the basis of the renovation, pardon, and justification of men, of their resurrection from the dead at his coming, eternal deliverance from the curse, and elevation to wisdom, righteousness, and bliss in his kingdom. If then, as Mr. Brown asserts, there cannot be an era of Christianity after his coming ; "if all the Christianity that has hitherto obtained will be withdrawn ;" if in other words, all the great realities of the work of redemption, Christ's death and resurrection, the renovation of men by the Spirit, their justification by faith, their resurrection, and adoption as sons of God, are struck from existence, then undoubtedly all the consequences of Christ's death and the influences of the Spirit must disappear along with them ; the whole that has been wrought in the salvation of men vanishes ; and the ransomed relapse to the condition they would have occupied, had they never been made par-

takers of spiritual life! If the foundation be annihilated, the superstructure must of necessity be swept to annihilation also. Such is the unfathomable abyss into which Mr. Brown's assumptions precipitate him! What a brilliant exhibition of his logical powers! What a worthy expedient for the overthrow of the great prophetic announcement that Christ is to come before the thousand years, and instead of terminating the work of redemption, is then to bring all peoples, nations, and languages, to partake of its blessings, and perpetuate and reign over them for ever!

Having thus annihilated Christianity at Christ's coming, and all that will have been accomplished by it in the salvation of men, it was scarcely necessary that he should undertake to show that the intercessions of Christ and the renewing influences of the Spirit will also cease at that epoch. He, however, makes that the subject of his next chapter.

"But I said that *the agencies of salvation* would cease at the same time; by which I mean the present work of Christ in the heavens, and the work of the Spirit as the fruit of it. The truth on this subject, which I shall now illustrate from Scripture, may be expressed as follows:

"Proposition Fourth—The intercession of Christ and the work of the Spirit for saving purposes will cease at the second advent."—P. 116.

A theme that so intimately affects the extent of Christ's redemptive work, and the nature of the administration he is to exercise through his eternal reign, is surely no fit subject for dogmatism, or presumptuous speculation. If Mr. Brown's proposition is false, it is a falsehood as great as the purposes of mercy are infinite which it contradicts, and as vast in its reach as the ages are illimitable through which that mercy is to extend. It ought not to be affirmed, therefore, without the most indisputable proof of its truth. What then does Mr. Brown offer to sustain it? Not a particle of evidence;—not a solitary hint from the Scriptures that such an event is ever to take place;—not a word from which it can even be remotely deduced. He only alleges passages which teach that Christ at his ascension *entered on the work of intercession*, and sent the Spirit as the author of miraculous gifts, and renewer and sanctifier; and accordingly makes the fact that

Christ *now* intercedes, and the Spirit *now* enlightens and regenerates, the ground of his assertion that the one will not intercede, and the other will not renew and sanctify after the second advent! In other words, he treats the fact that they now fill those offices, as a proof that after that epoch they will not fill them!

The passages he quotes in support of it are Heb. vii. 25, and ix. 12, 24-28.

Instead, however, of indicating the discontinuance of Christ's intercessions at his return to the earth, Heb. vii. 25 teaches directly and specifically that they are to continue *for ever*! Mr. Brown transcribes only the 25th verse, which declares, *on the ground of Christ's everlasting and unchangeable priesthood*, that he is for ever to be able to save those coming unto God by him, *seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them.*" Εἰς τὸ πάντοτε, rendered in the common version, to the uttermost, does not mean, as Mr. Brown assumes, completely as to the necessities of those who are saved, but eternally as to Christ's ability to bestow salvation. The apostle's argument is, that as Christ is to live *for ever* and have a priesthood which is never to change; that is, is never to pass from his hands, sink into desuetude, or undergo any variation in its object, therefore he can for ever save those coming unto God by him. It is a perpetuity of his ability to save those coming to God whenever it may be—not who have *already* come, or shall at any specific period have come—that is thus affirmed of him, and on the ground of his everlasting life, unalterable priesthood, and perpetual ability to intercede. The perpetuity of his priesthood and intercessions is thus declared in the most explicit manner; that perpetuity is offered as a proof of the perpetuity of his power to save those coming to God for salvation; and that annunciation directly implies that men are for ever to be coming to God to be saved by him, and are to enjoy his intercessions, and experience his redeeming power! The whole passage, most of which is omitted by Mr. B., presents this great truth in the clearest light. "The Lord swears and will not repent, *Thou art a priest FOR EVER*, after the order of Melchizedek. They truly were many priests, because they were not suffered to continue by reason of death. *But this, because he continueth EVER, hath an*

UNCHANGABLE PRIESTHOOD. *Wherefore, also, he FOR EVER can save, τοὺς ᾤχομένους, those coming to God by him, seeing he EVER LIVES TO MAKE INTERCESSION FOR THEM.*" It thus presents a direct contradiction to the proposition Mr. B. affects to found on it! Nor was he, as he clearly indicates, unaware of it; and yet with that singular recklessness that marks the whole course of his discussion, he persists in maintaining his proposition, under the pretence that *he has nothing to do with the nature of Christ's intercession after his advent*, and that he has proved that for saving purposes it will cease at that epoch! The annals of heartlessness and hardihood in the perversion of the word of God, exhibit few examples, we suspect, that transcend this. He says,

"Nor do I enter into the questions that have been raised about THE CONTINUANCE OF CHRIST'S INTERCESSION AND IN WHAT SENSE, after the whole church has been gathered and perfected [that is, on his theory, after Christ's second coming]. I WILL NOT BE DRAWN INTO SUCH MATTERS. The proposition *I have laid down* is, that Christ's intercession, for saving purposes,—by which I mean, *the inbringing of sinners, and the perfecting of saints*,—will cease at his second advent, and *this* I think I have established."—*Note*, p. 119.

But the very question at issue is, whether Christ's intercession is to continue after his second coming! Mr. Brown's assumption that if it continues after that epoch, it is to be wholly changed in its nature and have a wholly different object, is altogether unwarranted, and in contradiction to its very design. There is not a hint in the Scriptures that his intercessions are made or are ever to be made for any other persons than for those who come to God in order to be saved by him, and therefore, antecedently to the completion of their salvation. The passage we have quoted, in exhibiting the perpetuity of his power to bestow salvation on those coming to be saved by him, no matter how remote the period may be, as resting on his living at every period to make intercession for them, indicates as clearly as an express affirmation could, that the object of his intercession for them is their salvation! The apostle, therefore, in teaching that his priesthood, intercession, and consequently his power to save, are to continue for ever, teaches that he is to intercede for ever for the salva-

tion of men coming to be saved by him ; and thence that the work of saving them is to continue for ever. Mr. Brown's assertion that his intercession for saving purposes is to terminate at his advent, is not a demonstration of it ; nor is his *fancy* that he has established that proposition a proof that he has. He offers nothing that yields it any color of support. The sole ground from which he affects to deduce it, is the fact that Christ *now* intercedes in heaven ; and apparently from the consideration that he *ascended to heaven*, when he commenced his intercession. It is from that alone, as far as we can judge, that he assumes that he will discontinue it when he *returns* from heaven. Quoting the expression,—“ Now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself, and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation,”—he exclaims,

“ *Here the two advents stand at the two extremities of Christ's MEDIATORIAL WORK*, while the intercession stretches from one to the other, and occupies the whole intervening period. . . . Now as the second coming is here represented as *crowning the whole purpose of the first*, it is plain that the intercession, which is but a continued pleading upon the merit of his death, must be over for all saving purposes before he comes.”—Pp. 117, 118.

What a complication of astounding assertions ! Who informed Mr. Brown that Christ's *mediatorial work* is to be altogether confined between the two advents ? He offers no pretence of a proof of it. Are not Christ's priesthood and intercession a part of his mediatorial work ? Does Mr. Brown mean seriously to deny that they are ? Is his eagerness such to blot the revelation of Christ's pre-millennial advent from the Scriptures, that he is willing to incur the guilt of such a denial ? Is he unaware that the act of intercession is itself an act of mediation ; and that the office of intercessor and mediator is, as far as the former extends, the same ? In what an inextricable labyrinth of error has he involved himself in his efforts to accomplish his object ! He obviously assumes here, as in all his previous arguments, that any change in Christ's administration must necessarily involve a change of the whole, and thence an absolute

termination of the work of redemption. But if his mediatorial office terminates with his coming, how is he then to appear to the salvation of those who look for him? How is he to raise them from the dead, present them to the Father to be adopted as sons, and reign over them for ever in his kingdom? How is he to gather and judge all the nations, and assign them their everlasting award? Are they no part of his mediatorial work? How is it that Mr. B. is unable to see the contradiction which his assumption presents to the most indisputable and momentous of Christ's prerogatives and acts as mediator? He can no more assume that Christ's intercession is limited to the interval between the two advents, than he can that his official work as king is limited to that period. He is guilty of as flagrant a contravention of the teachings of the Scriptures, in limiting the mediatorial work of Christ to that interval, as he would be in limiting to it his union to our nature, his deity, or his existence. No doctrine is more indisputably taught in the Scriptures than that Christ's exaltation to the throne of the universe, and investiture with his peculiar kingly authority over this world, is founded entirely on his assumption of our nature and death on our behalf; and that he is for ever to exercise his regal and sacerdotal prerogatives in his character as the incarnate Redeemer. The reason given by the apostle for his exaltation and reception of a name that is above every name, that at his name every knee should bow of those in heaven, and on earth, and under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that he is Lord, to the glory of God the Father,—is, that “he made himself of no reputation, and took upon himself the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men, and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,” Phil. ii. 6—11; and that the relation in which he is to “sit at the right hand of God, far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and every name that is named, *not only in this age or dispensation, but also in that which is to come*, which is the age of his millennial reign on the earth, and that all things are put under his feet,—is, *that of the head of the church which is his body*,” Eph. i. 20—23. In like manner the reason of the ascriptions

to him by the living creatures, elders, angels, and the universe, of worthiness to take the book of God's purposes, and receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory *for ever and ever*,—is that he is the Lamb that was slain, and has redeemed men to God by his blood, Rev. v. 9–14. No representation, therefore, can be more unscriptural and derogatory to Christ, than Mr. Brown's, that his mediatorial work is to terminate at his coming. It is equivalent to a representation, that he is then to be wholly divested of his regal and sacerdotal power, and his kingdom itself come to an end!

His statement, that in the passage, Heb. ix. 28, "unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation," "the second coming is represented as crowning the whole purpose of the first," and as making it "plain that that intercession, which is but a continual pleading upon the merits of his death, must be over for all saving purposes, before he comes," is in like manner altogether unauthorized. It only announces that he will then appear unto the salvation of those who have looked for him. It utters not a syllable respecting others. The fact that he will then complete the salvation of those of his people who have died, by raising them from the grave, and constituting them kings and priests in his kingdom, and that he will change those believers who are living from mortal to immortal, and free them from the curse; is no proof whatever, that he has no purposes of mercy towards others. Mr. Brown might as well draw such an inference from any other act of the work of redemption. How is it that he cannot advance a step in his argument, except by sheer assumption, and the arbitrary ascription to the word of God of meanings which it does not express? Yet he closes this wretched pretence of demonstration with the following announcement: "If these observations are just, they go to settle the whole question. When the advent arrives, the intercession is done; and when the intercession is done, salvation is done." Instead of this, the Spirit of truth announces that Christ will at every period of his eternal reign be able to save those coming to God by him, because he will for ever live to make intercession for them!

Can there be any doubt which of these testimonies they will receive, who take the word of God as their guide?

Mr. Brown proceeds to establish that part of his proposition which respects the influences of the Spirit, in the same unscriptural and lawless manner.

"The second branch of our proposition regarding the work of the Spirit, *must stand or fall with the first*. For as the mission of the Comforter is through the intercession of Christ, and the continual effusion of the Spirit results from the continual intercession of our High Priest, the second advent, if it bring the latter to a close, must be the terminating period of the former also."—P. 120.

As then the first is wholly false, against the clearest teachings of the sacred word, and subversive of the throne and kingdom of Christ, the latter is equally false also. As it is indisputably certain that Christ's priesthood and intercession for men are to continue for ever, and are to be for their salvation, if the continuance of his intercession involves a continuance of the effusion of the Spirit, then the influences of the Spirit are not to terminate at the advent, but are to continue for ever. And Mr. Brown offers nothing whatever from the Scriptures that is inconsistent with this. He alleges, indeed, nothing having any bearing whatever on his proposition. The first five texts which he quotes relate to the miraculous gifts of the Spirit conferred on the apostles and believers, immediately after Christ's ascension, and utter nothing respecting a cessation of his saving influences at Christ's return to the earth. They are John vii. 38, 39; xiv. 16, 17, 26; xv. 26; xvi. 7, 14; Acts ii. 33. Mr. Brown can be guilty of no grosser violation of the laws of logic, or more unwarrantable perversion of the word of God, than to attempt by such a process to substantiate his proposition. What a resistless demonstration it presents, that he finds nothing in the sacred volume to countenance his audacious theory? Those who are able to verify their views by legitimate means, do not feel it necessary to resort to such sophistry and misrepresentation for the purpose.

He next alleges Tit. iii. 5, 6, which simply declares that God saves men by the renewing influences of the Spirit bestowed through the mediation of Christ. It utters nothing

respecting a discontinuance of those influences at Christ's second coming. "He saved us by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour." The mere fact that the Spirit conferred through him renewed and sanctified believers, is thus alleged by him as demonstrating that he will discontinue his renovating agency when Christ comes! Was there ever a more unpardonable misapplication of the word of God? Is there anything that may not be proved or disproved by the Scriptures, if such an abuse of them is admissible? The only other passages which he quotes, are Rev. iii. 1, and v. 6, which simply exhibit Christ as having the seven Spirits of God; by which is doubtless meant the Spirit whose gifts are sevenfold. They present no intimation that he is not to have the Spirit also after his second coming.

Such are the testimonies by which he affects to demonstrate that the Spirit's renovating and sanctifying work is to terminate at the Redeemer's advent. Are there any others in the Scriptures that refer in any form to the Spirit, that might not as well have been offered for the proof of it? Yet this pitiable attempt to wrench the word of God to his purposes, is closed by the pretence that the proposition he has undertaken to establish, has nothing to do with the question whether the Spirit is to continue his agency, and the Saviour his intercessions, after the second advent. "We have nothing here to do with the questions regarding the active agency of the Spirit, the exercise of intercession, and other mediatorial functions of Christ in the everlasting state," p. 121. But these are precisely the questions which he has affected to determine. He has represented in the most express and authoritative manner that "Christ's mediatorial work" is wholly comprised between his two advents; and that his "mediatorial power and presence," to give efficacy to the ministry of the gospel, "are to terminate at his second coming." If that be true, he is not to have any "mediatorial functions in the everlasting state." How is it that after having uttered and labored to establish this extraordinary assertion, he now ventures to claim that it has no relation to the question whether Christ is to exercise intercession and other mediatorial functions in the state that is to follow his advent? And what are

we to think of his disclaimer respecting the agency of the Spirit after that epoch? He has affirmed and affected to prove that "the work of the Spirit during the period when the saving of souls is going on," is to terminate at that coming; he has asserted that "the continued effusion of the Spirit results from the continual intercessions" of Christ; that those intercessions will cease with his second advent; and, consequently, that the effusion of the Spirit will then cease also; while with the fact before him that the intercessions of Christ are to continue for ever, and thence on his own theory, that the Spirit is for ever to continue his influences, he has offered no proof that Christ's intercessions are not to be of the same nature, and for the same object, nor that the influences of the Spirit are not to be of the same kind after as before that coming. How is it then that he affirms that he has not touched the question respecting their agencies after that period? Is he unable to comprehend the import of his propositions? Does he think it decorous in so momentous an inquiry to take for granted, not only without a shadow of proof, but against the clear teachings of the Scriptures, that there is to be a total difference between Christ's intercessions before and after his coming; and a total diversity also in the influences of the Spirit? Or is it his object in this pretence to appear to admit, what, though conscious that he contradicts in it the word of God, he has positively denied? Whatever the solution may be, what more indisputable evidence can we have, at once, of the utter untenableness of his proposition, the deceptiveness of his argument, and the unreliableness of his asseverations?

Had Mr. Brown succeeded in proving that all who are ever to be saved, are to be saved before Christ's second advent, and that at that epoch the means of grace are to disappear, and his mediatorial work and the sanctifying influences of the Spirit to terminate, it would be apparent that the kingdom itself of Christ, in which the salvation of men takes place, is then, also, to cease, and that the form in which it now subsists is that in which it is to continue to the end. He proceeds, accordingly, in his next argument to endeavour to verify that conclusion under his fifth proposition, which is the following:—

"Christ's proper kingdom is already in being ; commencing formally on his ascension to the right hand of God, and continuing unchanged, both in character and form, until the final judgment."—P. 130.

His treatment of this subject is marked by the same characteristics as his previous discussions : the total irrelevance or total misrepresentation of his proof texts, the assumption of the positions he is to demonstrate, the substitution of assertion in place of argument, and a haughty and scornful rejection or disregard of passages that contradict his views as having no reference to the subject. He commences by alleging passages to prove that Christ's kingdom is already in existence. The point at issue, however, is not whether his kingdom is now in being, but whether the form in which it now exists, is the only form it is ever to bear ; or whether it is hereafter to receive another that is to be far more glorious, efficient, and enduring. It does not follow from the fact that Christ's kingdom is now in being, that it is never to assume any other form, any more than it follows from the fact that God instituted a government over the race in Paradise, that that dispensation was never superseded by another ; or the fact that he instituted the religion of animal sacrifices after the fall, proves that he could never appoint a different sacrifice and institute a different religion. Instead, the Scriptures teach that Christ's kingdom is to subsist in two forms : the first, that in which it was instituted at his ascension—the peculiarity of which is that he reigns in heaven, and exerts an administration under which the means of salvation are made efficacious to but a small portion of the race ; his truth is left to struggle with its enemies, mankind are allowed under limited restraints and counteractive agencies to manifest their alienation in every possible shape, perverting his religion, rejecting its blessings, denying its truth, disregarding its sanctions, persecuting his people, instituting false worship, paying their homage to false gods and false saviours, and showing, in every conceivable mode, that they are in truth such beings as they are contemplated in his redemptive work ; and under which, on the other hand, those whom he sanctifies are put to a severe trial, and made to show, by the most decisive tests, that they are truly changed, and have

indubitably become his children : by which displays of the two great classes into which mankind are divided, all the facts on which the work of redemption is founded are verified, and a visible demonstration furnished to the universe of the reality of the grounds on which he is to assign rewards to those who live under this dispensation, and conduct the administration that is to follow.

But this method of administering his kingdom is to be superseded by another, in which, instead of reigning in heaven, he is to reign visibly on earth. At the period of its institution, he is to be invested with the dominion of the earth in a new relation, and is to come in the clouds, destroy the antichristian powers who now usurp his throne and pervert his religion, raise those who have died in the faith from the grave, invest them with regal and sacerdotal power, and give them to reign with him on the earth ; change the believers who are living from mortal to immortality, and free them from all the forms of the curse brought on them by the fall of the first pair ; banish Satan from the earth, that he may not delude the race ; convert the Gentile nations ; restore the Israelites to their national land, and reinstate them in their relation to God as his peculiar people ; give new revelations for the instruction of the race ; renew the earth in fruitfulness and beauty ; and, in this altered form, reign and carry on the work of redemption through the vast circuit of ages denoted by the symbolical period of a thousand years. That the Scriptures, interpreted by the legitimate laws of language and symbols, represent that he is to exercise these two modes of administration ; and that it is the last eminently and emphatically which they denominate his kingdom, is indisputable ; and it is this which Mr. Brown denies and attempts to disprove.

“ When it is said that Christ's kingdom will continue in its *present form*, from the period of his ascension onwards until the final judgment, — what is meant is, that its *external administration will continue the same*, that its constitution, structure, organic form will remain unaltered, that no new economical arrangements or change of *dispensation* will be introduced from the commencement to the close of its earthly career.”
—P. 132.

What now must Mr. Brown demonstrate, in order to verify

his proposition ? Not, simply, that Christ is now exalted to the throne of the universe, and conducting the work of redemption. That is not the question at issue ; nor has it any relation to it whatever. That Christ now reigns in heaven, no one denies. That he is now saving mankind, no one disputes. Yet, Mr. B., throughout his long and pompous argument, merely alleges passages that announce the fact that Christ *now* reigns ; and saves men ! Not a word is produced that shows that he is not hereafter to descend and reign on the earth, and over men in the body ; raise the dead to reign with him, change the living saints to immortal, convert the nations to obedience, and rule them in grace and peace through the period denoted by the millennium. The whole point in debate is, in his usual manner, assumed and asserted without a shadow of evidence. He takes no notice whatever of the passages which treat of Christ's reign on the earth, and the peculiarities of his kingdom in the form it is then to assume ! He utters not a syllable to show that there are no predictions in the Scriptures that he is to exercise such an administration ! This will be seen from his proof texts. The first which he offers is the following :—

“David, being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him that of the fruit of his loins according to the flesh, he would raise the Messiah to sit on his throne, foreseeing, he spake of the resurrection of Christ that his soul should not be left in hades, nor his flesh see corruption. This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses. Therefore being exalted at the right hand of God, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this which ye now see and hear. For David is not ascended into the heavens ; but he himself said, the Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou at my right hand, until I make thy foes thy footstool. Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly that God has made that same Jesus both Lord and Christ.”—Acts ii. 29–36.

Here is a mere announcement, that David knowing that of his posterity the Messiah was to be born to sit on his throne, had spoken prophetically of his resurrection from the dead, and that God had accordingly raised Jesus from the dead, and that being exalted at God's right hand, and having received the promised Spirit, by whose power the miracles just witnessed were wrought, he was assuredly both Lord and Messiah. There is neither an assertion nor implication that Christ is

for ever to reign in heaven, or is never to establish his throne on the earth. It is perfectly consistent with it, therefore, that he should descend, and here exercise the sovereignty *του κοσμου*—of the world, during his millennial sway.

Mr. Brown, however, contends and asserts with more than his usual impatience and dogmatism, that it exhibits Christ as actually seated *on the throne of David*, and he makes it, under that pretence, the ground of the inference that it is the only throne he is ever to occupy. Among the disqualifications which Mr. B. reveals on almost every page of his work for the task he has undertaken, one of the most obvious is the want of a critical acquaintance with the original language of the New Testament. He is, if not essentially ignorant, at least altogether regardless of its peculiar usage. Not a solitary instance occurs in the course of his volume, of a careful analysis of a proof text, and clear and demonstrative evolution of its philological meaning. Instead, the mere occurrence in a passage in the English version of *the name or term* which denotes the principal subject of his proposition, no matter what the exegetical meaning of the expression is, is usually the reason of his employing it as a proof. Of this we have already pointed out several examples. Thus, to prove a completeness of the *number* of the church, he uses expressions that denote a completeness of its *character*. To demonstrate that Christ's intercessions are to cease, he employs passages which exhibit him *as interceding* and *as for ever to intercede*. To show that the influences of the Spirit are to be discontinued, he alleges predictions and promises *of the gift of his influences*; the *words*, unblamable, intercede, spirit, irrespective of their connexion, being the sole media of his argument; while the affirmations themselves in which they occur, though presenting a direct confutation of his constructions, are overlooked by him, or set at defiance. His exposition of the passage under consideration is an example of this method of proving his proposition. He says :

" Here it is stated as explicitly as words could do it, that the promise to David of Messiah's succession to his throne *has received* its intended accomplishment; that God *HAS* raised up Christ to *sit upon that throne in the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus* as the fruit of David's loins,

to the right hand of power, and that his first exercise of regal authority from the throne of ISRAEL, was to send down the Spirit, as had that day been done."

"Pre-millennialists scout the notion of Christ's now sitting on David's throne, and ask a great many questions as to the points of analogy between the throne on which sat the humble son of Jesse, in the midst of his subjects in Palestine, and the celestial seat of the Redeemer's present power. *One is pained at the flippancy with which these questions are sometimes put, and the gross principles on which the point is decided.* In whatever sense the seat of Christ's present rule is termed *David's throne*, the fact I venture to say is *indisputable*. THAT CHRIST IS NOW ON DAVID'S THRONE is as clearly affirmed by Peter in this sermon, as words could do it. Let any one read his words again, and see if it be possible to make anything else out of them."—Pp. 138, 139.

Mr. Brown is led into this extraordinary error by assuming that in the expression in the common version, "he would raise up Christ to sit on his throne," the verb translated "raise up" denotes, as it does in the expression "God hath raised up Jesus," *his resurrection from the dead*; and it is on that that he builds his conclusion that the throne to which Christ was then exalted, was the throne of David! No more inexcusable mistake, however, could have been made. Though the verb in the original is the same, the meaning in the two cases is shown by the connexion to be wholly different. In the last only it signifies his resurrection from the dead; in the former it denotes his *birth*. There is no fact more indisputable than that, in Hebrew usage, the phrase ἐκ καρποῦ τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ τὸ κατὰ σάρκα ἀναστήσεν, means simply, to rise, or be born of his posterity. The oath to David, accordingly, was an oath that the Messiah should, as a man, be born of his posterity, to sit on his throne. The verb is used in the same sense both in the Septuagint of the original promise to David—ἀναστήσει σπέρμα—where the use of σπέρμα, seed, determines the meaning; and in Matt. xxii. 24, "His brother shall marry his wife, ἀναστήσει σπέρμα, and raise seed to his brother." Would Mr. B. maintain that the object of the second marriage was, that offspring—of which there was none in existence—might be raised from the dead to the deceased brother? Such a construction would be an exact parallel to the false sense he puts on the oath to David, and makes

the ground of his confident assertion that the throne to which Christ was exalted at his resurrection from the dead, is the throne of David! We do not flatter ourselves that this exposure of his error will for a moment disconcert him, or detract in the least from his self-confidence or dogmatism. He obviously has not the nature that is requisite to appreciate the discredit of such a blunder. We cannot but hope, however, that it may impress those who have inconsiderately commended him as able and reliable, with the indiscretion of giving their sanction to so superficial and inaccurate an author.

As there is no reference in the oath to David to the resurrection from the dead, there is no ground in it for the assumption that the throne to which Christ was exalted on his ascent to heaven, is the throne of David. Mr. Brown's assertion that that is affirmed in the passage is, accordingly, altogether gratuitous. It does not follow from the promise that the Messiah is to sit on David's throne, that the throne of the Almighty to which he ascended after his resurrection, is the throne of that prince.

The supposition, moreover, that the throne of God in heaven is David's throne, is obnoxious to insuperable objections on theological grounds. David, as the apostle testifies in this passage, has not ascended to heaven. He is not the monarch of the universe. He has none of the prerogatives of God. But to represent the throne on which Christ now reigns as his throne, is to ascribe to him the incommunicable rights and prerogatives of Jehovah, and exhibit him as the monarch of the universe, and the object to all creatures of worship—a deification of him far more lofty and blasphemous than that which is involved in the ascription of God's prerogatives to the wild beast, which is in the Apocalypse exhibited as equivalent to a worship; or in the usurpation of the divine rights by the man of sin, which is treated as a self-deification. *They* claim the throne and rights of God only in *this world*. Mr. Brown ascribes to David the throne and prerogatives of Jehovah as the ruler of *the universe*. It is in direct contradiction also to Paul's representation that the throne to which Christ is exalted in heaven, is "*far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is*

named not only in this age, but also in that which is to come."—Eph. i. 21. It cannot be the throne of Israel, therefore ; for that is one of the powers and names that is named in this age. Such is the discreditable issue of his first argument.

His next proof text, still more inapt, merely announces that Christ shall sit and rule upon his throne, and shall be a priest upon his throne. It presents no indication whatever that it is to be the throne of the universe, or that it is not to be on the earth. "Behold the man whose name is The Branch ; and he shall grow up out of his place, and he shall build the temple of the Lord ; even he shall build the temple of the Lord, and he shall bear the glory, and he shall sit and rule upon his throne, and he shall be a priest upon his throne, and the counsel of peace shall be between them both."—Zech. vi. 12, 13. Here is clearly nothing but the fact that Christ is to sit and rule on his throne, and be a prince on his throne, that Mr. Brown can make the ground of the inference that the throne on which he now sits is the throne of David. There is no affirmation to that effect. There is no intimation that the throne referred to, on which he is to sit, is at the right hand of the Majesty on high. Mr. B., accordingly, in his usual manner, takes for granted the point he was to prove. That construction is, moreover, forbidden by the consideration that the throne promised to the Messiah as the descendant of David, was not the throne of the universe, but the throne of Israel. The Branch, is the title of Christ as the offshoot of the root of Jesse. The throne on which it was promised he should sit as David's heir, was David's throne, which was on earth, not the throne of Jehovah in heaven. If the throne to which this prophecy refers, then, is David's throne, as it doubtless is, it is a throne on earth and in Jerusalem, not the throne of the Majesty on high, to which Christ ascended after his resurrection. It is truly unfortunate that Mr. B. is not able to see the incongruity of ascribing the throne of Jehovah to a creature that needs redemption ; that he regards it as an offensive "flippancy" to ask how such a deification of a human being, stained with guilt, is not, like all other ascriptions of God's throne and prerogatives to creatures, a violation of his rights, and a detraction from his sanctity.

His next quotation is equally irrelevant to his purpose. It does not even exhibit Christ as seated on his throne; but merely as standing in front of the throne of the Father, within the circle of the elders. "And I beheld, and lo! *ἐν μέσῳ*, before the throne and the living creatures, and *ἐν μέσῳ*, before the elders—that is, between the throne and the elders—stood a Lamb, as it had been slain."—Rev. v. 6. Is there any proof in this visionary spectacle that Christ is not to reign on the earth? Is there any other inference that Mr. B. might not with equal propriety employ it to sustain? In what other way could he more decisively indicate the utter hopelessness of his attempts, than that he resorts to such expedients to demonstrate his proposition? He exults over it, however, as a most decisive confirmation of his views. He finds in it the word *throne*, which is used in the promise to David, and in his usual way assumes from that fact, that the passage presents the requisite proof of the proposition which he professes to establish by it! "One is" disgusted "with the flippancy" with which he thus begs what he affects to prove.

The passage he next offers is still less to his purpose. He says:—

"That the Redeemer himself identifies his present sway with *the Davidical Rule*, is clear from the following words of his epistle to the church of Philadelphia:—

" 'These things saith he that is holy, he that is true, HE THAT HATH THE KEY OF DAVID, *he that openeth and no man shutteth, and shutteth and no man openeth* : I know thy works : Behold, I have set before thee an open door, and no man can shut it : Him that overcometh, will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out.'—Rev. iii. 7, 8, 12.

"These words are evidently taken from Isaiah xxii. 22, where the Lord tells Shebna, 'who was over the house,' but had, by his base intromission, brought the royal house to the brink of ruin, that he would call his servant Eliakim, and would clothe him with his robe, and strengthen him with his girdle, and would *commit the government into his hands*. And he added, *THE KEY OF THE HOUSE OF DAVID WILL I LAY UPON HIS SHOULDER : SO HE SHALL OPEN AND NONE SHALL SHUT, AND HE SHALL SHUT AND NONE SHALL OPEN*. When Christ, therefore, claims to have the key of David's house, so as to open and shut it at will, his meaning clearly is, that he has that antitypical authority in David's house

which Eliakim's robe, girdle, and key, faintly shadowed forth ; that he is now exercising this power of ' the key ' as he did to the Philadelphian church, when in opposition to a party ' calling themselves Jews when they were not, but did lie,' and who had denied the claim of those faithful Philadelphians to a church-standing, he says, ' Behold, I have set before you an open door, and no man can shut it.' But if Christ is now using ' the key of the house of David ' in his administration of the church, then *that house of David*—as Christ is ruler in it at least—*can be none other than the church of the Living God, under the Redeemer's regal administration.*"—Pp. 143, 144.

This is, perhaps, the most plausible argument in the whole series he offers to sustain his propositions. That it is altogether fallacious, however, and that the passage, on the supposition that it is genuine, confutes instead of sustaining his conclusion, will soon appear.

There are strong reasons to believe that $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \Delta\alpha\beta\iota\delta$ is a false reading substituted for $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\upsilon$, or $\theta\alpha\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\upsilon$. Four manuscripts are mentioned by Griesbach as reading $\acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\upsilon$ in place of $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \Delta\alpha\beta\iota\delta$. There are variations also in the reading of $\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega$, some manuscripts having $\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\delta\alpha$. It is not improbable that the resembling text of Isaiah having been placed at first in the margin as a parallel, $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \Delta\alpha\beta\iota\delta$ was, by accident or design, substituted by a transcriber for $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\upsilon$, or $\theta\alpha\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\omicron\upsilon$. That there is an error in the text, is indicated by the article prefixed to $\Delta\alpha\beta\iota\delta$. Had $\Delta\alpha\beta\iota\delta$ been originally used, the article would have been omitted, as may be seen from chap. v. 5, xxii. 16, and the usage generally of the New Testament.

This is confirmed by the consideration that all the characteristics and prerogatives of Christ enumerated at the commencement of the other letters to the churches, are taken from the attributes, offices, and symbols ascribed to him in the vision of the first chapter. Thus the first, " he that holdeth the seven stars and walketh in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks," is drawn from chap. i. 13, 16 ; the second, " the first and the last, who was dead and is alive," from i. 17, 18 ; the third, " he that hath a sharp sword with two edges," from i. 16 ; the fourth, " the Son of God who hath his eyes like a flame of fire, and his feet like fine brass," from i. 14, 15 ; the fifth, " he that hath the seven Spirits of God, and the seven stars," from i. 4, 16 ; and the seventh, " the Amen, the faith-

ful and true Witness, the head of the creation of God," from i. 5, 8. If the key of David, then, is the true reading, this is the only characteristic or badge that is not taken from the description in the first chapter; and, on the other hand, if *ἀδελφῶν*, or *ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἀδελφῶν*, be not the true reading, that is the only characteristic given of him in the first chapter, that is not repeated in the letters to the churches. As it is one of his most peculiar and important prerogatives, it seems altogether unlikely that it would have been overlooked in such an enumeration of his attributes and offices as the ruler and judge of men.

And, finally, that *Δαδὶδ* is not the true reading, is indicated by the consideration that the key of David *was not a badge of David himself, nor of royalty, but instead of the chamberlain or steward of his palace*, as is seen from Isaiah xxii. 15-22, from which *τοῦ Δαδὶδ* was, doubtless, introduced into this passage. To suppose it was here used as a badge of Christ, is to suppose that he exhibited himself as a subordinate of the monarch of Israel, and of a very unauthoritative rank, instead of the monarch himself; as a mere steward of his household, in whom his subjects at large had little interest, instead of the Lord of the world of the dead, which is one of his most peculiar and essential prerogatives, and of the utmost interest to all his subjects. This alone is a sufficient proof that the received reading is erroneous. There is no characteristic of the Apocalypse more conspicuous than the perfect harmony of all its delineations of Christ, with the dignity and grandeur of his attributes and acts as the King of kings and Lord of lords, the Almighty monarch and judge of the world. It is characteristic also of all the other Scriptures. If this passage was, as originally written, an exception, it is the only one, not only in the Apocalypse, but in the Bible.

Should it be thought, however, that this present reading should be retained, and taken as the true text, the consideration last mentioned, nevertheless, confutes the construction placed on it by Mr. Brown, and overturns his argument from it. As the key of David was not a badge of David himself, nor of the regal office, nor the house of David the Israelitish nation, but simply his palace or residence; his palace cannot, as Mr. Brown assumes, denote the church, nor can the posses-

sion of the key signify the government of the church. Whatever the badge may, in fact, denote, it cannot indicate any prerogative or agency of Christ as King, administering the government of the church at large. A subordinate station cannot represent one that is supreme; a limited office cannot denote one that is universal; the control of the property and menials of a palace cannot represent the moral administration of the church of all nations and all ages.

Indisputably mistaken, however, as Mr. Brown's application of the passage is, he yet proceeds, on the ground of his construction of it, to allege Isaiah ix. 8, in which it is predicted that the government shall be upon Christ's shoulder, and shall increase upon the throne of David, as proving that that throne is his throne in heaven.

"In this view of Christ's having 'the key of the house of David laid upon his shoulder,' can it for a moment be doubted that we have the true and only sense of that sublime prophecy of him by Isaiah, . . . 'and THE GOVERNMENT SHALL BE UPON HIS SHOULDER' as the supreme ruler of the church? And if this be the sense, it determines the meaning of 'the throne of David' in the next verse beyond all question.

"'Unto us a child is born,' unto us a son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, UPON THE THRONE OF DAVID AND UPON HIS KINGDOM to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever. The zeal of the Lord of Hosts shall perform this.'

"In understanding this of the administration of Jesus in the church—in the *sovereignty* and the *grace* of it, the *righteousness*, the *progress*, and the *perpetuity* of it—we would appeal to the reader whether we have not given a sense equally sound and soul satisfying, which a patient comparison of Scripture with Scripture will only the more confirm, and in which the heart can repose with evergrowing contentment."
—P. 144.

This is the style in which Mr. Brown often concludes his arguments. Having assumed the whole point he affects to establish, he then *appeals to his reader* whether he has not given a satisfactory exposition of his proof text, and amply demonstrated his position! What a convenient method of

reaching "a sound and soul satisfying" conclusion! As, however, the key of David was not a badge of David himself, but of an officer of his household, it cannot denote Christ's possession of regal authority; and cannot, therefore, be an equivalent to the prediction that the government shall be upon his shoulder. That ground of regarding the throne on which Christ now reigns as the throne of David, being thus altogether mistaken, Mr. B. has nothing to sustain him but the fact, that the government of Christ, which the passage foreshows is to increase for ever, is to be exercised upon the throne of David, and over his kingdom. But that renders it indisputable that it is a throne on earth, and in Jerusalem, not the throne of the universe in heaven. David's throne was a throne in Judea, not the throne of God in the heavens. His kingdom was the kingdom of Israel in Palestine, not the kingdom Christ now sways, which embraces all worlds and all beings. There is no law of language by which the passage can have the extraordinary meaning Mr. B. ascribes to it. The expression, "of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even for ever," is strictly literal. No figure whatever occurs in it. Mr. Brown cannot prove or furnish the faintest probability that the throne of David means the throne of the Almighty in heaven, unless he can produce a passage of Scripture that specifically affirms it. But he can allege no such passage, nor anything approaching it. The proposition is an infinite solecism, and confutes itself. It is, in fact, an ascription of the rights and prerogatives of Jehovah to David, and is in effect a deification of him.

As the passage is thus strictly literal, instead of supporting, it confutes Mr. Brown's whole scheme. Were it taught in no other passage, this would place it beyond debate that Christ is yet to reign on the earth, and over the kingdom of Israel. He has not hitherto exercised a government on David's throne and over his kingdom. The government which the prediction ascribes to him, is, therefore, still future. As the throne is a real throne, Christ must be personally present to reign on it; and as David's kingdom is a real

kingdom, and its subjects real subjects and Israelites, they must be Israelites, and in the body, over whom Christ is to reign. The subjects of David's kingdom were not disembodied spirits, nor risen saints. They were Israelites in the earthly body. As his government is to increase for ever, they are for ever to continue, and in the body, to be his subjects. The time from which the increase of his government and peace is to commence, is the time of its institution, which is yet future. If Mr. Brown is aware of any law of language by which any other sense can be ascribed to the prediction, let him produce it.

He next alleges Acts iii. 13-15, in which Christ is denominated the prince or author of life, and is declared to have been raised from the dead and glorified by the Father. "The God of our fathers hath glorified his Son Jesus. . . . Ye denied the holy one and the just, and killed the Prince of life whom God hath raised up from the dead, whereof we are witnesses." Is there any other passage that he might not as well have quoted to prove that Christ's throne in heaven is the throne of David, and that the administration he is now exercising is to continue to the final judgment? Christ's resurrection and exaltation surely do not demonstrate that the throne of the Majesty on High is the throne of David. That he is ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς—the chief, or author of life, that is, the restorer of the life forfeited at the fall, by the resurrection of the dead and the change of the living, is certainly no proof that he is not to change his present administration, under which death still passes upon all, and introduce another, which he is to conduct in person, on the earth. Were ever such means before employed to prove such a proposition?

His next proof-text, happily, has a direct relation to the subject, and presents an unanswerable confutation of his whole doctrine.

"Repent ye therefore, and be converted in order to the blotting out of your sins, when times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord; and he shall send to you the preordained Messiah, Jesus, whom the heavens must receive, until the times of the restitution of all of which God has spoken by the mouth of all the prophets from the beginning."—Acts iii. 19-21.

"Whether we understand the restitution here meant, of a *moral* or a

physical restitution, or *both*, considered as the burden of all Old Testament prophecy, and requiring complete accomplishment ere Christ can come—the words of the apostle are clearly subversive of a *millennial state after Christ comes*.”—Pp. 147, 148.

There is thus in the passage he cites, an express announcement that there is to be a limit to Christ's continuance in the heavens, and that he is again to be sent to the Israelites; and that the time of his coming is to be the time of the restitution of all which God has foretold by all the prophets from the commencement of their national history. What then is the restitution of all that God has foretold by the prophets? The answer is, the restoration of the Israelites to their covenant relation as God's people, the deliverance of the sanctified from death and mortality the penalty of sin, and the earth from the curse of barrenness and disorder; and God's visible manifestation of himself to men. This is apparent from the import of *ἀποκατάστασις*, translated restitution, which literally denotes *a restoration to a former state*. It is not a conversion of the Gentiles therefore, for that would not be a restoration to a former condition. It is a return of the Israelites to their national land, and re-adoption as God's people; a restoration of the holy dead to life, and of living believers to the immortality forfeited by the first pair; a renovation of the earth from the curse to which it was subjected by their apostasy; and the visible manifestation of God to the race, and communication to them of his will;—as these several events are predicted by the prophets as to be contemporaneous, and parts of the great system of measures that is to distinguish that new administration of the world. All these will be a restitution of what had existed before; and had been set aside by the revolt first of the first pair, and subsequently of the Israelites. The first of these especially is predicted by Moses, Deut. xxx.; 2 Sam. vii. 10; David, Ps. ii.; Isaiah lxvi. 18–24; Jeremiah xxx. 1–22; Ezekiel, xxvi.; Daniel xii.; Hosea iii. 4–15; Joel iii.; Amos ix. 11; Micah iv.; Zeph. iii.; Zech. x.–xiv.; Malachi, iii. 1–6; and the others by several of them, especially Isaiah and Ezekiel.

The millennium is, accordingly, to follow this restitution, not to precede it. The conversion of the nations, and the reign

of righteousness and peace are everywhere exhibited as contemporaneous with, and following the restoration of the Israelites, not as preceding it. It is in the last days, when the Lord's house is established on the top of the mountains, that all the Gentiles are to flow unto it, the word of the Lord is to go forth from Jerusalem, and the nations are to beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks, and learn war no more.—Isaiah ii. It is when Christ begins to judge the weak in righteousness, to do justice to the meek of the earth, to slay the wicked with the breath of his lips,—which is to be at his coming—and to set his hand to gather the remnant of his people from their dispersion; that the earth is to be filled with the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea, and the wolf is to dwell with the lamb, and the leopard lie down with the kid.—Isaiah xi.

That the apostle had a special reference to their restoration is indicated by his appeal to the prophets who had uttered predictions and promises that had a direct relation to them. Thus the promise recorded by Moses, which he first quotes, was made expressly to the Israelites. "For Moses truly said unto *the fathers*: a prophet shall the Lord your God raise unto you of your brethren, like unto me; Him shall ye hear in all things whatsoever he shall say unto you. And it shall come to pass that every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be destroyed from among the people." As this is alleged to confirm his announcement of a mission of Christ, and a restitution that were then future, it implies that Christ is personally to reveal himself to the Israelites, and give them new revelations of his will. He adds: "Yea, and all the prophets from Samuel"—who announced the oath of God to David, that the throne and kingdom of his offspring should be established for ever, and the final and everlasting settlement of the Israelites in their land,—2 Sam. vii. 7-16—"and those that follow after as many as have spoken, have likewise foretold these days,"—of restitution. "Ye are the children of the prophets, and of the covenant which God made with our fathers, saying unto Abraham, and in thy seed shall all the kindreds of the earth be blessed." This indicates both that the Israelites are, as God's covenant people, to be the special subjects of the restitution; and that the time at which it is to

take place, is to be the time when all nations are to become partakers of salvation.

That Christ's coming is to be at the commencement of the times of this restitution, not, as Mr. B. represents, at its close, is taught most explicitly in the passage itself. His continuance in heaven is to terminate at the commencement of the times of the restitution. The heavens must retain him *until* the times of the restitution. No language can be more specific, or more effectually contravene Mr. Brown's representation, that it requires the "*complete accomplishment, ere Christ can come,*" "of all Old Testament prophecy." He might as well claim that Christ's command to the apostles to tarry at Jerusalem *εως* till they were endowed with power from on high, was a command to continue there till the period of their possessing that power had expired; and that his statement that the inhabitants of the ancient world eat and drank, married and were given in marriage, *αχς* until Noah entered into the ark, and the flood came and destroyed them all, is a statement that they eat and drank, married and were betrothed, until the period of the flood had wholly passed. What beautiful exemplifications of his perspicacity as a critic, and reliableness as a logician! The passage thus teaches in the most express and emphatic manner, that Christ's continuance in the heavens is to terminate at the commencement of the times of restitution; that that restitution is to include as one of its conspicuous elements the restoration of the Israelites; and is to be followed by their everlasting occupation of their national country; and that it is to be contemporaneous with the other great events assigned by the prophets to the same period, the resurrection of the holy dead, the change of living believers to immortal, the conversion of the Gentiles, the renovation of the earth, and the gift to the race of new revelations.

He next offers Acts ix. 25-28, in which Ps. ii. 1, 2, is applied by the apostles to the conspiracy of Pilate, the Gentiles, and the people of Israel against Christ at his trial and crucifixion; and avers that they apply *the whole Psalm* "beyond all contradiction," to Christ's *present sovereignty and rule in the heavens.*" As usual, however, he is altogether mistaken.

... "Why do nations rage, and the people imagine vain things; the kings of the earth set themselves, and rulers consult together against Jehovah, and against his anointed. For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done."

The proposition Mr. Brown attempts to prove by this passage is not only that Christ's kingdom is already in being, but that it is to continue "unchanged both in character and form till the last judgment;" that "its administration," "constitution," and "structure," will remain unaltered; and that "no new economical arrangements or change of *dispensation* will be introduced from the commencement to the close of its earthly career." What proof of it, however, is there here? The apostles merely quote that part of the Psalm which exhibits the nations as raging, and the kings and rulers as taking counsel against Christ. They do not represent any of its other predictions as already accomplished, such as the inauguration of Christ as king on the hill of Zion, the gift to him of the Gentile nations as his inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth as his possession, and his breaking them in pieces with an iron rod, and dashing them as a potter's vessel. There is no intimation that the raging of the nations, and the conspiracies of the kings and rulers against Christ, had terminated, or was speedily to terminate. For aught that is foreshown in the Psalm, they were to continue as they in fact *have* for ages. The apostles indeed show that they contemplated their continuance; for they prayed, not that Christ would immediately interpose, and crush his foes by his irresistible power, but that he would grant them,—notwithstanding the opposition of the rulers—to speak his word with boldness, and verify it by signs and wonders. The inauguration of Christ as king of Zion, and the gift to him of the Gentiles universally as his inheritance, are exhibited as taking place after the nations had raged, and the kings and rulers conspired against him; and for aught that appears in the prediction, they might be at the distance of ages. Neither the passage therefore quoted by the apostles, nor the other part of the Psalm, presents the slightest proof that the administration instituted by Christ on his ascension, is to continue un-

changed to the end of his kingdom. Instead, it expressly declares that after the nations have raged, and conspired against him, and attempted to free themselves from his dominion, and while they are continuing the attempt, God is to announce to them in his wrath, that he has constituted his king on Zion his holy hill, and is to declare the decree by which he is to have dominion over all nations, and is to dash them to pieces as a potter's vessel; and the period of that inauguration and investiture with the dominion of the earth, and punishment of the nations, is expressly assigned in the vision, Dan. vii. 9-14, to the time of the judgment and destruction of the antichristian rulers of the fourth monarchy, which is yet future. His reception of the sovereignty of the earth is assigned also in the Apocalypse to the times of the seventh trumpet, when he is to descend from heaven with the armies of the saints, and destroy the wild beast and false prophet. Such is the result of his attempt to verify his theory by that passage.

He next alleges a text that is altogether irrelevant to his proposition; as it simply announces that God has exalted Christ as a Chief and Saviour. "The God of our fathers raised Jesus, whom ye put to death, hanging on a tree. Him hath God exalted at his right hand a Prince and Saviour, to give repentance and remission of sins."—Acts v. 30, 31. What proof is there here that Christ is to continue his present mode of administration to the last judgment? Mr. Brown manifestly regards the exaltation of Christ to the right hand of the Majesty on high, as a demonstration that he is for ever to reign there; which is directly taking for granted the point he affects to prove.

He founds his last and most confident argument on a class of passages which teach that Christ is to reign at the right hand of God, till his foes are made his footstool. The first are:

Ps. cx. i. "Jehovah said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool;" and Acts ii. 34, 35, in which that is quoted.

Heb. x. 11, 12. "This man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, sat down in continuance at the right hand of God, from thenceforth expecting till his enemies be made his footstool.

1 Corinth. xv. 24-26. "Afterward, the last band [shall rise from the dead], when he shall deliver the sovereignty to God even the Father, when he *shall have*

put down ALL rule, and ALL authority and power; for he must reign till he has put ALL enemies under his feet."

"These passages afford abundant materials for settling the whole question of Christ's kingdom."—Pp. 152, 153.

He assumes, accordingly, that they show, "beyond all contradiction," that he is to reign in heaven, till *all* his enemies are subdued, and he delivers to the Father the sovereignty he exercises during that reign. As usual, however, he is wholly in error. In the first place, he omits to notice the distinction between Christ's foes, who are mentioned, Psalm cx. i., Acts ii. 34, 35, Heb. x. 11, 12, and *all* enemies, whoever they are, *exercising rule, authority, and power*, mentioned 1 Corinth. xv. 24–26. Who, then, are the foes and enemies designated in the former? They are undoubtedly human beings solely, the nations, peoples, kings, and rulers, enumerated Ps. ii., who rage, take counsel against him, and endeavor to free themselves from his dominion. This is indicated in Ps. cx. The verse that follows the command, "Sit thou at my right hand, till I make thy foes thy footstool," exhibits him as to rule at Jerusalem, and among his enemies; and represents these enemies, like those of Ps. ii., as Gentile nations and kings.

"The Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool. The Lord will send the rod of thy strength—the rod of chastisement—*out of Zion*; rule thou in the midst of thine enemies. Thy people—the Israelites—are free-will offerings in the day of thy power, in the beauties of holiness; from the womb of the morning thou hast the dew of thy youth;"—that is, they are voluntarily to submit to his sceptre at the opening of his millennial reign, not to be subdued, like his Gentile enemies, by avenging judgments. "The Lord hath sworn and will not repent, Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedek. The Lord at thy right hand shall strike through *kings* in the day of his wrath. He shall judge among *the nations*; he shall fill with dead bodies; he shall wound the *head*—the chiefs—over many countries."—V. 1–6.

These are human beings exclusively, and the antichristian powers, undoubtedly, who are to be destroyed at his coming, and whose destruction is exhibited, Dan. vii. 9–14, as immediately preceding his investiture with the dominion of the earth, and institution of the kingdom of the saints—and, also, Zechariah xiv., Joel iii., and Rev. xix. The conquest, however, of these enemies will not necessarily involve the subjec-

tion of *all* his foes. Who, then, are his other enemies, who are to be put under his feet at the resurrection of the last band of the dead? We have the answer, Rev. xx. They are the nations who are to be excited to revolt after Satan's release at the end of the thousand years; the unholy dead, who are then to be raised and judged; Satan himself, who is then to be consigned to eternal punishment; and finally, death, the last enemy, which is then to be abolished. The fact, therefore, that Christ is to reign in heaven till the time of the destruction of the usurping kings and hostile nations, who oppose the institution of his kingdom on the earth, is no proof whatever that he is not to descend to the earth and reign in person over that kingdom, during the thousand years which are to precede the destruction of the other class of his foes.

In the next place, the exaltation of Christ at the right hand of the Majesty on High, denotes in reality, not a mere local exaltation or elevation to heaven, but rather his investiture with the sovereignty of the universe, or supreme power in heaven and on earth. Thus, his being set by the Father at his own right hand, "in the heavenly places," is described by Paul as his being exalted "far above all principality and power, and might and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this age, but in that which is to come," Eph. i. 20, 21; and as the gift to him of "a name that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, and those on earth, and those under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father," Phil. ii. 9-11, and that supreme authority over the whole empire of the Almighty, he is to exercise from the times of the restitution of things to the epoch of his delivery of the sovereignty to the Father, as well as during his continuance in heaven. *He is accordingly exhibited in the Apocalypse, in the vision of the New Jerusalem, in which God is to dwell with men during the millennium, as exercising his authority at the right hand of the Father.* Thus "the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple" of the New Jerusalem, Rev. xxi. 22; "The throne of God and the Lamb are to be in it," and its "pure river of water of life" is to proceed "out of

the throne of God and the Lamb," Rev. xxii. 1, 2. And finally, in harmony with this, the delivery of the kingdom or sovereignty to the Father, which is to take place after the resurrection of the last band of the dead, and subjection of *all* his enemies, is the surrendering to the Father of that supreme authority over the whole universe of creatures, in distinction from his dominion over this world. This is indicated by the fact that the dominion with which he is to be invested at his second coming, over all people, nations, and languages, is to be an everlasting dominion that shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed, Dan. vii. 14. As his dominion over this world is never to be relinquished, and the only other dominion with which he is invested is the sovereignty of other worlds, it is clear that the sovereignty he is to restore to the Father after the judgment of the last band raised from the dead, is the sovereignty of other worlds. "These passages," thus, in truth, "afford abundant materials for settling the whole question of Christ's kingdom;" but they settle it by confuting Mr. Brown's proposition, and establishing the great fact which he alleges them to overthrow.

Such is the mode in which Mr. Brown treats the question respecting the future kingdom of Christ. In regard to other there is a greater number of quotations, and a more elaborate revelation to quote the required truth on any other he discusses. Yet not one of the passages which show that he is to return from heaven and reign on the earth, is mentioned, with the exception of Acts ii. 19-21, Isa. li. ix. 6, 7, and Zech. vi. 12-13, which he totally omits to use. Instead of seeking any exact interpretation of the chief texts that relate to the subject, he uses them without as that God has revealed, trusting that he discovers in use from endeavoring to establish the conclusions since seen that the coming of Jehovah

he declares is the coming of Christ. He gathers the whole series of passages which he alleges to support it, and then uses it as though it were demonstrated to set aside the objections to show the truth of the Sacred Word when it is fulfilled. What such a course really is to be taken by a man in the advocacy of a demonstrable truth?

Does not such a course indicate a mind warped from impartiality

enthralled by the power of a false idea, and resolved to sustain it at all hazards?

We shall resume the notice of his work in the next number.

ART. II.—A DESIGNATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE FIGURES
OF ISAIAH, CHAPTERS XI. AND XII.

CHAPTER XI.

THE exhibition of a prince of the house of David as a shoot from the root of Jesse, with which the prediction commences, was suggested probably by the figure at the close of the tenth chapter, by which the Assyrian monarch and his army are represented as the forest of Lebanon. Though in number, strength, and magnificence, they were like the trees of that mountain, they were to be felled by the Almighty at one stroke. On the other hand, though the house of David was to be divested of its power, and like the stump of a tree that has long been cut down, seem on the point of extinction, the great personage was at length to be born of it who had already been predicted as the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, who should re-gather the tribes of Israel from their dispersion, redeem the world from the curse of sin, and reign over it for ever in glory. The prophet first exhibits his descent, draws his character, and depicts his peculiarities as a king; and then describes the condition of the animal world and of mankind under his reign; foreshows the restoration of the Israelites and reconciliation of Judah and Ephraim; and finally, chapter XII., recites the song in which they are to acknowledge and celebrate God's grace to them.

1, 2, 3, 4. Metaphors in the use of shoot and branch for a descendant of Jesse, and stump and roots to denote the line of which that individual was to be born. "And there shall come forth a shoot, or sprout, from the stump of Jesse; and a branch shall grow from his roots," v. 1. The exhibition of the family of Jesse as a stump, implies that it was to be

stripped of its royal prerogatives and reduced to ruin, before the time came in which the prediction was to be accomplished. The same image is used, chap. liii. 2. "He shall grow up before him as a tender plant ; and as a root out of a dry ground." He is denominated the Branch also by several other prophets ; and the same character is given by them as by Isaiah, of his reign. "Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise up unto David a righteous Branch, and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth. In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely ; and this is the name whereby he shall be called, the Lord our Righteousness." Jeremiah xxiii. 5, 6 ; Zech. iii. 8, vi. 12. He is undoubtedly, therefore, the Messiah, and the earth is to be the scene of his reign. Some have, indeed, referred the prediction to Hezekiah ; but that prince presents no resemblance to this monarch in wisdom and righteousness ; nor did the conditions of the Israelites, the Gentile nations, or the animal tribes, during his sway, exhibit any correspondence to those that are here foretold. No restoration of the Israelites from captivity then took place, no reconciliation of Judah and Ephraim, no change of the ferocious animals to harmlessness, and no spread of the knowledge of God throughout the earth, and conversion of the Gentiles.

5. Metaphor, in the use of rest upon, to denote the perpetual presence of the Spirit,—“And the Spirit of Jehovah shall rest upon him ; the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of Jehovah,” v. 2. This Spirit of seven characteristics, comprising all the great attributes which he exerts and displays in his influences on men, and symbolized in the Apocalypse by the seven lamps and seven eyes, is to abide and co-operate with him perpetually ; not occasionally only, as with other princes of the house of David, and with the prophets.

6. Hypocatastasis. “And he shall smell—inhalé or detect the odor of things—in the fear of Jehovah,” v. 3. This unusual expression has received a variety of interpretations, and is in a degree obscure. The act of smelling is used, however, it is probable, by substitution for the act of determining

by a piercing glance, or searching scrutiny, the moral qualities of men and their actions. The nature of many material things as agreeable or offensive, healthful or hurtful, is ascertained by their scent. The exercise of that sharp and powerful sense by which the qualities of the minutest emanations from bodies are detected, is put for a corresponding exercise of a keen and delicate sensibility to moral qualities in discerning the characters of men. That this faculty of instantly and infallibly detecting their moral nature is to be exercised by him in the fear of Jehovah, is a beautiful trait. Unlike other monarchs, who are often betrayed into rashness and injustice by their great talents, he is to be as absolute in his benignity and rectitude as in his intelligence. This is indicated also by the description that follows—"And he shall not judge according to the sight of his eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of his ears. And he shall judge in righteousness the poor; and give judgment in equity to the meek of the earth," v. 3, 4. He is not to found his decisions on external appearances, nor be misled by the professions of men, but will perfectly comprehend them and judge them according to their nature.

7, 8, 9. Metaphors. "And shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and shall slay the wicked with the breath of his lips," v. 4. To smite with the tongue is to denounce or condemn, Jeremiah xviii. 18. To slay with the breath of the lips is to pronounce a sentence of death, or consign to slaughter. His tongue is elliptically called the rod of his mouth. The sense is the same as though the expression had been, He shall smite the earth with his tongue, which is the rod of his mouth. In accordance with this Christ is exhibited in the Apocalypse, xix. 15, 21, as slaying the armies of the wild beast with a sword proceeding from his mouth; and, 2 Thess. ii. 8, as consuming the Man of Sin with the breath of his mouth. It is to be at that crisis, doubtless, that he is to exert the acts here ascribed to him.

10, 11. Metaphors, in denominating righteousness and faithfulness a girdle. "And righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins," v. 5. The office of the girdle of an eastern monarch was to bind his robe to his body so as to give symmetry to his form, and render his dress compatible with freedom and dignity of motion. A

loose robe would both be ungraceful and an obstacle to ease of action. Righteousness and faithfulness are to fill an analogous office among Christ's regal attributes, uniting them all in perfect harmony and grace, and giving freedom and majesty to his acts. What a beautiful delineation of his character! He is to form his estimate of men, not from appearances and professions, but from a perfect comprehension of their nature; he shall judge and vindicate the poor and meek in uprightness, but convict and condemn the wicked; and truth and righteousness shall be as conspicuous elements of all his official actions, as the girdle is in the official dress of a magnificent monarch. These traits of his reign indicate that the period to which that part of the prophecy refers is still future. There has been no such discrimination in his providence hitherto, between the righteous and the wicked; and that it is to be in a time that is yet to come is made certain by the prediction that next follows, of the change at that period of the ferocious and poisonous animals to mildness and harmlessness.

12. Comparison of the lion in eating straw, with the ox. "And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice's den," v. 6-8. Many distinguished commentators have regarded this passage as tropical, and held that the ferocious and poisonous animals are used by a metaphor to denote men of similar natures, and that the prediction is that they shall suppress their evil passions, and live in peace and concord with the righteous, whom they suppose the domestic and tame animals represent. Thus, Theodoret says: "By gentle and ferocious creatures he expresses the different manners of men; likening a rapacious disposition to the wolf, but the mild to a lamb; and again the mixed or varying to the leopard, which is a spotted animal; but the simple and humble to the kid. So he compares to the lion the proud and imperious; the bold to the ox; and another differing from those to the calf;" and

he held that the prediction had its fulfilment in the church of the fourth century in the union of emperors, prefects, and other officers of the imperial government, with the unofficial and poor in the rites and worship of the church. Jerome also spiritualizes it in the same manner. *Cæterum juxta vivificantem spiritum facilis intelligentia est. Lupus enim Paulus qui primum persequabatur et lacerabat ecclesiam, de quo dictum est, Benjamin lupus rapax, habitavit cum agno; —vel Anania, à quo baptizatus est, vel Petro apostolo cui dictum est, Pasce agnos meos. Et pardus qui prius non mutabat varietates suas, lotus in fonte Domini accubuit cum hædo; non qui a sinistris est, sed qui immolatur in pascha Domini. Et hoc notandum quod non agnus et hædus habitent et accubent cum lupo et pardo, sed lupo et pardus agni et hædi imitentur innocentiam. Leo quoque prius ferocissimus, et ovis et vitulus pariter morabuntur. Quod quotidie cernimus in ecclesia divites et pauperes, potentes et humiles, reges atque privatos pariter commorari, et a pueris parvulis quos apostolos intelligimus et apostolicos viros, imperitos sermone, sed non scientia, regi in ecclesia.* “Interpreted by the life-giving Spirit, the meaning is obvious. The wolf Paul, who had before persecuted and wounded the church, of whom it was said, Benjamin a rapacious wolf, dwells with the lamb—either with *Ananias, by whom he was baptized, or the apostle Peter to whom it was said, feed my lambs.* And the leopard which never before changed its spots, washed in the fountain of the Lord, lies down with the kid—*not the scapegoat, but that which was slain for the passover!* It should be noticed that it is not the lamb and kid that change their habits, but the wolf and leopard imitate their harmlessness. Also the lion, before the most ferocious animal, and the sheep and calf dwell together, as we daily see in the church:—the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak, monarchs and subjects dwell together and are governed by little children, by whom we understand the apostles and apostolic men, unskilled in speech but not in knowledge.” It is interpreted on the same theory by Cocceius, also, Vitringa, and commentators generally. They are unquestionably, however, mistaken. If the passage has in fact the meaning which they ascribe to it, it is not, as they assume, by a metaphor that it acquires it. The wolf, leopard, lion, and bear, are not used by that figure, inasmuch as they

are themselves the subjects of the affirmation, not the predicates, as they would be were they used metaphorically. In metaphorical expressions universally the figure lies altogether in the predicate, not in the agent or object to which it is applied: as the tempest *howls*, the wind *sighs*, the fields *smile*. In these metaphors it is the verb that is transferred from its natural use and employed in ascribing an act to the tempest, winds, and fields, which they do not literally exert, but that only resembles the effect they produce. If ferocious and meek men had been metaphORIZED as these writers assume, there would have been a direct affirmation that the one class are the wolf, leopard, lion, and bear, and the other the lamb, kid, ox, and cow. They treat it precisely as though the expression were, Cruel and bloody men are wolves, leopards, lions, and bears; the poor and meek are lambs, kids, oxen, and cows; but the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the cow and the bear shall feed, and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. Their construction accordingly involves in fact the interpolation of a passage before that of the prophet, declaring men of the two classes to be the animals of the corresponding natures; by which men are made the theme of the several propositions, instead of those brutes; and the subjects of the prediction thereby entirely changed. It is a monstrous violation, therefore, instead of a legitimate interpretation of the passage. Whatever its meaning is, the animals mentioned in it are the subjects of the prediction, not men. If any of the language were used by a metaphor, it would be the verb, not the nouns that are their nominatives. But the verbs plainly are not employed by a metaphor, as the wolf, leopard, and lion, are undoubtedly capable of the acts ascribed to them. And, moreover, nothing would be gained by supposing them to be used by that figure; as there are no analogous acts which they can be presumed to indicate that would not involve as great a deviation from their present habits as those which these verbs literally express.

Nor is there any other figure in the passage by which men are made the subjects of the prediction. The animals are not used by an allegory as representatives of men of resembling dispositions. None of the numerous writers, who in fact treat them as though they were employed in that relation,

regard the passage as allegorical ; and it is certain that it is not from the consideration that there is no express declaration that the wolf, leopard, lion, and other animals, are used as the representatives of men. The allegory always openly announces who it is that the agents or objects which it employs denotes, and what their actions are, also, which it exemplifies. Nor are they used by the hypocatastasis ; as in that figure, as well as the metaphor, the trope lies wholly in the predicate, not in the subject to which it is applied ; and its chief difference from the metaphor is, that the acts, events, or conditions of one class which it ascribes to its subject in place of another, are compatible with that subject's nature, as well as those which the substituted acts, effects, or conditions are employed to illustrate. Thus, in the command, "If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out : it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes, to be cast into hell-fire, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched ; for every one shall be salted with fire,"—the eye, an organ of the body, is substituted for an affection of the mind, and plucking out the eye, put for suppressing or eradicating that affection ; but the substituted act is as physically possible to the agent, as the act of restraining or suppressing the affection which it is employed to represent ; and the agent and subject of the substituted act, are the agent and subject also of that for which it is substituted. If the passage in question, then, were supposed to be used by that figure, the animals would still be the subjects of the acts denoted by those that are ascribed to them, as absolutely as they would had the verbs been used by a metaphor. There is no ground, however, for the supposition that they are employed by the hypocatastasis. There are no analogous acts which those literally expressed by the verbs can be presumed to represent. There are none of a resembling kind that are any more appropriate than those to their nature. But there is no other figure by which the language could possibly be made to denote men and their actions. There is, in fact, no figure whatever in it, except the comparison of the lion with the ox in eating straw. The animals must, therefore, by the laws of language, be the sole subjects of the prediction ; and the acts foretold of them, those which they are in fact to exert.

13. Comparison of the prevalence and abundance of the knowledge of Jehovah throughout the habitable earth, to the prevalence and abundance of the water where the earth is covered by the sea. "They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, because the earth is full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea,"—v. 9. What a forceful and impressive similitude! As the waters cover that part of the globe which is occupied by the sea, and are present at every point of it: so the knowledge of the Lord is to spread over all that part of the earth that rises above the ocean and is inhabited by men. The holy mountain is Mount Zion. They who are not to hurt nor destroy in all the holy mountain, are supposed by Calvin, Hengstenberg, Maurer, Alexander, and others, to be men. Jerome, Cocceius, Vitringa, and many others, suppose them to be the asp, basilisk, and ferocious animals of the preceding verses; and that is undoubtedly the true meaning, as they are the antecedent of the verbs. The reason that the universal knowledge of the Lord is alleged as a proof that they are then to be harmless is, that at the period when that knowledge is to become universal, the curse brought on man, the animal world, and the earth, is to be repealed.—Chap. lxx. 17–25.

The prophet next predicts the conversion of the Gentiles, and the restoration of the Israelites at that epoch.

14. Elliptical metaphor, in denominating the Messiah the Root of Jesse; whom he had before called a branch from his roots, and a sprout from his stock. "And it shall be in that day, that the Root of Jesse, which stands as a signal to the nations, unto him shall the Gentiles seek, and his rest shall be glorious,"—v. 10. Or more simply, "And it shall be in that day, that the Gentiles shall seek unto the Root-sprout of Jesse, which stands as a signal to the nations, and his rest—that is, his place or station—shall be glorious." That he is to stand and be as a signal to the nations, that is perceptible at a distance, and that the place of his rest shall be glorious, indicate that he is to be visible. In the corresponding prediction, chap. iv. 5, it is foretold that Jehovah shall then create on every dwelling-place on Mount Zion, and on her assemblies, a cloud and a smoke by day, and the shining of a flaming fire by night; which is to be an element, doubtless, of its glory.

The verb translated *seek unto*, signifies to inquire of, or consult for instruction in respect to his will and their duty, and shows that he is directly to communicate with them and make to them new revelations. There is a similar prediction, chap. ii. 3: "And many nations shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of Jehovah, to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of Jehovah from Jerusalem." We are thus shown that the glorious place of his rest is to be Mount Zion; and that the nations are to go thither for the purpose of being taught what he requires of them; and that he is to speak or communicate to them his word, as he did to his ancient people and the prophets, and impose on them his law. The period when this is to take place is in the last days, and manifestly from his visible presence and communication directly with men, after his advent.

15. Comparison of the Root of Jesse to a signal to the nations. As conspicuity is doubtless the relation in which he will be to them as a signal, it indicates that he is to be visible, and in a mode that will bespeak his deity. The passage is thus a clear revelation that he is then to appear in person, and that the Gentile nations are to recognise him as the Messiah, and submit to his sceptre. There is no law of language by which it can bear any other meaning. It is not metaphorical, except in the denomination of the Messiah as a Root-sprout of Jesse which stands. The acts affirmed of the Messiah and the Gentiles, and the characteristic of the place of his rest, are not employed by hypocatastasis for others of an analogous nature. If they were supposed to be used by that figure, the persons and place of which they are affirmed would still be the subjects of those which they are employed to denote. But they are not substituted for others of a different kind. In the first, "unto the Root-sprout of Jesse which stands as a signal," the attitude ascribed to the Root-sprout is appropriate to him considered as a signal. It was for that reason, doubtless, that he was denominated a Root-sprout, instead of a Branch of Jesse; that he might be exhibited in an attitude of loftiness and conspicuity suited to the office of a signal or standard to the nations. No other attitude would accord with

that relation. A mere branch extending horizontally from the stock, and near the ground, would be unsuitable to it. The attitude ascribed to the Root-sprout must therefore be taken as denoting precisely what it directly expresses, not as put for a position of a different kind. This is made indisputable, moreover, by the law of the metaphor, which, when an agent or object has been made the subject of that figure, requires that the acts, conditions, or qualities that are then affirmed of it shall be appropriate to the nature that has been metaphorically ascribed to it. Thus Judah, being declared to be "a lion's whelp," is then treated in the other affirmations that are made of him as like that animal. "From the prey, my son, thou art gone up; he stooped down, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion: who shall rouse him up?" In like manner, the Messiah being exhibited as a Root-sprout, the act or attitude that is ascribed to him is conformable to that nature, and must be taken, therefore, as denoting that which it directly expresses, not as a substitute for another of a different kind. We have thus the most absolute certainty from the laws of language, that there is no other figure in that part of the passage than the metaphor; and that that which it ascribes to him is nothing else than a visibility and conspicuousness to the nations, by which he shall be to them like a signal that may be seen at a distance.

In the second affirmation, "and unto him shall the Gentiles seek," or repair, as to an oracle for knowledge in respect to the future; or of him shall they ask counsel—the act ascribed to the Gentiles cannot be supposed to be used as a substitute for another of a different kind. There is nothing in the ascription that requires or suggests such a supposition. In Christ's command to pluck out the eye, and cut off the hand and foot, *if they offend*, the exhibition of those organs as offending is supposititious, and the direction to eradicate and excise them founded on that supposition, and requires to be construed accordingly. No one infers from it that the foot or hand is in fact to be cut off, or the eye plucked out, in order to one's preventing himself from sinning. Instead, it is seen that they are used simply to show that the affections and passions, which are the real occasions of sin, are to be suppressed and eradicated in a manner as stern, self-denying,

and effective for them, as the excision or eradication of an important bodily organ would be, were that the necessary means of avoiding transgression. But in the prediction in question, "unto him shall the Gentiles seek for knowledge," or, "unto him shall they apply for counsel," there is no such substitution of one act for another. That is itself a natural and appropriate act: it is suitable to the visibleness and conspicuity in which it is shown in the preceding clause he is then to appear to them; and there is no other act more natural and appropriate either to them or him of which it can be used as a substitute. To treat it, therefore, as employed by a hypocatastasis to denote a different act, were not only groundless, but in violation of the law of that figure. We have thus the utmost certainty that it is used in its literal and not in a figurative sense.

Such is the fact, also, with the last affirmation, "and his rest—or the place of his manifestation—shall be glorious." There is no room for the supposition that glorious is used as a substitute for another quality. It cannot denote an invisible and spiritual property or characteristic, for it is attributed to a place or natural locality, and must signify, therefore, a property or characteristic of a locality, and that is perceptible to the senses. We have thus not merely a probability, but the most absolute demonstration from the nature of the hypocatastasis, that none of the affirmations of the passage are used by that figure.

Nor is it symbolical. The Root of Jesse and the nations are not symbols seen by the prophet in vision. They were not beheld by him in the condition and exerting the acts ascribed to them. The events predicted are predicted as future, not as witnessed by him. There, moreover, is no other being of whom the Messiah could be a symbol. No other is ever to fill such an office towards men. Nor is there any other body of men than the Gentiles, whom the Gentiles could symbolize. They would of necessity denote themselves, if used as symbols, as there is no other class whom they can be supposed to signify. They have no adaptation to represent Israelites; and they are, moreover, expressly discriminated from them in the prediction that immediately follows. That the Root of Jesse and the Gentiles are used to denote not

any other agents is certain also, from the comparison of the office the Messiah is to fill towards them, to that of a standard or signal; as in that figure the agents or objects it is employed to illustrate, are always those that are expressly named.

16. Hypocatastasis. "And it shall be in that day, that Jehovah shall stretch out his hand the second time to recover the remnant of his people that shall be left from Assyria, and from Egypt, and from Pathros, and from Cush, and from Elam, and from Shinar, and from Hamath, and from the islands of the sea," v. 11. Extending his hand is put for analogous acts of his providence, to deliver or repossess himself of his people. Pathros is the Thebais, or upper Egypt. Cush is Ethiopia and a part of southern Arabia, inhabited by the same race. Elam is a part of Media, Shinar Mesopotamia, and Hamath a city of Syria, on the Orontes. The period of this interposition for the restoration of his people is defined as that in which the Root of Jesse shall visibly manifest himself in glory at Jerusalem, and the Gentiles shall go there to learn his will. It is to be after his advent therefore. The dispersion of the Israelites at the present time, is obviously such as is contemplated by the prophecy. They are scattered not only throughout Egypt, Ethiopia, Mesopotamia, and Persia, but throughout the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean and western seas.

17. Hypocatastasis. "And he shall set up a signal to the nations, and shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and bring together the dispersed of Judah from the four wings of the earth," v. 12. Setting up a signal, like the standard of an army, is put for some analogous act or sign which will show to the Israelites that it is his will that they should return to their ancient land; and like the pillar of cloud and fire in their journey from Egypt, indicate the points at which they are to assemble, and the route by which they are to proceed.

18. Metaphor in the use of wings to denote the distant regions of the earth, east and west, north and south.

19, 20. Metaphors in the use of depart and cut off. "And the envy of Ephraim shall depart, and the adversaries of Judah shall be cut off. Ephraim shall not envy Judah; and Judah shall not vex Ephraim," v. 13. To depart, which is to move

from one place to another, is not literally predicable of envy, which, instead of a real subsistence, is but an act. It is used by a metaphor to denote that the envy of Ephraim shall cease. Those two branches of Israel are no more to be rivals, but to be united under one government. To cut off, is literally to excise, or separate by cutting, as a bough from a tree, or a limb from the body. It is applied to the adversaries of Judah, to denote that they are to be put to death. That Ephraim is no more to envy Judah, nor Judah to vex Ephraim, is because they are to be gathered together as one nation under the Messiah, and implies therefore that their restoration is to be real, not figurative. It was as rival and hostile powers that they envied and harassed one another. It is in their national capacity, or re-union as tribes, that they are to abstain from rivalry. Otherwise the prediction would be incongruous. How will it be a peculiarity of that period, any more than of the present age, and others that have passed since their dispersion, that they do not envy and vex each other, if they do not exist in such a relation as to render it possible?

21. Metaphor. "And they shall fly upon the shoulders of the Philistines, towards the sea," v. 14. The act ascribed to them is that of a bird pouncing on its prey; and denotes a violent assault, and conquest of them. Some suppose, from the fact that there is no longer a people there who are known as Philistines, that the term must be used by a figure to denote persons sustaining an analogous relation to the church. But denominatives formed from the names of countries, are applied to the inhabitants of those countries without any consideration of their national descent; as European, Asiatic, African, Syrian. In like manner Philistines may be used for the inhabitants of Philistia, although they may not be descendants of the ancient race of that country.

22. Elliptical metaphors in denominating the native inhabitants the sons of the east. "Together they shall spoil the sons of the east," v. 14. That is, those who not only possess the region, called the east, but had their birth and nurture there.

23. Hypocatastasis. "And they shall lay their hand upon Edom and Moab, and the children of Ammon shall obey them," v. 14. The act of laying their hand upon Edom and Moab,

is substituted for seizing them by conquest, or taking possession of them.

24. Elliptical metaphor in the use of tongue, to denote a narrow branch of the sea terminating in a point. "And Jehovah will destroy the tongue of the Egyptian sea." The sea, the extremity of which is destroyed, is the Arabian gulf. The verb, in the original, signifies to devote to destruction.

25. Hypocatastasis. "And he will shake his hand over the river with his vehement wind, and strike it into seven streams, and make them tread it in shoes," v. 15. Shaking his hand is substituted for an act of will or providence. The figure bespeaks in a sublime manner his infinite power. He has but to beckon, and a resistless wind strikes the stream, and driving it into seven separate channels, leaves the original bed dry. The river is the Euphrates.

26. Hypocatastasis, in the use of highway to denote a way that is freed from obstructions and made easy of passage. "And there shall be a highway for the remnant of my people that shall be left from Assyria, as there was for Israel in the day of his coming up from the land of Egypt," v. 6. That a literal highway, or artificial road, is not meant, is seen from its resemblance to that of the Israelites in their march from Egypt to Canaan. They had merely a way freed from its natural obstructions, not a road made by art. It is used to show that a way will be opened to them by the removal of all great obstructions, like the Red Sea and the Euphrates, and the provision perhaps in the desert between Assyria and Palestine, of water and food, as they were provided for the Israelites in their journeying through the wilderness.

27. Comparison of the highway from Assyria with the way of the Israelites from Egypt.

This prediction of the restoration of the Israelites to their ancient land is regarded by many commentators as a prediction of their conversion to Christianity and admission to the church. Some suppose that their return to Palestine from the places of their dispersion is used by a metaphor to denote their accession to the church. It is, however, wholly mistaken; as the act ascribed to the Israelites is compatible with their nature and condition, not an act that is only practicable to some other class of agents, as it should be, in

order to be ascribed to them by a metaphor. They are actually dispersed through all the countries mentioned by the prophet, and their return is no more an impossible or unnatural act, than their migration there, or movement in any other direction. It is certain, therefore, from the principle of the metaphor,—which is the ascription of a nature, act, or condition, to an agent or object that does not belong to it,—that the act here affirmed of them is not employed by that figure.

Those writers, however, in fact, though unaware of it, proceed on the assumption that this prophecy is symbolical instead of figurative; for they treat the act of returning to Palestine as representative of a conversion to Christ, Edom and Moab as symbols of anti-christian or unchristianized countries or powers, and the conquest of those countries as the conquest of the enemies of the church, or the heathen. But this is as erroneous as the other. The prediction is not symbolic. The Root of Jesse, the Gentiles, the Israelites, the countries from which they are to return, the act itself of their return, Edom, Moab, and the children of Ammon, and their conquest of those countries and that people, were not exhibited to the prophet in vision, and the acts and events beheld by him which are foretold of them. They are predicted as to take place at a future day, not represented as witnessed by him, as a visionary spectacle, as they would have been had they been symbols. Moreover, the act of returning to Palestine is not a proper symbol of a conversion to God. A return to Palestine does not necessarily involve or imply even a nominal conversion to Christianity. Thousands of Israelites migrate thither now, without any relinquishment of their disbelief that Christ is the Messiah. Besides, as the Christian church is, at the period when the prophecy is to be fulfilled, to be established in all the lands from which the Israelites are to return, as is shown by the prediction that the Gentiles are then to seek to Christ; a return from those lands where the Christian faith is universally to be held, is not a proper symbol of a conversion to Christ. It would be merely to move from one christianized region to another, which presents no resemblance to a change from unbelief to faith, and from enmity to love. And finally, if the countries in

which they are dispersed, the land they are to possess, and the act of returning, are symbols of things of a different nature, then must the Israelites themselves and the Gentiles be taken as symbols of men of different classes; which is impossible, as there are no others among the inhabitants of the earth. The assumption that the prophecy is symbolic is thus altogether untenable. We have, therefore, all the demonstration that the laws of language and symbols can furnish, that the event it foreshows is such a restoration of the Israelites to their ancient country as it literally describes.

CHAPTER XII.

THIS is confirmed by the acknowledgments and celebrations which the prophet next shows they are to utter on that occasion, which imply that their condition as a people is altogether changed; and by extraordinary interpositions and displays of power, such as would be involved in a miraculous restoration to their national country, like that which is described in the preceding prediction.

1. Apostrophe to the Israelites, though not expressly named,—as now no longer two nations, but a single people, and implying, therefore, their literal restoration and re-union. “And in that day thou—Israel—shalt say, O Lord, I will praise thee,” v. 1.

2. Metaphor, in the exhibition of anger as turned away;—which signifies a motion in space, to denote that it is no longer exercised towards them. “Though thou wast angry with me, thine anger is turned away, and thou comfortest me,” v. 1.

3, 4, 5, 6. Metonymies of the effect for its cause or source, and of a work for its subject. “Behold God is my salvation; I will trust and not be afraid; for Jah Jehovah is my strength and song; and he is become my salvation,” v. 2. Salvation is put for Saviour, or the author of salvation; strength for the author or source of strength, or him who exerts the strength that gives deliverance and safety; and song for the subject of the song, or him who is celebrated in it, and occasions the joy which it expresses.

7. Hypocatastasis. “And ye shall draw water with joy from the springs of salvation,” v. 3. Springs of salvation are

salutary springs, or springs that refresh, invigorate, and give health. To draw water with alacrity and gladness from such springs, is put for embracing with promptness and exhilaration the blessings generally provided for them by God, who is the source of their salvation.

8. Apostrophe. "And in that day shall ye say, Praise ye Jehovah; call upon his name, make known among the nations his exploits, remind that his name is exalted. Praise Jehovah, because he has done excellent things; known is this in all the earth," v. 4, 5. They are here exhibited as addressing one another, and exhorting to this commemoration of Jehovah's wonderful works towards them.

9. Metaphor in the use of exalted, which denotes elevation in space, to signify that his name is manifested in such a manner as to attract in a higher measure the adoration and love of her people.

10. Apostrophe. "Cry out and shout, O inhabitant of Zion, for great in the midst of thee is the Holy One of Israel," v. 6. This is addressed to the inhabitants of Jerusalem in distinction from the Israelites generally; and indicates, like the prediction that his rest shall be glorious, that Zion is then to be the scene of great and majestic displays of his presence.

1. The contrast which Christ's reign is to present to theirs who have hitherto swayed the earth, is worthy of his perfections, and shows that his presence and rule is to be an infinite blessing to the race. The great monarchs of the nations who precede him, are like ferocious brutes that naturally prey on the harmless and helpless animals. But omniscience, omnipotence, infallible wisdom, and infinite righteousness and benignity, are his attributes; and instead of oppressing and destroying, he is to protect and vindicate the weak and unoffending; and instead of justifying and prospering, is to convict and punish the wicked.

2. This prophecy plainly shows that Christ is to exert the rule here ascribed to him in person and visibly to men, that he is then to discriminate perfectly between the good and the evil, that all noxious and ferocious creatures are to become harmless, that the earth is to be filled with the knowledge of him, that the Gentiles are to recognise and acknowledge him as the Messiah, and repair to him for instruction respecting

his will, and that the Israelites are then to be restored by extraordinary means to their ancient land, and reunited as a nation. As these great futurities are thus revealed, and with a clearness and certainty that cannot be evaded, except by a violation of the indisputable and fundamental laws of language, they are to be received with as entire trust as any of the other events that God has made known for our faith. To disbelieve them, is to disbelieve him. To attempt to expunge them from the prophecy, and introduce others in their stead, is not to interpret, but to put aside his word, and substitute another in its place. To denounce them as unworthy of his perfections, as some unhappily do, is in effect to impeach his wisdom and truth, and exhibit his word as unworthy of trust.

3. Some hesitate to receive this prediction of the restoration of the Israelites on the ground that they cannot see that it can answer any end that seems to present a sufficient reason for so extraordinary a measure. The question, however, whether God has revealed their return, is not to be determined by the estimate those persons may form of its wisdom, but by the terms of the prophecy. Whether the ends it is to answer, or the results that are to spring from it, are seen to be worthy of his perfections or not, his wisdom and righteousness furnish an ample certainty that they will be suitable to the grandeur of his attributes, and the great interests of his kingdom which they are to affect; and God, to intercept doubt, has revealed in the prophetic song with which the prediction is closed, the impressions with which it is to be contemplated by those who are to be the subjects of it, and shown that instead of distrust or indifference, it is to be regarded by them with wonder and gratitude, and celebrated with praises and thanksgivings throughout the world. What a beautiful method of conciliating the faith of his people now, and inspiring them with gladness and praise in the prospect of the wonderful event!

ART. III.—OBJECTIONS TO THE LAWS OF FIGURATIVE
LANGUAGE.

PROFESSOR BUSH employs himself in several of the articles he has devoted to what we have written on the principles of interpretation, in endeavoring to overturn the views we have advanced of the nature and laws of figurative language, and show that they present no such bar, as we suppose, to the spiritualization of the Scriptures. He does not offer, however, any direct confutation of any of the definitions or laws we have given. He does not undertake to prove that any of them are universally, or in the main, erroneous. He is undoubtedly satisfied, that in respect to the figures generally, they are true. That at which he immediately aims, is only to prove that there are exceptions to them ; and those imagined exceptions he then treats as invalidating the laws themselves in respect to the ends for which we employ them, and demonstrating the reality of the spiritual sense for which he contends, in distinction from that which is literal and figurative. In order, however, to make out his point, he ought, in the first place, to show either that there are figures that are of no species whatever, and cannot, therefore, be defined and assigned to a class ; or that there are figures that are of a class or classes that differ from those which we have enumerated ; or, else, in the next place, that there are figures of the classes we have designated, that still do not accord with what we have stated as their laws. If he does not accomplish the first, he does not prove what he attempts, that there are passages that are figurative without involving any known and definable figure. If he does not achieve the last, he does not demonstrate that there are figures that are exceptions to the laws, as we have stated them, of the classes to which they belong. We shall make it apparent, by a notice of his several allegations, that he has accomplished neither of these. We scarcely need to state that he has not formally undertaken to show that there are figures that do not admit of definition and classification, and, therefore, are of no species whatever ! It would, doubtless, have been a formidable task. To treat an expression as tropical, demonstrate its difference from all other

forms of figurative diction, and show that it has distinctive qualities, and is framed by peculiar laws, and yet presents no definition of its nature, would require a species of intellect of the reputation of which Professor B. can have no ambition. Yet that he should have done, if he would have demonstrated that there are passages which are figurative, that yet involve no known and definable figure.

Nor has he attempted to show that there are figures of a different species from those which we have enumerated, the office of which is to express a spiritual in distinction from an ordinary tropical sense. This, if practicable, is obviously the achievement at which he should have aimed in order to accomplish his end. Could he show that there is a species of figure overlooked by us, the very design of which is to express a spiritual in distinction from a literal and natural sense, and prove that by its laws it fulfils the function which his theory of a double meaning requires, he would have effectually confuted us, and vindicated the system, at least to the extent to which such a figure exists, on which he interprets the Sacred Word. He has done, however, nothing of the kind. Not an intimation appears in his disquisitions that there is any other species of figures in the Scriptures than those which we have defined.

Nor, finally, has he indicated any figure of any one of the classes we have designated, that deviates in any relation from the laws, as we have stated them, of its nature. He has not pointed out any law omitted by us of any one of those figures. He has not furnished any instance in which any one of those figures deviates from its laws as we have expressed them. This he has, indeed, attempted, but without success. He has accomplished nothing, therefore, except to express his dissent from our views, assert in what he denominates "a certain vein of confident assumption," the accuracy of his own theory, and allege in a vague and undemonstrative manner, a number of passages which he treats as indubitably figurative, and yet as not in accordance with any of the definitions we have given of the nature and laws of tropical expressions.

His first objection is to the "axiom that no passage is figurative, unless it has a figure in it." This he is very far from regarding as a self-evident proposition. He says :

"In hundreds of passages the very question to be determined, is, whether they actually contain a figure or not. The application of his own criteria may satisfy him that no figure is to be recognised in a given passage, and yet we should be equally confident that there was. Take for instance, Ezek. xxxvi. 24. 'I will take you from among the heathen, and gather you out of all countries, and will bring you into your own land;' and we hold most strenuously that the language is figurative, or contains a sense beyond that of the letter, while our author would as strenuously hold the contrary. But here, as elsewhere, it is palpable that he takes it for granted that his *primary definitions of the nature and functions of figures* will not for a moment be called in question; whereas, these are the very points that we dispute in the outset, for reasons which we shall give as we proceed."—N. C. Repos. p. 394.

The question at issue, in respect to the axiom that a figure is requisite to constitute a passage figurative, he thus admits, is the question whether our definitions comprehend the whole variety of figures, and are adequate criteria to determine whether expressions are literal or tropical. If then they are not, if there are tropes of a class that we have not noticed, it behoved Professor B. to point them out, show what their characteristics are, and indicate the way in which they yield the spiritual sense which it is his wish to demonstrate. Without that, he achieves nothing. Were it debated between two chemists, whether a certain enumeration embraces all the constituent elements of atmospheric air, it would not be enough for the one who denied it, to claim that it has simply been ascertained by analysis that the ingredients enumerated are certainly its constituents;—not that no other species of matter is embodied in its nature. To verify his denial, it would be necessary to prove directly, by adequate tests, the existence of another ingredient in its composition, and define its properties. Otherwise it would simply be equivalent to an assumption that it contains an element, which, nevertheless, there are no means of detecting, and of the existence of which, therefore, there are no discernible evidences. In like manner, if Prof. B. would prove that a passage is figurative, although no figure of any of the species we have enumerated exists in it, he must directly prove that there is a figure of a nature that differs from them, define its peculiarities, and demonstrate its presence in the passage. Otherwise he as-

sumes that an expression may be figurative without involving any figure whatever, and implies, therefore, that there is a species of figure of which language is not the medium, which is mistaken; as figures are a property exclusively of language, and are nothing else than certain modes of diction.

Professor B., however, does not undertake to show that there are figures of any other species than those which we have enumerated, while he still contends that passages like that quoted by him from Ezekiel are figurative, although there is no figure in them of either of those kinds. Instead, he proceeds on the tacit assumption that there is a species of figure of which language is not the medium; which is groundless and absurd. He has fallen into this error by confounding figures with symbols; or denominating passages figurative, which he, in fact, only regards as representative. Thus of the passage alleged by him from Ezekiel, which contains no figure whatever: "I will take you from among the heathen, and gather you out of all countries, and will bring you into your own land," he says, "we hold most strenuously that *the language is figurative, or contains a sense beyond that of the letter.*" In reality, however, the medium on his theory of that imagined second sense is, *not the language at all*, but instead the Israelitish people, denoted by the pronoun you, the acts or events expressed by the verbs take, gather, and bring, and the place designated as their land. Those persons are interpreted as symbols of Gentiles, their land as the representative of the Christian church, and those acts as indicating the union of the Gentiles to that church. On the supposition, then, that the passage has the sense he ascribes to it, it is not a figurative, but purely a representative meaning. It is not expressed by the *language* of the passage, but conveyed through the Israelites, the events that are predicted of them, and their land. He thus wholly mistakes the point at issue, and confounds the question, whether the persons, objects, and acts of a passage are symbolical, with the question whether the language itself of the passage is figurative. Could he prove, therefore, that the events foreshown by the prediction of Ezekiel are of the nature he supposes, and not those which the language describes, he would not thereby invalidate in any degree the axiom which he employs it to overturn,

“that no passage is figurative unless it has a figure in it.” The position he would establish is of a wholly different nature, and involves no contradiction whatever to the axiom.

This confusion of figures with symbols is not peculiar to Professor Bush, but common to a great body of writers, and is one of the most mischievous of the errors that prevail. They are as distinct from each other as spoken and written language, as speech and gestures, as expressions by the voice and expressions by the countenance, as objects and the shadows they cast; and they cannot be properly treated unless their differences are understood. We are surprised that Professor B. has failed properly to distinguish them; as he indicates in the articles we are considering, that he regards the real question between us as not whether *the language* of the Scriptures is the medium of a figurative or spiritual sense, that is not recognised by us; but whether the persons and things presented by that language have a representative office, and are in that relation the medium of a second and spiritual sense. This we shall have occasion to notice as we proceed, and show that if he succeeds in demonstrating the reality of the peculiar sense for which he contends, it will be—not by confuting the views we have advanced of the laws of figurative language,—but by proving that the agents, objects, and events mentioned in the passages to which he ascribes that meaning, are symbols of others of correspondent spiritual classes.

As figures, then, are nothing else than peculiar modes of diction, or uses of words, and are predicable only of language; the truth and self evidence of the axiom, “that no passage can be figurative unless it has a figure in it,” remains unaffected by Prof. B.’s objections: and when the point at issue between us is comprehended, will cease to be controverted, as will the laws also doubtless, as we have stated them, of the several figures, and the whole question in debate be seen to be merely, whether, besides the import of the language of the sacred word, the persons and things which that language denotes, have a representative office, and signify other and higher things of a spiritual nature.

His next objection is to the axiom, that “language neither

ever has, nor can have, any other meaning than that which is either literal or figurative." He says:—

"This is aimed at the assertion of a *spiritual* sense, such as was held by Origen, Theodoret, Jerome, Vitringa, Cocceius, and others, and will include that of Swedenborg. The truth of the proposition depends upon the extent which the author gives to the term 'figurative.' From his ordinary use of the term, we presume he would not admit what we denominate the spiritual sense of a word or phrase to be a figurative sense, unless perchance he should by special courtesy allow it as a kind of interloping sense, under the head of what he calls *hypocatastasis*. If, however, he refuses to admit altogether such a sense, the proposition is undoubtedly false, as we shall show at length in the course of the discussion."—P. 394.

But his difficulty here arises from his not recollecting that the second sense for which he contends, is not in fact, on his own method of interpretation, couched in the language of the Scriptures, but in *the things* which that language denotes; and is the result, not of a figurative use of terms, but of a representative office of persons, objects, and acts. The axiom, when understood, is self evident, and cannot be controverted without a contradiction. Professor B. himself, in this objection, virtually admits its truth, by denominating the spiritual sense which he seeks to demonstrate a *figurative* sense; as, if that sense is figurative, its existence is of course in harmony with the axiom, not in contradiction to it. To prove that, in addition to those we have enumerated, there is another figurative sense, is not to prove that there is a sense that is neither figurative nor literal. In arguing as though it were, he has fallen into the solecism of assuming that that figurative sense in fact after all is not figurative, but of some other species. If all the senses for which he argues are either literal or figurative, then the axiom is as consistent with his views as with ours; and the only question that can remain between us is, whether or not there is a species of figures which we have not noticed that is the medium of the spiritual sense, the existence of which he is endeavoring to establish. He proceeds next to present instances which he supposes exemplify the existence of that secondary sense.

"For the present we would simply propose the query to Mr. L., what

epithet he would apply to the sense embodied in those *practical reflections* which are often founded upon a critical analysis of a text, and which are of no rare occurrence in his own writings. Is that sense taught in the texts unfolded? If not, why are such pious lessons sought to be educed from them? If it be, is it the literal or the figurative, or some ulterior and interior sense, which may properly be termed spiritual?"—P. 395.

We answer, those lessons are neither the literal nor the figurative sense of the passages on which they are founded, but are reflections merely, or considerations suggested and exemplified by the facts and truths that are directly expressed in those passages. In the article, for instance, in the *Journal* on the *Figures of Isaiah ix.*, the incorrigibleness of the Israelites, under the chastisements enumerated in that chapter, is treated as indicating the inadequacy universally, of mere teachings, warnings, and punishments to reform them. But that truth is not directly taught in the passage, either literally or figuratively. It is a different and more general truth, *suggested* by the particular fact which it does directly teach, and founded not solely on that fact, but generally on the nature of man, and on the peculiar dispositions manifested by that perverse people. Nothing could be more groundless or preposterous than to suppose that that general truth deduced by a logical process from the subordinate fact which the chapter expressly teaches, is itself also couched either as a literal or figurative sense, in the terms of the passage.

In like manner, the purpose of the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace, to reign for ever on the throne of David and restore the earth and the race from the curse of the fall, is presented as a ground of joy and gratitude because of its consonance to his infinite attributes, the completeness and grandeur of the redemption it is to secure, and the inadequacy of all other means to remedy the evils with which the world is overwhelmed. But those grounds of joy and thankfulness are not directly presented in the language of the chapter. They are suggested by his infinite perfections on the one hand, the hopelessness of man's condition on the other, and the beauty of such a scheme of government, as involving a perfect redemption from the thralldom of

sin. What, now, can be more mistaken than to suppose that the joy and gratitude which this great purpose is thus adapted to excite, are themselves couched in the language in which that purpose is expressed, either in a figurative or literal sense? Can any two things be more perfectly distinct: the one being a cause or reason, and the other a consequence of it—the one being God’s purpose, or scheme of government, the other the affections with which we should contemplate that purpose? Nothing can be more certain than that such a reflective or inferential view is not involved either in a literal or figurative sense in the language in which the purpose is announced that suggests it.

He next alleges the following, as an instance of a spiritual sense :—

“ In Deut. xxv. 4, occurs the precept, ‘ Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn.’ In two passages of the epistles of Paul we find this ordinance referred to as if it had a spiritual meaning. 1 Cor. ix. 8–10, ‘ Say I these things as a man? or saith not the law the same also? for it is written in the law of Moses, thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen? or saith he it altogether for our sakes? For our sakes no doubt this is written.’ 1 Tim. v. 17, ‘ Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine; for the Scripture saith, thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn. And the laborer is worthy of his reward.’ The question is, has it such a meaning? Had the inditing Spirit who dictated the law to Moses, an eye to such an application of the precept as Paul makes? If he had, do not *the words* convey a spiritual sense? If he had not, on what principle is the Apostle’s allusion to it to be explained? The intimation that God saith it *altogether* for our sakes is certainly strong, and would seem to imply that there is a scope in the original enactment beyond that of the letter, and which yet is not figurative on Mr. L.’s theory of figures.”—P. 395.

We respond without hesitation that *the words* do not convey such a sense. And is there any room for doubt respecting it? It turns wholly on the question whether the word *ox* denotes, either literally or by a metaphor, apostles, presbyters, and other teachers in the Christian church; and whether the command not to “muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth

out the corn," denotes, according to the established usage of the terms, not withholding from Apostles and other teachers of the church, the means of subsistence, as a consideration for their official labors. And is there any place for debate of that question? That certainly is not the literal import of the terms. Instead, none can be conceived more foreign to their natural and established meaning. It is equally certain, also, that it is not their metaphoric meaning, as they are not used by a metaphor—the act which is prescribed being perfectly compatible with the nature of man and of the ox, and the command having been literally observed doubtless by thousands and myriads of the Israelites. Nor is there any other figure by which the words *thou*, *ox*, and *muzzle*, would acquire such a meaning. An "interloping sense" of the "kind" could not possibly gain accession to the terms, even "under the head" of "the hypocatastasis;" as the sense conveyed by that figure is not couched in the words in which it is expressed, but conveyed through the things which those words denote. In the hypocatastasis, for example, "a bruised reed he shall not break, and smoking flax he shall not quench," it is those acts of one species that are the medium of signifying the acts of another, which Christ was to exert; not the words by which those representative acts are expressed. There is no trope except the metaphor, which would be a direct affirmation of it, by which the terms *ox* and *muzzle* could be invested with such a meaning.

How then is it that the passage teaches the duty which the apostle employs it to enforce? We answer, not directly through the medium of the words, but through the duty which those words enjoin, or the principle of equity on which the precept they express is founded. It is by a logical process; by an application to Christian teachers of the principle embodied in that statute, that an agent that labors for man, even though an animal, is entitled to such means of subsistence as its nature requires to sustain that labor. This is apparent from the apostle's argument. He does not intimate that the statute in respect to the *ox* relates directly to teachers of the Gospel. Instead, he places their title to a support from those among whom they labor, on the ground of equity, or the rightfulness of a reciprocity of benefits, that is recognised by

men in all the relations of society. He says: "My defence to those who examine me is this,—Have we not a right to eat and drink? Have we not a right to take with us a wife" in our visits to the churches "as the other apostles, and the brothers of the Lord, and Cephas? Or I only and Barnabas, have we not the right of not laboring" for our support? "Who, serving as a soldier, subsists on his own provisions? Who plants a vineyard, and eats not of its fruit? Or who takes care of a flock and eats not of the milk of the flock? Do I say these things simply according to man,—that is, according to man's judgment? In other words, do I speak of this as an equitable principle that is merely recognised by *men* in their common social relations? Or does not the law also speak the same? For it is written in the law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle the ox treading out the grain. Has God a care for oxen, or does he speak altogether for us? It is written, indeed, for us, inasmuch as he who plows *ought to plow* in hope, and he who threshes, to thresh with a hope of partaking" of the grain. Here the title of the ministers of the church to support by those for whom they labor, is placed on the ground of equity as universally felt and acknowledged by men in the other relations of life; and the object of the quotation from the law of Moses is to show that that right is not only admitted by men, but is recognised and sanctioned also by God, even in relation to the laboring ox; and it is recognised and sanctioned in regard to that animal, in order that men might, with a deeper realization of its force, recognise and observe it in their relations to one another. It is written, he says, assuredly for us, because the great principle which it embraces is of far higher authority in reference to man; for he adds, "he who plows *ought to plow* in hope, and he who threshes ought to thresh with the hope of partaking" of the grain. The application he makes of the principle is thus still merely to secular, not to religious affairs. He contents himself with showing that the justice of such a reciprocation of benefits is acknowledged by men in all their other relations, and leaves it to his reader to see and feel that it is equally just between churches and their ministers. He uses the precept in the same manner also, in the epistle to Timothy. "The elders that rule well *are worthy* of a

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double reward—have a title to a double stipend—especially they who labor in the word and teaching.” For the Scripture saith, “the ox treading out grain thou shalt not muzzle,” and “Worthy is the laborer of his hire.” Here also the title of the ministers of the church to a stipend is placed on the ground of right. They are worthy,—they have a just claim to such a recompense. The consideration he alleges to prove it is, that the equity of a recompense for labor is recognised by God in his law, not only in respect to men, but also in respect to beasts. And the reader is left, as before, to see and feel that the rule is as applicable to the minister of the church as to any other class of laborers. His argument is simply this—That which men universally acknowledge to be just between one man and another in the common affairs of life; and that which God recognises and enforces as right, not only between one man and another, but even between men and brutes, must be acknowledged to be equally equitable and obligatory between churches and their ministers.

His use of the passage, accordingly, involves no double sense of the terms. Instead, it precludes such a meaning. Its whole propriety and significance depend on the literal import of the language. If the precept, “thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the grain,” and the rule, “worthy is the laborer of his wages,” do not mean that which the terms literally express, his reasoning fails, as he alleges a consideration to verify his proposition that has no adaptation to sustain it. If the word ox mean minister of the Gospel, and not muzzle the ox mean not withhold from the minister of the Gospel a stipend, then his proof is identical with the proposition to be demonstrated by it, and the argument a mere tautology.

He next excepts to the third axiom advanced by us, that “The words of a passage never have in any one of the several places in which they are used in it, more than one meaning.” Of this, he says:

“This is amplified and explained, ‘If that meaning is literal, they have in that instance no other literal, and no figurative signification. If it is figurative, they have in that place no other figurative, and no literal meaning. They may be used in the same prediction in different senses, but never in the same place fill two dissimilar offices, or bear a double sense.’ We are not unwilling to submit this to the test. ‘Out of

Egypt have I called my Son' is a quotation from Hosea xi. 1, which the Evangelist applies to our Lord, but which the prophet applies to Israel. 'When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my Son out of Egypt.' Is not the word 'Son' here employed in more than one sense? We ask not the commentators; we submit the question to Mr. L.—
P. 295.

We answer, It is not. It is applied by the prophet to the Israelitish people of whom he speaks by an elliptical metaphor as an individual, to denote them in their filial relation to God, to which they were admitted by adoption. It is applied by the evangelist to Christ, by a metaphor also, to denote him in his filial relation to the Father as the Word, begotten in his human nature of the virgin by the Holy Spirit. The sense in which it is employed in both cases is, therefore, the same. The fact that in the one instance it is applied to a people who had before been metaphorized as an individual and a child, and, in the other, to a real child, does not render its meaning in the one different from its meaning in the other. It denotes in each, a person sustaining a filial relation to God. And as each of the parties to whom it is applied actually sustained such a relation, there is not the slightest room for the supposition of a spiritual sense in either case, or a diversity of signification in its use.

The real question, however, which Professor B. meant to ask, perhaps, is, whether the use of the passage by Matthew does not imply that it was originally a prophecy of Christ's call out of Egypt; and whether that, differing as it does from the meaning attached to it by the prophet who uttered it solely of Israel, does not indicate, though he was unaware of it, that it has a double meaning? We answer: The apostle is not, in our judgment, to be regarded as treating the passage as a prediction of Christ's call out of Egypt. It was not originally a prediction in respect to Israel, but an historical statement of an act that had been exerted eight hundred years before. It was not a prophecy of Christ, therefore, as a history is not a prophecy; nor is it treated as such by the evangelist, but simply as a statement of an event in regard to the Israelites, that now had occurred also in Christ's history. His language is, "And Joseph, rising, took the child and his mother by

night, and departed into Egypt; and he abode there till Herod's death—*ἡ αὐτοῦ θάνατος*—so that that could be accomplished which had been spoken by the Lord by the prophet, saying, Out of Egypt I have called my Son." In other words, he continued in Egypt till Herod's death, the consequence of which was, that that which had been narrated by the prophet of Israel could now be narrated of Christ, "Out of Egypt I have called my Son." Or still more simply, He continued in Egypt till Herod's death, so that that which had been related of the Israelites, was now related of Christ, "I have called my Son out of Egypt." This is the plain import of the passage as employed by the evangelist. The supposition that he treats it as a prediction, or that he ascribes to it a second or spiritual sense, is wholly gratuitous, and instead of yielding any aid in its explanation, embarrasses and confounds it.

The attempt by Theodoret, Jerome, Marck, Stuck, and others, to account for the application of the passage to Christ by the supposition that Israel was a type of him, is equally groundless and absurd. Professor B. proceeds:

"Another instance of a very striking character is the following: 2 Sam. viii. 12-16, 'And when thy days be fulfilled, and thou shalt sleep with thy fathers, I will set up thy seed after thee, which shall proceed out of thy bowels, and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build a house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever. I will be his father and he shall be my son. If he commit iniquity I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men: but my mercy shall not depart away from him, as I took it away from Saul, whom I put away from before thee. *And thine house and thy kingdom shall be established for ever before thee*: thy throne shall be established for ever.' It might seem at first blush that this annunciation referred itself at once and entire to Solomon, for Solomon reigned in prosperity and peace after David; he built the temple at Jerusalem, and sat undisturbed on his throne to the end of his days. Not only so, it is in several cases expressly applied to Solomon, as 1 Chron. xxii. 7-16, xxviii. 2-7 Solomon, also, in like manner, 1 Kings v. 5, makes himself the subject of the prediction.

"But on the other hand, there are difficulties in the exclusive application of the words to Solomon too serious to be overlooked Thus in Acts ii. 29-31, 'Men and brethren, let me freely speak unto you of the

patriarch David, that he is both dead and buried, and his sepulchre is with us unto this day. Therefore, being a prophet, and knowing that God had sworn with an oath to him, that of the fruit of his loins, according to the flesh, he would raise up Christ to sit on his throne; he seeing this before, spake of the resurrection of Christ.' There is no passage known to which Peter refers except the one we are now considering, and which is thus construed by an inspired apostle as pointing directly to Christ. Compare Psalm cxxii. 11; Luke i. 32, 69; Rom. i. 3; 2 Tim. ii. 8. So the writer of the epistle to the Hebrews, in the most express terms, refers this promise to Christ, ch. i. 5. 'For unto which of the angels said he at any time, thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son.' Compare Isaiah ix. 6, 7; Psalm lxxii. 7, 8. Indeed, what are so frequently spoken of as 'the sure mercies of David,' are to be referred to the promise to David as a primary source, and yet these very mercies are predicated of Christ. Acts xiii. 31, 'And as concerning that he raised him from the dead, now no more to see corruption, he said in this wise, I will give you the sure mercies of David.' Is it not evident then, from this induction of parallels, that the passage before us has at the same time an unequivocal reference both to Solomon and to Christ? And what is this but a double sense? And if a double sense what becomes of the 'axiom' under consideration? It would be easy to adduce other instances in abundance showing the fallacy of the rule."—1p. 395-397.

We answer, the passage has undoubtedly "an unequivocal reference both to Solomon and to Christ;" but not at all through the medium of a double sense, but by the literal import of the terms. Prof. B. treats it as though there were nothing in its language inconsistent with the supposition that it had reference exclusively to Solomon. But that is a palpable error. The promise to David is of a *seed, or line*, involving a succession or series; as is seen from its terms, and the fact that the throne that line is to inherit and the kingdom over which it is to reign is to endure for ever. "And *thine house*"—that is, family—"and thy kingdom shall be established *for ever* before thee; thy throne shall be established for ever." It is not a promise, therefore, merely of Solomon's birth and accession to this throne; as that would imply that he was to continue for ever in the body, and reign over Israel, which was not God's covenant and purpose.

That it is a promise of a line or posterity that should reign on his throne for ever, is shown, moreover, by the form in which it was renewed to Solomon himself, after he had built the temple. 1 Kings ix. 4, 5: "And the Lord said unto him, I have heard thy prayer and thy supplication that thou hast made before me; I have hallowed this house, which thou hast built to put my name there for ever; and mine eyes and mine heart shall be there perpetually. And if thou wilt walk before me, as David thy father walked, in integrity of heart, and in uprightness, to do according to all that I have commanded thee, and will keep my statutes and my judgments; then I will establish the throne of thy kingdom upon Israel for ever, as I promised to David, thy father, saying, *There shall not fail thee a man upon the throne of Israel.*" This, also, was the construction put on it by David himself at the communication to him of the original promise. "Then went King David in and sat before the Lord, and he said, Who am I, O Lord God, and what is my house, that thou hast brought me hitherto? And this was yet a small thing in thy sight, O Lord God, but thou hast spoken also *of thy servant's house for a great while to come.*"—2 Sam. vii. 18, 19. That is the view given of the promise, likewise, Ps. cxxxii. 11, 12: "The Lord hath sworn in truth unto David; he will not turn from it; of the fruit of thy body will I set upon thy throne. If thy *children* will keep my covenant and my testimony that I shall teach them, *their children also shall sit upon thy throne for ever.*" The promise, therefore, has not an exclusive reference to Solomon, but its terms are wholly inconsistent with such a limitation. It is a promise of a seed, or line of descendants, that should reign on David's throne for ever; and it is each obedient individual of that line that was to inherit the throne, that he promises shall be his son, and of whom he engages to be a father. It is applicable, therefore, to every one of the line that walked in the steps of David in integrity, and as absolutely so to Christ, who is to be the last in the train, as to Solomon who was the first. Is it not strange that Prof. B. did not see what is thus stamped in the clearest characters on the face of the passage? The fancy of a double or spiritual sense in the term son, because of its application to Christ, is not only unnecessary, but is solecism.

tical; as it is used in identically the same relation in each instance, Christ being in fact, as well as Solomon, a son of David "in respect to the flesh." There cannot by possibility, therefore, be any mystical or spiritual sense in its application to him, the relationship it indicates in that use being identically the same as that which it signifies in its application to Solomon.

Prof. B. next assails the axiom that, "in metaphorical passages, the agent or object to which the figure is applied, is the agent or subject of that which the prediction expressed by the metaphor foreshows."

"This position is the grand *πῶς* of the author, from whence he is to get his exegetical lever under the mountain mass of error heaped up by former interpreters, and heave the whole from its foundation. . . . We, however, shall not assent to it, maugre its mathematical certainty, till we are furnished with a little more evidence of its truth, and till we are assured that in yielding to it, we are not giving up the entire argument to a *petitio principii* artfully preferred. The assumption is, that the agent or object of any metaphorical predicate is the precise agent or object named, and no other. The name applied to it is the literal name of the subject intended, and of nothing else. If Jacob or Israel is the Lord's flock, if Zion is a diadem of beauty in the Lord's hand, it is the literal Israel and the literal Zion, *and not any agents or subjects represented by them*, that are the real subjects of what is affirmed or foreshown respecting them. To this we are tied down by the inexorable rigor of the alleged law; and if, as the author would have us believe, there is no possible escape, we may as well concede to him at once all that he claims on the score of demonstration. If Israel means Israel, and nothing else; *if all representative import is absolutely excluded from the term by the operation of an unquestionable law*, then, of course, he rides triumphantly to the goal of his deduction, and the literal restoration of the literal Israel is not to be gainsayed. But we hesitate not to say that the so called axiom is a postulate in disguise, and the above proposition a mere trap to catch a conclusion and hold it fast. *This rule, it is evident, is put forth as the opposite to that which would make the metaphor denote something else than the agent or object indicated by the literal terms.* If Jacob or Israel is to be made a threshing wain to thresh the mountains, it is *that people alone* that is intended. If Jeremiah is to be made a fenced brazen wall, Jeremiah and *no other person* is to be and to suffer what is predicted of him. *What can be the drift of all this*, but to go against an opposite interpretation, or one

that would make these names in certain connexions denote *something else* than the persons literally signified by them? *For if this be not his aim, at what is he driving?* Who has ever held that the subject or agent named in a metaphor, was not, in the first instance, to be literally understood? Who has imagined that any other people than Jacob or Israel were intended by the *literal names* here employed? Who has ever supposed that any other person than Jeremiah was *primarily* referred to, when the Most High affirmed that he would make him a fenced brazen wall? *We have never heard of any such theory, nor can we conceive that Mr. L. has any such in his eye.* Again, then, we ask, at what does he aim in launching forth from his rhetorical catapult the present 'axiom?' The answer is at hand. He is, in fact, aiming a deadly blow at the assertion of a *representative* character sustained by the agents of Scriptural history, or Scriptural prophecy. A *representative* function necessarily supposes a *spiritual* sense, and such a sense he is intent upon exploding from the sacred oracles. Israel must always signify the literal Israel, and Jerusalem the literal Jerusalem, because otherwise the *terms* might be understood as *representing* the Christian church, which is the *spiritual* sense couched beneath the sense of the letter—and the spiritual sense is at all hazards to be shut out of the word of God. The writ of ejectment, it is true, is served upon it in the name of the metaphor, but this is a mere *ruse*—the metaphor has no more to do with it than any other figure."—Pp. 397, 398.

Professor Bush thus perceives that the law of the metaphor we have stated, if true, is fatal to the representative function which he and many others assign to metaphorical passages, and passages that are supposed to be metaphorical. The whole question between him and us, and between us and the spiritualizers generally of the narrative and prophetic Scriptures, turns, he is aware, on the truth or error of that definition of the figure. If it cannot be confuted, their whole system falls. If we vindicate and maintain it, we verify the conclusions of which we have made it the ground.

He still proceeds, however, on the mistaken assumption that it is the language of metaphorical passages that is the medium of the representative function which he ascribes to them; not as is the fact, both in his own method of interpretation, and that of other spiritualizers, the agents, objects, or acts which it is the mere office of that language to denote. In a prediction, for example, in which Jerusalem is taken by him and

others as a representative of the Christian church, it is not *the word* Jerusalem, but Jerusalem itself, which that word is employed to denote, that is treated as that representative. The supposition that the word is the representative of the church is absurd, as no analogy or connexion whatever subsists between them. There is an analogy between Jerusalem, the place where the Israelitish worshippers assembled to offer homage to God, and the places where Christians assemble to worship him. There is an analogy also between the Israelites who worshipped him at their temples, and Christian assemblies that pay him homage in their houses dedicated to his praise ; but there is no such resemblance between the mere name Jerusalem and such places of Christian worship, nor between the word Israel and such Christian assemblies. If such a representative function, therefore, as he asserts, is predicable of the passages to which the discussion relates, their language is not its medium, but the agents, objects, and acts which that language denotes ; and accordingly, could he even demonstrate the reality of such a representative function, it would not affect in the least degree the truth of the views we have advanced of the law of the metaphor. That law would remain unrefuted, and would sustain all the conclusions of which we have made it the ground ; inasmuch as the metaphor is a function exclusively of *words*, not of *things*, and is nothing else than a use of them in a peculiar relation. On the other hand, if that is truly the law of the metaphor, his theory of a representative sense is confuted, inasmuch as he holds that it is through *the metaphor* that the passages in question "denote something else than the agent or object indicated by the literal terms." The question then is, whether the axiom we have stated, is truly the law of the figure. And in the first place, he in fact admits it. For he asks, "Who has ever held that the subject or agent named in a metaphor was not in the first instance to be literally understood ? Who has ever imagined that any other people than Jacob or Israel were intended by *the literal names* here employed ? Who has ever supposed that any other person than Jeremiah was primarily referred to, when the Most High affirmed that he would make him a fenced brazen wall ? We have never heard of any such theory, nor can we conceive that Mr. L.

has any such in his eye." But this is a concession of the very point which he denies. If, as he admits, and as is indisputable, the term in a metaphorical expression, denoting the agent or object of which the affirmation is made, is used literally, then that is its only meaning, and the agent or object which it literally denotes, is the real and sole subject of the affirmation; for the figure lies not in the name denoting the subject of which the affirmation is made, but in the terms expressing that affirmation. When it is said, for example, the landscape *smiles*, the word landscape denoting the subject of the proposition is used literally; and the figure lies in the use of the verb *smiles*, which properly signifies a movement or condition of the human face, that is not literally possible to a landscape, and is employed to denote a cheerfulness and beauty of appearance that give the beholder a pleasure analogous to that produced by a smile. If the word landscape were not used literally, the expression would be nugatory; as there would be no means of determining what it is that is said to smile. If, besides the literal, there were also a representative meaning in the passage, the landscape or visible scene itself would be the medium of it, not the word by which it is denoted. That the word landscape in the expression should have a representative function, or bear a secondary sense by virtue of the metaphor, which is limited to the verb, is absolutely impossible from the nature of the figure. This, Prof. B., if he carefully considers it, cannot fail to perceive. It is totally to mistake the office of words, to ascribe to them a representative function. They are mere *names* of the things to which they are appropriated; not symbols of them, by virtue of an analogy subsisting between them and those things. No conception could be more utterly groundless, and inconsistent with their nature and uses. Professor B., then, in admitting the fact that the terms which denote the subjects of metaphorical affirmations, are used literally, admits that their literal is their only meaning, and cuts himself off from the pretence that they also have, by virtue of the metaphor, a representative office.

We earnestly invoke the attention of the spiritualizers, whether of his or other schools, to this characteristic of the metaphor. No question of hermeneutics was ever debated, of

greater moment to the truth, or that affected the import of a more important part of the word of God. No law was ever advanced that worked the confutation of a greater mass of constructions that are current in the theological world, or unfolded and demonstrated on a greater scale, the true but now unperceived and rejected meaning of the sacred word.

In the next place, if Professor B. would confute this view of the metaphor, and maintain the ground he assumes against it, he must not only express his opinion that the terms denoting the subject to which the figurative affirmations are applied, though used literally, have a representative function, but he must both bring positive proofs of it, and show that they have that function by virtue of the metaphor, or that the figure by the law of its nature invests them with that symbolic office. If he cannot produce such proofs, his theory is a mere gratuitous assumption, and can contribute nothing towards overturning the positive proofs—in effect admitted by himself—of the truth of the view we have advanced of the figure.

Let him show then, if he can, that it is the office of the metaphor to invest the term that denotes its subject with such a representative power. Let him show, as his theory requires, that it is the office, not only of here and there a metaphor or metaphors that occur in the Scriptures, but of all metaphors whatever, and that they must universally, therefore, be interpreted in accordance with that assumption. And finally, let him show what it is that is denoted in that relation by the principal metaphors of the Bible and the great poets and orators. In the metaphor, for example, "All flesh is grass," what is it of which the *word* flesh,—in contradistinction from flesh itself, of which the word is the name,—is the symbol? In the expression, "Wisdom is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her," what is it of which the *word* wisdom is the symbol, in contradistinction from wisdom itself, of which the word is the name? What is it that the word *nature* symbolizes in the same relation in the expression, "nature droops?" Here is a wide field for the display of the professor's powers, and that has hitherto been wholly neglected. We shall look for novel and brilliant developments from its investigation.

In the third place: It will prove an embarrassment to that

undertaking, that should he succeed in it, he will thereby overturn his theory of symbolization as effectually as our views of the metaphor. For the theory of symbols entertained by Swedenborg, on which he proceeds, ascribes their representative function altogether to things; not, as Professor B. here does, to the words that are their names. The relation of effects to causes, and the correspondences supposed by him to subsist between objects sustaining that relation to one another, which is the basis of his theory of symbolization, is a relation subsisting between spiritual or physical and material *existences*, not between mere *words* as their denominatives.

How is he to justify this important addition to the theory of Swedenborg, whom he takes as his guide? As he advances in the investigation, he will find it necessary, we doubt not, to relinquish his theory of the symbolic office of words, and limit that function to things; and when he reaches that result, he will have abandoned the whole ground on which he now controverts what we maintain as the law of the metaphor. He now, however, directly denies the truth of that law, and alleges what he regards as examples of the figure, which, he asserts, prove at least that it is not universally true. Some of the passages, however, which he alleges are not metaphorical, and such as are, instead of confuting, exemplify and confirm the law. He says:

“The canon here very distinctly announced is, that the subject of the metaphor is always expressly named—that it is not left to be ascertained by interpretation, as in the case of symbols. A principle so confidently put forth had need to be very richly endowed with self-evidence, or susceptible of ready and abundant proof. In both respects, however, it is sadly deficient. *The simple illustrations he has given may conform to the rule, BUT IN HUNDREDS OF INSTANCES IT WILL NOT HOLD.* Take, for instance, the following: Jer. v. 5, 6—‘I will get me unto the great men, and will speak unto them; for they have known the way of the Lord, and the judgment of their God; but these have altogether broken the yoke, and burst the bonds. Wherefore, *a lion out of the forest shall slay them, and a wolf of the evenings shall spoil them, a leopard shall watch over their cities; every one that goeth out thence shall be torn in pieces, because their transgressions are many, and their backslidings are increased.*’ The lion, the wolf, the leopard, here mentioned, are used either metaphorically or literally. But will Mr. L. affirm the latter?

Does he suppose the great men of Jerusalem, who had known the way and the judgment of the Lord, but had transgressed and backslidden, were really threatened with being torn to pieces by ravenous wild beasts ?"—P. 401.

If Prof. B. is able to show that they were not really threatened with being torn in pieces by those wild beasts, why did he not prove it ? He has not offered a particle of evidence that the terms are not used literally. Why did he content himself with assuming what he was to demonstrate ? An example "so confidently put forth had need to be very richly endowed with self-evidence, or ready and abundant proof. In both respects, however, it is sadly deficient."

But that is not the only defect in his example. On the supposition that the lion, the wolf, and the leopard are not used literally, it does not follow, as he asserts, that they are employed metaphorically. So far from it, it is absolutely certain that they are not used by that figure, as they are the *subjects* of the affirmations with which they are connected, not the *predicates*, or parts of the predicates, of the propositions in which their names occur. But that figure is universally an element of the predicate of a proposition, never of its subject. There is no affirmation that something else is the lion, the wolf, and the leopard, as there would be were the terms by which they are named metaphorized—as when it is said, Judah is a lion, Joseph is a bough, all flesh is grass. But the propositions are, "a lion out of the forest shall slay them ; and a wolf of the evenings shall spoil them ; a leopard shall watch over their cities ;" which are acts that are perfectly suitable to the nature and habits of those animals. There is not a trace, therefore, of the metaphor in the passage. If the terms, lion, wolf, and leopard, are used by any figure, it is either the *hypocatastasis*—by which an agent, object, or act of one species is put for another of an analogous nature, in order to an emphatic exemplification of that which is meant—or else, which is their use here, the *synecdoche*, by which a part is put for the whole ; or, as in this instance, one of a species for a multitude. The destruction of the revolting Israelites by wild beasts, so far from being improbable, is one of the forms in which they were fore-

warned while on their journey from Egypt, that, if rebellious, they would be punished. "And if ye walk contrary unto me, and will not hearken unto me, I will bring seven times more plagues upon you according to your sins; I will also send wild beasts among you, which shall rob you of your children, and destroy your cattle, and *make you few in number*, and your high ways shall be desolate."—Leviticus xxvi. 21, 22. This example, then, contributes nothing to Professor B.'s purpose. It only shows that he has not studied the metaphor sufficiently to distinguish it from other figures; and this is a fair sample, doubtless, of the "hundreds of instances" in which he assures his readers the law of the metaphor he is combating "will not hold." He proceeds to another—

"Does he suppose that the great men of Jerusalem were really threatened with being torn to pieces with ravenous wild beasts? If it be so here, the same would seem to be intimated in the preceding chapter, v. 6, 7: 'Set up the standard towards Zion; retire, stay not; for I will bring evil from the north, and a great destruction. *The lion is come up from his thicket*, and the destroyer of the Gentiles, or the Gentile destroyer, is on his way; he is gone forth from his place to make thy land desolate, and thy cities shall be waste without an inhabitant.' Yet here the lion is so paralleled with the destroyer of the Gentiles, that it is clearly to be taken as what Mr. L. would call a metaphorical term. In like manner, the lion that was to slay the apostate great men is metaphorical also, denoting some evil agency by which their backslidings were to be punished. It is clear, therefore, that in this case the rule does not hold, that the subject of a metaphor is in all cases explicitly named, and is not left to be ascertained by interpretation. Some kind of interpretation is absolutely indispensable to determine what is meant by the animals here mentioned."—P. 401.

Here again, without a particle of evidence, and against the laws of the figure, he assumes that the expression is metaphorical. But the term lion is not used by that figure, indisputably, because it is not used in the predicate, but is the subject of the affirmation; nor is there any metaphor in the predicate, as that which is affirmed of the lion, "he is come up from his thicket," is in accordance with the nature and habits of that animal. The fancy that the expression is metaphorical is a total mistake, and indicates a singular in-

consideration of the nature of the figure. The lion is in this instance used undoubtedly by the hypocatastasis as a representative of the monarch of Babylon, the Gentile destroyer, who was on his way to invade the land, and make it desolate. This instance, therefore, like the former, is wholly irrelevant, and shows—not that the law of the figure, which he is attempting to refute, “in hundreds of instances,” “does not hold,” but only that he has not sufficiently made himself acquainted with its nature to distinguish it from the most dissimilar figures. He goes on :

“ But again, we are mystified by the author's use of the term ‘subject,’ in the connexion. What would he have us understand by the *subject* of a metaphor, which is ‘always expressly named?’ If we say that a ship flies over the waves, the subject of the metaphor is the subject of the predicate. But in prophetic language this will not always hold. Thus, in the passage alluded to, the lion is the subject of the predicate ‘slay ;’ but that which the lion *denotes* is the subject of the predication.”—P. 401.

But Prof. B. here proceeds on the mistaken assumption we have already confuted, that the passage in question, “the lion is come up from his thicket,” is metaphorical. There is no metaphor, however, in it. That which is asserted of the lion is not incompatible with its nature and habits. There is no transference of the verb, and the words associated with it in the affirmation, from a natural to an extraordinary and improper use. The figure of the passage, the hypocatastasis, is of a wholly different nature, embracing the agent of which the affirmation is made, as well as the act that is ascribed to it : the act also ascribed by it to the agent, is suited to its nature and habits, not, like that of the metaphor, of a species that is foreign to its nature, and peculiar to some other agent. It presents no evidence, therefore, against the truth of the proposition he employs it to overthrow, that the subject of the metaphor is always the subject of the predicate of the expression in which it occurs. He goes on :

“ Let us take, moreover, one of Mr. L.'s own examples of the metaphor, and see how it will fare under the application of his law. Is. i. 10 : ‘Hear the word of the Lord, ye rulers of Sodom ; give ear unto the law

of our God, ye people of Gomorrah.' Here our author expressly avers that the rulers of Sodom, and people of Gomorrah, denote the rulers and people of Jerusalem. Is it not obvious then, that the real subject of the prediction is not the subject of the predication, and that Mr. L. palpably confoundst he two?"—P. 401.

Here Professor B. assumes that the rulers of Sodom and people of Gomorrah are the subjects of a *predication*. But where is it? If there be one, why did he not point it out, and make his argument unanswerable? Why is it that he does not take care to see whether the ground on which he proceeds is legitimate or not; and if known to be tenable, present proof of it that will give assurance to his readers? But there is not the shadow of an affirmation in the passage of which the rulers of Sodom and the people of Gomorrah are the subjects. Instead, they are themselves elliptically predicated of the inhabitants of Jerusalem. The inhabitants of Jerusalem are the subject of the address in the passage, under the denomination of "the daughter of Zion," and are said to be "left as a cottage in a vineyard," "as a lodge in a garden of cucumbers; as a city that has been besieged." The prophet adds, "except the Lord of hosts had left unto us a very small remnant, we should have been as Sodom, we should have been like unto Gomorrah." They are then addressed by an apostrophe—as actually being the rulers of Sodom and the people of Gomorrah, "Hear the word of the Lord, ye rulers of Sodom, and give ear unto the law of our God, ye people of Gomorrah," which is equivalent to an affirmation that they were the rulers of Sodom and people of Gomorrah. They are treated by the figure as having been previously declared to be such. And the import of the expression is precisely such as it would have been had the words which the apostrophe rendered unnecessary been supplied:—Ye rulers of Jerusalem who are rulers of Sodom, hear the word of the Lord; ye people of Jerusalem who are people of Gomorrah, give ear to the law of our God. The only affirmation of the passage, which is an elliptical one—but so obvious as not to be misunderstood—is the affirmation that the rulers of Jerusalem are rulers of Sodom, and the people of Jerusalem people of Gomorrah; and that predication is meta-

phorical. The metaphor, therefore, in place of confuting is in harmony with the law he employs it to overturn, as the people of Jerusalem who are the subjects of the predicate, are the subjects of the metaphor. It is Mr. Bush accordingly, not we, who confounds the prediction with the inhabitants of Jerusalem, of whom it is made. He adds :

"In fact, another of Mr. L.'s examples confutes his canon. Jacob or Israel denotes, he says, that *people* only. But *literally* those are the names, not of a *people*, but of an *individual*, so that Jacob or Israel is not really the subject of what is predicated of him, but the posterity descended from him. We encounter a figure, therefore, when his principles, if sound, would require the utmost literality of speech. From all this we may learn what judgment to form of the self-evident axiom that in metaphorical passages the agent or object to which the figure is applied, is the agent or subject of that which the prediction expressed by the metaphor foreshows. That is to say, the subject of the predicate is in all cases the subject of the prediction,—a most palpable error, as we have shown above, and could easily confirm by additional scores of examples."—P. 402.

The truth of this very confident conclusion respecting the terms Jacob and Israel, depends on the propriety of the assumption that they are used in the instances to which he refers by a *figure*. But if they are, why did he not prove it? Why did he not show what the figure is by which they are employed, and become the names of the descendants of the patriarch, instead of the patriarch himself? Or if he can point to any passage in which, as he asserts, we have represented that they are "only" used to denote that people, never as the name of their progenitor, why did he not produce it?

These assertions astonish us. We have never made any such statement. We have only affirmed that *in the instances in which they are used as the denominatives of the Israelites*, they signify that people only, in opposition to the opinion held by Professor B. and others, that instead of that people, they really, in those cases, denote Gentile nations, or Christian converts. He is equally mistaken in the assertion that it is by a figure that they are used as the appellatives of the Israelitish people. There is no trope in that use. There is no figure by which such a change in their signification could

be wrought. If Professor B. is aware of any that would work such a change of meaning, let him designate it. The metaphor would not. There could not be a metaphor in calling the descendants of Jacob and Israel by his name; as it is just as compatible with their nature that they should be called Israel and Jacob, as it is with his. The metonymy would not. In that figure, that from which the name is taken is always of a different nature from that to which it is transferred. A table, for example, is put for the food that is set on it; a head for the mind that animates it; a land, as Syria, Assyria, Egypt, France, England, for the people inhabiting it. But there is no such difference of nature between Jacob and his descendants. Instead, they are of the same species. Nor will the synecdoche work such a change of meaning; as in that figure, a part is put for the whole, or the whole for a part; but Jacob himself is not in these instances put for his descendants, nor his descendants put for him. The names Jacob and Israel, when used to denote the Israelitish people, are used absolutely and literally as their names, and not as his. There was then no more room in it for a figure, than there now is in the denomination of children, families, and generations of descendants, by the name of a common parent. Is it by a figure of speech that the direct descendants of the first colonists of this country still bear their family name; that those of the lineage of a Winthrop are called Winthrop; those Mather who are of the line of a Mather; and those Hooker, Edwards, Lathrop, Huntington, Stuyvesant, or Livingston, who are the offspring of ancestors of those names? The fancy that the patronymic is used by a figure in the one instance any more than the other, is wholly groundless and absurd.

Such is the issue of Professor B.'s attempt to confute the law of the metaphor. Not one of the instances he alleges presents the slightest inconsistency with it.

He proceeds to animadvert on the axiom that "verbal prophecies have no meaning except that of which their terms are the media."

"Verbal prophecies, in the diction of our author, are what he regards as unfigured and unsymbolical prophecies; and these, he says, have no meaning except that of which their terms are the media; and by this, we

understand him to assert, that they have no other than a literal meaning."—P. 402.

This is a singular mistake. A verbal prophecy is a prophecy that is conveyed through language, in distinction from one of which symbols are the media. It does not follow, therefore, from the fact that a prophecy is verbal, that the language in which it is expressed is used only in a literal, never in a figurative, sense. It is as consistent with the nature of a prophecy in words, that some of them should be used by figures, as it is that some of them should be used literally. What the axiom asserts, accordingly, is not what he ascribes to it, but simply that language prophecies have only the meaning which their language—whether literal or figurative—expresses; and not in addition to that, as Professor B. and others hold, a representative meaning, of which the agents, objects, acts, or events signified by its words, are the medium. He proceeds:

"We should be pleased to know under what head Mr. L. would class the following: Mal. iv. 5, 6, 'Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet, before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord, and he shall turn the hearts,' &c. This is thus interpreted by the Lord, Matt. xi. 13, 14, 'For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John. And if ye will receive it, this is Elias which was for to come.' If our author will admit the Lord himself as a competent expounder of his own word, we are at a loss to perceive how he can refuse to concede that a verbal prophecy may have some other meaning than that which the literal terms convey."—P. 402.

He here proceeds again on the mistaken assumption we have already refuted, that the words of a verbal prophecy are never used in a figurative sense. We not only have not made any such averment, but it is inconsistent with all the representations we have made on the subject. This instance, therefore, like all that had preceded it, is wholly irrelevant.

The figure by which the prediction which he proposes for explanation is used, is the hypocatastasis. That the promise is figurative, is seen from its fulfilment in John. But the figure is not the metaphor; as the event predicted of Elijah was not incompatible with either his nature, or the power of

God. He still existed in the body, and was capable, therefore, of a manifestation to men, as was exemplified indeed in his visible presence at Christ's transfiguration. It was perfectly possible, also, to God, as was also shown at that time, to send him to the earth, and enable him to fulfil a mission to men. The prediction, therefore, is not metaphorical.

The only other figure by which it can have the meaning Christ ascribes to it is the hypocatasis, by which an act of one kind is put for one of another, of an analogous nature; or the sending an ancient prophet who exercised his ministry among an apostate people, for the sending of another to them of a similar boldness, fidelity, and power, as a harbinger of Christ. The supposition that it may have a further fulfilment by the mission of others to the Israelites like John, immediately before Christ's second advent, is consistent, also, both with the figure and the context, which relates, there is reason to believe, to his second appearing. It may be, that the conversion of a portion of the Israelites, which is to take place antecedently to his coming, and the general desire to return to their native land with which they are to become animated, are to be the consequence in a measure of the teachings of a body of extraordinary ministers.

He closes his criticisms on the laws of figurative language by objecting to the axiom, "that symbolical prophecies have no meaning but that of which their symbols are the media. The language by which they are described is never, in the same instance, the media of the same or another revelation." He says—

"The formal annunciation of this axiom would seem to imply that somebody had held the contrary. As a general rule, we have never conceived that any one could differ from our author. We have never heard of any one who questioned that Daniel's vision of the four beasts, for instance, had one definite and exclusive signification, could it be ascertained. What that signification is, is indeed a point of various and conflicting speculation; but expositors have usually been agreed to admit that one symbol has but one meaning in one place."—P. 403.

Professor B. cannot have considered the true import of the axiom, as it is directed both against him, and a great body of interpreters with whom he is familiar. It denies the

assumption, for example, on which all those proceed, who hold that the names denoting the subjects of metaphorical predictions are themselves also used by the metaphor, and that the effect of the figure is that they are made symbols of other agents and events of an analogous nature, as they treat those predictions as at the same time both symbolical and verbal. It is directed against a class of German expositors, also, and their followers, such as Professor Stuart, who do not regard the symbols, even in symbolic prophecies, as the media of the revelation, but hold that those predictions, like others, are to be interpreted by "the established principles of *historico-grammatical* exegesis."

Such are the expedients by which Prof. Bush endeavors to invalidate and overturn the laws of figurative language. Can the reader wish a more effective answer to his objections? Is there any one of his allegations to which we have not given a full reply, and a reply that is in harmony with and the offspring of the principles of language we are endeavoring to maintain? We find no necessity of modifying any of the axioms he assails, nor of advancing any new hypothesis to meet the difficulties he has suggested. Those, however, who are accustomed to spiritualize the Scriptures will, perhaps, continue to assume that though the passages alleged by Professor B. are thus satisfactorily explained, there yet are "hundreds of others" that do not admit of such a reconciliation with the principles we maintain. If there are, let them be produced. We are not aware of any of which the axioms we have advanced do not furnish an equally natural and perfect solution.

ART. IV.—THOUGHTS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPHECY.

IN addressing ourselves to the work of interpreting prophetic Scripture, we should proceed on the assumption that the language of the sacred writers is intelligible. Ancient heathenism had its oracles. Its priests affected a peculiar mystery. They carefully avoided familiarity with the multitude. They delivered oracular responses from dark and secluded recesses or caverns, in which they professed to have

free intercourse with a divine being who knew future things. These responses were uttered in ambiguous and enigmatical phrases. It was impossible to obtain from them a certain, well defined signification. It can hardly have escaped the observation of any who have given attention to the origin of religious opinions, that all persons who adopt false religious theories, are inclined to think that the facts which are the basis of a religious faith, are communicated to men in obscure hints or allegories which can be understood only by sacred persons or philosophers, whose minds are so refined by abstract speculation, that they can discern, what, for wise reasons, is concealed from the vulgar. There is yet another class of errorists who profess to be inspired by the Holy Spirit, so that they can understand what is revealed in the Bible. They despise the laws of language, and pretend that they are taught what to believe and what to do, by impulses which they receive directly from the Spirit of God. We shall not attempt a full explanation of this peculiarity of errorists. We will, however, suggest, that as all error is a phantom, or misconception of a perverted intellect or imagination, and cannot from its nature assume a consistent form, and the more the mind labors to give it consistency, the more it becomes bewildered,—the advocates of false doctrines are very apt to think that all persons are equally perplexed with themselves, and to impute to the Sacred Scriptures the obscurity and darkness which exist in their own disordered minds.

1. God has taught us that his word is intelligible. He said by his prophet Isaiah, "I have not spoken in secret, in a dark place of the earth," Isaiah xlv. 19. This declaration was made in connexion with a prophecy respecting the future prosperity of the seed of Jacob. The Bible contains many passages in which we are taught that God has revealed himself in language which is easily understood.

Deut. xxix. 29, "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God; but those *things* which are revealed *belong* unto us and to our children for ever, that we may do all the words of this law." Again the Lord spake by his servant Moses, Deut xxx. 11-14, "For this commandment which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off.

It is not in heaven that thou shouldest say, who shall go up for us to heaven and bring it unto us, that we may hear it and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, who shall go over the sea for us and bring it unto us that we may hear it and do it? But the word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it." The truths which God has been pleased to reveal are given in the language of our mouth, in the words by which we converse with each other, and are addressed in a clear, unambiguous manner to the heart. The Bible is so easily understood, that even children and unlearned persons are under no absolute necessity of depending upon priests or philosophers to make known the meaning of the messages by which Jehovah communicates to his people what he would have them know respecting himself and their relations to him.

2. That the sacred Scriptures are written in perspicuous language, is confirmed by those declarations which affirm that, in them, the Holy Spirit instructs the ignorant, makes the simple wise, and reveals the sublime mysteries of godliness to babes. The Psalmist celebrates the perspicuity of the word of God in the following beautiful strains, "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple." . . . "The entrance of thy word giveth light; it giveth understanding to the simple." Nothing can exceed the elegance and sublimity of the words of our Saviour, when he spoke of the fact that the truth is revealed to persons whose minds are characterized by true simplicity. "At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight."

This fact is strikingly exhibited, also, in the calling of the church. What the apostle affirmed of the Corinthians, has always been verified in the history of Christ's true disciples. "For ye see your calling, brethren, how, that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called. But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise."

We are not to understand from these, and similar texts, that, in the Bible, the truth is revealed to a simplicity of idiocy or stupidity. Those who are enlightened by the word of God, have an earnest, conscientious, but modest mind. They are conscious of ignorance, and desire to be instructed. They know that in themselves they are without strength and wisdom, and wish to be told in plain language what truth is. They think that God speaks what he means, and it is only necessary to give good heed to his words to understand him. We all know enough of human character, to be assured that this class of persons would never know the true meaning of the sacred Scriptures, if they were not written in simple, intelligible, unsophisticated language. Though they may not be able to analyse a passage of Scripture, and give the principles by which it should be interpreted, yet guided instinctively by the laws of their own minds, they ever apply the rules of exegesis to what they read with rigid exactness. They have no suspicions of an affected obscurity to please a disordered taste; a rhetorical flourish, to gratify those who are more pleased with distortion than with natural eloquence; of a design to conceal truth from the unhallowed familiarity of the vulgar. In their simplicity they think the writer expresses his thoughts just as they are, and with a simplicity like their own. To this very class, the word of God is addressed. To them it was first spoken, and they were its first and most accurate interpreters. They understand it. It is, therefore, plain, and gives the truth in a language easily understood, and capable of an accurate and certain construction.

3. We are admonished to regard the language of the Bible as intelligible, by the fact that in it truth is revealed to faith. It may be proper in this place to make some remarks respecting the true office of philosophy and of faith, and their relation to each other.

Philosophy—when it fills its proper office—treats in a clear and accurate manner of those subjects which lie within the compass of the understanding. It extends no further than the capabilities of the mind to observe and accurately define or comprehend. It is not so much conversant about the nature of things, as of their qualities, attributes, and relations. While

it is constantly extending its dominion, it always leaves an immense, yea, infinite field of knowledge unexplored. Philosophy treats of facts which have been developed in the regular operation of things ; or which have been brought out by investigation and experiment. It combines these facts, notices their relations, and observes the consequences that result from them.

Faith apprehends facts that are without the sphere of our direct perception ; and of which we cannot gain a knowledge by observation or induction. It seizes hold of the real existence of that which lies beyond the reach of science or philosophy. It claims not the power of comprehending. It asks not for proof. It is satisfied with the simple declaration of the divine word, giving truth in intelligible propositions or statements. As the confiding child believes his teacher when he says, the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles, and the proposition is intelligible to him, though he cannot demonstrate its truth, so the child of God receives as true, without being able to solve its mystery, the proposition that God can "be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." And the fact thus stated and received by faith, is as clearly apprehended, and a knowledge of it as beneficial as it would be, if we were able to comprehend the mysterious efficacy of the blood of Christ. The facts, a knowledge of which is communicated to the mind by faith, are often mysterious in their nature, and it is sometimes impossible for us to reconcile them with other well established facts. Knowledge by faith is most certain. It cannot receive aid from demonstration. It has for its guarantee the truth of God. Knowledge by faith must always be more excellent than that of philosophy, for it gives to us facts respecting God, the wonders of his works of creation and providence, his moral government and redemption, which are beyond the sphere of philosophy. Philosophy may creep along after faith, but can never gain upon it in its rapid strides in divine knowledge.

But our limits will not permit an extended discussion of this part of our subject. A few examples will be sufficient to illustrate it.

On a certain occasion, when our Saviour taught the people that the Son of man must be lifted up, the people answered him, "We have heard out of the law that Christ abideth

for ever, and how sayest thou the Son of man must be lifted up? Who is this Son of man?" There were two facts clearly foretold by the prophets respecting Christ. One was that he should die for his people; the other that he should reign for ever with his people. These facts appeared, to the minds of the unbelieving Jews, to annul each other. They could not reconcile them. By an attempt to bring them within the province of philosophy, their minds were troubled, and to extricate themselves from difficulty they denied the former, as it was most offensive to their vain and selfish hearts. Faith would say that they are both true, and beautifully harmonize with each other, though finite minds cannot tell how, until prophecy shall have a realization in history.

The knowledge of the Pharisees, who seemed to think they had a perfect understanding of the Scriptures, was put to the test in the following manner, "Jesus asked them, saying, What think ye of Christ? Whose son is he? They say unto him, the son of David. He saith unto them, how then doth David in Spirit call him Lord, saying, the Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou on my right hand till I make thine enemies thy foot-stool? If David call him Lord, how is he his son?" Their philosophy could not answer this question; and ever since that day, those who have "trusted" that their philosophy could "draw up" the infinite ocean of truth, have not been able to give it a solution; and they shrink from the consideration of it, in confusion, from a consciousness of their inability. But faith receives both facts contemplated in the question, and adores that Being, the mystery of whose existence can never be solved by finite minds.

One more illustration will suffice. The prophet foretold that Jerusalem should be destroyed, and that the Jews should be carried into captivity, after the coming of the Messiah. It was also revealed that, under the reign of the Son of Man, the seed of Jacob should be exalted. It is evident, that at the time of the first coming of Christ, the Jews could not reconcile these prophecies with each other.

They evidently either lost sight altogether of the first, or gave it an allegorical interpretation. And since it has been verified in history, so literally, that no account of the overthrow of the Jews and their miseries can be more accurate

than that contained in the writings of the prophets; a large part of the Christian world are unwilling to believe that the latter can be anything more than a figurative representation of the future prosperity of the church. But faith in the divine testimony gives literal reality to what remains, as well as to that which has already been fulfilled.

Philosophy is constantly extending into the regions of faith, as there is a development of facts revealed in prophecy. But the importance of faith is by no means diminished, for it has the everlasting Jehovah for its object, and philosophy can never, by adding finite to finite, approximate even to a comprehension of all which faith receives and rejoices in.

As philosophy comprehends its object, the language of a philosophical treatise may be modified according to the nature of the subject to which it relates, provided it is understood. And if there are inaccuracies, they can be detected, and corrected. If words are used out of their ordinary signification, their meaning can be defined.

But as faith respects things of which we could have no knowledge unless they were made known to us by another, and which, even then, are often mysterious and sometimes apparently contradictory to each other, or other known facts, we are dependent upon the accuracy of the description given by the informer for a true knowledge of them. If his language is such that it cannot be subjected to the laws of interpretation, which are universal and inherent in the minds of the unlearned as well as of the learned, it will not—nay, it cannot, enlighten us. When our knowledge depends upon the words of another, there is a necessity that they be accurate and intelligible. If they are not, we shall remain in ignorance, or, what is worse, be led into error. We cannot, by a comprehension of the subject, correct his errors or evolve his meaning, given in a manner which is in direct violation of the fundamental laws of interpretation. Philosophy may sit in judgment on language which belongs to its province, but it has no business with those communications which are addressed to faith alone, excepting to suppress vain speculations, and restrain investigation within the appropriate bounds of philology. Whenever philosophy attempts to usurp on over faith, and to dictate to her what she is to

receive from communications made to her by a revelation from God, she assumes a position that is out of her sphere; exalts herself above God; and shows by her vain words and false teachings, that her boasted wisdom is but folly and her knowledge ignorance. The language addressed to faith is simple and easily understood; or if it be not, faith will presume that it is. We always expect that he who would make us acquainted with a fact of which we had before been ignorant, will tell us his story in a simple, unaffected manner, or with such figures and illustrations as will give us a more definite and impressive view of the subject, than could otherwise be obtained. A narrator who should do otherwise, would be considered guilty of an unpardonable offence, not only against the rules of rhetoric, but also against good breeding.

It is not unfrequently urged that the language of the sacred Scriptures is made obscure by the frequent use of figures of speech, or poetic imagery. This notion is based upon a misconception of the nature of poetry and of figurative language. We readily acknowledge that the effusions of transcendentalists and many other modern writers, misnamed poetry, are often so obscure, that no one can obtain a definite idea of their object. The reason, however, is, that they have none to express. They seem to think that the "hiding of their power" consists in being unintelligible.

The object of poetry is to present truth in an interesting form, and as far as possible give an exact picture of what is described. Figures of speech may abound in good poetry, but are not necessary to it. In all good writing, tropes are introduced only when they are useful, either because there are no literal words that are so appropriate to depict what the author would describe, or in order to give a more lively impression than can be produced by the use of literal terms. When a lecturer wishes to describe to us what we have neither seen with our eyes, nor heard with our ears, or what our hands have not handled, or what cannot be subjected to the power of abstract reasoning, he often uses diagrams, paintings, or moulds, to aid our minds to a clear conception of it. The appropriate office of poetry is much the same. Of the ancient Grecian literature, poetry is by far the most

easily understood. Of all uninspired books, the Iliad of Homer gives the conceptions of the author in the most perspicuous and impressive manner. His figures do not "darken counsel by words without knowledge," but present the objects of which they treat with such distinctness and clearness that they could hardly have been better understood by an eyewitness. If a man knew only the poetry of Homer, or of the sacred Scriptures, he would regard the idea that poetry or figures of speech are obscure, as absurd. In Homer's most animated descriptions, in which comparison follows comparison in rapid succession, separated only by a brief allusion to what he would describe, his language is as transparent as air. In those passages we have the appropriate use of comparisons, and it is for this purpose that they are used in the Bible. And, notwithstanding all that has been said about the obscurity or ambiguity of the Oriental style, there is no uninspired book which so nearly resembles the sacred writings as the Iliad of Homer. The student of that great poet can hardly avoid noticing the similarity between his style and that of the prophets, and especially of our Saviour. The reason is obvious. The language of both is in accordance with the rules of rhetoric, natural, simple, pointed, and perfectly intelligible.

4. We are taught in the Bible that believers have a most perfect assurance of the reality of the facts which it reveals; and this is another proof that the language of the sacred Scriptures is both intelligible and easily understood.

That we may have a perfect assurance of the facts revealed in the Bible, it is necessary that we should be able to know that it is the word of God. Though the world by wisdom knows not God, nor that the Bible is the word of God, there is a wisdom in faith which knows both. Faith is not that blind thing, which they suppose, who in their own self-conceit think they receive nothing as certainly true which they cannot comprehend or measure by their philosophy. The believer has two ennobling characteristics. He is able to know God, and to trust in his word as the perfection of reason and of wisdom. He possesses within himself integrity, the image of the truth of God. He is able to distinguish
 • and what is human, between what is

infinite and what is finite, between what is infallible and what is fallible. Thus we are taught by the Apostle in the first epistle to the Corinthians, "Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given us of God." But we cannot enlarge on this topic.

An ability to understand the Bible is also essential, that we may have a perfect assurance of the facts which it reveals. The believer does not merely know that the Bible is the word of God, and therefore true. He knows what the things are which are true. There would be little consolation in knowing that the sacred Scriptures teach the truth, unless we could know what the truth is. But it may be urged that, while some parts of the Bible are easily understood, other parts, and especially those which are prophetic, are obscure. It should be remembered that the gospel connects what has been, and now is, with what shall be, in such intimate relations, that a knowledge of one necessarily requires a knowledge of the other. How can a person know the desert of sin, unless his mind, by the aid of prophecy, looks forward to the future condition of those who die in unbelief? Who could understand the full design of the death of Christ, had not God, in the language of prophecy, told us of his exaltation, and the condition of the redeemed in his kingdom?

Still it may be urged that there are difficulties in the interpretation of the prophetic writings, and that Peter has taught us that there are, in the character he ascribes to Paul's writings. "Even as our beloved brother Paul, also, according to the wisdom given unto him hath written unto you, as also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction."—2 Peter iii. 15, 16.

It is worthy of notice, that the apostle places the difficulty in the subject, and not in the language of the inspired writer. Prophecy often relates to events which had never been developed in the history of God's dealings with men. It is with difficulty that the mind forms a definite idea of what has never existed, and which scarcely finds any resemblance in anything which had hitherto come under the observation of man.

On this account the writings of the prophets are but little understood. Many persons, because they cannot comprehend how the things foretold will come to pass, inasmuch as the like never existed, hesitate not, according to the apostle, to wrest the Scriptures. That is, they reject the obvious sense, and give to the sacred writings an allegorical interpretation, suited to their fancy, and favoring their selfish feelings; and in this manner, pervert them to their own destruction.

From these considerations we should expect to find the language of the sacred Scriptures intelligible. It cannot be otherwise, since in them truth is revealed to a childlike simplicity, to babes. It is revealed to faith which seeks not to comprehend or contradict the words of God; which asks not for demonstration, but is satisfied with a knowledge of the momentous facts which are revealed for the consolation of those who believe.

If this is thought to be mere theory, let it be proved to be such. But if what we have suggested can be substantiated by facts, then it should be received as truth. We will readily grant that all theories should be tested, when the facts to which they relate have had their proper and legitimate development, in history or experiment. Many prophecies have had their fulfilment. The language of the prophets has been tested by history. We have, therefore, the means of determining whether it is obscure, allegorical, and enigmatical, or whether it is perspicuous, simple, literal, and easily understood. What then does history teach respecting this subject?

“The Lord said unto Noah, for yet seven days, and I will cause it to rain upon the earth forty days and forty nights.” History relates: “and it came to pass after seven days, that the waters of the flood were upon the earth, and the rain was upon the earth forty days and forty nights.”

The Lord told Abraham that his seed should be a stranger in a land that was not theirs, and should be afflicted 400 years. This prediction was literally fulfilled. The Lord commanded Moses to say unto the people, “as I live saith the Lord, as ye have spoken in mine ears, even so will I do to you. Your carcases shall fall in this wilderness, and all that were numbered of you, according to your whole number, from twenty years old and upward, which have murmured against

me ; doubtless ye shall not come into the land which I swear to make you dwell therein, save Caleb the son of Jephunneh, and Joshua the son of Nun." History records that this was all fulfilled to the letter : " Among these there was not a man of them whom Moses and Aaron the priests numbered, when they numbered the children of Israel in the wilderness of Sinai. For the Lord had said of them, they shall die in the wilderness, and there was not left a man of them save Caleb the son of Jephunneh, and Joshua the son of Nun." Samuel prophesied that David, the youngest son of Jesse, should be king over Israel ; and in due time David was made king according to the prediction.

" A man of God went out of Judah, by the word of the Lord unto Bethel, and Jeroboam stood by the altar to burn incense. And he cried against the altar, O, altar, altar ! Thus saith the Lord, behold a child shall be born unto the house of David, Josiah by name, and upon thee shall he offer the priests of the high places that burn incense upon thee, and men's bones shall be burnt upon thee." This is prophecy. What does history say ? " And as Josiah turned himself, he spied the sepulchres that were in the mount, and sent and took the bones out of the sepulchres, and burned them upon the altar, and polluted it, according to the word of the Lord, which the man of God proclaimed, who proclaimed these words."

Jeremiah prophesied respecting Zedekiah that his eyes should behold the eyes of the king of Babylon, and that he should be led to Babylon. Ezekiel prophesied that the Lord would bring Zedekiah to Babylon, but that he should not see Babylon, though he should die there. How could Zedekiah be carried to Babylon and see the king, but not see the city, in which he would live and die ? An infidel might deny, and a neologist might allegorize. But what says history ? " Then they took the king and carried him up unto the king of Babylon, at Riblah, in the land of Hamath, where he gave judgment upon him. And the king of Babylon slew the sons of Zedekiah before his eyes ; he slew also the princes of Judah in Riblah. *Then he put out the eyes of Zedekiah*, and the king of Babylon bound him in chains, and carried him to Babylon and put him in prison till the day of his death." If the reader would examine other

prophecies which have already been fulfilled, he will find a like correspondence between the language of the prophet and the historian, and facts in which the things foretold have had a fulfilment. I need not refer to the numerous predictions respecting Jerusalem, Nineveh, Babylon, Egypt, and Tyre, Cyrus, Nebuchadnezzar, and our Saviour, which have been long since fulfilled, and which so minutely described the facts or incidents to which they relate, that they are often quoted to prove the truth of divine revelation. It is peculiarly worthy of notice, that, although the language of the prophets is usually very concise, yet it presents a very comprehensive and even minute description of the things to which it refers.

But it may be asked, were not some prophecies given in figurative language, which have been fulfilled? We answer, yes; but the meaning of the prophet is not made uncertain by the use of figures. When the prophet would describe the feelings of men towards Christ, he said, "For he shall grow up before him as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground; he hath no beauty nor comeliness, and when we shall see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him. He was despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, and we hid, as it were, our faces from him. He was despised and we esteemed him not." Here is figure, but no obscurity. When the same prophet would describe the meekness of the Saviour, he said, "He was oppressed and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth. He is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth." All this was done, and no man complains of the obscurity of the language, because it is poetic. By a few examples we will illustrate the fact, that by the use of symbols the prophets set forth the things which they foretold in a clear light, and gave to their prophecies a more intelligible form.

"And it came to pass at that time, when Jeroboam went out of Jerusalem, that the prophet Ahijah, the Shilomite, found him in the way, and he had clad himself with a new garment, and they two were alone in the field; and Ahijah caught the new garment that was on him, and rent it in twelve pieces; and he said to Jeroboam, take thee ten pieces; for thus saith the Lord God of Israel, behold I will rend the

kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee." No one can fail to discover that the symbol in this instance makes the prophecy more perspicuous, and gives great force and energy to the words. It certainly makes nothing obscure.

"And when he was come unto us he took Paul's girdle and bound his own hands and feet, and said, thus saith the Holy Ghost, so shall the Jews at Jerusalem bind the man that owneth this girdle, and shall deliver him into the hands of the Gentiles." Why did the prophet use this symbol? Certainly it was not to make prophecy enigmatical. In the prophecy of Daniel symbols of another character are employed; but it is obvious that the language of the prophet is made more significant by them. The lion which had eagle's wings, the bear, the leopard, and the fourth beast without a name, but "dreadful and terrible and strong exceedingly, with great iron teeth," were fit symbols of the agents which God revealed by them. A very slight attention to this subject will be sufficient to convince every intelligent person that symbols, when their use is explained, give a distinct conception of the things which they represent. They have this advantage over a description by words only. Words have no resemblance to the ideas or objects, a knowledge of which they are employed to express. Symbols bear such a resemblance to the things which they represent, that we easily form from the one a conception of the other.

But perhaps some may ask, why spend so much time to prove that the language of the prophets is intelligible? Our answer is ready. It is not to be disguised that one, who, perhaps, more than any other, has been regarded as the father of exegetical studies in this country, is accustomed to speak disparagingly of all attempts to interpret the prophetic writings, his own and those of a few learned Germans, of course, excepted. It is also well known, that another individual, connected with one of our oldest theological schools, affects to sneer at those who believe that the prophetic Scriptures mean what they say. The sentiment that the writings of the prophets cannot be understood prevails to so great an extent, that but a few, even of the ministers of the Gospel, presume to give a positive opinion respecting

what the prophets have revealed. Their writings are accordingly neglected; and those who advance positive opinions respecting them are held up to ridicule as vainglorious enthusiasts, or ambitious of the reputation of discovering some new thing.

Our second reason for dwelling so long on this subject is, that if we believe the language of the prophets to be perspicuous, we shall interpret their writings according to the laws of philology,—if, on the other hand, we believe that the prophetic writings are enigmatical, our interpretations will be more in accordance with our own fancies than with the principles of hermeneutics.

It is not the design of this essay to give rules for the interpretation of prophetic writings. There can be no doubt that they conform to the principles which are inherent in all well written productions. A few suggestions will be made, which we consider important to the interpreter.

1. The first inquiry of the interpreter should respect the subject of the prophetic announcements, or in other words, the person or persons, or the place or places of which the predictions are made. If it is known who or what it is to which the revelations relate, the interpretation is usually free from difficulty: but so long as it is unknown who or what it is of which the predictions are made, the prophecies must be unintelligible. If, for example, the Israelites are the subject of a prediction that literally foreshows their restoration, its meaning is obvious and certain. If, however, instead of really treating of that people, they are put as substitutes for another class of human beings, of whom no mention is made in the prophecy, its meaning must be altogether uncertain. Our judgment, therefore, respecting the subject should be correct, and our apprehension clear. The truth of this position, it would seem, must be obvious to all, and yet many publish comments on passages, the real subject of which they entirely misapprehend. The pernicious consequences of such an error are seen in the utter uncertainty in which they involve them, and the confused, absurd, and sometimes monstrous significations which they ascribe to them. They are bold in denying the truth, but often have nothing of which they themselves feel sure to substitute in its place.

Christ forewarned his disciples not to fear their persecutors. "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." There are those who positively affirm that hell is literally the name of the valley south of Jerusalem. And although the word, in this text, obviously means a place of punishment, where the wicked are punished after death, they, contrary to their usual custom, insist that the literal meaning of the word is to be retained, even though they are not able to give good authority for the assertion that hell literally means the valley called, in the Old Testament, the valley of the son of Hinnom. But when called upon to tell what the passage quoted above means, they find it impossible to give a definite answer. They suggest a variety of things, all of which are attended with so many difficulties that they will not positively adopt any one of them. Some say one thing and some another, while none of them know anything whereof they affirm. The truth is, they reject the subject plainly given in the passage, and thence their interpretations are necessarily nonsensical.

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Many learned men have asserted that this Scripture does not teach the divinity of Christ; but when asked to tell what it does teach, they have no definite answer to give. They offer conjectures about the text, or the translation, or give what they think may be a plausible rendering; but they show plainly that they have no great confidence in their own theories, and that they would be unwilling to have it thought that they considered any one of them as undoubtedly correct. So long as a writer thinks a passage of Scripture may mean this, that, or the other thing, or all of them together, it is absolutely certain that he does not understand it.

The subject of a prophecy is usually easily ascertained. It is frequently given in express or literal terms. When a prophecy refers to a particular place or nation, the name of that place or nation is usually given. The prophecy of Nahum commences with "the burden of Nineveh." This is enough to notify us that what follows relates to Nineveh. In many of the prophecies against Chaldea, either Chaldea or Babylon

is named as the object of the prophetic denunciation. The thirteenth chapter of Isaiah commences with "The burden of Babylon;" the fifteenth with "The burden of Moab;" the seventeenth with "The burden of Damascus;" and the nineteenth with "The burden of Egypt." When places are thus formally announced, we need not search further to find the subject to which the prophecy relates. We are under no necessity to prove that the language is used literally. If it is not, we may expect that we shall be notified of the fact in a manner not to be mistaken.

In very many prophecies the nation of Israel, by some appropriate term, is named as the subject. But it has been suggested, in respect to many of them, that while Israel is named as the subject, the church or spiritual, and not literal Israel is meant. And in confirmation of this interpretation, passages from the New Testament are cited, which teach that all believers are children of Abraham, and heirs according to the promise. It is said that the nation of Israel lost its position as the chosen people of God at the introduction of the gospel, and that the new order of things then established by the apostles is to continue until the end of time; that Israel is never again to be gathered and treated as the centre of the kingdom of God on earth. This suggestion deserves consideration.

There are two theories on this subject. One is, that on the introduction of the gospel, the nation of Israel was rejected, and the church, the spiritual Israel, substituted in its place. According to this theory, the apostles were exalted as the heads of the twelve spiritual tribes. They sat on twelve thrones judging these tribes. As the church continues, and, according to this view, will continue until the end of time, these twelve spiritual invisible tribes remain. And it would seem to follow that the apostolic office remains in the church, that the apostles had successors in office. And if so, it would not seem unreasonable that they should have chosen a president from their number, and called him "the Pope."

The other theory affirms that, while all believers are heirs according to the promise, they become so by being grafted upon the parent stock of Israel; that the Jews are broken off for a limited time only, and will be grafted in again; that the

Gentile Christians do not bear the root, but the root them; and that there is now but one Priest, who has passed into the heavens, where he waits till the time appointed for his return; that there is no temple or temple worship on earth; that for the present time only, the form of independent synagogue worship remains; and that at the appointed time Christ will come to reign, and then Jacob will arise and be increased by an innumerable number gathered from among the Gentiles; and the Apostles, according to Christ's promise, will reign with him, sitting on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. Which of these views accords with the Scriptures is a question of great interest, in the determination of which we must not allow ourselves to be biassed by preconceived theories, but be guided exclusively by the settled and unalterable laws of language.

When the subject is given in express terms, and that which is affirmed in the predicate, literally interpreted, is appropriate to that subject, it is improper and absurd to ascribe a figurative or allegorical signification to the language.

It may be proper in this place to make some remarks respecting allegorical interpretations. This species of exposition seems to have been introduced into the church by Origen. For many centuries, the practice prevailed of giving to the language of the Bible a double sense. The most simple narrative of facts was made to prove or illustrate some important Christian doctrine. The primary meaning was deduced by a philological interpretation. The secondary or allegorical sense was evolved, not by any established rules, but from a fancied discovery of a resemblance between what was literally described, and some received doctrine or custom of the church. It might, at first view, seem that the secondary sense would be harmless, provided it was made to harmonize with the truth established by an application of the laws of exegesis. But while some might be uninjured, multitudes who should make no discrimination between the primary and secondary sense might often be perplexed, and finally led to believe that the Bible is at best a blind book, since men of opposite opinions can, with equal seeming propriety, prove their views from the same passages.

This system of allegorizing Scripture is now generally dis-

carded by philologists. But there is another method of interpreting the sacred writings which rejects the literal or obvious sense, and adopts the allegorical as the only true meaning. This method of interpretation is worse than the former. By the former system the true meaning is acknowledged, though treated as of less importance than the secondary. But by the latter, all guides are thrown aside, and men are left to their own fancy to determine the meaning. The result is, that they go to what they call their intuitive or inductive powers to find out the will of God; while by inductive or intuitive powers are too often meant the impulses of depraved and sinful affections.

It is not here intimated that the sacred writers never made use of allegories to illustrate truth. Our Saviour often employed them. This species of writing is, under proper restrictions, not only intelligible, but presents the thoughts of the speaker or writer with greater perspicuity and force. Allegories, however, are admissible only when their object is expressly stated, or it can, by some other means, be perfectly well understood.

Our Saviour explained to his disciples the meaning of most of his parables. In some instances they were so apt, that even the blind Jews understood for what intent they were spoken. Always when he employed this mode of giving instruction, his hearers understood that his discourse was not to be taken literally. He did not always give to the multitude an application of his allegories, but the explanation is often written out by the historian. He withheld it from the unbelieving Jews, that his peculiar treatment of them might show others also, that he does not condescend to answer the objections of the caviller, or to give explanations and illustrations to those who deliberately reject the truth. This fact, therefore, will not justify the custom of giving an allegorical interpretation to Scripture according to one's fancy. In his peculiar manner, here referred to, Christ indirectly taught that in the word of God in which truth is revealed to faith, all parables and tropes are properly and fully explained. Accordingly, he said to his disciples, "It is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given." On account of those who have ears to hear, the

Scriptures are given in an intelligible form, but not to gratify men of corrupt minds, nor to justify the ways of God to the apprehension of human and perverted reason,

We will give a few examples of the substitution of a tropical for a literal signification of the language of Scripture. The 1st chapter of 2d Thessalonians, and the 3d chapter of 2d Peter, by one class of interpreters have been made to refer to the destruction of the Jews and the Gnostics and other heretics, preparatory to the introduction of the pure universal church. Another class of interpreters seem to refer them entirely to the destruction of the Jewish state, the miseries of the Jews, and the establishment of Christianity. It is in vain that you urge the obvious meaning of the language, and call attention to the fact that there is no allusion, either directly or indirectly, to the destruction of the Jewish nation or to the Gnostics. These interpreters think they can see some analogy between what is here described, and the events to which they make them refer. It is to no purpose that the Apostle Peter speaks of the destruction of the earth by comparing it with the former overthrow by the flood; and does this by way of reply to those who say "Where is the promise of his coming, for since the fathers fell asleep all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation?" This plain language being made doubly plain by the argumentative form, must be subjected to the allegorizing process, that it may be made to mean just what the interpreter chooses to evolve from it.

Equally absurd is the tropical interpretation put upon other passages, to which we will refer the reader, by another and more respectable class of expositors.

In Jer. xxxi. 35-40, there is a notable prophecy. The subject, as given by the prophet, is the perpetuity of the nation of Israel, and the rebuilding of Jerusalem, which he declares shall not be plucked up nor thrown down any more for ever. A similar prophecy is found in Jer. xxxiii. 19-26. In both of these passages the perpetuity of the nation of Israel is confirmed in a very solemn manner. "Thus saith the Lord which giveth the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night, which divideth the sea when the waves thereof roar; the Lord of

hosts is his name. If these ordinances depart from before me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel shall cease from being a nation before me for ever." This is the same Israel which had been repeatedly plucked up and afflicted, and whose fathers had been brought out of Egypt. There is a similar passage in the prophecy of Amos which closes with the following significant language : " And I will bring again the captivity of my people of Israel, and they shall build the waste cities, and inhabit them, and they shall plant vineyards and drink the wine thereof, they shall make gardens and eat the fruit of them, and I will plant them upon their own land, and they shall be no more pulled out of their own land which I have given them, saith the Lord God." This is spoken respecting the same Israel which God has sifted among all nations.

These passages are made to refer, by a class of interpreters, to the dispensation of the gospel as it now exists, while the nation of Israel is scattered and sifted among all nations. To allegorize these Scriptures, however, in this way, is, it is apprehended, to justify the wildest and most extravagant absurdities, of those who deny a future retribution, a resurrection, or other indisputable revelations of the sacred word.

On a certain occasion Jesus said to the Jews, " Marvel not at this, for the hour is coming in the which all that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of man, and shall come forth : they that have done good to the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of damnation," John v. 28, 29. By a class of interpreters this passage is made to designate a spiritual resurrection. The literal and obvious meaning of the terms is disregarded. Everything is made to yield to an allegorizing construction formed contrary to all rule, and without even the appearance of propriety, that a favorite theory may receive no detriment.

We will refer to another passage, Rev. xx. 4, 5, " And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them ; and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and whoever had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark on their foreheads, or in their hands ; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years.

But the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished." The subject of this prophecy, as given by the sacred writer, is the resurrection of saints, and their reign with Christ a thousand years. But this passage is allegorized by certain interpreters, so as to make it teach the reviving of the spirit of the martyrs in those who shall dwell on the earth during the millennium. It is to no purpose that the dead who are here spoken of, and whose resurrection is distinctly stated to be the subject of the vision, are a complement of the whole number of those who will have died before the thousand years commence ; and that the remaining part will be raised after the termination of that period, and that their resurrection is so manifestly to be literal that it is admitted even by those who make the first figurative. Such a subjection of the language of the sacred writers to the whims of interpreters who have the rashness to pervert it to support their theories, should be discountenanced and rebuked by all who revere the Scriptures. It is essentially as guilty as it were to reject them, or claim the right to assign them whatever meaning pride, presumption, or unbelief, pleases.

2. After ascertaining the subject of a prophecy we are prepared to examine the predicate ; and in that we are not to think it strange, if we meet with highly figurative language. But it will not be difficult to determine what is literal and what is figurative, if we diligently adhere to the following rule :— If the language presents an appropriate description of the known properties or qualities of the subject, if it involve no absurdity to give it a literal rendering, and if we are in no way notified that it is tropical, then we may safely assume that it is to be construed literally. When, on the other hand, we are required by good and substantial reasons to consider the language tropical, we should always bear in mind that figures are used to render truth more obvious and forcible than it could be made by literal terms, and by all means avoid the absurd notion that because language is figurative, every one is at liberty to understand it as he pleases. It is not, however, necessary to extend our remarks on this topic. We will only add that to deny the application of a trope to the subject which it is designed to illustrate or enforce, is as irrational and as much a violation of the laws of language as it

would be to refuse to words the signification which properly belongs to them.

3. We will suggest one topic more which should receive attention from those who would accurately interpret the sacred Scriptures. The leading object of a divine revelation should be thoroughly understood, and should have a due influence on the application of grammatical rules to particular passages. If we mistake not, this consideration is but little appreciated by many persons who think that great advances have been lately made in the science of hermeneutics. Modern expositors have been jealous of the application of the analogy of the faith to the interpretation of Scripture, as if it were pre-judging what they ought to teach. But as, in the word of God, truth is revealed to faith, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a true religious faith will so harmonize with the laws of language that we shall be greatly aided in applying them by it. Faith is a confidence in the words of another. So long as we study the Scriptures with this confidence in God's power and design to speak in plain intelligible language, we shall think much more of philology than of philosophy or the deductions of science. As the Bible harmonizes in all its parts, a knowledge of what is taught in one part will prepare us to understand what is written in other parts. A knowledge of what is taught in the Old Testament is a fit and necessary preparation for the study of the New. This fact is capable of an almost unlimited illustration.

There are two systems of interpretation. One is based upon confidence in the divine word, as giving a perfect exhibition of truth. This system assumes that we are ignorant and need instruction ; that in consequence of the fall, whereby we naturally love darkness rather than light, our preconceived opinions respecting truth are more liable to be wrong than right ; that our reason is so perverted that it cannot be trusted. It moreover assumes that in the gospel there is a system of truth revealed that is so transcendently excellent, that human and finite reason, however perfect, cannot be a proper judge of it. It is an embodiment of facts whose existence could not be known without a revelation from God.

The other system makes the reason, the intuitive and inductive powers, the supreme judge of truth. It subjects the

language of the Scriptures to the control of the reason of each individual interpreter.

Now, it has been conceded by the most learned rationalists, that that system which assumes that truth is revealed to faith, harmonizes best with a strict adherence to grammatical rules in the interpretation of Scripture. This being true, and no one, we presume, can doubt that it is, it is easy to understand how this system of truth which is derived by faith in the divine testimony, will prepare the mind to apply the rules of interpretation with facility and judiciously. Many passages, at which philosophy stumbles, are to faith perfectly clear and full of meaning. Their relation to the true religious system is readily discovered. On the other hand, those who appeal to reason as the standard of truth, will meet with difficulties at every step, from which they can free themselves only by forced constructions which violate every law of language, and arbitrary, allegorical interpretations, which would justify the most extravagant heretics. It may be asked, does not the system which is based upon faith in the divine testimony, as the true, and the highest reason, have its difficulties? We answer, yes. But they are such difficulties as arise from our limited powers. They are not philological difficulties. The doctrines of original sin, the new birth, the atonement, election, the resurrection, may have their metaphysical or philosophical difficulties, because our minds cannot comprehend all that God knows, all the reasons of his government, nor his eternal power and God-head. But there is no difficulty in deriving these doctrines from the sacred Scriptures, by a faithful adherence to the rules of exegesis. And it is a matter of history that these doctrines are rejected not on philological, but upon assumed philosophical grounds. The Christian is not greatly troubled because God has revealed facts which he cannot comprehend, but is in an agony when unable to make one passage of Scripture harmonize with another. While, therefore, it is decidedly wrong to adopt opinions dictated by our conceptions of what ought to be true, and force the Scriptures into a harmony with them, it is most obviously reasonable to expect that a system derived from the word of God by faith, will make the interpretation of many apparently obscure passages easy.

Indeed, much of the Bible is written as though those to whom it was addressed believed the true system of religious doctrines. We have frequently been asked, of what practical use is the belief that this earth is to be restored to its pristine fertility and salubrity, that Christ will appear and reign in person, and the saints with him, at the commencement of the millennium, and that other events which are foreshown in the prophecies are to take place? But it should never be asked, by the Christian, of what practical utility a belief is in the truth. If a doctrine or revelation is true, it should be believed without stopping to inquire whether the belief of it will do good. But the question can be easily answered. The Christian lives by his faith. Faith leans upon the divine testimony. The divine testimony is better understood when the system of religious belief is the result of a discovery of the harmony of all its parts. Our faith is perplexed, stumbled, and made weak, not by philosophical difficulties, but by being unable to reconcile a large part of the Bible with a theory which has been adopted, and is made a criterion of truth. We know not how it is with others, but we for many years labored under great perplexities and anxieties, because unable to make many Scriptures harmonize with the common opinion respecting the millennium. But, casting aside theories, and following philological guides, a beautiful harmony was at once discovered in the passages which before had embarrassed us with insuperable difficulties. Our limits will not permit a further discussion of this subject. We will only refer to a few passages of Scripture which illustrate these remarks. It appears from Daniel vii., 2 Thess. ii., and 2 Peter iii., that the persecuting power will continue until the Son of man shall make his personal appearance, for he will destroy the man of sin, at his coming. How then can a thousand years or more intervene, between the overthrow of the power of wickedness and the coming of the Son of man? It would seem from Acts i. 6, 7-11, and iii. 19, 20, 21, that the restoration of "the kingdom to Israel," under the personal reign of the Messiah, was taught by Christ and his apostles; and there is no way to avoid this conclusion, but by such forced constructions as will always perplex and obstruct those who maintain the

truth ; while they will justify errorists in supporting their dogmas.

The time has come when orthodox Christians should seriously inquire, whether they will apply to the interpretation of the prophecies the same rules as they employ in defending the doctrines of grace against Arminians and Socinians ; or whether they will adhere to a mode of interpreting those Scriptures which relate to the future state of the church, that fully justifies their opponents in their perversions of the sacred word.

H. C.

ART. V.—THE CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS AND LAWS OF PROPHETIC SYMBOLS.

A wish has been expressed that we would briefly state the chief characteristics and laws of prophetic symbols as they have heretofore been presented in the Journal ; exhibit the proofs by which they are sustained, and the results to which they lead ; and indicate the principal points which inquirers need to investigate in order to determine their truth and authoritativeness. We shall treat of the nature and classification of symbols, the marks by which the prophecies in which they are used are distinguished from those of which language is the medium, their laws as indicated in the inspired interpretations that are given of them, and the results to which they conduct in the construction of the principal uninterpreted symbols.

I.—THE NATURE OF PROPHETIC SYMBOLS.

A symbol is an agent or object employed as an instrument of revelation by the Most High, as the representative of an agent or object in respect to its nature, state, acts, or the events of which it is to be the subject. It is a necessary condition of its use that it should be beheld by the person to whom the revelation is made. The symbols were presented to those who witnessed them in three modes. 1. In dreams. 2. In ecstatic visions. 3. Naturally. Of the first class were those beheld by Joseph, Pharaoh, and Nebuchadnezzar. Of the

second, which are far the most numerous, were Jehovah, the cherubim and the temple of Ezekiel's prophecies, the Ancient of days, the Son of man, and the animals of Daniel's; and God the Father, the Lamb, the living creatures, the candlesticks and stars, the horsemen, the monster cavalry, the wild beasts, great Babylon, and others of the Apocalypse. Of the third class are the knife, the balance, the fire, the picture of Jerusalem, the pan and others of Ezekiel, and the high priest with crowns of Zechariah.

II.—THE CLASSES OF SYMBOLS.

The symbols consist of five classes: 1. Living conscious agents—as God, the Lamb, living creatures, angels, men, beasts, birds, fish, insects. Parts of animals are also used as symbols of corresponding parts of the combinations of men which the animals themselves represent, as heads, horns, eyes.

2. Dead bodies—as the slain witnesses; and parts of dead bodies—as bones and flesh.

3. Natural unconscious agents or objects—as the earth, sun, moon, stars, waters, winds, mountains, tempests, trees.

4. Artificial objects—as an image, candlesticks, a sword, cities, diadems, books, badges, names, marks, periods, measures.

5. Acts, affections, qualities, conditions, and relations of agents and objects—as speaking, fighting, heat, color, silence, height, direction.

The living agents consist of two classes: the intelligent and the unintelligent. To the first belong the divine—Jehovah, the Ancient of days, the Father, the Son of man, the Lamb, the Word. The second are created beings—1, seraphim; 2, cherubim; 3, living creatures; 4, angels; 5, Satan; 6, devils; 7, souls; 8, human beings in the natural life; 9, unclean spirits; 10, risen and glorified saints; 11, the unholy raised from death; 12, monster beings partaking of the human shape, as the horseman under the fourth seal and the horsemen under the fifth trumpet.

The living agents without intelligence are—1, beasts, such as the bear, the ram, the goat, horses; 2, monster animals, such as the winged lion, the winged leopard, the dragon of seven heads and ten horns, the monster horses of the sixth

trumpet ; 3, birds ; 4, fish ; 5, monster insects, the locusts of the fifth trumpet.

The symbols are exhibited in spheres that are appropriate to them, and the acts and phenomena ascribed to them accord with their nature. God is enthroned, receives the homage of intelligent creatures, makes revelations to men, rewards his children, and punishes his enemies. The Son of man is invested with the dominion of the earth, receives the homage of the living creatures, elders, and angels, opens the seals, and comes in glory with his risen saints to destroy the usurpers of his kingdom. The seraphim and living creatures attend the Almighty, and offer him homage. Angels stand in his presence, worship him, and act as his messengers, and the executors of his will. Men appear as kings, commanders, the subjects of conquering, oppressing, and slaughtering rulers, witnesses for God, idolaters, suffering corporeal inflictions, speaking, wondering, blaspheming, and being put to death. Ferocious beasts kill and devour their prey ; insects torture. Tempests sweep over the earth, and discharge lightning, rain, and hail. A volcanic mountain projects lava, discolours the sea into which it falls, and destroys fish and ships.

III.—THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH SYMBOLS ARE EMPLOYED.

The principle on which symbols are employed is twofold : 1, that of analogy, or a partial resemblance between agents or objects that differ in nature or relations ; and 2, that of general similarity or an exact likeness of nature. When the symbolic agent or object is of such a nature, or is used in such a relation that it can represent another agent or object differing from it in kind or relation while it resembles it, it is employed on that principle, and symbolizes an agent or object that differs from itself. Thus the four great beasts of Daniel's visions represent tyrannical men, who exhibit a ferocity of disposition, and exert a destroying agency towards the nations within their power, like that of those carnivorous beasts towards inferior animals which they made their prey.

When the symbol is of such a nature, or is used in such a condition or relation, that there is no analogical agent or object which it can represent, it is then used as its own representative, or the representative of one or more of its kind. Thus the palm-bearing multitude who are described

as having gone out of the great tribulation with robes made white in the blood of the Lamb, and as to be led by him to the fountains of the waters of immortality, are representatives of multitudes of all nations and peoples and kingdoms and tongues, who are to survive the great trials that are to precede and attend the advent of Christ, be justified, and made immortal; as there is no other class of mankind, or other intelligences, whom they can symbolize. There are none but human beings who wash their robes in the blood of the Lamb. There is no class of persons but those whose bodies are changed from mortal to immortal that they can represent. They were in bodies: otherwise their drinking of the fountains of the waters of life would have been unnatural. They were in immortal bodies: as the waters of life are the waters of immortality. In like manner, the risen saints, *Rev. xx. 4-6*, denote risen saints; the souls of martyrs under the fifth seal, the souls of martyrs; and the risen dead of the last resurrection, the risen dead of that epoch.

IV. THE LAWS OF SYMBOLIZATION.

1. THE FIRST LAW. THE SYMBOL AND THAT WHICH IT REPRESENTS RESEMBLE EACH OTHER IN THE STATION THEY FILL, THE RELATION THEY SUSTAIN, AND THE AGENCIES THEY EXERT IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES. This is true universally, whether the symbol is employed on the principle of a partial resemblance, or of an exact likeness. Thus an agent symbolizes an agent; an object of agency represents an object of agency; an act denotes an act; an effect foreshows an effect; an office, condition, or characteristic, an office, condition, or characteristic. A living agent symbolizes a living agent; a conquering agent denotes a conquering one; a destroying or tormenting one represents a destroyer or tormentor. A symbol used in the relation of an instrument or auxiliary, as a sword, a bow, a horse, denotes a corresponding instrument or auxiliary used by the persons represented by the agent using the symbolic instrument. The horses of the four first seals, for example, symbolize corresponding auxiliaries of their office employed by the persons denoted by the riders of those horses. That which is represented is thus universally in its own sphere, whatever its nature may be, the counterpart of that by which it is symbolized.

2. THE SECOND LAW. THE REPRESENTATIVE AND THAT WHICH IT REPRESENTS, WHILE THE COUNTERPART OF EACH OTHER, ARE OF DIFFERENT SPECIES, KINDS, OR RANK, IN ALL CASES, WHERE THE SYMBOL IS OF SUCH A NATURE, OR IS USED IN SUCH A RELATION, THAT IT CAN PROPERLY SYMBOLIZE SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM ITSELF. Thus the image and tree of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the beasts of Daniel's visions, the candlesticks and stars, the incense, the robes and many others of the Apocalypse, represent agents, or objects, that while a counterpart to themselves, are yet of a different species or sphere. The image denotes the rulers of the four great empires; the tree symbolizes Nebuchadnezzar as the monarch of the Babylonian empire; the candlesticks denote churches; incense the prayers of the saints; and robes their righteousness.

3. THE THIRD LAW. SYMBOLS THAT ARE OF SUCH A NATURE, STATION, OR RELATION, THAT THERE IS NOTHING OF AN ANALOGOUS KIND THAT THEY CAN REPRESENT, SYMBOLIZE AGENTS, OBJECTS, ACTS, OR EVENTS OF THEIR OWN KIND. Thus the nature, station, prerogatives, and relations of God are peculiar to him. There is no creature whom he can properly symbolize. There is no creature who can properly symbolize him. In their greatest peculiarities they present infinite diversities instead of a resemblance. When God, therefore, appears in the symbolic visions, he represents himself, not a created being. And for the same reason the Father, whose office is peculiar, represents the Father; and the Son, the Lamb, the Word, whose nature and office are peculiar, represents himself. The souls of the martyrs symbolize the souls of the martyrs; as there is no other class of agents whom they can represent. The risen dead, in like manner, symbolize the risen dead, and of the same character as their symbols, as there is no other order of agents who are to pass through a corporeal change like a resurrection; and there is no other corporeal change which a resurrection can represent.

4. THE FOURTH LAW. WHEN THE SYMBOL AND THAT WHICH IT SYMBOLIZES DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER, THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVE AND THAT WHICH IT REPRESENTS, STILL EXTENDS TO THEIR CHIEF PARTS; AND THE GENERAL ELEMENTS OR PARTS OF THE SYMBOL DENOTE CORRESPONDING PARTS IN THAT WHICH IS SYMBOLIZED.

Thus a monstrous ferocious beast of ten horns, iron teeth, and brazen claws, represents a combination of human rulers of a resembling organization headed by ten kings, and of a kindred disposition towards their subjects. A monster brute of seven heads and ten horns symbolizes a combination of human tyrants and destroyers of a resembling organization, having lines of chiefs that answer to the heads, dynasties of kings that answer to the horns, and subordinate parts that correspond to the trunk, limbs, and claws.

5. FIFTH LAW. THE NAMES OF SYMBOLS ARE THEIR LITERAL AND PROPER NAMES, NOT METAPHORICAL TITLES. If their names were not their proper names, there would be no means of knowing what the agents or objects are for which they stand. If that which is called a candlestick was not a real candlestick, there is no indication in the prophecies in which it is used what it was; and no means, therefore, of discovering that it presents any analogy to churches, which it is employed to represent.

6. SIXTH LAW. A SINGLE AGENT, IN MANY INSTANCES, SYMBOLIZES A BODY AND SUCCESSION OF AGENTS. Thus waters represent peoples and nations; a candlestick a church consisting of many individuals; a wild beast of seven heads and ten horns, the combined rulers of a nation for many generations and ages.

That these are the true laws of symbolization is shown by the fact that they are the laws of the interpretations that are given of the symbols in the prophecies themselves, and that those interpretations are so numerous and various as to present an ample certainty that they are their true and sole laws. Thus there are interpretations given of one or more of the symbols of each of the great classes, 1, the Divine; 2, created intelligences; 3 unintelligent creatures of the natural world; 4, monster creatures; 5, agents and objects of the natural world; 6, artificial objects; and the exemplifications which they present of the most important of the laws, are very numerous. The first, that the symbol and that which it symbolizes are the counterpart of each other in the order and station which they occupy in their respective spheres, agents representing agents, acts denoting acts, and effects effects, is verified by every interpretation, near a

hundred and fifty in number, that is given. The second, that the symbol and that which it denotes are of different species or kinds in all cases where the symbol is such that it can represent a different species, is verified by all the interpretations,—upwards of a hundred in number,—that are given of symbols and their acts that are used on that principle. The third, that a symbol that is of such a nature that it cannot symbolize a thing of a different species, represents itself, or one or more of its own kind, is confirmed by all the interpretations that are given of symbols of that nature.

These laws are applicable to all the symbols that are not interpreted in the prophecies themselves, and adequate to their solution; and it is owing to their having proceeded on other principles in their explications, that expositors have failed to give just interpretations of them.

V. THE QUESTIONS WHICH NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE TRUTH OF THE FOREGOING VIEWS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SYMBOLIZATION. Such being the characteristics and laws of symbolization as they have been presented in the Journal, the points which need to be investigated by inquirers in order to determine their truth, respect their office; their condition, or the marks by which the prophecies in which symbols are employed are distinguishable from those of which language is the medium; their classification; the principles on which they are employed; the revelation of their laws in the interpretations that are given of them; their obligatoriness, and the results to which they lead.

I.

THE OFFICE OF SYMBOLS.

In order to determine whether these views of the characteristics and laws of symbols are correct, the first question to be tried is, whether the symbols are the medium of the revelation made in connexion with them, in contradistinction from the language in which they are described; as, if they are not, then as the meaning of the prophecies in which they occur is not to be obtained by the explication of the symbols, but of the language, their laws are not the real laws of those

prophecies. That the symbols, however, are the medium, and the sole medium of the revelations that are made in connexion with them, though overlooked and misapprehended by many writers, no one probably will specifically deny. And that they are, is clear from the fact, first that all the interpretations given of them by the Spirit, exhibit them as the sole medium of the predictions in which they occur. Those interpretations are interpretations exclusively of *the symbols*, not of the language in which they are described. Thus it was the image and tree of Nebuchadnezzar's dreams, which Daniel explained to that monarch; not the words and propositions by which they are described. Those words and expressions were not embraced in his dreams. He saw only the image, the stone from the mountain and its descent, the demolition of the image, and the drifting away by the wind of the dust to which it was reduced; and it was that spectacle alone which the prophet interpreted as signifying the agents and events which he announced as foreshown by the dream. In like manner, they are the great beasts which are interpreted as denoting dynasties of four empires, not the names of those beasts. Their names are not mentioned in the explication that is given of them, and indeed, no name but the generic one, beast, is anywhere used in the description of the fourth; and so of all the other inspired interpretations. It is the candlesticks which Christ declares to be symbols of the churches, not the word candlestick; and the stars which he held in his right hand, not the name by which he designated them, which he pronounced to be symbols of the messengers of the churches.

Next, the supposition that the symbols are not the medium of the revelation made in the prophecies in which they occur, is equivalent to the supposition that no revelation whatever is made in them. If the symbols, for example, in the vision of the last resurrection, are not the medium of a revelation, and of the only revelation made through that vision, there is no prophecy whatever involved in it. The language in which it is described, is not prophetic. It utters no announcement of an event as future. It is occupied altogether in the description of what the prophet had seen. If the symbols, therefore, are not representative of a future real resurrection and judg-

ment of the dead, it is a mere record of a vision that had passed, at the time it was written, and has no more prophetic significance than the description of any other spectacle that has been witnessed, or the history of any other past event.

The symbols, then, are indisputably the medium, and the sole medium, of the symbolic prophecies ; and those prophecies, accordingly, are to be interpreted by the laws of symbolization, and not by the laws of philology. The laws of philology are to be used only in the interpretation of the language in which the symbols are described, and the inspired explications given of them expressed.

II.

THE MARKS BY WHICH THE SYMBOLIC PROPHECIES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE OF WHICH LANGUAGE IS THE MEDIUM.

This is a point of great moment ; as, if there are no peculiarities by which the symbolic can be distinguished from the unsymbolic prophecies, there are no means by which it can be determined which are to be interpreted by the laws of symbolization, and which by the laws of philology. And a just understanding of it is rendered of the utmost importance by the fact, that a great number of commentators have confounded the two media of prediction, and proceeded in their explications of the prophecies that are made through language on the tacit assumption that the persons, places, and acts of which they treat, are used as symbols of others of different species. The symbolic prophecies, however, are distinguished from those of which language is the instrument, by the most palpable and ample marks.

1. That the symbolic prophecies are made exclusively through their symbols in contradistinction from the language in which they are described, is alone sufficient to distinguish them infallibly from predictions of which language is the instrument ; inasmuch as not one of the symbolic prophecies is a prophecy, or presents any revelation, unless its symbols are the media of it. The language in which the symbols are

described, is not predictive. It merely announces the fact that the dreamer had the dream in which the symbols were seen, or that the prophet beheld them in vision, or naturally, and describes them and the acts they exerted, or agencies or events of which they were the subjects. If the symbols themselves, then, are not the medium of revelation, the dreams and visions in which they were seen present none whatever. Thus, if the souls under the fifth seal were not representative of souls, and the instrument of a revelation respecting them, the vision in which they were beheld was not prophetic. The record of it is a mere record of what has already taken place, and of which the prophet was the sole subject; it is no more predictive than the history of any other conception or event, which he or others have experienced or witnessed. In like manner, if the rainbow angel, his cry, and the thunder voices that followed, are not representative, and the medium of a revelation, the vision presents none whatever. Let the philologist educe one, if in his power, from the description and narration. He will find it impracticable. He knows not what it was which the angel uttered with his lion voice. He knows not what it was that was uttered by the responsive thunder voices. He has no hint in the narration what it was which the apostle proposed to write. If those symbols are not the medium of a revelation, therefore, neither the visionary spectacle, nor the description and narration of it, involve any. All revelations then, of which symbols are the media, are symbolic revelations; and none are symbolic but those of which they are the sole instrument.

2. Another peculiarity of symbolic prophecies, that amply discriminates them from those which are made through language, is, that the symbols were presented to the dreamer, or prophet, in a manner that made it certain that they were employed by the Most High as the instruments of foreshowing the future. Thus, some were seen in dreams, and they were of so singular a nature as to make a profound impression on those who beheld them, that they involved something supernatural; and those of them that were dreamed by persons who were not inspired, were interpreted by prophets. Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh, and the baker and butler, and Daniel those of Nebuchadnezzar. The principal symbols

of Ezekiel, all those of Daniel, all those of Zechariah, except two, and all those of John, were beheld in vision, and with a perfect consciousness that they were presented to them supernaturally, and were prophetic; and they describe them as such. It was in visions of God, when the heavens were opened, Ezekiel represents, that he beheld the Almighty enthroned above the cherubim; and he was carried in vision to Jerusalem, when he beheld the city and temple as symbols, and witnessed the descent of the Almighty, and annunciation that that is the place of his throne for ever. Daniel beheld the symbols of his prophecy in vision. Zechariah saw his in the night, and therefore in vision, and several of them were out of the circle of realities, and had only a visionary existence. John was in the Spirit, when he beheld his. They are all accordingly described in such a manner as to render it certain that they were presented to those who beheld them in an extraordinary way, and produced a resistless conviction that they were supernatural, and involved a representation of things that were future. And they are as easily distinguished by those marks from all other spectacles that are described, or events that are narrated, as predictions are from histories, or as the miracles wrought by Christ are from his ordinary acts. All the other symbols were naturally present to the prophets, and are shown to be employed as symbols, by the fact that the prophets were expressly directed by the Most High, to use them as such, in order to exemplify in the sight of the Israelites, the great events of which they were the representatives. Thus, Ezekiel was commanded to take those of his fourth and fifth chapters, and exert the prescribed agency with them in the presence of the people, as signs to the house of Israel; and Zechariah was in like manner directed to place the crowns on the head of the high priest, and pronounce in the presence of the appointed witnesses, the prophecy which they exemplified.

Their visible exhibition was obviously necessary, indeed, to their being the media of a revelation. It was necessary that they should be seen, that they might be distinguished as realities from mere illusory conceptions, and those who were to describe them, be properly aware of their supernatural

character, discern the peculiarity of their acts and catastrophes, and be able to delineate them with accuracy. The visible exhibition of them in a manner that gave the clearest apprehension of their forms and agency, and produced a conviction that they were presented by God as the means of a revelation, was obviously the proper mode of putting the prophets in possession of them. Probably no other would have been at all adequate, or was even possible. How, for example, could a prophet describe a seven headed and ten horned wild beast, of which he had never had a conception, treat it as a real visionary existence, and represent it as exerting a variety of actions towards human beings in peculiar conditions, unless he actually beheld it? To represent it as a mere ideal form, framed by his own imagination, would not be to exhibit it as the work of the Most High, formed and employed expressly as a prophetic representative of men who were to rise and act a resembling part towards the nations and the church. It would be to exhibit it as the product of the prophet's imaginative powers, and, therefore, as having no higher office than any other mere uninspired conception, or figment of the human mind. To make it divine and authoritative, it must be seen and felt to have come directly from God, and to be invested by him with its symbolic office.

But the subjects of the language predictions were not necessarily present to the prophets in order to their uttering their prophecies respecting them, and were not in fact, except in a few instances, the objects at the time of their perception. Isaiah did not see the Lord's house established on the height of the mountain, and all nations repairing to it, receiving revelations from the Messiah, and beating their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks, when he recorded that sublime prediction. Jeremiah and Ezekiel did not see the Israelites regathered from the distant countries in which they are dispersed, and re-established in their national land, when they uttered their prophecies of those great events. Paul did not see the man of sin usurping the prerogatives of God, enthroning himself in his temple, and at length destroyed by the breath of Christ's mouth at his coming. And though a few of the subjects of the language prophecies were present to the prophets when their predictions were uttered, such

as the buildings of the temple when Christ predicted their overthrow, yet they were not necessarily so, in order to the possibility of the predictions: as those subjects, whether places or persons, were in all instances known to those who uttered the predictions independently of their beholding them at the time, and their prophecies might, accordingly, have been uttered in any other scene, as well as in their presence. Christ, for example, might as well have predicted the capture of Jerusalem and demolition of the temple when at the Jordan, on Mount Tabor, or at the sea of Galilee, as when gazing on the city from the Mount of Olives.

The actual and necessary presence of the symbols to the prophets distinguishes the symbolic prophecies, therefore, in the most ample manner from those which are made through the medium of language.

3. The symbolic prophecies are distinguishable from the others by their language also, as well as by the media through which they are made, and the relations to the prophets of the things of which their language treats. The symbols and their actions and phenomena are universally described in the past or narrative tense, as having been already beheld by the prophet, and exerted the acts or exhibited the phenomena which they ascribe to them. The language prophecies are expressed either in the future tense, as those of Isaiah ii., or in the present, used instead of the future to indicate the certainty of the events which they foreshow, as those of Isaiah x. 28-31. Where single expressions or descriptions occur in the past tense, it is in predictions chiefly expressed in the future, and merely in order to a more vivid exhibition of the events foreshown, as Isaiah ix. 2-4, which have a reference to chap viii. 22 and ix. 1, and are shown by them, and ix. 5, to be descriptive of what was future.

4. The supposition that the persons, places, and events, which are the subjects of the language prophecies, are used as symbols, implies that the predictions respecting them of which the language is the medium, are to be literally fulfilled before those persons, places, and events, can be symbols of others, either of a different order, or of their own kind; inasmuch as symbols must have a real or visionary existence, in order to their being symbols. But for that reason, it is impossible, at

least generally, that they should have been symbols to the prophets who uttered the original language prophecies respecting them; inasmuch as they did not obtain a real existence during their prophetic mission; and a vast portion of them, such as those that relate to the restoration of the Israelites and the dispensation that is to follow, have not yet had a fulfilment. They cannot, therefore, possibly be symbols until a future period, and to a prophet or prophets at a future time. The supposition that prophecies of that class, such as those of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and others, of which language is the sole medium, are symbolic, is in the utmost degree mistaken and absurd.

5. That the language prophecies are not symbolic is seen, moreover, from the impossibility of finding any analogous agents, objects, and events, which the persons, places, and events of which they treat can symbolize. Thus the predictions, Isaiah ii. 1-4, xi. 10-16, cannot be symbolic of nations, places, and events of a different order from those mentioned; as there are no nations but Gentiles and Israelites; no places analogous to Assyria and Egypt, Pathros and Cush, Elam and Shinar, Hamath and the islands of the sea; and no event differing from the restoration of the Israelites which their return can represent: while to suppose that they represent themselves, instead of nations, places, and acts of a different kind, is to suppose that there are to be two restorations—the first, that which is foreshown by the language prediction, and another which that restoration, when accomplished, is to symbolize as still future; which is not only altogether groundless and absurd, but is shown to be false by numerous predictions that the Israelites after their restoration are never to be driven into exile again, but are to continue for ever in the peaceable possession of their land.

The symbolic prophecies are thus distinguished by the most indubitable and ample marks from those of which language is the medium; and it is a fact of the utmost importance, as it results from it on the one hand, that the symbolic prophecies, and they alone, are to be interpreted by the laws of symbolization; and on the other, that the language prophecies, and they alone, are to be interpreted by the laws of philology: and thence, that such methods of interpretation as that of

Professor Stuart, who attempts to expound symbols by the laws of philology; and such as those of Cocceius, Vitringa, and others, who often treat the language prophecies as though they were symbolic, are altogether erroneous.

III.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SYMBOLS.

There is little room for discussion in respect to the classification of the symbols. It is manifest that there can be no other classes than—1, divine, and 2, created; 3, intelligent, and 4, unintelligent; 5, living, and 6, inanimate; 7, natural, and 8, artificial; 9, real, and 10, visionary; 11, proper, and 12, monstrous;—and that there are representatives of each of those classes is easily shown: as the Ancient of days and the Lamb, of the first; seraphim, living creatures, angels, men, souls, unclean spirits, the risen dead, of the second, third, and fifth; beasts, birds, and fish, of the fourth and fifth; the sun, moon, and stars, the earth, sea, rivers, air, and winds, of the sixth, seventh, and ninth; candlesticks, swords, robes, cities, ships, of the eighth and ninth; all the symbols of Daniel's visions and the Apocalypse, of the tenth, and most of them of the eleventh; and the winged lion and leopard, and the beast of ten horns of Daniel's vision, and the seven-headed dragon and seven-headed beast of the Apocalypse, of the twelfth.

IV.

THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH SYMBOLS ARE EMPLOYED.

In order to determine whether the views we have given of this subject are correct, the first question to be decided respects the ground or medium of symbolization. What is it that connects the representative with that which it represents? Resemblance either partial or absolute, or some other element?

That it is resemblance, is manifest, in the first place, from the fact that there is nothing else that can be a medium of representation. In order to the possibility of the symboliza-

tion of one agent or thing by another, there must be some element in the symbol that fits it to be the representative of that which it symbolizes, and be the medium to the interpreter of determining at least its general nature. If there were no such general adaptation in the symbol to represent that which it symbolizes, its use, being wholly arbitrary, would be nugatory; as it would present no clue to that which it denotes. But there is nothing besides resemblance that can be such a medium, or connective of the symbol with that which it symbolizes. How can it be inferred that one individual thing represents another, or the same individual, unless there is something that is common to them, to be the means of that inference? Absolute unlikeness is obviously not only not suited to be the medium of a specific representation of one thing by another, but is a total disqualification for it. As there are thousands of things that have no resemblance, for example, to a beast, a tree, an angel, a man, if either of these were supposed to be used to represent something to which it bore no resemblance, there would be no means of determining or rendering it probable which of those innumerable things was the individual it was employed to symbolize. There must of necessity, therefore, be a general resemblance or correspondence between the representative and that which it represents, in order that the one may present a clue to the other.

In the next place, this is confirmed by the fact that all the interpretations that are given of the symbols in the prophecies exhibit a general resemblance between the representative and that which it represents. If the representative is an agent, that which it represents is also an agent. If the representative is an act, that which it symbolizes is also an act. If the one is an effect or a condition, the other is also an effect or condition; and there is, in all cases, a striking analogy between the one and the other. Thus there is a conspicuous correspondence between ferocious and monstrous wild beasts seizing and devouring inferior animals, and powerful, merciless, and bloody human conquerors, oppressors, and destroyers of their fellow men. The last are in their sphere what the others are in theirs. A candlestick supporting a candle in a position to shed its light through an apartment so as to be

most available to those who occupy it, presents an obvious and beautiful resemblance to a church sustaining a minister of the gospel in a station in which he may most efficiently fulfil his office as teacher. There is a perfect adaptation in the risen holy dead to represent the risen holy dead; inasmuch as, on the one hand, their correspondence is absolute, and on the other there are no other agents whom they can represent,—as there are no others who are to be the subjects of such an extraordinary change in the mode of their existence. All the other interpreted symbols have a similar adaptation to represent the agents, objects, and acts which they are employed to denote.

There is a like correspondence also between the uninterpreted symbols, and agents and objects in the political and religious world. Thus there is a likeness between the sun, moon, and stars, and the earth on which they exert their influences, and kings, princes, and magistrates, and their subjects on whom they exercise their power; and the obscuration, disarray, and disappearance of those orbs, and the agitation of the earth by violent convulsions, are fit representatives of political agitations and revolutions, in which governments are subverted and society thrown into confusion and anarchy. There is an impressive aptitude in a furious tempest sweeping over a fertile territory, discharging lightning, bloody rain and hail, destroying the grass, uprooting and dismantling the trees, and spreading the fields with desolation; and an army of ferocious barbarians invading a cultivated and luxurious nation, slaughtering vast crowds of all ages, pillaging those that survive, burning dwellings, villages, and cities, and reducing the population to misery. The one is in the natural, what the other is in the political and social world. There is a perfect adaptation in disembodied souls to symbolize disembodied souls, both as their correspondence is absolute, and as there are no other agents to whom, in the mode of their existence, which is their chief peculiarity, they present a resemblance.

These considerations, which might be confirmed by an analysis of the whole series of the symbols, both interpreted and uninterpreted, render it certain that the ground on which

they are employed, is a resemblance between themselves and that which they represent.

The next question respects the degree—partial or absolute—that subsists between the symbol and that which it symbolizes ; and the adequacy of the marks by which it is determinable to which class the several symbols belong. That between some the resemblance is partial, and co-exists with a diversity of nature or office, is manifest from the interpretations given of the image and tree of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the beasts of Daniel's visions, the candlesticks, stars, and robes of the Apocalypse, and many others. In these, and nearly all the others that are explained in the prophecies, the symbol is of a different nature, order, or office, from that which it denotes, and the resemblance between them is accordingly partial. There are many others also that are not interpreted, that obviously from their nature must denote agents, objects, or events that differ from themselves. Thus death on the pale horse, the monster locusts of the fifth trumpet, and the horses and riders of the sixth, cannot denote agents of their own order, inasmuch as there are none in existence. They must of necessity stand for agents of different but analogous species. There are others also in the physical world, such as a volcanic mountain projected into the sea, a wormwood star falling on the fountains and streams of a vast territory and rendering them deadly, and a stroke on the sun, moon and stars, intercepting one third of their light, that cannot represent themselves, inasmuch as such occurrences are not compatible with the laws of the natural world.

That others are employed on the ground of an absolute resemblance or identity, is manifest also from the interpretations that are given of them. Thus God is shown by his acts, and the ascriptions of the living creatures and elders, Rev. iv., to represent himself ; and it is expressly revealed, Rev. v., that Christ appeared in the vision and acted in his own person, because no created being was adequate to represent him. The risen holy dead are in like manner interpreted as representing the risen holy dead. There manifestly are others also, such as the souls under the fifth seal, the slain witnesses, and the dead of the last resurrection, that must represent themselves, or human beings of their own order and condition,

inasmuch as there are no others whom they can represent. It is clear, therefore, that while most are employed on the ground of analogy or a partial resemblance co-existing with a diversity of nature, office, or relations, there are others that appear as representatives of themselves, or others of their own natures and conditions.

Are these two classes so distinguished from each other, that it is easily determinable to which the several symbols that are not interpreted belong? This is an important question; as, if they are not, the interpretation of those which are unexplained in the prophecies themselves, must be extremely doubtful. There is, perhaps, no other point in respect to which inquirers will be so likely to hesitate. It is susceptible, however, of the most ample solution. An exact consideration of the several symbols will disclose the most decisive and abundant criteria of the class to which they belong.

Thus it is certain, from the peculiarities of their nature, station, and agency, and the reasons given Rev. v., that the Lamb appeared in the vision and opened the seals—that no creature could represent him,—that whenever Jehovah, the Father, the Son of man, the Lamb, or the Word, appear in the visions, they represent themselves, and not any created agent; and for the same reason, on the other hand, that no created agent appearing in the visions is a symbol of God or the Lamb. Next, it is manifest that those created intelligences whose nature, condition, or agency is so peculiar, that there is no other class whom they can represent, must act as symbols of themselves, or others of their own kind and condition. And such are disembodied souls, and the risen dead of the last resurrection. Such is Satan bound and confined in an abyss, that he may not deceive the nations. There is no other order of beings whom he can represent. He cannot denote the nations themselves manifestly, nor any portion of them, as he is distinguished from them, and is removed from their presence. It is inconsistent with the nature of men in the body, to suppose them to exist in an abyss through three hundred and sixty thousand years. He cannot represent any other order of beings, as there is no other that has deceived the nations, or attempted their deception. He must, therefore, denote himself and his fellow angels. Such also are human

beings in the immediate presence of God, acting in relations or modes that are peculiar to men of their class, and objects of peculiar acts of God; such as the people, nations, and languages, who are the subjects of the everlasting dominion with which the Son of man is invested; as there will be no others who can at once be his subjects, and the subjects also of the risen saints who are to reign with him. Such are the kings and captains, and mighty men, and bondmen and freemen fleeing from the presence and wrath of the Lamb under the sixth seal; as there are none but human beings whom he will come to judge and punish, and none but their classes who will at his coming be assembled in formal opposition to him. It is the kings and their armies who are to be gathered together to the battle of the great day of God Almighty. Such also are the palm-bearing multitude who have gone out of the great tribulation, having their robes whitened by the blood of the Lamb, and are led by him to the fountains of the waters of immortal life; and those also with whom God is to dwell on the descent of the New Jerusalem, who are to be freed from death, and all other penal consequences of sin; as there are none but human beings whom they can represent, no others being made partakers of such peculiar blessings, and no others of mankind being to be the subjects of those peculiar gifts, except those who are changed from mortal to immortal.

Such also, it is equally manifest, are all those human beings who are exhibited as acting, in a direct relation to the great symbols of the persecuting and apostate powers, the wild beast of ten, and the wild beast of two horns, and great Babylon; as the witnesses whom the wild beast of ten horns assails and slays; the kindreds, and tongues, and nations over whom the wild beast receives power, and those dwelling on the earth who worship it, whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb; those whom the second beast causes to worship the first beast, whom it deceives, and directs to make an image to the beast, and whom it causes to worship the image of the beast, or be killed, and to receive a mark on their right hand, or on their forehead, or debars them from buying or selling; and the nations of the earth that drank of the infuriating wine of great Babylon. All these must of necessity represent human beings of their respective classes, as there are no

others towards whom the ecclesiastical powers represented by those symbols, exercise such acts ; nor any others who suffer from them such evils, are the subjects of such impositions, or exercise towards them such peculiar acts, as are denoted by worshipping the beast and its image, making its image, receiving its mark on their forehead or their hand, and drinking the flaming wine of the woman drunk with the blood of the saints and martyrs. No higher certainty can be desired than is furnished by the nature of those symbols, the relations and acts of the nations and individuals towards them, and the acts by those symbols, of which the nations and individuals are the subjects, that they represent human persons, and nations precisely like themselves. Such also are those human beings who are exhibited as exerting peculiar acts towards the symbols of the true worshippers, and the redeemed ; as the people, and kindreds, and tongues, and nations who gaze on the dead bodies of the witnesses, and will not suffer them to be put in the sepulchre ; and they that dwell upon the earth who will rejoice over them, and make merry, and send gifts one to another, because those two prophets had tormented them. There plainly are none but human beings who can exercise such acts towards the slaughtered witnesses ; and there as plainly are no other analogous acts which that extraordinary agency towards the dead can represent. In like manner, the nations that walk in the light of the new Jerusalem, and the kings that bring their honor and glory into it, must represent nations and their kings, as none but human beings are to dwell on the earth to act in the relation to the risen saints denoted by the walking in the light of the city, and none but large organizations of human beings, or nations, have kings.

But these several classes embrace all that appear in the visions as their own representatives, or representatives of their kind. An exact analysis of the whole series of the symbols will show that God, the Lamb, their immediate attendants, as the seraphim, cherubim, living creatures, and others, Satan bound and unloosed, the dead as souls, the slain witnesses, and the risen dead, men and nations acting in an immediate relation to God, to the symbols of the anti-christian powers, or to the witnesses and the new Jerusalem, and the fowls at the great battle, are all that appear in the visions

as representatives of themselves or their kind; and it is obvious from their nature, the relations in which they act, the peculiarity of their agency, or the agency of which they are the subjects, that they must represent themselves. On the other hand, it is equally clear that all the other uninterpreted symbols may, and must, represent agents and objects of a different nature or class from themselves. It is obvious in the first place, in respect to all those that involve a deviation from nature, whether in the physical or the animal world; such as a stroke on the sun, moon, and stars, a tempest of bloody rain, and fire that devoured the grass, and one third of the trees, a mountain projected into the sea, a wormwood meteor falling on the fountains and streams of a vast region, a star having an intelligent agent as its head with a key to the bottomless abyss, an effusion of vials on the sea and rivers converting them to blood, the pouring of a vial on the sun augmenting its heat so as to scorch men, and on the throne of the beast filling its kingdom with darkness, and others. As no such catastrophes take place in the natural world, or are compatible with its laws, those symbols and the events of which they were the subjects, must of necessity represent agents and events of a different order from themselves. Such is the fact also with all the living symbols that involve a deviation from nature, such as monster brutes and insects. They cannot symbolize themselves, or their kind, as none such exist or are to exist on the earth.

In the next place, all the remaining symbols are obviously of a nature that fits them to represent agents or objects of a species that differs from themselves, and are, therefore, employed in that relation. Such are all those that are taken from the physical world. There is a striking analogy between the physical and the political world. The sun, moon, and stars are in many important respects to the earth, much what monarchs, princes, and chiefs are to the nations whom they rule; and the one may appropriately be employed to symbolize the other. A similar analogy subsists, also, between other symbols that are taken from the natural world, and the world of men, as waters, mountains, trees, grain, grapes.

Such are those, also, that are taken from the political world. There is a strong analogy in many respects between great conquerors, usurpers, and tyrants of mankind, and suc-

cessful, grasping, and tyrannical ministers of the Church. The first are, in their sphere, what the others are in theirs ; and they are accordingly employed under the seals to represent such classes who rose to power in the church. There is a similar analogy between angelic beings descending to the earth and addressing men, and men of great powers, exerting a conspicuous and important agency on large bodies of inferior fellow men. The conspicuity, dignity, and power of the Reformers, for example, were to those of ordinary men, in a measure, what a majestic angel is compared to them. Armies of good and evil angels, warring for the possession of the sky, present an analogy, also, to bodies of great and influential men contending with each other for supremacy in respect to religion. The great Christian and Pagan parties, which struggled for supremacy in the Roman empire in the third and fourth centuries, were to each other what the armies of Michael and the Devil were, battling for the dominion of the sky. There is a like analogy between the symbols taken from the world of art, and organizations and instruments in the religious world. Thus there is a likeness between a city, and a temple, and an organization of men, who have authority over others ; and between a bow, a sword, and a rod or reed, and other instruments which men use in resembling relations to produce moral and intellectual effects on each other. And finally, there is an analogy between the body and the mind, and between causes that produce effects on the body and that produce resembling effects on the mind.

But these are all the species of uninterpreted symbols that are not of the class that represent themselves, or their kind ; and they are distinguished by the most conspicuous characteristics from them.

It is clear, then, that the ground of symbolization is resemblance ; that the resemblance on which it is founded is in some cases partial, and in others absolute ; and that the peculiarities which distinguish symbols that are employed on these separate grounds, are such as to render their discrimination from each other easy and certain.

V.

ARE THE INTERPRETATIONS GIVEN BY THE HOLY SPIRIT TO BE REGARDED AS A REVELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH SYMBOLS ARE EMPLOYED; AND THE LAWS BY WHICH THEY ARE FRAMED, REVEALED LAWS BY WHICH ALL THE OTHER SYMBOLS ARE TO BE INTERPRETED?

In the first place, then, it must be supposed that they are used on some uniform principles that have their ground in their nature; as otherwise they would be altogether uninterpretable. If their use were arbitrary, as it could not be based on any uniform element in their nature, there would be nothing from which their meaning could be deduced; and consequently they could not be a medium of revelation. The fact, therefore, that they are used as an instrument of prediction, is a proof that they are employed on some settled principles that have their ground in their nature, and that are easily discoverable.

But if they are employed on any natural and uniform principles, they must of necessity be those on which these interpretations are framed. The same individual symbols cannot possibly be used on opposite principles. They must be used either on the ground of partial resemblance, or an exact likeness or identity of natures; as, if there is nothing common to them and that which they symbolize, there can be no means of determining, out of the millions that are without any similarity to them, what individuals they are, which they represent. There is no relation but resemblance, that can be made the basis of uniform representation.

One of the reasons, indeed, that those interpretations were given, doubtless was to indicate the principle on which symbols are used. Many of those which are explained are of no more importance than others that are left uninterpreted. It is noticeable that the first interpretations of moment that are given of the symbols of the great prophecies which relate to the administration of the world until Christ comes, are of the symbols of Nebuchadnezzar's dreams and Daniel's visions, and the next of Zechariah's visions, which relate to

the same great agents and events. The number of those of the Apocalypse that are explained is proportionally small. That the first great symbols are thus interpreted, and that the interpretations embrace some of every class, indicates in a very emphatic manner that they are designed to furnish the key by which all the others are to be resolved.

They are sufficient in number and variety to answer that end. They amount to about one hundred and fifty, and embrace every variety of symbols, and symbols of each of the prophecies in which they are employed as a medium of revelation. They are uniform in the principle on which they are founded, and show that the symbols of all the prophets are employed on the same principle. If there were any instance in which it could be shown that an interpretation is framed by a different law, it would prove that these are not the sole laws of symbolization. If there were a class of which no one is interpreted, it might perhaps be thought that there is no absolute demonstration that all are to be explained by these laws; but as there is not, it is apparent that they are the laws by which all are to be interpreted.

To suppose, indeed, that they are not, is in effect to suppose that the explanations God has given are deceptive, and must naturally lead to a wrong construction of the symbols which he has left uninterpreted. It is certainly natural to regard the whole of the symbols as employed on the same principle. No reason can be conceived why such an instrument of revelation should not be used as much as language is on a single principle. It would be absurd and monstrous to claim that the language of the uninterpreted prophecies is used by wholly different laws from that of the prophecies that are explained. But why is it not equally so to suppose that the symbols that are unexplained are employed on a different principle from those which God has resolved? If they are, in fact, then, used on different principles, the interpretations that are given are adapted to lead those who understand them to a false construction of the others; and consequently, the only persons who can be secure against misconceiving the unexplained predictions, are those who actually misunderstand or are ignorant of the principles on which those are employed which are explained; which is incredible in the utmost

degree, and were dishonorable to God. There is as absolute reason, therefore, for regarding these laws as revealed, and the laws universally of symbols, as there is to regard the laws of the language prophecies that are interpreted, the laws of all the other prophecies that are made through language ; and the laws of those parts of the physical world which fall under our observation, as the laws of all its other parts. It is as much the duty of the interpreter to use them exclusively, as it is of the philologist to adhere exclusively to the laws of language ; of the geometer to adhere in his processes to the principles of geometry ; and of the natural philosopher to found all his solutions of the phenomena of the physical world on the laws of matter.

VI.

THE RESULTS TO WHICH THESE LAWS LEAD IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE SYMBOLS.

They demonstrate that the constructions that have heretofore been put on many of the symbols are erroneous, and lead to their true interpretation. Thus the symbols of the four first seals have generally been construed as denoting men of their own order, instead of agents of a different profession, and have been applied to the wars of the Romans on the Jews, which preceded the date of the Revelation ; to the wars of the Romans on other nations ; and to the domestic broils and contests of that people. But the symbols of the fourth manifestly cannot represent agents and objects of their own kind ; as the horseman was a monster, and the grave cannot follow such an agent traversing an empire. He must of necessity denote agents of a different kind ; and as he had life, must represent living agents, and therefore human beings who destroy by instruments analogous to the sword, pestilence, and famine, and consign their victims to a place analogous to the grave : and such men are apostate ministers of the Christian church, who destroy those under their influence, in a religious relation, by means analogous to those by which the monster is exhibited as destroying those under his power. The other horsemen also present similar analogies to faithful, usurping,

and negligent and false teaching ministers of the church, and are to be taken as symbolizing them ; and interpreted in this manner, they have an obvious appropriate and consistent meaning, and are shown by the most ample historical evidences to have been verified by the great teachers, and tyrants, and corrupters of the church of the second, third, and fourth centuries especially, and some of them on an immense scale to the present time. The agents, acts, and events that verify this construction, transcend the power of enumeration, and constitute so vast a demonstration of its truth, as to render it unreasonable and absurd to doubt its accuracy. The import thus ascribed to these symbols is moreover in harmony with the design of the visions, which was to reveal what was to come to pass in respect to the church, and the powers that were to oppose and pervert it. The events assigned by other interpretations had scarce any reference to the church. The conquest of Judea had taken place nearly thirty years before the revelation was made, and could not therefore be foreshown by those symbols. The foreign and civil wars of the Romans of the first three centuries had no direct reference to Christians, either true or nominal. But the events foreshown by the symbols as interpreted by these laws, were of the utmost moment to the church at the time of their occurrence and afterwards, and are essential to be known in order to a just understanding of the other visions—as they were directly or indirectly the causes of all the apostasies, persecutions, and judgments that constitute the history of the church and civil empire, in the ages that follow.

They set aside, in like manner, a variety of mistaken constructions of the symbols of the first four trumpets, and lead to interpretations for which specific reasons can be given, that exhibit the events foreshown as suitable to the great ends of the Revelation, intimately connected with those that are subsequently revealed, and necessary in order to a just view of the great series of agencies and events which make up the history of the church.

They work a like change also in the explication of the symbols of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth chapters of the Apocalypse. There has been no consistent and demonstrative solution on any other prin-

ciples of interpretation of the rainbow angel, and the symbols associated with him, the measuring of the temple, the slaughter and resurrection of the witnesses, the powers denoted by the wild beast, the image, and great Babylon, nor can there be. The views, even, entertained of them by commentators that are in a large degree correct, cannot be substantiated by the rules which they usually follow in their interpretations.

They set aside, also, the false construction that has been universally placed on the sixth vial—a symbol which, on that account, it is peculiarly important should be justly understood; and show that they whom the waters of the Euphrates represent, instead of being Turks, or what is still more inconsistent with the law of symbolization, the Turkish empire, are *persons* who stand in a relation to the great Babylon of the prophecy, like that which that river sustained to the real Babylon through which it passed.

They vindicate the symbols of the first resurrection from the false interpretations that are generally placed on them, and show beyond all rational debate, that they represent a real resurrection of the holy dead at the commencement of the thousand years.

They show in like manner that Christ is to descend in person at that epoch, destroy the anti-christian powers, assume the sceptre of the earth, and reign with the risen saints, during the long series of ages symbolized by the millennium.

And, finally, they indicate the error of the expectation many entertain that the advent of Christ is at the remotest very near, and may take place at any hour; as they show that many great and extraordinary events are revealed as to precede his coming, that have not yet taken place, and that must naturally occupy a considerable period.

It may be added that the interpretations to which these laws lead are in harmony with the teachings of the other Scriptures. They exhibit God as ruling the world in the majesty of his perfections, present men in their true relations to him, and unfold the scheme of redemption in immeasurable vastness and grandeur.

The obviousness of these laws, the ample proofs of their truth, the facility with which they may be applied, and the interest and importance of the events which they unfold as at

hand, entitle them to the serious consideration of the people of God, and especially of those who fill the office of teachers and expositors, and make it their duty to employ them in the explication of his word. To neglect or reject them, and follow other principles of interpretation, is to reject the key he has given us and substitute a false one in its place, which can only violate and distort his truth.

ART. VI.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *THE PARABLES OF JESUS EXPLAINED AND ILLUSTRATED.* By Frederick Gustav Lisco, Minister of St. Gertraud Church, Berlin. Translated from the German by the Rev. P. Fairbairn, minister of Salton. Philadelphia: Daniels & Smith—New York: R. Carter & Brothers—Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1850.

THE Parables relate chiefly to Christ's kingdom in this world, and are generally prophetic of the condition in which it was to exist, the treatment it was to receive from men, and its triumph at his second coming. They display in a very striking manner the vastness and wonderfulness of his designs, the perfection of his knowledge, and the inimitable truth and delicacy of his taste; and they need, in order to a full appreciation of their significance and beauty, to be studied collectively, and with the utmost minuteness and exactness. The explanations and illustrations presented in this volume, are among the best we have seen. The author has availed himself of the aid of former writers, and especially of Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin, from whom he has quoted many fine passages. The interpretations are simple and natural, and the practical thoughts appropriate.

2. *THE PSALMS TRANSLATED AND EXPLAINED.* By J. A. Alexander, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Vol. III. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1850.

THIS work, which is completed by this volume comprising the last fifty Psalms, fully verifies, in the learning and judgment it displays, the high expectations that were entertained of it; and with the exception of

Dr. Alexander's work on Isaiah, forms the most important contribution that has been made by the teachers in our theological seminaries to the translation and exposition of the Scriptures. The parts that are least adequately treated, are the Psalms that relate to the kingdom and reign of the Messiah. We hope the author will complete the design which he indicates in the preface, and publish as a fourth volume, a critical introduction. Though less attractive perhaps to general readers, it will be of great interest and service to those who desire a minute knowledge of this part of the sacred writings.

3. ANALYSIS OF GEOGRAPHY, for the use of Schools and Academies. Sixth Revised Edition. By Sylvester Bliss. Boston: J. P. Jewett & Co. 1851.

THE object of this work is to facilitate the study of Geography partly by schedules of the great divisions of the earth, in which the several countries of which they consist and their peculiarities, such as dimensions, surface, productions, government, religion, are arranged in separate columns, like a table of statistics; but chiefly by maps on which numbers, arranged in such order that they are easily traced, are substituted for the names of rivers, lakes, mountains, cities, and other objects, and catalogues given in which those numbers are annexed to the names they represent. A tract accompanies the maps in which the topics are classified for separate lessons. The work is well adapted to its object, and will be useful as a key to common maps. Any one may in a moment ascertain by it the position on a globe, chart, or map, of any important place or object.

4. THE PLANETARY AND STELLAR WORLD: a popular exposition of the great Discoveries and Theories of Modern Astronomy. By O. M. Mitchel, A. M., Director of the Cincinnati Observatory. New York: Baker & Scribner. 1851.

THIS fine theme for the communication of novel, interesting, and ennobling knowledge, is treated very successfully by Professor Mitchel. He has skilfully avoided unnecessary technical terms, needless details, and abstruse calculations, while he has presented all the explanations that are requisite to enable the reader to understand the subjects he discusses. His first two lectures on the problems presented by the heavens, and the astronomical discoveries of the early ages, are very happily conceived. In the third, fourth, and fifth, he exhibits the theories of the ancient Chaldean and Greek astronomers, and the discoveries of Kepler,

Galileo, and Newton, by which the true system of the universe was determined. In the lectures that follow, he treats of the stability of the planetary system, the orbs lately discovered, and the cometary worlds, the vastness of the universe, and the motion of the stars. The last is the greatest and most wonderful of modern discoveries, and invests the infinite complication of worlds with which the realms of space are peopled with the highest sublimity. The conjecture of Sir W. Herschell, near seventy years ago, is believed to be verified, that our sun is changing its position in relation to the stars, by a motion round a central orb, like that of its own planets round itself; that it advances along the line of its orbit more than 30,000,000 miles a year, and that the circuit on which it moves is so immense that 1,800,000 of our years will be comprised in the period of a single revolution. Though these calculations are but approximations to the truth, of the fact itself of such a movement of the system there seem to be ample evidences. What a beautiful indication it presents of the purposed perpetuity of our world, and its associate orbs! Its movement on such a line is doubtless as adequate a ground for the inference that it is to complete and repeat the revolution, as its own movement on the line of its orbit round the sun was at the commencement of its motion, that it was to complete and repeat that revolution; and as the wheel of the lately discovered planet Neptune on its line round the sun, is that it is to finish and repeat that round through the ages that are to come, as it has though the ages that have passed since its creation. In what a sublime attitude it presents the boundless kingdom of the Almighty! Into what an immeasurable grandeur it expands the scheme he is pursuing!

5. A DISCOURSE: Delivered September 3d, 1850, before the Porter Rhetorical Society, in the Theological Seminary, at Andover. By William B. Sprague, D.D. Albany.

DR. SPRAGUE treats in this discourse of the aids which pulpit eloquence derives from models and from occasions; and the manner in which he handles it, shows that he has not only acquainted himself with a great variety of preachers, and the best specimens of pulpit eloquence, but sedulously aimed to render his own desk subservient to the true ends of the ministry. The spirit which it breathes is to be admired, also, as well as the models which it exhibits. All sectarian prejudices are waived in a generous desire to do honor to those to whom it is due, and to incite his youthful auditors to a right use of the models which he graphically portrays. He indulges in no brilliant conceits, no startling paradoxes, no glittering verbiage, nor any of the rhetorical

expedients which, at the present day, are too often adopted either to disguise a penury of thought, to divert the incautious from essential truths, or to create a momentary sensation.

He forgets himself in his subject, and speaking as he thinks and feels, with intelligence, candor, taste, and a deep sense of the high ends of the ministry, enlists the sympathies and sways the judgments of his auditors. His criticisms are discriminating and felicitous, and his suggestions judicious and important. We cordially commend the discourse to the perusal of candidates for the ministry. R. W. D.

6. THE BORDER WARFARE OF NEW YORK DURING THE REVOLUTION;
or the Annals of Tryon County. By William W. Campbell. New
York: Baker & Scribner, 1850.

THIS history of the settlement of Cherry Valley and the neighboring towns, and the tragic events of which they were the scene during the war of the revolution, first published several years since, is now re-issued, much enlarged, and is one of the most interesting to which that contest has given birth. The population of Tryon County were distinguished alike for their love of liberty, their bravery, their exertions in the cause of freedom, and their sufferings. The massacre of the inhabitants of Cherry Valley by a horde of Tories and Indians, was only exceeded in atrocity by that of Wyoming. It invests their history and misfortunes with a peculiar interest and dignity, that they were a religious people. A minister of the gospel was one of the first who settled there; a church was early formed, public worship maintained, and the population nurtured to piety under his ministry down to the period of the war. Mr. Campbell, whose grand-parents shared largely in the horrors of that day, has rendered an important service in preserving these memorials of their courage and their sufferings in so attractive a form. The narrative is confirmed by numerous letters, and documents, and biographical notices are given in the appendix, of several of those who took a conspicuous part in the military expeditions in this state during the revolution against the Indians and the British.

NOTE.—*Notices omitted for want of room will be inserted in the next number.*

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